CHINESE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR TOWARD INSURGENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 25, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
lp 4P
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
MAR " " 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Chinese Attitudes and Behavior Toward Insurgencies
in Southeast Asia
In order to obtain a sound basis for U. S. policies in Southeast
Asia and China over the next five years, we need to obtain an
analysis of Chinese attitudes and behavior toward Southeast Asian
insurgencies.
We need a factual analysis of the details of Chinese support (money,
training, and manpower) in the 1960's for insurgents in Burma,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Special emphasis should be placed
on changes in, or the turning points of, Chinese support or involve-
ment.
In analyzing these facts in terms of an overall interpretation of what
they imply about the Chinese attitude and behavior toward Southeast
Asian insurgencies, the following issues could be addressed:
-- SNIE 13-69 (March 6, 1969) described Chinese involvement
in the Burmese insurgencies as a possible "indicator of trends in
Peking's foreign policy. " If this is true, what does the last year's
experience in Burma suggest about these trends?
-- Contrasting Chinese involvement in the insurgencies in
Thailand and Burma, what can be said about the degree to which
Chinese involvement is deterred in Thailand by the U. S. commitment
compared with Burma where there is no U.S. commitment? How has
Chinese support in Thailand varied as U.S. involvement in Thailand
has grown since 1962?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7 A.^
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
W
SECRET
-- Contrasting Chinese and North Vietnamese involvements
in Laos and Thailand, what can be said about the competitive or
complementary nature of their objectives? Are there agreed spheres
of influence and a division of labor, or is there competition? How
does one account for the decline in support for the Thai insurgency
since 1967?
-- What does the Chinese road in Laos imply about Chinese
support for Southeast Asian insurgencies?
-- How has Chinese support for insurgents varied with
government to government relations between Peking and Rangoon?
Phnom Penh? Bangkok? Vientiane?
-- Does Chinese adherence to the Maoist principle of self-reliance
limit Chinese support for Southeast Asian insurgencies? If so, how?
-- Do the Chinese support non-Communist as well as Communist
insurgencies? If so, what are Chinese objectives, stated or implied?
These questions are illustrative. There may be others that provide
a better insight into what Chinese objectives are served by supporting
Southeast Asian insurgencies. The purpose of the analysis should be
to develop that view or alternative views by working from the facts
available on past and current Chinese involvement.
We need the results of this analysis by May 15, 1970. While I think
the field should have an opportunity to contribute and comment, the
time period is clearly too short to search out new facts. Rather, the
emphasis should be on presenting those facts that are readily available
within the intelligence community. If there are gaps in our knowledge,
these can be filled in later.
(Signed) HENRY A. KISSINGER
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
;a;~TM^"?~
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
W To: Henry A. )singer
SECRET
From: Larry Lynn
Study on Chinese Attitudes Toward Southeast Asian Insurgencies
Reasons for sticking to known facts and early deadline. We have
already been into this subject to considerable depth. We know there
are substantial data on these Chinese activities. Our first objective
was to get the intelligence community to talk about these facts. What-
ever the answer, this has to be the first step. More facts will not
help if the intelligence analysts continue to ignore them and give us
the conventional wisdom instead. Our first objective is methodo-
logical.
Little will be gained by launching an ambitious research expedition
unless the intelligence community learns how to take the first few
steps. This was learned from NSSM 38. The Cambodian Sanctuary
fiasco is another example of the risks we run when we ask intelligence
analysts to tell us what they think rather than what they know.
Reasons for leaving out Malaysia and Indonesia. We considered
doing these countries and others, but excluded them. First, we
felt that the more countries we include, the more likely it is that
the intelligence community will fall back on generalizations ahd
botch the job. We prefer a sampling approach. If the intelligence
community did three countries (we asked for four) and did them
well, we would know more than we have ever known about Chinese
involvement.
a large number of countries that have nothing more in common than
a Chinese-supported insurgency, past or present. 10
We also ruled out other countries for more obvious reasons. We
think we have asked some tough questions, most of which are related
to the countries we specified (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and
Burma). We reasoned that concentration on the few countries where
these issues apply would be more productive than trying to consider
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
SECRET W
W
We felt that because Indonesia is off the mainland, Chinese
objectives there may not apply to the mainland, where we have
cause for real concern in the 1970s. Malaysia is not currently a
very active Chinese account and hasn't been since the 1950s. We
did not feel that much of -current value could be gained by studying
the 1950s. Nor did -,,,we believe that studying Malaysia in the 1960s
Would be worth-the risk of further depreciating the analysis,
eon.. sicleri.n.g that the Malaysian insurgents are now n. ostly located
in Thailand and Chinese support for them would be analyzed in the
Thailand study.
We had discussed all these issues and others with several individuals
before we drafted the final m emorandurn. We infornxal.ly asked INR
and several analysts in CIA for their views on i-nost of. the questions,
and they said they were excellent questions and should be answered.
Dick Moorsteen, who is doing some work on China for Elliot Richardson,
also looked at the questions and, besides saying Svc had upstaged hinz
on part of his study,- agreed fully with our approach. (At Moorsteen's
suggestion we added the question on Chinese support for non--Communists
insurgencies. )
RECOMMENDATION:
I have prepared two alternative memoranda. 11 1 a.h?l w e' pub;., -
origin ., proposal.wi.tl , a new clue date of May ' l ti, .1970. 1 .:Cab.B.
is a modified
dat: that includes M y.;
].970 version
t.lla.t i the i analysis is and stipulates ysls is to be
basedl on new facts as wel). as those presently available. I recommend
y`ou sign the memorandum at Tab,A.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Chinese Attitudes and Behavior Toward Insurgencies
in Southeast Asia
In order to obtain a sound basis for U.S. policies in Southeast Asia
and China over the next five years, w 'need to obtain an analysis of
Chinese attitudes and behavior tawar Southeast Asian insurgencies.
We need a factual analysis of the d~tails of Chinese support (money,
training, and manpower) in the 19 0's for insurgents in Burma,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, alaysia, and Indonesia. Special
emphasis should be placed on c anges in, or the turning points of,
Chinese support or involvemer#
In analyzing these facts in to ms of an overall interpretation of what
they imply about the Chines attitude and behavior toward Southeast
Asian insurgencies, the fol awing issues could be addressed:
-- SNIE 13-69 (Ma1ch 6, 1969) described Chinese involvement
in the Burmese insurgences as a possible "indicator of trends in
Peking's foreign policy. " If this is true, what does the last year's
experience in Burma sug est about these trends?
-- Contrasting Chinese involvement in the insurgencies in
Thailand and Burma, what can be said about the degree to which
Chinese involvement is deterred in Thailand by the U. S. commitment
compared with Burma where there is no U. S. commitment? How has
Chinese support in Thailand varied as U. S. involvement in Thailand
has grown since 1962?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
SECRET
-- Contrasting Chinese and North Vietnamese involvements
in Laos and Thailand, what can be said about the coiipetitive or
complementary nature of their objectives? Are there agreed spheres
of influence and a division of labor, or is there c(/mpetition? How
does one account for the decline in support for the Thai insurgency
since 1967? /
-- What does the Chinese road in Lags imply about Chinese
support for Southeast Asian insurgencies? i
-- How has Chinese support for i surgents varied with
government to government relations be een Peking and Rangoon?
Phnom Penh? Bangkok? Vientiane? 1akarta?
-- Does Chinese adherence to the Maoist principle of self-reliance
limit Chinese support for Southeast sign insurgencies? If so, how?
-- Do the Chinese support on-Communist as well as Communist
insurgencies? If so, what are th Chinese objectives, stated or implied?
These questions are illustrativ . There may be others that provide
a better insight into what Chin se objectives are served by supporting
Southeast Asian insurgencies. The purpose of the analysis should be
to develop that view or altern tive views by working from the facts
available on past and curren Chinese involvement.
We need the results of this 4nalysis by July 15, 1970.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
MEMORANDUM W W
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. L
INFORMATION
March 5, 1970
SUBJECT: Chinese Attitudes and Behavior Toward Insurgencies
in Southeast Asia
The Purpose
The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of a divergency
of views on the Chinese attitude and behavior toward Southeast
Asian insurgencies. This divergency has, important implications
for our Thailand policy and our general policy toward China and
Southeast Asia.
After discussing the points of contention, I recommend that you
ask Mr. Helms to initiate a study of the available facts on Chinese
involvement in Southeast Asian insurgencies and present findings
to you by April 15, 1970. At Tab A is a memo for Director Helms
which I recommend you sign.
Problem
A major assumption underlying our policy in Southeast Asia and
our general policies toward China is our view of the Chinese
attitude and behavior toward Southeast Asian insurgencies.
Everyone can agree that the Chinese support Southeast Asian
insurgencies as a means of expanding their political influence in
an area over which they believe they should have big power dominance.
But there is serious disagreement over the practical implications of
this broad Chinese attitude. At least two views have substantial
support within the government;
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
SECRET 2
- The Doctrinal. View - One view, which can be labelled
doctrinal, argues that Chinese support and involvement in Southeast
Asia insurgencies is constrained both by their ideology and by their
cautious approach. to external matters.
Those who hold the doctrinal view argue that Chinese ideology places
great emphasis on the Maoist principle of self reliance. Foreign
insurgents must prove that they can go it alone. They must first
achieve some measure of indigenous strength and political support
before they can expect substantial Chinese support. Ideological
support plus a few parsimonious handouts from China are all
insurgents can expect until they prove their indigenous strength.
The doctrinal view also argues that the Chinese are preoccupied
with the long-term task of governing China and wish to avoid major
external burdens, especially a confrontation with big powers. This
view dictates caution and suggests that Chinese support for insurgents
will be restrained.
Thus, large-scale armed shipments and certainly the direct involve-
ment of Chinese cadre as advisors or operatives in Southeast Asian
insurgencies are unlikely. Whether or not insurgencies succeed will
be determined more by indigenous conditions in Southeast Asian
nations than by Chinese support.
-- The Expansionist View - The second view sees the Chinese as
expansionists who will support Southeast Asia insurgents with abundant
resources and even Chinese cadre, if there is some hope that they will
be successful.
Therefore, the Chinese can be expected to place all the resources
behind an insurgency that can be productively employed.
Whether one accepts either of these two views or another view of
Chinese objectives in supporting insurgencies in Southeast Asia implies
greatly different program requirements for Thailand, and more
fundamentally, leads to dramatically different views on what we should
expect to happen in Thailand in the next few years. For example, will
Thailand be another Vietnam?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
SECRET 3
Likewise,our view of wider policy alternatives in Asia -- for
example, how we view broad policy alternatives such as the
desirability of closer Sino-Thai relations -- is affected by this
issue. The desired extent of our post-Vietnam base and force
presence in Southeast Asia may also turn on the same issue.
There is a substantial body of facts available against which
alternative views of Chinese objectives can be judged. For example,
there is evidence on specific details of Chinese support (money,
equipment, training, and cadre) in the 1960's for insurgents in
Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.
The memorandum for Helms at Tab A asks for an analysis of the
facts available and what those facts suggest about Chinese objectives.
The memorandum raises several issues which should be explored
by the analysis. It does not hypothesize any general view's on the
assumption these should be developed from the analysis.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH I N G T? N
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Chinese Attitudes and Behavior Toward Insurgencies
in Southeast Asia
In order to obtain a sound basis for U. S. policies in Southeast
Asia and China over the next five years, we need to obtain an
analysis of Chinese attitudes and behavior toward Southeast Asian
insurgencies.
We need a factual analysis of the details of Chinese support (money,
training, and manpower) in the 1960's for insurgents in Burma,
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Special emphasis should be placed
on changes in, or the turning points of, Chinese support or involve-
ment.
In analyzing these facts in terms of an overall interpretation of what
they imply about the Chinese attitude and behavior toward Southeast
Asian insurgencies, the following issues could be addressed;
-- SNIE 13-69 (March 6, 1969) described Chinese involvement
in the Burmese insurgencies as a possible "indicator of trends in
Peking's foreign policy. " If this is true, what does the last year's
experience in Burma suggest about these trends?
-- Contrasting Chinese involvement in the insurgencies in
Thailand and Burma, what can be said about the degree to which
Chinese involvement is deterred in Thailand by the U.S. commitment
compared with Burma where there is no U. S. commitment? How has
Chinese support in Thailand varied as U. S. involvement in Thailand
has grown since 1962?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7
SECRET 2
- Contrasting Chinese and North Vietnamese involvements in Laos and Thailand, what can be said about the competitive or
complementary nature of their objectives? Are there agreed spheres
of influence and a division of labor, or is there competition? How
does one account for the decline in support for the Thai insurgency
since 1967?
-- What does the Chinese road in Laos imply about Chinese
support for Southeast Asian insurgencies?
-- How has Chinese support for insurgents varied with
government to government relations between Peking and Rangoon?
Phnom Penh? Bangkok? Vientiane?
-- Does Chinese adherence to the Maoist principle of self-reliance
limit Chinese support for Southeast Asian insurgencies? If so, how?
-- Do the Chinese support non-Communist as well as Communist
insurgencies? If so, what are Chinese objectives, stated or implied?
These questions are illustrative. There may be others that provide
a better insight into what Chinese objectives are served by supporting
Southeast Asian insurgencies. The purpose of the analysis should be
to develop that view by working from the facts available on past and
current Chinese involvement.
We need. the results of this analysis by April 15, 1970. While I think
the field should have an opportunity to contribute and comment, the
time period is clearly too short to search out new facts. Rather, the
emphasis should be on presenting those facts that are readily available.
If there are gaps in our knowledge, these can be filled in later.
Henry A. Kissinger
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-4-7-20-7