FRENCH OFFER TO MEDIATE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-38-4-10-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-38-4-10-4
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4804-X
SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
-
August 29, 1973
MR. KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
French Offer to Mediate Cambodian Question
Ambassador Swank has sent you a message
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offer to mediate the Cambodian question (Tab B). While a French
initiative would have little chance of success, we probably should not
discourage the GKR from accepting this offer. Areply to Swank along
these lines is at Tab A.
SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS 5B(2)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-38-4-10-4
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
25X1
On August 25, i3oret told Swank of "Fompidou's" unofficial offer and said
he regarded this as a serious initiative. He added, however, that before
acting on it, the High Council wanted to know the U. S. reaction and whether
the French initiative would prejudice any negotiations we have in train.
Swank has asked us how he should reply.
Hummel. and Stearns (Sullivan's replacement) do not believe we should
discourage GKR acceptance of the French offer, and I agree.
t this point, the French might be impressed that the
FANK hasn't disintegrated -- as they probably anticipated., Our State
colleagues believe the French might at least succeed in engaging, Sihanouk
in a sensible review of the situation' and could have some influence with the
25X1 Chinese. In any case, they see no harm in the French trying - as long as
it is not at our behest. If the. French are. acting on behalf of the GKR, this
would be in line with our policy of encouraging negotiations between the Khmer
parties.
Your reply to Swank (Tab A) instructs him to tell the Cambodians that we have. no problems with their accepting the French offer, but that they should not
tell the French we were consulted. It also advises the Cambodians to exude
confidence when they follow up on this offer.
RECOMMENDATION:
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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SECRET/ SENSITIVE
?AMBASSADOR SWANK
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
REFERENCE: Phnom Penh 28572
1. In reply to points raised by Boret in reftel, you may tell him that
we have no problems with GKR acceptance of French offer to mediate;
however, the French must not repeat not be told that U. S. was consulted
in this -matter. This must be understood as a French effort to mediate
between the Khmer parties without U. S. involvement.
2. you should stress to the Khmer the importance of convincing the
French that the GKR is confident of- its ability to survive. While we
have little hope that the French can alter the other side' s uncompromising
stand, perhaps they might help erode Communist confidence in an early
and easy victory in Cambodia.
3. If the French follow through on their offer, we would appreciate the
GKR's keeping us informed of developments and letting us know if they need
our advice or assistance.
SECRET / SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-38-4-10-4
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FHNONT 1 PENH 28572, 26 August 1973
"TO:
DR. KISSINGER
AMBASSADOR SWANK
"FOREIGN MINISTER LONG BORET GAVE ME 25 AUGUST AN ACCOUNT-
OF THE POMPIDOU UNOFFICIAL OFFER TO THE GI TO MEDIATE T -NE
CAMBODIAN QUESTION (REFERENCE, PARAS 5 AND 7) CLOSELY
PARALLELING THE SPECIAL REPORTING FACILITY ACCOUNT. FIE
SAID HE REGARDS THIS INITIATIVE AS SERIOUS, AND BEFORE THE
HIGI-I POLITICAL COUNCIL ACTS UPON IT THE GKR DESIRES TO KNO
(A) THE REACTION OF THE USG AND (B) WHE:THh;R AUTHORIZING
THE FRENCH TO PROCEED WITH THE EFFORT WILL PREJUDICE ANY
NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE IN TRAIN.
"I PROMISED I-IIM AN EARLY REPLY AND WILL-APPRECIATE YOUR
ADVICE SOONEST IN THIS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE CHANNEL.
I HAVE EMPLOYED THIS CHANNEL. BECAUSE CF THE RESTRICTIO 'S
PLACED ON .DISSEMINATION OF THE REFERENCE."
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