KHMER INSURGENT LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: July 10, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

111)A A/
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
URGENT INFORMATION
July 10, 1973
MR. KISSINGER
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
SUBJECT: Khmer Insurgent Leadership
The CIA has submitted a paper (Tab A) on Khmer insurgent leadership
which maintains that hard-core Khmer Communists --"probably"
responsive to Hanoi -- clearly direct the insurgency and represent the
most important of three district insurgent groups. Sihanouk reportedly
would have difficulty in working with them in a coalition and such an
arrangement would involve some "steady jockeying for political advantage."
According to the CIA report:
-- The insurgency clearly is directed by hard-core Khmer
Communists; its principal leaders are the three "ghost" ministers
(Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim) who "probably are more
politically oriented towards Hanoi" and who are "indeed still alive.
Ieng Sary, Sihanouk' s shadow for the Khmer Communists, is another
key figure and is being groomed for future political stardom.
-- The insurgent movement includes three broad elements.
The most important consists of hard-core Khmer Communists who
"probably" have closer ties to Hanoi than Peking. The other groups
(the pre-1970 Khmer Rouge and the pre-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdoh) have
"far less political clout" and "are more leftist than the Communists."
-- The insurgent's political differences have had no discernible
impact on military capabilities. All three groups work togdher and
have endorsed the Communists' plan to make Sihanouk a key figure in any
subsequent negotiations.
-- Despite surface harmony, Sihanouk's relations with the Khmer
Communists are more uneasy than not. The Communists remain
unenthusiastic and wary of Sihanouk. Meanwhile, the Prince has
SECRET/ SENSITIVE XGDS By Auth CIA
5B(2) & (3)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
acknowledged difficulties between Communists and non-Communist
elements : of his Front. In a recent interview. in Peking, he reportedly
said that "I hope that they will all be able to intregrate after the war
because -- if this could not be so -- We tomorrow would be very
difficult.
Comment
We agree that the insurgents are dominated by the Communist element
and that Sihanouk might feel uneasy in any coalition. However, we would
differ with the attached report in that we are more confident the Khmer
Communists are responsive to Hanoi and that they represent the only
significant insurgent element. We have seen little or no evidence to
support the thesis that there is more than.one meaningful insurgent
group, 4. e., Hanoi's), and we do not believe that, despite his own
instincts, Sihanouk would be able to provide any meaningful check on
the Khmer Communists.
SECRET / $ENSIT NE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
Dg4t-u
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.G. 20505
9 July 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : The Khmer Insurgent Leadership
Attached, for your information, is a note on the Khmer
Insurgent leaders and factions within the insurgent movement.
We thought this memorandum might be helpful to those partici-
pating in the 10 July WSAG meeting and, hence (as indicated
below), are circulating it to the WSAG members and their
principals.
Ge ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Copies to:
Secretary Rogers, w/att. #15
Under Secretary Porter, w/att. #16
Acting Assistant Secretary Godley, w/att. #17
Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan, w/att. #18
Secretary Schlesinger, w/att. #19
Deputy Secretary Clements, w/att. #20
Admiral Moorer, w/att. #21
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
 25X1
` No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
opy
6 July 1973
SUBJECT: Some Comments on Khmer Insurgent Leaders
and r av t..e,v%ts
There is a dearth of reliable information
available on the identities of the key individuals
who actually are responsible for leading the Khmer
insurgency. The insurgency clearly is directed-by
hardcore members of the Khmer Communist Party. Al-
though there is also a paucity of information on the
party, its in-country leadership appears to rest in
the hands of three of the key "ministers" in Sihanouk's
Peking-based "government." The three apparently have
been in Cambodia guiding the insurgency since the
early days of the war.
The triumvirate in question consists of "defense
minister" Khieu Samphan---who evidently is the most .
important, "interior minister" Hou Yuon, and "infor-
mation minister" Hu Nim. All are young, French-
trained intellectuals who were among the leaders
of the leftist or pro-Communist political faction
in Phnom Penh'during most of the 1960s.' They dropped
out of sight in 1967 amid widely circulated rumors
that Sihanouk had had them killed in secret. These
rumors now appear groundless. During Sihanouk's
trip to Cambodia this past March, he met with them
and films and photographs taken of them on that
occasion indicate that the "three ghosts" are indeed
still alive. There is no evidence that any of them 25X1
have been in Hanoi or Peking since the war began.* V
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
 bzu.v
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
They probably are more politically oriented toward the /
North Vietnamese, who first surfaced them as the intended
leaders of the Cambodian "resistance" on 10 April 1970.
On that date, Radio Hanoi issued a statement attributed
to the three in which they. gave their support to Siha-
nouk's "Five-Point Program" of- 23 March 1970. Some
information exists on several insurgent leaders operat-
ing on the regional level in Cambodia, but they appear
to be of secondary importance politically.
Khmer Communist interests in Peking--and perhaps
Hanoi--most likely are represented by leng Sary. He
bears the title of "special envoy of the interior,"
and arrived in Peking from Hanoi in the summer of
1971. Like Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Tim, he
first came under Communist influence during his stu-
dent days in France. leng Sary, too, drew Sihanouk's
fire for his leftist activities and, in 1963, went
into a long period of hiding that ended only with his
emergence in Peking. He has stayed close by Sihanouk's
side ever since, accompanying the Prince on all his
travels abroad--including the trip to Cambodia in
March. The attention that leng Sary has received both
from the Chinese and the North Vietnamese suggests
that he is being groomed for future political star-
dom in Cambodia.
Within the Khmer insurgent movement, there are
three broad groupings--whose resp. ue Si 7 s_ rannd,~-+ J
be determined. The most important group, however,
is the one consisting arc core er omnunists.
Most of them have been trained in North Vietnam,
and increasing numbers -of these cadre have been re-
turning to Cambodia in the past two years to assume
positions of responsibility in the insurgent.inf ra-
structure and in insurgent military units.. Because
of their longer-standing direct relations with the y/
North Vietnamese, these Khmer Communists probably have
closer ties to Hanoi than to Peking. some o em,
however, almost certainly desire to maintain their
independence from foreign ommunist. control.
The second group, the Khmer Rouge, consists of
insurgents whose opposition to-Sihanouk precedes his
ouster in 1970. The third group, the Khmer Rumdoh
(the equivalent of "Khmer Liberators") is composed
of pro-Sihanouk elements. These last two groups
SECRET
:''' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
are more leftist than: Communist, and undoubtedly have
far less olitical cldut than the Khmer Communists.
There is no reliable evidence of the existence of a
separate "P,ioscow-oriented" group among the insurgents.
The likelihood of such a faction of any significant
size seems remote, in view of the Soviets' refusal
to break diplomatic ties with Phnom Penh.
The political differences existing within the
insurgency have had no discernible impact on insurw-
-
^^~' ^" i' ary capabilities all $-11rPt~ C-r-MI n ,c_:
4 A&4 .....--~i. tinue to work together in common opposition tothe
P m jPex~.h_~g ovornnent. More importantly, however,
they also appear to accept----with varying degrees of
enthusiasm---the Communist strategy for negotiations
that has flowed from Sihanouk's trip to Cambodia. The
central purposes behind that undertaking seem to have
been to enhance the "legitimacy" of Sihanouk and his
"government" and to give Sihanouk and insurgent
leaders the chance to reconcile any serious differences
they had. Upon his return to Hanoi from Cambodia,
Sihanouk claimed that both these goals had been
obtained. With regard to his political relations
with insurgent leaders, he emphasized that as a
result of his discussions with them they fully sup-
ported him as "their chief of state and commander-
in-chief." This endorsement, when added to those
Sihanouk had already been given by Peking- anted--Hanoi,
rounded out the Communists' plan to make S.i .anouk
the key figure on their side in any subsequent
negotiations for ,a cease-fire and a political settle-
ment in Cambodia.
Although the timing and ultimate outcome of such
a settlement cannot now be predicted, it is possible
to speculate about the relations that might exist
between Sihanouk as at least a titular chief of state
and insurgent_ ea ers occupy~.n ey positions in a
Communist-domina.ed government in Phnom Penh. At
present, their relation s on the sur ace still appear
to be cordial and cooperative. Late last month, for
example, Sihanouk in a press interview in Romania
stated that the insurgents had told him that he would
be chief of state until the end of his life. He also
quoted leng Sary as saying that he, Sihanouk, was
"the cement, the guarantee of the union of the Cam-
bodians." In the same interview, Sihanouk made a
SECRE'
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1
I I
deferential bow of his?. own toward the insurgents when
he indicated that it was up to them to decide whether
or not he should engage in any direct negotiations
with the US.
From the foregoing it is apparent that any gov-
ernment involving Sihanouk and the Khmer Communists
is likely to involve some steady jockeying for politi-
Gal_ advan Ea__ge_.., There is no doubt that Sihanouk and
his fellow non-Communist, nationalist supporters in
Peking recognize that it will be.hard to work together
harmoniously in any future coalition government in
Phnom Penh. He was his usual candid self on this
point during a press interview he gave this week when
he returned to Peking from his two-month visit to
various African and East European countries. After.
noting that there were difficulties between the Com-
munist and non-Communist elements of his political
front, Sihanouk said that "I hope that they will all
be able to integrate after the war because--if this
could not be so--life tomorrow would be very diffi-
cult."
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27: LOC-HAK-36-2-35-1