PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL NET ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-32-3-8-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 -
--ft eftrl"f March 29, 1973
National Security Study Memorandum 178
MEMORANDUM FOR
6S-6-2-
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Program for National Net Assessment
in furtherance of his memorandum of November 5, 1971 concerning the
organization and management of the U. S. Foreign Intelligence Community,
the President has directed the initiation of a program for the prepara-
tion of a series of national net assessments.
As a first step in this process, the President has directed that a paper
be prepared which would:
d sr'ii c
-- Define the national net assessment nrnrpss; and
the range and types of topics that would be addressed.
-- Discuss methodology appropriate for use in preparing
net assessments.
-- Establish reporting and coordination procedures for the
program.
The President has directed that this paper be prepared by an ad hoc
group comprising representatives of the addressees and chaired by the
Director, Net Assessment Group, of the National Security Council staff.
The report of the Ad Hoc Group should be completed by May 15, 1973,
and forwarded for consideration by the National Security Council.
Intelligence Committee.
NSS, OSD Reviews
Completed
Henry A. Kissinger
- GDS
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W 0 6502
MEMORANDUM Outside System
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT ACTION
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL 29 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Net Assessment Memorandum
FROM: A. W. MARSHALL
The version preferred by Murphy is generally satisfactory. I do think,
however, that while it is all right to discuss in the initial stages the
range and types of topics that would.be addressed in national net
assessment, it would be inappropriate to attempt to negotiate a
definitive list of the initial national net assessments. To do so would
foreclose HAK's options. You might make this clear to Murphy as our
understanding of that provision.
I believe HAK would prefer the initial formulation of the final paragraph
asking that the report be forwarded to the NSCIC. I have restored the
original wording.
A marked up copy of the Defense draft memo, and a final version for
HAK"s signature are attached.
ATTACHMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL
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MEMORANDUM 6502
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: A. W. Marshall
SUBJECT: Initiation of Net Assessment Studies
ACTION
March 7, 1973
Getting a national net assessment process started has been stalled since
last fall. At Tab A is a chronology which describes what has happened
since last August. On October 24 you indicated in the margin of a memo-
randum from me to you (see Tab B) that you wanted to go forward with one
of the proposed options for initiating a program of net assessment studies
after the election. You were to sign a-NSSM which would form an ad hoc
group under my leadership to:
Define the national net assessment process.
-- Prescribe methodology to be followed in preparing net
assessments.
-- Establish reporting and coordination procedures for
national net assessments.
When Richardson came on board an additional option opened up that could
short-cut the definitional effort, and allow us to move directly to substantive
studies. Discussion with Richardson was suggested, aimed at getting him to
agree that moving forward on national net assessment studies was feasible
and desirable. Detailed procedural problems could be settled by direct
discussion between his staff and the NSC staff. (See my memorandum of
January 9 at Tab C and a joint memo with Phil Odeen dated January 17 at
Tab D with talking points for a breakfast meeting with Richardson.)
A few weeks ago Abramowitz; of Richardson's staff, approached me,
initially to discuss people to fill Defense jobs, and then with regard to
advice as to what to do with the several net assessment efforts that have
been started in Defense. In the course of discussing the latter issue I
reviewed with him the past history of the attempt to get a national, NSC
level net assessment effort started, Laird's opposition, etc.
SECRET - GDS
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Abramowitz is likely to have the long-range planning function on
Richardson's staff and become the focal point for directing the net
assessment effort within Defense. He reports that Richardson tends
to favor continuing the Defense net assessment effort.
My discussion with Abramowitz suggests, however, that:
-- Richardson would like to start any net assessment of a
major defense or national security problem in a limited,
experimental way.
-- They like the general issue we initially selected, i. e. ,
the comparative cost and capabilities of U. S. and Soviet
military programs.
- They would prefer to start with one of the four suggested
studies: a comparison and assessment of U.S. and Soviet military
manpower programs (see Tab E for the terms of reference we
prepared several months ago for such a study).
-- They would prefer to do it as a Defense study with the
involvement of CIA to provide intelligence inputs on Soviet
programs and the costing of Soviet efforts.
This presents a way of moving forward within the government in the
development of net assessment, but may limit the NSC role. I believe
you should discuss these matters with Richardson, either to propose
that he go forward in this way, or to insure some NSC relationship to
the study. At a minimum you should indicate:
-- NSC desire to develop an intimate and informal
involvement in the study.
-- That when the study is completed that it would be
useful to have it reviewed by the NSCIC.
The various net assessment efforts going on elsewhere badly need a
definitive lead and sense of direction. The effort serving Laird directly
never really produced anything, and the lower-level efforts produced a
SECRET
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Mixed bag of studies, some good, some bad. The new Defense team
may give the needed leadership, but the NSC should be involved and
hopefully playing the leading role. Questions as to NSC seriousness
in going forward with net assessment will arise unless we overcome the
bureaucratic obstacles that have held us up thus far. Some action 'by you__
is needed. If we cannot get at least the beginnings of a well organized
effort started in the next couple of months, I suggest that we cease NSC
efforts to produce national net assessments.
In the latter case, I propose putting all of my staff's efforts on the
problems of improving the quality of intelligence support to you and
the NSC staff. With Schlesinger taking charge as DCI we have a whole
new ball game. Substantial progress probably can be made over the
next couple of years in changing the nature of the intelligence product
coming to the White House. You will have a separate memorandum
from me in a few days that describes:
-- The changes Schlesinger is making.
My views as to the best course of action for my staff,
-- Actions I believe you should take with respect to the
NSCIC and other issues.
Option One: Issue the NSSM originally proposed on August 1, 1972
directing four substantive studies (copy at Tab F).
Option Two: Discuss the initiation of net assessment studies with
Richardson at your next meeting and secure his
agreement to proceeding with an initial study under
mutually agreeable terms, these to include some
NSC role in the study.
O tion Three: Issue the NSSM proposed in the October 13 memorandum
and designated by you for implementation "after the
election. "
O tion Four: Do some in-house studies, along the lines previously
proposed for interdepartmental working groups.
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Option Five: Abandon efforts to produce national net assessments.
Pros and Cons
Option One would get net assessment on the map, but would almost
certainly cause a confrontation with Defense, with undesirable side
effects. I believe we will get a better job in the long run by a less
direct approach.
Option Two will get us started in a small way, but keeps open options
for substantial expansion of the effort later if desired. Richardson,
as discussed above, would probably go along with this approach.
Option Three would get us started on a definitional study, to which
no one, including Defense, could have much plausible objection. How-
ever, an interdepartmental group to consider how to do net assessment
is not likely to produce much of value. This option must be looked upon
as a ploy to get the major players materially involved before directing
substantive studies.
Option Four would probably result in interesting studies, but we are
severely limited by the amount of manpower we can devote to this.
The NSC budget does not allow letting large study contracts. Prelimi-
nary efforts to get the CIA. to produce the sort of intelligence inputs we
would need show that a lot of our effort would be absorbed in badgering
them, although Schlesinger's interest in net assessment might well
change this. If we do produce our own studies, their conclusions can
be disputed by other agencies who have not participated. The one payoff
could be to provide you with some additional insights into selected problem
areas.
Option Five would allow me to concentrate my staff's efforts on improving
intelligence support. However, it would inevitably involve some loss of
NSC credibility with the bureaucracy. Also, I believe that we would miss
a significant opportunity to improve the quality of the analytical effort
focused on major defense issues over the next few years. Attached at
Tab G is a copy of a paper previously sent to you describing this in
more detail.
SECRET
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Recommendation
I recommend that you select Option Two, If you agree, I will
prepare talking points for your next meeting with Richardson,
Decision: Option #
SECRET
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 SECRET
Net Assessment Chronology
1 August 1972
1 September 1972
14 September 1972
Net Assessment Group (NAG) forwards
proposed NSSM directing a national net
assessment of the comparative efficiency
and effectiveness of the U. S. and Soviet
military establishments. NSSM is passed
to SecDef for comment prior to issuance.
SecDef comments on proposed NSSM
received. He is against doing the NSSM
in an interdepartmental group, and in the
absence of well understood net assessment
methodology.
NAG forwards SecDef comments,
recommends revised approach to national
net assessment which involves starting with
a short study to define nature and purposes.
13 October 1972 NAG revises 14 September paper to
bring it up to date.
18 October 1972
24 October 1972
9 November 1972
SECRET - GDS
NAG forwards paper on the "Status of
Net Assessment Studies" describing
current situation and NAG activities
while awaiting decision.
HAK annotates 13 October paper "I
agree with Option 2, but prefer to
implement after the election."
NAG forwardsrevised version of 13 October
NSSM in accordance with 24 October
guidance.
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28 November 1972
9 January 1973
18 January 1973
SECRET
NAG forwards revised and updated
version of 13 October NSSM for action
immediately after the scheduled NSCIC
meeting (meeting cancelled, NSSM
returned).
NAG forwards memo entitled "Status of
Net Assessment Studies" proposing direct
approach to new SecDef in order to get
started on substantive studies.
NAG provides Talking Points for meeting
with- Richardson. These suggest enlisting
Richardson's support for national net
assessment, and proceeding directly to
substantive studies as proposed on
1 August 1972.
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