THE STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 20, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
--MEMORANDUM-
4P 2214
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION
SECRET /SENSITIVE April 20, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
MORI/CDF
C05138348
RICHARD T. KENNEDY P'',L -
JOHN H. HOLDRIDG ~,r} I J
The Status of Military Forces in Laos
CIA has reviewed the current status of Communist and friendly military
forces in Laos (Tab A). The paper concludes that:
-- The RLG would probably be unable to cope with major
sustained Communist military activity in either Northern
or Southern Laos in the near future without massive
outside assistance.
-- Over the last 18 months the Communists have developed
clear fire power advantage, which in the past has been
offset by U. S. airpower.
Both sides are now in strong logistical positions, but if heavy
fighting resumes, the RLG will have problems getting supplies
to the front without our support for. air delivery.
Recent fighting has demonstrated the Communists hold the upper
hand--and almost certainly intend.to retain permanent control--
in areas of Communist tactical interest in Laos: The PDT';- from
where they are trying to open Route 4 to the South; Muang Phalane
in Central Savannakhet Province; the Bolovens Plateau in the
lower third of the Panhandle; and Laotian Panhandle where there
is the large NVA rear services organization.
A comparison of manpower, firepower, airpower, and logistical balances
of both sides indicates:
Manpower: The overall manpower balance favors the Communists in
numbers and quality of troops; however, the RLG has somewhat more
combat ground troops.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
DECLAS: 12-31-81
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
W
SECRET /SENSITIVE
There are in all Laos an estimated 117, 000 enemy troops,
of which about 39, 000 are NVA who have borne the brunt
of the fighting; 19, 000 Pathet Lao who for the most part hold
ground taken by the NVA; and "Dissident Neutralists" (DN),
having little military usefulness but used so the Communists
can claim "true neutral" support. In both North and. South
Laos, NVA strength has been augmented in the last year.
Friendly forces number 95, 000 and consist of FAR/FAN
(50, 000), guerrilla forces (26, 000), RLAF (2, 000)j
Friendly forces have never been a match for combined NVA/PL
forces. Inferior firepower, poor leadership, low pay, and
inadequate training are mostly responsible for FAR/FAN's
poor showing. The Meo effectiveness has declined from heavy
fighting and 1oss.es.
Firepower: The Communist firepower is greatly superior(in terms of
numbers of heavy pieces, range and rate of fire) to that of friendly forces,
but has traditionally been offset by U. S. /RAF airpower.
In North Laos--mostly in MR II--the enemy possesses 30-40
tanks; at least 75 heavy field weapons including 85 mm and 130 mm
guns, 105 mm and 122 mm howitzers, 122 mm rocket launchers,
120 mm mortars; also an estimated 150 antiaircraft guns of 57 mm,
85 mm, and 100 mm calibre.
-- In Southern Laos- -MR III and IV- -the enemy has a combined total
of 20-25 tanks; 40-50 heavy weapons; 8 AAA regiments of 600 guns;
and a large number of SA-7 missiles in the Panhandle.
The FAR have fifty-five 105 mm and thirty 155 mm howitzers
throughout Laos, which are inferior (range, accuracy, and rate
of fire) to Communist long-range artillery.
Air: Allied air power has played a key role in Laos and if heavy fighting is
resumed, the RLAF aircraft are no match for enemy antiaircraft capability
without U. S. air support.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
1P a
SECRET /SENSITIVE
Traditionally, the U. S. has flown about.two-thirds of all sorties--
mostly in Southern Laos against logistical targets along the Trail
but also tactical missions in support of friendly troops.
The RLAF can fly about 4, 000-5, 000 attack sorties per month with
its 168 assorted aircraft. Except for 10 AC-47 gunships, seventy-
two T-28 aircraft are the only combat aircraft possessed by the
RLAF.
-- NVN has never flown strikes in support of PL/NVA ground forces,
but has the capability (,8 IL-28 bombers and about 200 MIGs) to do
so, especially if unchallenged by U. S. aircraft.
Logistics: At present neither side is short of supplies, but the RLG may
have difficulty in moving supplies to the fighting units if heavy fighting resumes..
-- The Communists have large stores of all types inside Laos and
adequate reserves in NVN.
-- Logistical position in Southern Laos--with its redundant road
network--is as potentially strong as anywhere in Indochins..
Supplies come from both North Vietnam and Cambodia (food-
stuffs, largely rice). Stockpiles in Southern Laos and in the
North Vietnamese Panhandle can probably sustain the esti-
mated 5 to 10 tons of present daily military needs.
Supplies from North Vietnam must reach the PDT, Samneua,
and Luang Prabang regions via three distinct corridors, but
each has proved capable of meeting yearly requirements.
-- There are sufficient ammunition and weapons in Laos to maintain
the RLG for an indefinite period under current ceasefire conditions--
for about a month25X1
if heavy military activity resumes. Planning has begun to ensure
availability of supplies and equipment during F? 1974. The
problem will be in moving supplies forward without U. S. air support.
Comment: This is a pessimistic report, but is a fair and balanced one.
Friendly forces--without U. S..air support--will not be able to match the
better led and equipped Communist forces should serious fighting resume.
In a continued ceasefire situation, the forces are roughly equal and will
probably balance each other.
Attachment
Tab A
SECRET /SENSITIVE
--" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Sensitive
Intelligence Memorandum
The Current Status of Military.Forces in Laos
Handle via Comint Channels
Secret .
SC-06972/73
April 1973
Copy No. 3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/15: LOC-HAK-33-1-19-3