ACDA VIEWS ON SALT TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 24, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21: LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
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March 24, 1970
THE SECRETARY OF STATJ
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
THE ATTORNEY "Y GENT I',AL
T1Tr CHAIRMAN, J-wOINT CHZST OF STAFFr yeaC
TtHE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL XNTELLICE ~iYE
$JECT: ACDA Views on SALT Talks
The Preoidont has Raked me to cir att to the att shed letter sent
to him by the Director of .AEA e reaatng views on the position
the U. S. ,.houl4 take at Vienna.
State Dept. review completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
( igaad) HEPIRY A. KISSING ER
Ianry A. (issi er
 OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
Dear Mr. President:
1iv. 0z=copies, beri.es A
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON
March 23, 1970
As we approach the reopening of the SALT talks, I
wish to submit for your consideration some views as to
the stance the United States should take.
We have learned from some fourteen months of study-
ing SALT problems that there are no clear cut answers to
all the important issues. It seems to me that all deci-
sions on these issues are close. There are risks attached
to each of the various possible courses of action, as
there are risks to continuing on our present course of
independent strategic arms development and deployment.
Even if the approach best calculated to advance the
United States interest could be clearly identified, one
cannot foresee clearly what arrangement might be negoti-
ated with the Soviet Union, or on what conditions.
In approaching the next phase'of SALT,. a central
question is whether to try for (1) a relatively simple
quantitative arrangement freezing numbers of launchers
for major systems, or (2) a comprehensive arrangement
including a MIRV ban and perhaps other qualitative
limitations.
I think the-security interests of the United States
would.be better served by a more comprehensive agreement
if the necessary verification arrangements can be
The President,
The White House.
SECRET
CROUP 1
Excluded from auto-
matic downgrading
and declassification.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 : LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 : LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
W
negotiated. The current strategic balance, while in pro-
cess of change, rests on high levels and a variety of
strategic weapons on both sides. A limited agreement
Would not remove a number of the concerns which we now
have about the sufficiency of our strategic forces in
the years to come. It might also leave unchecked a
costly, risky competition in areas not covered by the
agreement. Unless we make comprehensive proposals, we
will fail to test fully the depth and nature of Soviet
interest in agreements to.constrain the strategic arms
-.competition..
psychological costs.
If a MIRV ban and low or zero ABM levels can be ne-
gotiated with.the:conditions which have been worked out
:in the Verification Panel, and for a short term of perhaps
five-years,.1 think that United States security would be
,subject to no greater-risks than obtain under the present
-;uncontrolled situation. There would be risks in such a
Tconttrolled---environment-, but I believe. that they are cal-
culable, insurable, relatively short term, and reasonable
ones.'to.xun~ My suggestion-is in line with the recent
'.re,conimendations to.you' of the General Advisory Committee
cc-haired by John:McCloy.
From an international as well as domestic political
point of view, it strikes me that if a posture is adopted
(of not trying for controls-over MIRVs or for ARM levels
Bless'than the full Safeguard program, there will be heavy
.:.__.If .SAIrT fails, Congressional support for strategic
weapons programs in the future may depend in good part on
the nature.-of.United_:States,SALT--offers. that the Soviet
-,.would not.accept...
If you reach a similar conclusion as to how this
nation's security interests might best be served, I believe
'."from:-the negotiating point of view that it would be prefer--
ablelfor-..us:to=put.forward proposals for comprehensive SALT
arrangements at Vienna. This will . help us to take control
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 : LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
of the negotiating process. We would, of course, retain
the option of agreeing to simpler quantitative arrange-
ments if that proves to be all the Soviets are interested
in or all they will agree to on our conditions.
We would of course make clear at the outset that any
comprehensive agreement would have to
(1) Cover Soviet systems which we want brought under
control as well as excluding Soviet proposals (such as a
no-transfer agreement or unacceptable restrictions on
operations of our strategic forces) which are contrary to
our interests;
(2) Include collateral restraints to make major
limitations effective and verifiable;
(3) Provide for a short duration (e.g., five years)
which reflects the experimental nature of any agreement
in such a sensitive and unprecedented arms control area
and limits our commitment to a period of time tolerable
even in the event of unexpected technological change or
unsatisfactory operation of the agreement without explicit
proof of Soviet violation.
If your decision is that the risks and uncertainties
leave you unwilling initially to authorize us to put for-
ward proposals for a comprehensive agreement, an alterna-
tive would be to propose a simple quantitative agreement,
coupled with explicit statement of our readiness to explore
actively'more comprehensive quantitative and qualitative
limitations on strategic arms -- if the Soviets are in-
terested and if we can reach agreement as to scope and
equitable balance of commitments, verification, and other
provisions such as duration.
Such a pasture would still enable us to probe Soviet
interests and positions without commitment on our part,
and would in my judgment be accepted bythe majority of
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 : LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7
? W
Cq_ngr_.essjo,nal and Allied opinion. If the Soviets indi-
cated a positive attitude on such key. issues as the
cal_later.al restraints we consider essential for verification
o-the MIRV test ban, or destruction of the major facilities
associated with their Moscow ABM system, this might weigh
importantly. in your decision as to the-risks and benefits
of : a, broad strategic arms limitation. My concern is that,
if we are not able to make specific proposals on key areas
of limitation, such as MIRVs and ABMs, we may find it
difficult to ascertain what conditions the Soviets might
agree, to.
()":_On the question of a negotiating moratorium or some
kind of temporary mutual restraint in strategic arms
development and deployment, I recommend-that-our posture
be:that we recognize the possible value of such action,
and would be prepared to consider it with regard to any
equitable package of strategic systems on which the
Soviets ey_i;dence a general interest in- reaching agreements
under conditions which would make them/verifiable.
C. , . l
SE CRET.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/21 : LOC-HAK-4-7-11-7