CIA ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAMIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-4-1-22-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 31, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM S
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION January 31, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger /(
SUBJECT: CIA Assessment of Vietnam,ization
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The CIA has produced the attached narrative review of Vietnamization
progress and prospects (Tab A). It is based on a study of the views of
ARVN commanders, and on an analysis of ARVN performance and the
current activities of enemy forces.
The memorandum concludes that the real test of Vietnamization will
probably not come until at least the end of 1970, by which time the
Communists anticipate a substantial further reduction of US ground forces.
Meanwhile, there have been both bright and disappointing spots in the
performance of SVN forces. It is clear that the ARVN, especially, still
has a considerable way to go in developing both the technical skills and
the will to fight necessary to cope with a threat of the magnitude currently
posed by enemy forces.
Some of the specific points made in the CIA assessment area's follows:
There is sound evidence that the territorial forces (regional and
popular units) have greatly improved over the past year in all the standard
indicators of efficiency, most notably their KIA rate. It must be recog-
nized, however, that the improvement is based on a very poor performance
base originally, and that further gains will come harder.
-- By contrast, the performance of the ARVN regular units has
declined in the past year when measured in statistical terms such as the
KIA rate, combat contacts, etc. This is not so much a reflection of
deterioration in ARVN capabilities as an indication of a shift in enemy
tactics toward initiatives primarily aimed at the territorial forces.
-- Late last year, surveys of the views of top ARVN leaders on
Vietnamization found most of them optimistic about the future. Recently,
however, a similar survey revealed a growing pessimism with concern
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centered around the fear of an overly hasty American withdrawal which
would leave the ARVN badly vulnerable to renewed Communist main force
pressures. It is worth noting that the pessimism has increased as the
ARVN combat load has risen.
Progress by Corps
I Corps. ARVN units, among the GVN's best, have continued to hold the
populated coastal sectors effectively. Communist main force units were
largely driven out of these areas by US and GVN forces by early 1969. The
Communists have not tried to mount a major new push since then, but do
have large forces located in nearby border sanctuaries from which they could
quickly intensify pressures along the coast.
II Corps. The first real test of Vietnamization occurred here in the
? summer when the Communists laid siege to two Vietnamese border strong-
points. The results were inconclusive. Some ARVN units performed well,
and the Communists suffered heavy losses, largely as a result of allied air
power. However, they never really tried to take the camps, and one ARVN
regiment was badly demoralized as a result of its combat experience. Along
the coast, the ARVN has been holding its own, but its leaders fear the with-
drawal of any American ground units from this sector in the foreseeable
future.
III Corps. ARVN units here have traditionally been among the weakest
in the country, and the US program has concentrated on raising their effective-
ness. As a result some gains have been noted in two of the divisions, but the
division closest to the enemy along the Cambodian border is still performing
very poorly and could not hold its own against the Communist units arrayed
in the area, if left without substantial US ground support.
IV Corps. The ARVN division which filled in for US ground units with-
drawn in the upper Delta has so far not performed very effectively, and the
enemy has begun to rebuild his position. The recent replacement of the
division commander could help remedy this situation, however. The picture
is brighter in the lower Delta where one of the ARVN divisions is considered
as good as any GVN unit in the country. However, the Communists clearly
intend to mount a strong test of Vietnamization in the Delta and have moved
in several regiments in the western provinces to strengthen their position.
ARVN performances against them sofar has been mixed.
Att.
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Vietnamization: Progress and Prospects
Secret
26
23 January 1970
No. 0469/70
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 January 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Vietnamization: Progress and Prospects
-General Considerations
More favorable conditions for turning over
additional war responsibilities to the South Viet-
namese became evident soon after the 1968 Tet.and
May offensives. Many of the larger regular enemy
units withdrew into North Vietnam or across the
Laotian and Cambodian borders, where they could no
longer effectively support local Viet Cong forces
and the Communists' political apparatus.
Allied forces gradually regained the initiative
in the war as US and South Vietnamese units moved
out into the countryside. They were followed by
government territorial security forces (Regional an(T
Popular Force troops) and pacification teams. The
government made substantial progress in extending
its control over the population.in the countryside,
and it recruited new personnel and trained them for
duty in the various branches of the armed forces
during the latter half of 1968 and 1969.
The Communists resumed larger scale military
attacks in their spring campaign early in 1969,
stalling the government pacification program in
several important areas and setting it back in a
few provinces. Since then, enemy activity has
Note-: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current InteZZi-
gence and coordinated with the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of National Estimates, and
the Special Assistantfo,r Vietnamese Affairs.
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South Vietnamese Army Areas of Responsibility
7 cr? xureN:
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NORTH
'VIETNAM
Capital Military District
'~taI Military District
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7th Division
SOUTH VIETNAM
CONFIDENTIAL
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MILES
Demilitarized Zone
ter; {
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again fallen off sharply and has consisted mainly
of "highpoints" of harassing attacks and limited
campaigns against South Vietnamese outposts along
the Cambodian border and in the Mekong Delta.
The performance of South Vietnamese forces
in these very limited combat tests shows that they
still have a considerable distance to go in devel-
oping both technical skills and aggressive com-
bat attitudes. Although some South Vietnamese
units acquitted themselves well in 1969, us advisers
report that other units once again displayed the
perennial weaknesses of poor leadership and lack
of aggressiveness. Most government units, however,
simply have not been put to the acid test.
If the Communists intend to challenge South
Vietnamese forces seriously in 1970 in an attempt to
reverse the military and pacification momentum built
up over the past year and a half, they will have to
commit more forces than they did in their spring
campaign of 1969. In order to roll back the paci-
fication program significantly in the near future,
for example, they probably would have to bring enough
large Communist units into action to force allied
units back from the countryside into defensive
positions around bases and towns. This would have
to happen in widespread areas before the Communists
could hope to bring effective support to local Viet
Cong troops and political cadres that have been hard
pressed and unable to operate effectively in many
rural areas in recent months.
Despite the Communists' need to provide more
protection for their local elements almost every-
where it is by no means clear that they intend to
step up military activity across the board in 1970.
The Communists may be hoping that some impressive
battlefield successes over selected South Vietnam-
ese units, say in some parts of the Mekong Delta or
in northern I Corps, might have far-reaching psycho-
logical consequences. It appears likely, however,
that the'Communists deem it wise to hold much of their
strength in reserve until more US troops have been
withdrawn, probably in the belief that there will
be better opportunities later to challenge the
South Vietnamese head-on. In the meantime, the
-2-
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enemy probably assumes that shellings, sapper, and
terrorist attacks and occasional main force engage-
ments will keep South Vietnamese forces on edge,
remind the population that the Communists are still
to be reckoned with and provide some measure of pro-
tection for their own local assets. If the Commu-
nists really keep their military activity within
limited bounds for the time-being,-South Vietnamese
armed forces probably have a good chance of making
additional progress in developing their strength
and in further improving the government's popula-
tion control.
In the longer term, however, Hanoi probably
regards the Vietnamization program as a fundamental
threat that must be challenged forcefully. The
Communists might be ready for a major push a year
from now during the annual winter-spring campaign
period of 1970-71. At the withdrawal rate of the
past few months the US will'have-pulled out some
200,000 troops by the end of 1970.' If the Communists
were willing by then to put the manpower resources
into.such an effort, they might be able to put South
~Z etnamese and other allied forces still in the
country on the defensive and at least begin to re-
gain a better grip on part of'the rural population.
The enemy's chances of success in such a venture
would depend largely on how much South Vietnamese
forces have developed and how well government pacifi-
cation efforts have succeeded in the meantime.
.The number of variables`involved makes it ex-
tremely difficult to predict the outcome of a radical
enemy-test of Vietnamization. _ Much will depend on
.enemy intentions and strengths at the time such a
test occurs and on the capabilities that South Viet-
namese forces have developed by'that.time. Some im-
pvrtant-variables in the situation such as political
moods,. tempers, and clima-te,'are inherently difficult
to.measure. if major segments of:South Vietnam's
rural population and the personnel of government or-
ganizations, military and civil, think Vietnamization
is-going to work--i.e., that-the-Communists' apparatus
is going to deteriorate"and the-government's position
continue to improve- then they would support the pro-
gram. Conversely, a widespread opinion among the same
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segments of the Vietnamese populace that the Com-
munists are eventually bound to win, and the GVN to
fail, would lead to a general apathy toward Vietnam--
ization'and the failure of the program. Thus the
pattern of actual events develops dynamics of its
own that can materially affect the eventual outcome
of the struggle. If the Communists opt to deter
launching a major countereffort against Vietnami-
zation for another year or so, they run the distinct
risk of playing Casey at the bat. The longer Vietnam-
ization oi' pacification appears to be working--and
the prolonged absence of serious Communist counter
pressure certainly contributes to the government's
chances for success--the more likely people are to
think it is working.
For all of these reasons, the present situation
is very murky, and its evolution hard to predict.
The trend of events over the next six months or so,
however, should clarify at least some currently
opaque questions and provide a much firmer basis
for assessing the future of Vietnamization beyond
that time frame.
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The Territorial Forces
1. The most significant change within the South
Vietnamese armed forces during the two years since
the 1968 Tet Offensive has been the development of
the Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Force (PF)
units. These organizations defend the hamlets-,
villages, and provincial towns scattered throughout
the country. The number of RF companies has increased
by about 60 percent since early 1968, and there are
now 25 percent more PF platoons. During the same
period the number of regular South Vietnamese
battalions increased by some 10 percent. Of the
million or so South Vietnamese now bearing arms on
behalf of the Saigon government, nearly half are
serving in RF and PF units.
2. These territorial forces have assumed a much
greater share of the fighting in the past year,
largely because of the changed character of the
war. This in turn has given them better oppor-
tunities than regular South Vietnamese battalions
to demonstrate improved performance. RF and PF
troops have shown significant improvements in most
of the standard indicators of military performance,
such as kill ratios, weapons captured, and number
of operations conducted, Both the expansion and
improvement in performance have helped substan-
tially in the government's pacification program.
Territorial security judgments, based on the Hamlet
Evaluation System, show an increase in "relatively
secure" population from 60 percent in March 1968
following the Tet Offensive to more than 90 percent
today. Even allowing for the inadequacies of such
statistical measures, these figures suggest how
much progress has been made in extending Saigon's
writ into the countryside.
3. US advisers report that the best RF and
PF units are located in the I and IV Corps areas.
Those in III Corps are considered average, and
those in the II Corps area are reasonably active
but have poor performance ratings.
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The Regulars
4. While the standard indicators of military
performance show that territorial security forces
have:been expanding and improving their performance
Oince the 1968 Tet period, these same indicators
point-to declines instead of improvements for South
Vietnamese regular units. For example, the rate at
Which South Vietnamese regular units killed enemy
troops and captured weapons dropped by about 20
percent in 1969, as compared with the period in
1968 following Tet. These declines in the standard
indicators, however, probably reflect changes in
both-Communist and allied tactics more than they do
Any actual deterioration in the performance of South
Vietnamese regulars. The Communists have de-emphasized
large-scale infantry assaults.since the first half of
1968, which means that South Vietnamese regulars have
1ad'many fewer opportunities to fight defensive bat-
fortifiedpositions--situations-that.have
a.ri,the.past cost the Communists heavily in manpower
andweapons and have usually resulted in a kill ratio
Very "favorable to the allies. Instead, the enemy has
engs:ged.RF and PF units.more often, maintaining a
high level of smaller scale but widespread attacks
AA-
ur -of the ops is proviperformance
of_SouthnVietnamese best
Army e tro
provided by by US
u er_td swh ch make quarterly evaluations of the
._ts they are tacked. During the -
1S- t onth period from January .1968 through June -1,9,6 9 ,
the-.US ratings of the-operational effectiveness
Q~f Mall SouthVietnamese infantry battalions showed
o s
ignificant over-all improvement. The number
o : b_at,ta1io.ns with improved' scores- n a -given re-
porting period was usually offset by an equal num-
ber o_f battalions receiving lower ratings.--In the
third`.quarter of 1969, however,: the- overall_opera-
tp.el effectiveness rating showed -some. gain .for
the` f ir:st time since the current ", ;rating system was
d _
that -83 battalions had demonstrated greater compe-
tence and that only 46 had regressed during the
period.
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6. In addition to their regular army forces, the
South Vietnamese have about a division each of elite
Marine, Airborne, and Ranger units that consistently
turn in a good performance. The Marine and Airborne
troops have operated mainly in III Corps, although
some battalions have been attached to mobile task
forces in the delta. Several battalions of Rangers
operate permanently in each of the corps areas.
Leadership Problems
7. US advisers report many areas in which South
Vietnamese officers continue to exhibit serious short-
comings. Most of them cite deficiencies in leader-
ship, pointing to the failure of-South Vietnamese of-
ficers and troops to be aggressive in seeking out
and destroying the Communists. Although the leader-
ship problem has been recognized for years, improve-
ments have been very gradual and difficult to discern.
There is little good evidence that leadership in the
South Vietnamese Army has improved very much over
the past two years.
8. US adviser reports indicate that South Viet-
namese officers in the higher ranks owe their promo-
tions more to-their political sense and personal con-
tacts than to their records as commanders of combat
units. Few middle and lower level officers seek com-
bat commands. There.is little incentive for them to
do so, because promotions come more quickly to those
in rear area staff positions. Although the South
Vietnamese Army's table of organization calls for
infantry battalion commanders to hold the rank of
lieutenant colonel, in practice only a small percen-
tage rank that high, and most are captains and majors.
The latest available US advisory report, covering the
third quarter of 1969, indicates that the number of
infantry battalions with captains as commanders
was increasing rather than being reduced.
9. The South Vietnamese officer corps is bottom-
heavy with too many junior officers and not enough
officers in the middle and senior grades. This
situation is due in part to the expansion of the
armed forces over the past two years, during which
there seems to have been a failure in spotting and
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moving the best commanders up the line. The'South
Vietnamese Government denies itself access to vast
resources of leadership because of its restricted
standards of class and education. In the selection
of officer candidates, for example, the government
generally does not look beyond the very small per-
centage'of young men from the bourgeois urban class
who have completed secondary education. The vast
majority of youths, who come from peasant families
in the countryside, are seldom considered for leader-
ship positions, either in the military or the civil
service, and consequently this large source of po-
tential drive and talent is left for the most part
to be exploited by the Communists. President Thieu's
replacement of several division commanders late last
summer and, more recently, his assignment of new com-
manders in the delta and lI Corps may mean that some
progress is finally being made in dealing with this
long-standing leadership problem, at least in the
senior echelons,
10. The needs of the Vietnamization program
probably provided the main impetus for President
Thieu's recent shake-up of military command posi-
tions. A desire for'better leadership rather than
political motives seems to lie behind the few
changes announced so far. Most of the new com-
manders are experienced line officers considered
aggressive and dynamic, as well as 'loyal to the
President.
11. Poor leadership probably explains in large
part why there are about 30 regular South Vietnamese
battalions that for more than a year have consistently
received low ratings on their aggressiveness from US
advisers. The army's shortcomings are also compounded
by a lack of leadership in the areas of staff work,.
training, and morale. US advisers in position to
judge believe that about 20 percent of the South Viet-
namese intelligence and operations staffs at both
regimental and divisional level are operating inef-
fectively. Advisers also say that about half of the
combat training conducted by the South Vietnamese is
ineffective or marginal. in addition, poor leadership
has adverse effects on morale and the number of deser-
tions, which yearly drain away nearly one third of
the manpower in the regular combat maneuver battalions.
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r.v? nsaw~.aac.t _a4:4V1. C:Vll1...L.I.J.)41L:1.11~ LU 111UrcAJ. p.ron-
lems and the high desertion rate among South Viet-
hamese enlisted men is the poor economic conditions
in which-many of the soldiers and their families
live. A survey in the fall of 1969 found that
nearly 30 percent of the US advisers rated the
housing. provided for South Vietnamese Army fami-
lies as-worse than that provided for Viet Cong
ralliers in the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) programs.
Stock shortages still appear to be reducing the
effectiveness of the commissary system. A recent
US Embassy survey indicated that soldiers were
still bitter about last November's austerity tax,
which raised prices and significantly worsened
living conditions, especially for'enlisted men.
Morale and Attitudes
13. Most South Vietnamese officers interviewed by
US officials late last year expressed guarded opti-
inismabout the prospects of Vietnamization in their
immediate areas of responsibility. In general, they
said that they would be able to keep the Communists
at bay if significant American artillery, air, and
logistics support continued. More recently, however,
~L='-similar survey found a few senior officers quite
--pessimistic about war prospects.
14. The new commander of the South Vietnamese
5th Division north of Saigon provides an extreme
rexampple of this pessimism. He doubts that his unit
n take-over total defense responsibilities from the
US 1st Infantry Division, which is due to withdraw
,rood-the country this spring, and he predicts that
If current plans are carried out, the situation will
soon'become as bleak as it was in the early 1960s,
=e-xcept' that this time there would be no hope of
rescue.
=15.--Similar reservations about Vietnamization were
epessed by the commander of the 22nd Division, who
=saxc: -that- the withdrawal of the US 173rd Airborne
brigade-from Binh Dinh Province this year would be
ia;ghly_undesirable. The general commanding the
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special defense zone along the Cambodian border in
the delta gave an extremely pessimistic account of
his situation late last year when increasing numbers
of North Vietnamese troops were turning up in his area
of responsibility. This officer was recently relieved
of his delta command and put in charge of South Viet-
namese-Special Forces.
16. In the recent survey, only one South Vietnamese
general-officer-among ten expressed the belief that
the war would "fade away." Most of the generals be-
lieve that the war will either drag on inconclusively
for years--with South Vietnamese units strong enough
to contain Communist attacks but not to destroy
them--or that the enemy will wait until US forces have
pulled out and then launch large-scale attacks, which
the South Vietnamese Army might not be able to with-
stand.. The more confident South Vietnamese generals
were found in IV Corps, where South Vietnamese forces
have always carried a greater proportion of the combat
burden, and in I Corps, where some South Vietnamese
units have gone through a number of severe battles
and.performed well.
17.-A more meaningful assessment of South Vietna-
mese morale will be possible only after many more
units have undergone major combat tests under condi-
tions of diminished US support. A number of South
Vietnamese officers, especially the best younger
field. commanders, believe that their forces will
successfully weather these coming tests and that
heightened self-pride and nationalism growing out
of-the confrontations will eventually contribute
substantially to South Vietnam's ability to contain
the Communists indefinitely.
Progress in I Corps Faces Strong Potential Threat
18. In I Corps, US and South Vietnamese military
and pacification. forces have been making progress
rivaling-that-seen anywhere else in the country.
The allies-face a strong threat in the northernmost
provinces,-however, from the large concentrations
0
f North Vietnamese troops just across the borders.
There are sizable North Vietnamese forces along the
Laos border just west of,the A Shau Valley, and
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additional large units are deployed just north of
the Demilitarized Zone.
19..The South Vietnamese commander of I Corps be-
lieves that heavy enemy attacks from across those
borders might force his units to give ground ini-
tially, but he is confident that such thrusts could
be contained. Most South Vietnamese officers in
the northern provinces, however, do not expect the
Communists to launch a massive invasion from Laos
or North Vietnam in the near future. They estimate
instead that the enemy will continue to rely mainly
on smaller scale ground attacks and shellings. They
anticipate periodic upsurges of this kind of activity
and some damaging sapper and infantry assaults de-
signed mainly for high psychological impact. They
believe that the enemy has been hurt seriously in I
Corps in recent years and does not want to pay the
high cost in casualties that another large-scale
.sustained offensive campaign early this year would
necessarily entail.
20. These South Vietnamese assessments appear to
be generally realistic. Available intelligence sug-
cJests that the Communists will refrain from overly
adventurous attacks in I Corps for the time being.
It remains possible, however, that they may decide
to use some of the dozen or so regiments positioned
nearby to test severely the mettle of the South Viet-
namese 1st Division, which has taken over defensive
responsibilities below the Demilitarized Zone from
the recently departed US 3rd Marine Division.
21. US advisers assigned to the lst Division
have consistently rated it one of the best in the
South Vietnamese Army. The division rose to the
occasion and fought well during the 1968 Tet offen-
sive, and it has conducted aggressive operations
against the reduced enemy threat in northernmost
Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces ever since. The
South Vietnamese 51st Regiment in the Da Nang area
and the 2nd Division in southern I Corps are also
rated among the best fighting units in the army by
US advisers, which is significant because the latter
unit faces an especially tenacious enemy force.
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II--Corps: The First Limited Test of Vietnamization
22. -The-first allied effort to test the Vietnam-
ization concept took place in the Ben Het campaign in
the central. highlands in May and June 1969, Early
in-May it became clear from intelligence. reports
that two North Vietnamese infantry regiments with
supporting artillery were-closing in on the outpost
at`Ben Het in Kontum Province, The main responsi-
bility for, defense of this border outpost was turned
over to.the South Vietnamese 42nd Regiment and an
elite Ranger Regiment, -Strong units from the US
4th-,Infantry Division were available nearby in Kon-
tum, but they were not committed to the Ben Het
frght
- 23 The South Vietnamese relied heavily on US air
andar.xllery. strikes to break up the North Vietnamese
attack, and-the battalions of the-Ranger Regiment
also-moved-out aggressively to control key terrain
near Ben Het and.block enemy avenues of approach.
US advisers-with the Rangers reported that their
performance was outstanding.- Advisers with the 42nd
Regiment battalions, however,-reported that their
units~wer'e not.aggressive while in contact with
the encroaching North Vietnamese forces. The deser-
ti-on-rate of this regiment rose from about 19 per
th'ousand_'in'March to nearly 60 per thousand in June
-_-during the heaviest fighting. Its kill ratio was
cut in half, and US adviser assessments of the regi-
m&n?t's -,-effectiveness -and :leadership dropped -drasti-
c al.l_y .
r' 24 As rt turned--out the North Vietnamese did
not -make -a -major assault directly against Ben Het,
prakiably =because of the -massive allied =air strikes.
Tlid "Vatt'l'e could hardly "be judged "in ungtiial-ified suc--
cess---for ei-ther the South-Vietnamese or the enemy.
Tbe:North-Vietnamese-may, nevertheless,-
have-consid-ered worthwhile insofar as they wore down and de-
moralfzed -'a _large government_unit..:
5: - -Tlie same North Vietnamese - regiments that
f rght around :Ben' Het 'shifted'=mare -thax1 ' 150-miles
to the south and conducted a very similar campaign
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in the Bu Prang - Duc Lap sector of southern II
Corps in late October and November. The enemy once
again relied mainly on shelling attacks and small
probes for more than a month before pulling back
into Cambodian sanctuary and returning north toward
Kontum Province.
26., The South Vietnamese 23rd Division defend-
ing Bu Prang and Duc Lap also relied mainly on air
support as the most effective means to'counter the
enemy drive, There were reports that elements of
the 23rd performed more effectively in this campaign
than did their counterparts in the 42nd Regiment
at Ben Het. Subordinate units of the 23rd report-
edly were rotated in and out of the battle area
more efficiently, and no single battalion became
completely exhausted. The North Vietnamese never
mounted a major ground effort to overrun either Bu
Prang or Duc Lap, however, and the fighting qualities
of the South Vietnamese ground forces were not fully
tested. It appears likely, moreover, that the same
North Vietnamese regiments that fought at Ben Het
and later at Bu Prang - Duc Lap will be ready for
another incursion into the highlands within a month
or two.
27. The border campaigns in the central highlands
in 1969 must, of course, be assessed in the context
of the enemy's general de-emphasis of military opera-
tions in the II Corps region. Starting in early
1968, soon after the Tet offensive, the Communists
pulled several North Vietnamese regiments out of
II Corps and sent them southward to operate in III
and IV Corps. Additionally, the infiltration of
northern replacements during the past two years to
II Corps has been lighter than to any other region.
28. Despite the withdrawal of substantial Commu-
nist units from II Corps, however, it appears likely
that South Vietnamese forces in the region will have
to face additional significant combat tests later
this years In addition to the North Vietnamese reg-
iments still ranging along the Cambodian border in
the highlands, the North Vietnamese 3rd Division has
been moving into position to attack allied forces en-
gaged in the pacification program in Binh Dinh
-13-
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W
,Province on the coast, The South Vietnamese 22nd Di-
-vision and the 173rd Airborne Brigade recently began a
-major spoiling operation in Binh Dinh aimed at knock-
-ing?the North Vietnamese 3rd Division off balance.
_TSadvisers report that the 22nd Division conducted
;some good operations in support of pacification in
1969, but that there was a lack of combat aggressiveness
in all three of the division's regiments.
VIII Corps Not Now Tod Enemy Priority Area
29. The Communist intent to reduce the near-
term -concentration of effort in the Saigon - III
Corps region has been evident since early last sum
Mero- The enemy has shifted five regular North Viet--
,n4mese.regiments from the provinces northwest of the
capital to the delta. These redeployments have re-
duc'e.d the basic enemy threat north of Saigon to three
-.divisions, which for the most part have remained in
-the remote area along the Cambodian border since the
,conclusion of the 1969 spring offensive.
:30a These forces have been playing a role similar
to that of,the large North Vietnamese troop formations
threatening northern I Corps from positions just
across the Laotian and North Vietnamese borders?
The concentrations along both the I and III corps
-borders constitute major threats to South Vietnamese
rces,:.territory, and population. Substantial-num-
-. e1rs_. of North Vietnamese replacement packets are
Pow en.,--route to the III Corps, probably meaning that
the -enemy-:anticipates significant fighting in the re--
gion_ this. year. There is little hard evidence, how-
ever, that the Communists intend to commit their III
1corps divisions fully in the near future.
31. The three South Vietnamese Army divisions in
III corps have always been among the weakest combat
units. in the country. During the summer and fall of
49 rS the -25th Division operating in Hau Nghia and
Taong An provinces started to show some improvement,
xoweve.r, after it began to conduct combined operations
w?i.th -US. forces 0 The 18th Division, which operates east
Wit: Saigon in one of the least threatened areas in
mouth Vietnam, also began to get better ratings from
c
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`-US advisers when a new commander took over in August
1969.
32. A new commander and a large increase in com
`,biped operations with US forces during the fall did
not produce any appreciable improvement in the 5th
:Division. The 5th, responsible for the most active
war sector in northern III Corps, including Phuoc
-Long and Binh Long provinces, continued to be rated
as one of the least effective South Vietnamese divi-
sions during the third quarter of 1969. Five of the
-12 US advisers to the infantry battalions in the 5th
Division reported that their units were not aggressive
""when in contact with the enemy. On balance, it appears
that the South Vietnamese still have a long way to
.Ego -,in developing fighting units capable of contain-
ing even the reduced enemy main force threat in the
outer reaches of III Corps.
33. Closer in to Saigon, the Communists' main and
local force units have deteriorated under heavy gov-
ernment pressure. These units are constantly short
of replacements, munitions, and food. Intelligence
indicates that enemy sappers and terrorists will
G.-continue to try to penetrate the Saigon area--and
_.__M - some will probably get through--but the Communists
-seem to have relatively modest ambitions for opera-
~`tions, in the capital area, largely because the
--strong,and effective allied defenses are too form-
ridable for their reduced capabilities. Government
tr- security services have had considerable success
-even against sapper operations, harassing, penetrating,
c`.-and rounding up Communist intelligence, special ac-
tion, and terrorist units.
L~.. -34, Recent developments in the Mekong Delta sug-
=;
gest'that this region may be the scene of some of
the=most significant action between South Vietnamese
r r,..
and_Gommunist forces in the coming months. Beginning
~.::..
_xn thespring of 1969;-the Communists--for the first
t1me'in the war--sent North Vietnamese regulars into
the area, which used to be their primary source of
in-country manpower. These reinforcements are sub-
stantial, now totaling five regular regiments, at
Foreign Dissern
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least one divisional headquarters, and probably
several thousand replacement troops either in the
region or nearby in Cambodia. The Communists are
unmistakably bent on trying to regain greater access
to the large human and material resources of the
delta, over which the government has been steadily
increasing its control since mid-1968. But how they
intend to proceed is still quite unclear.
35. The new North Vietnamese troops in the area
might be used in a try for quick gains, or they might
be employed more prudently to bring gradually in-
creasing pressure on government forces. With a few
exceptions, the units have been fairly cautious so
far, suggesting that they may be gettling in for the
long haul. The North Vietnamese may, for example,
have a primary mission of establishing and consolidat-
ing secure bases in peripheral areas, such as the U
Minh Forest and the Seven Mountains, from which they
could support hard-pressed local forces and try. to
regain control. over populated areas. There have been
a number of reports suggesting that another enemy
objective in this area is to build up a formidable
position that would be advantageous in the event of
a cease-fire.
36. The size of the enemy buildup in the delta,
however, suggests that the Communists will be on the
lookout for opportunities to maul some of the larger
South Vietnamese military units, or possibly to over-
run or significantly damage a provincial capital..
Some sources claim that the enemy plans to commit
two regiments to an attack against My Tho, the prin-
cipal city in the upper delta, where US troops once
operated. The present position of units also sug-
gests a threat to Chau Doc city, the capital of
Chau Doc Province. A number of other cities have
also been mentioned as targets for large-scale at-
tacks. The Communists may believe that a succession
of impressive attacks in the delta in the next few
months would have great psychological impact and
be interpreted by many as evidence that Vietnamization
is unrealistic.
. 37. The South Vietnamese Army divisions in the
delta region are considered by US advisers to be
No Fore Di
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about average. The 7th Division's area of responsi-
bility in the upper delta--Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and
Go Cong provinces--is a difficult one. These prov-
inces are among the most densely populated in the
country and also the least pacified, although consid-
erable progress has been made since early 1968. There
still is a high density of enemy forces in the up-
per delta, including many guerrillas. Nearly 100,000
people in Kien Hoa remain 'uncter Viet Cong control,
Almost 60 percent of the 7th Division's combat deaths
are caused by mines and booby traps set out by Commu-
nist local forces and sympathizers. US advisers re-
ported that the 7th Division showed some improvement
in the third quarter of 1969, after a slight deteriora-
tion during the three previous quarters.
38. The 9th. Division, based in the central delta,
has recently demonstrated increased mobility, detaching
battalions to assist both the 7th Division to its
north and the 21st Division to the south. The 21st
Division, with a large area of responsibility in the
southern delta, is probably the best South Vietnamese
division in IV Corps, but US advisers reported that
its effectiveness declined somewhat over the first
three quarters of 1969.
39. The South Vietnamese reaction to the Communist
buildup in the delta so far has been spotty. South
Vietnamese Army units claim to have kept the enemy's
273rd Regiment bottled up in its U Minh Forest
stronghold, but the regiment does not appear to have
made any really serious attempt yet to break out.
One battalion of the regiment was mauled badly last
summer by South Vietnamese forces supported by US heli-
copter gunships as it was moving from the Cambodian
border to the U Minh Forest. The North Vietnamese
18B Regiment has made some forays out of the Seven
Mountains base area, causing many civilians to flee
and setting back the pacification program in two dis-
tricts in Chau Doc Province, A battalion of North
Vietnam'.s 88th Regiment also launched an assault
against a district town along the Cambodian border,
but local government defenders, including Popular
Forces, beat back the attack, inflicting heavy los-
ses on the enemy with little help from regular army
units.
No Foreign Dissem
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40. In Dinh Tuong Province, in the area covered
by the South Vietnamese 7th Division, Viet Cong units
with new North Vietnamese fillers became more active
beginning in November. At that time they attacked and
nearly destroyed a government battalion as an effec-
tive unit. Pressure against the pacification program
also built up gradually in Dinh Tuong and nearby
Kien Hoa provinces during November and December as
the enemy began operating in larger units.
41. If the North Vietnamese do try for major vic-
tories in the delta, it is difficult to predict who
will prevail, as neither the South nor the North Viet-
namese have had much experience fighting conventional
large-unit warfare in the delta terrain.. The superior
air and artillery firepower'support available to the
South Vietnamese, if used effectively, should make
it extremely hazardous for the North Vietnamese to
.mass large units for attacks in the open terrain of
the delta. The great expansion of the South Vietnam-
ese territorial security forces there during the past
two years also puts the government in a favorable po-
sition right now. The outcome of the struggle in the
delta will depend on how well the South Vietnamese
.regular battalions stand up to'the growing North Viet-
namese main-force threat, and how well the Regional
.and Popular soldiers in the newly pacified areas hold
their ground against Viet Cong local forces and guer-
rillas trying to make a comeback.
No Foreign Dissem
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