REQUEST FOR CIA/DIA STUDY ON EFFECT OF KHMER INSURGENT VICTORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-33-6-8-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 9, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-33-6-8-0
4P 19
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NATIONAL SECURITY. COUNCIL
6/SENSITIVE URGENT ACTION
May 9, 1973 , W ~
I
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOW CROFT
O
X R
MV1: WILLIAM .LJ? al L,L"~.1L1V. i1V ~~
SUBJECT: .. Request for CIA/DIA Study on Effect
of Khmer Insurgent Victory
A key element in our rationale for continued heavy U. S. air operations
in Cambodia is the argument that an insurgent/North Vietnamese victory
might pose unacceptable security and psychological risks to the GVN
and could upset the Vietnam Agreement. Defense Secretary Richardson
for example made this argument in Congressional testimony on May 8.
A number of Congressional leaders reportedly dispute this contention.
Using administration arguments on the current strength of ARVN, they
claim that the GVN could withstand this threat and should be aide to
continue to live within the Agreement. We urgently need more infor-
mation on the probable impact on South Vietnam of a Communist victory
in Cambodia. We will need this material before the Senate votes on
Cambodia assistance early next week.
Therefore, I strongly recommend that you authorize me to ask CIA
andDIA jointly to produce a study on the cronsequences of and likely GVN
reaction to an insurgent victory in Cambodia. Aspuming that Hanoi
would exercise predominant influence over a successor government
(with or without Sihanouk), the paper should focus on the following
questions:
-- How would the enemy' s position in South Vietnam be strengthened
logistically, politically and tactically by an insurgent victory?
-- Based partly on the pre-1970 experience, to what extent would
the reopening of Kompong Sorn port ease enemy supply problems, and
speed up its military timetable in Vietnam?
NSS, DIA,
OSD reviews
completed.
SECRET- SENSITIVE XGDS BY Auth Stearman 1981
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-33-6-8-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-33-6-8-0
SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
-- What would be the CVN's likely response to an insurgent
victory -- politically, diplomatically, and tactically? Subjectively,
would it feel so threatened that, for example, it, would intervene
heavily in Cambodia or would balk at further progress towards a
political settlement?
-- Objectively, do we think that the GVN could live with a
Hanoi-dominated government in Phnom Penh and withstand the pre-
sumably increased threat to its security?
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize me to ask CIA and DIA to prepare the study
described above.
Approve Disapprove
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/07: LOC-HAK-33-6-8-0