TALKER FOR BREAKFAST MEETING WITH SECRETARY RICHARDSON, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-32-5-14-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 10, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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ME?ORANDUM
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CECI ?T April 10, '1973
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
.//
FROM: Jeanne W. D
SUBJECT: Talker for BrA4kfast Meeting with
Secretary Rich rdson, Wednesday,
April 11
Phil Odeen has prepared a talker at Tab I for your meeting
with Secretary Richardson covering the status of various
NSSMs and the timing of ongoing NSC -work, MBFR and
SALT.
In addition,. several other staff members have suggested-
items you may wish to discuss (Tab II).
Attachments
at-GRF,T
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MEMORANDUM
1981
ACTION
SECRET April 10, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Phil. Ode en 0
SUBJECT: Breakfast With Secretary Richardson
You are scheduled to have breakfast with Secretary Richardson on
Wednesday, April 11. These talking points cover (1) Status of NSSMs
on NATO, Naval Forces, Nuclear Policy and Asian Strategy, (2)
MBFR, and (3) SALT. Some thoughts on the timing of on-going NSC
work are also included.
NSSM 168 - NATO
The review of our ability along with that of our Allies to implement our
strategy for NATO is receiving full support from DOD although it is too
early to judge the quality of the work. A series of eight papers covering
the various aspects of the problem have been developed, reviewed by the
working group and are being revised. The four key papers (1) Estimates
of our ability to implement a conventional defense, (2) Force improve-
ments for our Allies and deployed U.S. forces (3) NATO mobilization
and reinforcement capability, and (4) Theater nuclear strategy are
undergoing major revision and the usefulness of the study will depend
on their contributions.
DOD is giving this study good support. However you could stress the
importance of developing a good understanding of the force improvement
we want our Allies to undertake, as well as ways we can enhance the
effectiveness of our forces in Europe and our ability to reinforce more
rapidly.
Discussed Did Not Discuss
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NSSM 177 - NAVAL FORCES
Secretary Richardson has proposed that the following parts of the Naval
Forces study be completed by July 1: (1) an analysis of the Soviet
Naval threat; (2) the diplomatic impact of Soviet naval deployments; and
(3) areas where we may be unilaterally involved and could face Soviet
naval forces. He proposes delaying the (1) analysis of the adequacy of
U.S. force levels; (2) evaluation of the future role of the carrier; and,
(3) alternative means of supporting naval missions which involve naval
forces until well beyond next summer. This would mean that the NSSM
could not affect the review of the FY 75-80 Defense program.
I believe the Richardson proposal is unacceptable. It delays all of the
really substantive work and in essence only completes those aspects
that are primarily the responsibility of State and CIA. You have a memo
which asks Richardson to complete an analysis of the adequacy of current
and planned U. S. forces by mid-summer. It agrees to delay the analysis
of alternative ways to support missions involving naval forces because
this very contentious area could undercut meaningful progress on the
rest of the study.
I recommend you stress the interest of the President in this study and
after discussing it with Richardson sign the memo (Tab A) to him.
Discussed Did Not Discuss
NSSM 169 - NUCLEAR POLICY
The review of U. S. nuclear policy, including the DOD work on targeting,
is proceeding somewhat slowly, but it should be ready for. review within
two or three weeks. The study group, which is chaired by Johnny Foster,
has prepared a second draft of the Summary Report. The draft still has
many shortcomings, and we expect to have an improved version out next
week to serve as a basis for the final review. The study focuses on
employment policy (targeting) and declaratory policy, in particular, how
we explain our new policy to the European Allies. State has taken the
lead on this aspect and prepared a useful paper.
SECRET
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I see no need for you to raise this with Richardson as the work is
proceeding adequately. But if it does come up, you should stress
the importance of this work and the fact that it will receive careful
attention by the DPRC and the President.
Discussed Did Not Discuss
NSSM 170 - ASIAN STRATEGY
Work on the Asian Strategy NSSM is almost complete. This study
will give the President a forum to decide our long-term post-war Asian
deployments, the broad objectives of our security assistance in Asia,
and the resultant impact on long-term. U. S. force planning. The
conventional force work is good, and the nuclear work lays broad roles
for these weapons in a useful way. But it does not give us a detailed
look at the specific ways tactical nuclear weapons would be used in
support of conventional forces.
You may want to stress to Richardson the need to improve our knowledge
of tactical nuclear weapons and actual ways they could be used to support
conventional forces.
Discussed Did Not Discuss
Finally, Richardson may bring up the Defense Planning study which
asks for analysis of strategic and general purpose force modernization
programs and their consistency with pl 1mied future force levels. Action
has been given to Systems Analysis, but I do not believe work has started.
You may want to stress the need to get the review to the DPRC before
June and the start of the budget review process (both studies are due
May 1).
MBFR
You might raise with Richardson the issues that you plan to bring up
at the NSC meeting on Thursday, with the object of getting his views
on them.
-- Linkage between force improvement and MBFR.
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SECRET 4
-- The acceptability of the three options developed by the Working
Group.
-- How these should be presented to NATO and whether we should
state a preference or not.
In particular, you might press Richardson to outline how he plans to
handle the force improvement issue with the Defense Planning Committee
later this spring. Regardless of what we say in the context of MBFR
proposals, it is important that Richardson take a strong position with
our Allies.
You might also discuss how MBFR can assist us with our Congressional
problem regarding troops in Europe. NATO has been the principal
subject that Richardson was questioned on during his Committee
appearances in support of the Defense program.
You might also mention the NATO Balance of Payments Offset Study
(NSSM 170) and ask his views on how this effort can help us with our
problem with the Congress. You should point to the potential problem
we face in determining the priority to give to Allied force improvements
as opposed to greater efforts on their part to offset our foreign exchange
policy.
Discussed Did Not Discuss
SALT
You should press Richardson to give you his views on how we should
handle MIRV issues. Does he still believe that we should ignore the
MIRV issue and concentrate on an agreement that gives us, equal numbers
and equal throw weights ? Does he appreciate the impact, politically and
psychologically, as well as the pressures for new programs, if the
Soviets develop and test a MIRV for their big missiles ? If Richardson
indicates willingness to explore the MIRY issue with the Soviets, you
should make it clear that, while we may start with an ICBM MIRV freeze,
this approach is unlikely to be negotiable. Therefore, does he agree that
some type of equal MIRV limits would be an acceptable outcome if agreed
to in the context of Soviet agreement to negotiate an equal central system
aggregate?
Did Not Discuss
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TIMING OF ONGOING NSC WORK
The last time you met with Richardson he indicated that he wished to revise
the schedules for several of the NSSMs and other work that is underway
within the NSC system. In part, this is to give him more time to focus
on the substance and in part to relate the schedules to other ongoing DOD
work. If he raises this subject, you should ask him for a specific set of
proposals which we can address in light of other priorities and issues.
But there are certain considerations that you might raise if the issue is
discussed.
-- The NATO work needs to be completed within the next month so
that the results will be available as part of our MBFR approach as well
as being available for the Ministerial meetings which will take place in
early June. -
-- The nuclear policy work is time urgent in the sense that we need
to understand our nuclear policy as a basis for. SALT decisions.
-- The naval forces study as well as the work on general purpose
and strategic forces that was requested for DRPC review, should be
completed in time so that it can be considered when the DPRC addresses
the five-year DOD program this summer.
Discussed Did Not Discuss
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: NSSM 177 - Military Missions involvino aval Forces
As you may know, the President first asked for a deta,ed analysis of
the implications of the Soviet naval threat in February 1971. At that
time Defense promised that work would be startedr'immediately and that
these issues would be examined in a report submitted for Presidential
review. This work was never completed. I a therefore, concerned
to learn that you now believe it will be possiJ'le to complete only a limited
portion of the naval forces study by this suzihmer.
The careful evaluation of the military a/nd diplomatic significance of
Sovi.?t naval threat which you believeAan be completed by July will be
a major contribution towards understanding the appropriate U. S. military
and diplomatic response. Howev , even this will be incomplete unless
the analysis also evaluates the 94equacy of the current and planned U. S.
forces against the projeiet threat. In addition, I believe it is
imperative that we impunderstanding of the future role of the
nalysis, we will have an inadequate basis
aircraft carrier. With:/,,l
for conducting a thorouof the capability of planned U. S. forces
to support our future st
I, therefore, believe t essential that we at least have an analysis of the
adequacy of curren and planned U. S. forces by mid-summer for
consideration by t e time the DPRC reviews the FY 75-80 IJefense program.
In order to acco plish this, the detailed ana yses of alternative ways to
support our nat'on-al objectives called for in paragraph three of the NSSM
could probabl be postponed beyond the July 1 due date and completed by
late summer or early fall.
Henry A. Kissinger
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