CIA REPORT ON IMPACT OF "EAGLETON AMENDMENT" IN INDOCHINA(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-35-5-7-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
ION-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
3624
INFORMATION
? June 29, 1973
Na_bas seen
MR. KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. STEARMA.N
CIA Report on Impact of "Eagleton Amendment"
MORI/CDF per
C05141336
in Indochina 25X1
Cambodia
Here the crucial question is whether or not logistical support to the FANK
could be continued under the terms of the Amendment. Ii such support can
be continued, the impact of the Amendment would be as follows:
-- The physical?impact on FANK would be serious, but not necessarily
fatal.
-- If it does not fall prey to defeatism; FANK should have the capa-
bility of protecting Phnom Penh and keeping Routes 4 and 5 and the Mekong
open; however, the additional forces needed for these missions might re-
quire the effe-ctive surrendering of such beleaguered cities as Svay Rieng,
Prey Veng, Takeo, Kampot and Kompong Thom.
-- Panic, disorder, anarchy or a wave of anti-Americanism in
Phnom Penh, though possible, are not probable in the near term. Trouble
would come from small enemy raids or rocket attacks..
? There is not likely to be a disastrous disintegration of FANK,
although its morale would suffer from a lack of U.S. combat air support.
-- A political crisis could develop leading to In Tam's resignation
and to a Sink Matak government.
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-- Communist negotiating demands would probably not change.
They would regard the bombing halt as a major victory and would
intensify military and propaganda efforts against the GKR. They would
soften up Phnom Penh by infiltrationg cadre and sapper teams and by
cutting off its communications. Should they estimate that it would take too
long to effect Phnom Penhis collapse, they might concentrate on taking
isolated GKR?cities (e. g., Takeo and Kampot) thus placing their side in
a strong position to dictate the terms of a coalition government to a
supine GKR.
If, however, the Eagleton Amendment were to be interpreted as pro-
hibiting logistical support for FANK, the results would be:
-- A rapid disintegration of FANK, probably within ten days.
-- A psychological and political impact on the nation as a whole
"nothing short of disastrous" and food riots in Phnom Penh and other
urban centers resulting from an implied cessation of rice deliveries.
Laos
-- The military situation will not be significantly affected.
-- An absolute proscription of U.S. bombing in Laos would undoubtedly
encourage Pathet Lao intransigence in the talks and may increase the RIAG1
willingness to compromise on fundamental political and military issues.
South Vietnam
-- The Amendment will encourage the Communists and strengthen their
belief that we have given them a free hand in Southeast Asia.
-- By the same token, this will contribute to weakening the GVN.
-- There is not likely to be any immediate change in Communist
tactics and policies in South Vietnam; however, it will be easier for
them to consolidate their position in the country (through increased
freedom of action in Cambodia) and the onset of new pressures against
the GVN will probably be hastened.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEPY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
28 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Impact Of The "Eagleton Amendment"
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As Seen By CIA
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1. Immediately after the U.S. House of Representatives passed
the FY 1973 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, including the so-
called "Eagleton Amendment," we requested
views on the implications of this Congressional
action. It is believed that their answers, though written before
President Nixon's veto of the bill, will still be of interest to you,
since the issue of funding to support combat activities in Cambodia
(and Laos) clearly remains with us.
CAMBODIA
a. What will be the physical impact on FANK
capabilities if U.S. air operations in fact cease
within the next few days?
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b. What will be the psychological and
political impact on the Cambodian government,
army .and populace if the Cambodians themselves
assume or believe that U.S. air operations will
so cease?
c. What will be the impact on the negotiating
demands, posture and tactics of the Khmer
Communists?
25X1 d. Would the ending of U.S. combat support
activities materially increase the near-term risk
of disorder or anarchy in Phnoin Penh?
The.. The kcy wordr, in the BaglPto.ri Amendment
are those which state that no funds may be
expended to support directly or indirectly combat
activities in, over, or from off the shores of
Cambodia, or in, or over, Laos by United States
forces (underlining added). ? It would appear
that the amendment clearly prohibits bombing and
other combat activities over Cambodian territory.
The inference also is that logistical support
aimed at maintaining FANK combat capabilities. --
arms, ammunition, etc. ? provided to the
FANK by the U.S. may also be interpreted as
being affected. Depending on whether this
interpretation is correct, we are dealing with
two contingencies the implementation of which
will have different implications. We will deal
with each of these separately below.
"b. Positing the fact that combat air operations
would cease but that logistical support to FANK
would continue:
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"(l) The physical impact on FANK
capabilities would be serious but not
necessarily fatal. U.S. combat air
support has played a major role in
whatever limited successes FANK
has been able to achieve in the recent
reopenings of Routes 4 and 5,* and
even more importantly, in keeping
the Mekong river corridor open to
ship convoys. U.S. tactical air
has, without a doubt, hurt the enemy,'
prevented him from concentrating his
forces, and has inflicted (or threatened
to inflict) substantial personnel and
material losses to his field units.
The presence of U.S. air has been a
major factor in persuading ship
masters to continue their willingness
to venture up the Mekong. Without
such support, FANK would find it
difficult to keep the banks of the
Mekong free of enemy units with a
consequent increased harassment
of river convoys. Enclaves ,.such
as Takeo, where enemy pressure
has been constant and U .S. air
combat support has been the
balancing factor might well be
lost to the enemy. FANK will find
itself hard pressed to prevent the
sporadic interdictions of Routes
4 and 5 and in equal difficulty in
reopening the LOCs after they
have been cut. In order to do so,
it will be forced to concentrate its
forces along these avenues perhaps
at the expense of maintaining units ?
now scattered in such places as
*Route 5 has been closed again since this was written.
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Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Takeo,
Kampot and Kompong Thom, thus
effectively surrendering these cities
to the enemy.
? "(2) However, if a defeatist
psychology can be prevented, the
FANK even with the cessation of
bombing should have the physical
capability of performing the missions
of defending Phnom Penh, keeping
Routes 4 and 5 open, and, with
Cambodian navy assistance and the
total commitment of the KAF (Cambodian
Air Force), ruining convoys up the
Mekong.
"(3) The psychological and
political impact on the bureaucracy,
the military and the populace at
large is difficult to gauge. The
realization.that U.S. bombing was
ending would undoubtedly be a
severe shock to the Khmer who have
not really been willing to focus on such
a possibility, and have been assuming
all along that the U.S. President will
find a way out of his dilemma. There
are some indications that hoarding
of rice may have begun, that
scattered individuals may be
converting their money into hard
currency, and that a few military
personalities may be pulling up
stakes and preparing to leave the
country. These hints, although
disquieting, are as yet far from
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taking on the proportions of a panic
or a massive exodus. A bombing
halt would most likely not accelerate
such preparations if the announcement
Of the bombing cessation could be
accompanied by strong and believable
assurances by both U.S. and GKR
sources that military and other aid
to the GKR would be continued, that
food supplies would be guaranteed,
and that a bombing cessation did not
presage the total abandonment by
the U.S. of the GKR to its fate.?
SANK morale would undoubtedly
suffer, especially among units
accustomed to receive significant
air support and there would
undoubtedly continue to be
cases of indiscipline among
individual units. There is not
likely to be, however, an immediate
and disastrous disintegration of
FANK. The Cambodian reaction
would be one of acute disappointment
but.not despair. On the political front,
agitatiori on the part of the military
and of In Tam's political enemies
(largely kept in check in recent
weeks by U.S. Embassy efforts), for
the removal of In Tam could be
expected to resume. A political
crisis could develop leading, in perhaps
short order, to In Tarn's resignation.
The results of such a dissolution
are not now predictable but such a
development might lead, for better
or for worse, to a S).rik Matak .
government. Whether such a new
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administration could cope more
effectively with Cambodia's problems
is a moot point.
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"(4) In the event that bombing
ceased, Ithmer Communist (KC)
negotiating demands probably would
not change. The KC would continue
to call for the removal of the Lou Nal
'clique' and to refuse to negotiate with
representatives of the current government.
They would consider the cessation of
the bombing as a major tactical and
psychological victory for their
cause and would undoubtedly
intensify military pressure and prop-
aganda efforts against the GKR.
Although they probably would not
wish to attempt to take Phnom Penh
City immediately, the infiltration
of cadre-men into the city would
continue and probably intenb ify d
small unit/sapper attacks against
selected individual objectives within
the city and on its periphery could
be expected. The aim of the KC
would be to create chaos and Confusion
within the city, as well as cut off its -
communications, in the hope that the
GKR would suffer an internal
collapse, thus opening the door to
a KC takeover with a minimum of risk.
Should the KC estimate that such a
collapse would prove to be a
lengthy process, they might opt to
concentrate units against isolated
GKR redoubts in such urban localities
as Takeo, Kampot, etc., and attempt
to overrun them piecemeal. In the
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SICIEVENSTAVE
absence of U.S. air support, the KC
would probably estimate themselves
capable of taking most, if not all,
GKR-controlled enclaves removed from
Routes 4 and 5 and thus find themselves
in a very strong bargaining position
permitting them to dictate the terms of
a coalition government to a supine GKR..
"(5) Disorder or anarchy in Phnom
Penh, although always a possibility,
would probably not be an immediate near
term result of a bombing halt. What
trouble could arise would come from
enemy action against the c-apital in the
form of small unit raids or rocket
attacks. These would not be likely to
touch off popular uprisings but might
conceivably be directed against U.S.
installations anri/nr rser9onriPl. IA74.
do not envisage any manifestations
of pronounced anti-Americanism on
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bombing halt.
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stated that
he would have added the following
comment at this point
If a rice
shortage should develop in Phnom
Penh, disorder would be a likely
result. added
that if lines of communications were
completely disrupted, an airlift of
the needed 550 tons of rice per day
could not meet the city's demands,
because facilities at Pochentong
airfield would not be-able to handle
th.e n.eeded volume of air traffic.)
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"c. We would be in a different ball game if the
Eagleton Amendment were to be interpreted as
prohibiting such indirect support to combat
activities as the resupply of FANK with
ammunition, arms and other war-making
accoutrements. In such a situation, FANK
would disintegrate in the very near term. Ten
days would not be too short a time frame. The
psychological and political impact on the
nation as a whole would be nothing short of
disastrous and the implied cessation of rice
deliveries to Phnom Penh and other urban
centers would create conditions under which
food riots could be safely predicted."
LAOS
Iia. U.S. aircraft have bombed within Laos
on only two occasions since the 22 February 1973
cease-fire. Since there are no U.S. bombing
operations? currently underway. in Laos, a
Congressional cutoff would have no military
impact except as the threat of U.S. bombing
presumably serves as a deterrent to major
enemy cease-fire violations
"b. The fact that U.S. strategic and
tactical fighter bombers are available to the
RLG, if formally requested by the Prime
Minister and approved by Washington, is
well-known The loss
Of that latent capability would almost certainly
have a deleterious psychological and political
impact on the RLG. This would in turn
influence the continued determination of the
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RLG and the Lao military to negotiate a
reasonably equitable agreement with the
NLHS, perhaps by increasing the RLG's
willingness to compromise on fundamental
political and military issues.
"c. NLHS/RLG negotiations are currently
at an impasse. The NLHS approach to the
negotiations has been hard and uncompromising.
The Lao Communists have arrogantly insisted
that their draft protocols contain the only
correct line and that any negotiations must be
based on these drafts alone. Because of NLHS
intransigence, the dialogue has been suspended
for the past four days. The last negotiating
session between the plenipotentiaries was
held on 22 June.
The present
impasse is based thus far on irreconcilable
positions on the military protocol, positions
which transcend the issue of Pathet Lao
presence in the administrative and royal
capitals as such. An absolute proscription
of U.S. bombing in Laos would undoubtedly
embolden the NLHS negotiators while at the
same tixne weakening RIZ resolve.
"d. This development would not
materially increase the near-term risk of
disorder in Vientiane, We continue to .
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believe that the cease-fire will, by and
large, hold in Laos and therefore do not
believe that the military situation would be
significantly affected by U.S. bombing
prohibition in Laos."
SOUTH VIETNAM
a. In general one can say that the U.S.
Congressional action dismays our friends and
encourages our enemies This is not to say that
South Vietnamese morale will collapse as a
result of this specific action, which is just
one of a series of American moves cutting
unilaterally previous commitments. The
overall effect i a_ cumulative weakening of the
GVN and an 'overall reduction in American
leverage.
"b. The Viet Cong and the North
Vietnamese will undoubtedly celebrate the
Eagleton Amendment as a major victory, which
of cdurse it is for them. It will confirm the
Communists in the belief that they can safely
proceed with their designs against non-
Communist governments of Southeast Asia
without fear of American intervention or
retaliation.
"c. While we Americans understand the present
American constitutional problems, including the
dispute over warmaking powers, the continuing
wrestling match between the Executive and
the Congress over foreign policy, and the
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related purse string issues and the impact of
Watergate as a tilting factor, these niceties will
certainly not be understood or analyzed by
public opinion in Indochina. The implementation
of the Eagleton Amendment would be viewed
as a blow against the non-Communist side and
as a real help to the Communists, even though
this may not have been the intent of Congressmen
voting for the measure.
"d. It is unlikely that the Congressional
action would cause any immediate change in VC/
NVA tactics and policies in South Vietnam, which
have evolved from local military realities.
Whatever happens in Cambodia:, the VC/NVA
would still need to build up their political and
military strength for any next round. However,
it is certain that the increased Communist freedom
of action in Cambodia which would result would
IllitItC.0 the jub uf against South
Vietnam considerably easier and probably would
hasten the onset of new pressures against the
GVN."
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