ITALY: POLITICAL SITUATION, NSC MEETING, ET AL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-4-1-16-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 27, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
S7,Cftt'T1NODIS ACTION
January 27, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER
FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Italy; Political Situation, NSC Meeting, et al
4970
6560
6665
6682.
6693
6696
NSS/NSC, State Dept.
reviews completed
Sharp attention has been focussed on Italy from various quarters lately.
This memo attempts to put these pieces together.
The NSC Meeting. The timing for an NSC meeting can be geared to
the fact that the center -left parties will probably resolve their immediate
differences and agree within two weeks or so to return to a four-party
coalition. At that time, the first act in the process of forming a new
government, Rumor's resignation, will take place. The next high point
will occur in the spring with the regional and local elections. Depending
on the outcome, there may be a drift to the right or left. Thus, an NSC
meeting in early March could set the tone for action we might take in an
attempt to influence the spring elections. I have attached at Tab A a memo
to Secretary Rogers informing him of the President's desire for an NSC
meeting and requesting that Ambassador Martin be called home to attend
as the President requested. (If you want to broaden the meeting to the
Mediterranean as a whole, what about other Ambassadors? How do you
with to proceed with preparations? An NSC staff paper on the whole region
for Review Group consideration? Who should do it? What themes? )
Secretary Rogers' Report. The Secretary has sent a memo for the
President (Tab G) outlining the prospects in the Italian political scene. He
makes the following points:
will
-M Rumor/probably be able to form a center-left coalition prior to
regional and local elections;
if the elections do not confirm the status quo, there is a chance of
Saragat dissolving Parliament and holding national elections;
the Christian Democrats will remain in any foreseeable democratic
government, but the Communists are not expected to participate;
..ECP. " ~NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS -2-
while the US can accept either a continuation of the center-left
or a move back to the center, it is essential'to have a government
capable of carrying out needed reforms in the government and
social structure,
I have attached at Tab B a memo to the President enclosing the.
Secretary's report, as well as informing him of the Redcoste issue and
other related actions. The Secretary's report in its present form is an
insufficient base for the NSC meeting.
Saragat's Signals. Mr. Buchanan sent a memo to the President on
January 12 reporting a conversation between President Saragat and
Ambassador Tasca on December 31. John Brown informed you by memo
(Tab H) that the President had reviewed the Buchanan report, had asked
you to note the "deadly pattern, " and asked that you pass the information
on to Ambassador Martin and Mr. Flanigan. At about the same time, Mr.
Robert Murphy wrote to you enclosing a copy of a letter he had received
from Ambassador Tasca reporting in detail his December 31 conversation
with Saragat (Tab 1). The gist of the conversation is that
Saragat has learned that high Vatican authorities believe that
the world is headed for Communism, and that the Church did not
intend to repeat its 19th Century error of fighting the Liberal
movement; this attitude will undercut the Christian Democrats
and will encourage Communist participation in government;
(This differs from the thrust of what Benelli said to you. )
-- the President of Fiat told Saragat that it would be useful to
allow the Communists participating in the government, since it
would bring peace to Italy;
-- the trade unions have become a revolutionary force, a Communist
Trojan Horse in Italy.
Saragat also had a long conversation December 30 with Brosio. Saragat
asked Brosio to convey his feelings to the President through Bob Ellsworth.
(Ellsworth has reported this in a memo to you - Tab J.) Saragat conveyed
his depression over the "inevitable" development of "cooperation" between
the Communists and the Christian Democrats, possibly within 1970. He
hinted that he might resign before the end of his. term (this may be a garble
SECRET/NODIS
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for others report that he is thinking about dissolving Parliament and
calling for national elections after the spring elections). Saragat would
be interested in the President's reaction, and Brosio has made himself
available as a communications link.
I have included these messages in your memo to the President, and
suggested that he not respond to Saragat at this time -- perhaps after
the NSC meeting. I have attached at Tab C a letter from you to Ambassador
Martin reporting these Saragat observations, as the President has requested;
a similar memo to Mr. Flanigan is at Tab D; at Tab E is a brief letter to
Mr. Murphy thanking him for his letter. I think it would be a mistake to
use Brosio as yet another communications link to Saragat. Aside from
the danger of getting too close to the players, it would undercut Ambassador
Martin's role at just the time you have written to him about the Saragat-
through-Murphy report that his Embassy has been ineffective. At Tab F
is a letter to Bob Ellsworth suggesting that we will probably not wish to
use Brosio as a vehicle.
Contingency Study on Communist Party Entry. In response to your
memorandum of October 6, Under Secretary Richardson has submitted
tnryou a study prepared by an inter-agency ad hoc group on the possible
entry of the Communist Party (PCI) into the Italian Government (Tab K).
The conclusion is that PCI entry is unlikely in the next 2-3 years. The
study sets out the various factors which might lead to PCI entry (lack of
institutional reforms, left-right polarization, and transformation of the
PCI toward democratic responsibility), and suggests a range of actions
we could take to encourage the center and center-left parties. The Under
Secretary has asked EUR to work out the steps necessary to carry out
these actions (which he considers are marginal in potential effect), and
has also requested a re-examination to ensure there are not more effective
measures we can take. Portions of this study will be useful at the NSC
meeting, but the section dealing with our possible actions to encourage
stability is inadequate for the NSC discussion. This comment is reflected
in your memo to the Secretary.
RECOMMENDATIONS
That you sign
1. ...The memo to. Secretary Rogers on the NSC..meeting at .Tab A.
SECRET/NODIS
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2. The memo for the President on the Secretary's report, the
Saragat messages, and the Redcoste reduction telegram, at Tab B;
3. The letter to Ambassador Martin on the Saragat messages,
At Tab C;
4. The memo to Mr. Flanigan on the Saragat messages, at Tab D;
5. A letter to Robert Murphy on the Tasca/Sara at letter, at Tab E;
g
Tab F.
SECRET/NODIS
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A letter to Bob Ellsworth on the Brosio/Saragat exchange, at
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON'
January 22, 1970
940
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Evolution of the Italian Political
Situation
.'I know you are deeply interested in political
developments in'Italy and the unstable situation which
has characterized the political scene there in recent
months.
Following the fall of the center-left coalition
last summer as a result of a split in the Socialist
Party, Prime Minister Rumor has endeavored to govern
with a minority government. He has done so with a
fair degree of success, aided in part by a successful
resolution of industry-labor disputes which marked the.
Italian scene last fall.
Recent recourse to local violence (the bombings
in Rome and Milan) has now led the former members of
the center-left coalition to work more closely together
in an effort to reconstitute the center-left government.
First established in 1962, it was expected that
the center-left by incorporating all the democratic
progressive elements in the country would be able to
reform _the inadequate bureaucracy and iniquitous
social structure. Modest progress has been made, but
in the past two years--and particularly since its dis-
solution last summer--there has been an increased ques-
tioning of the ability of the center-left coalition to
create public confidence in its capacity to handle
Italy's domestic problems.
SECRET .. .
GROUP 1
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.
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SECRET
Ambassador Martin in Rome has recently reported
some evidence that the center-left concept in Italian
politics may be losing its validity, in spite of
efforts to reconstitute it at this time.
What are the prospects for the future?
The Italians may muddle through as they have done
for the past twenty years. The Christian Democrats
have been in power since the founding of the Italian
Republic. They are likely to remain in any foreseeable
democratic government. Their efforts are currently
focussed on reconstituting the center-left, regarding
it as the only viable political alignment at this par-
ticular time.
If this effort fails, the only other conceivable
democratic alignment would involve a return to the old
formula of the Forties and Fifties. This would prob-
ably consist of the Christian Democrats, Unitary
Socialists, the Republicans, and the Liberals. It
would differ from the center-left by replacing the
Socialists with the Liberals, but more importantly by
the nature of its platform. This would probably empha-
size a more efficient public administration. Presently,
there is little active support for this concept, prin-
cipally because its achievement would require the dis-
solution of the Parliament and national elections two
years before the end of the term of. the present Parlia-
ment. The prospect of early elections does not appeal
to most Parliamentarians at this time.
This could change, of course, particularly if the
rank and file of the Christian Democratic Party members
decide, as a result of the outcome of the local elec-
tions this spring, that the center-left is dead.
SECRET
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Local political ambitions will also influence tht?:'
scene. Ambassador Martin reports that President
Saragat is pondering the possibility of calling for
national elections well before the end of the normal
term (1973)--which would be the first time that this
has happened since World War II--on the theory that
there may be a trend to the center-right which would
benefit his new party (PSU--Unitary Socialists). Such
a step, however, would not be considered until after
the Italian regional and local elections are held this
spring, giving some indication of the temper of the
Italian public.
Immediate Possibilities
We envisage that the following scenario will prob
ably dominate the Italian scene in the coming months:
(A) Rumor will endeavor to organize a new ver-
sion of the center-left coalition prior to local elec-
tions. The chances now seem to favor slightly this
prospect.
(B) Local elections are held this spring. The
results will either confirm the status quo, or suggest
a move either to left or right (back to the center).
However, the spring elections might not give any clear-
cut results and the outcome could be continued cabinet
shuffling until somebody made a move. _
?(C) If the elections confirm the status quo, we
will probably have a continuation of the center-left.
If, however, the elections indicate a move either to
the left or to the right, then the chances are greater
for the dissolution of the Parliament and the holding
of elections.
(D) We would not expect the Communists to par-
ticipate in any foreseeable national-governmental-com-
bination, but they will continue to be active at the
local level in some areas.
SECRET
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U.S. Interest and Possibilities
Where lies the U.S. interest in all this? We re-
quire a democratic Italy where neither the Communists
nor the neo-Fascists participate in government. We
desire a reasonably stable, prosperous partner which
will meet its Alliance responsibilities and cooperate
generally on the world scene. We can accept either a
continuation of the center-left or a move back to the
center, but what we consider essential is a government
which will carry out reforms to bring the government
and social structure more in line with the growing eco-
nomic position of the country. Unless improvement
comes, increasingly dangerous instability is inevitable.
While we do not possess the resources we once had
to influence the Italian scene, there are some things
we can do to let our views be known. Your invitations
to Rumor and Saragat, Secretary Volpe's visit to Italy,
and other high-level exchanges are important. They
serve to maintain the close ties with Italian authority
which are necessary if we are to have influence in Rome.
We should expand exchanges at all levels with students,
labor leaders, scientists, and lower level political
figures. To do this, we will need to overcome the
shortage of funds for this entire program. We must
also take full account of Italian political needs in
our day-to-day relations--for example, in considering
the effect of reducing our military presence there, in
looking at closing of consulates, and in handling the
details of economic,financial, and commercial problems.
We must avoid a stance of taking Italian support for
granted.
In summary, I look forward to a period of con-
tinued unease on the Italian political scene for the
next several months. We do not foresee any immediate
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_5_
threat to democratic government there, but must keep
the problem under close scrutiny and continually assess
the means of using our resources to make our views known
in a discreet, but effective fashion.
William P. Rogers
SECRET
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 kk'T-T 'f' I" TT(' IT( C / ~
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AC WN 1N,1h,A101AN1 tA\/1 WAS111NC.IOT LOG NO.. P135
Date: Friday, January 16, 1970
FOR ACTION: Dr. Kissinger
Time: 7:00 p. m.
CC (for information) :
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE :
Date: Friday, January 23, 1970
Time: 2:00 P.M.
SUBJECT :
President''s request for your recommendations concerning the
Italian: President Saragatrs comments to Ambassador Tasca,
ACTION REQUESTED :
For Necessary Action For Your Recommendations
Prepare Agenda and Brief Draft Reply
For Your Comments Draft Remarks
REMARKS:
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or it you anticipate a ~K
delay in submitting the required material, please I. R. COLE, JR.
telephone the Staff Secretary immediately. For the President
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 16, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
On reviewing the attached memorandum from Mr. Buchanan
the President directed the following remarks to you:
1. He asked that you take note of this deadly pattern.
2. He asked that you pass on this information to Graham Martin
and Mr. Flanigan.
3. He asked for your recommendations as to what should be done.
Please submit your recommendations to the Office of the Staff
Secretary.
Thank you.
JOHN R. BROWN ILL
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January 12, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
Ambassador Tasca saw President Saragat of Italy on the
31st of December. The President asked Tasca to relay
to RN two stories:
1. Monsignor Casaroli --- described by Saragat as
the equivalent of a Foreign Minister at the Vatican -- informed
a trusted newspaper friend of his that the "world would become
Communist and that the Church had no intention of repeating
the error it had made during the 19th century with the Liberal
Party of the period. " President Saragat is appalled at th '--
attitude high in tt Church --- it helps to explain, says Tasca,
the weakness of the Christian. Vexnocrats in Italy's struggle
against Communism.
2. Agnelli, President of FIAT, told Saragat that he
believed that Communists in the government in Italy would be
a good way of taming them and bringing peace to Italy.
(Note; Crosby Noyes has a very pessimistic piece on
the political future of Italy, feeling that the Right will move as
MussA1ini did before it allows the Communists to get close to power.)
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
CONFIDENTIAL
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