YOUR DRAFT MESSAGE FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 27, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
V 1W r (->
TOP S n :Y4 L'![
DOS, ARMY reviews
completed.
SUBIECT*
E $l9 CRETARY OF STATE
JAifte 27, 1969
IR
Massage for Aae ss*dor Bunker
The Pr.sI baa rev ewod tbe aftcbed 4faft e>abI46 Wye
a>ag to the s.sd for a AM for Uu cage y
want* ao pyres x r to Thl" u1 2 Thtwra h"
rwtva* to eonqaMW btae prop**". At tit ttxnr
Pier ag P"" to U"Or"Iko R f Ikda"" 5"U ray Council
review of the eta,
icy A abWor
TOP SZCaET/NO .`VY' 0NLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
: AmembACTION" assy SAIGON
For Bunker from the Secretary
STATE_._ NODS/EYES ONLY
The establishment of the provisional Revolutionary Government
Mr. Green ,
TOP SECRET
their effort will diminish in the future.
(PRO) is quite clearly intended by the communists to be a major
and significant;event. Examining this move in the context of the
overall Communist strategy both on the battlefield and at the
conference table, we have concluded that it is an important step in
the direction of emphasizing political, rather than military, action
as a central element of future Communist activity.
2, While available evidence is far from conclusive, there are some
indications that the Communists, by not repeat not replacing their
casualties, may be prepared to let their military strength diminish
somewhat by attrition. If intelligence to this effect is correct, they
.could afford to do this only if their reliance on the military thrust of
EA... WBSullivan/C: RFPedersen: ms 6/17/69'
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
2. On the other hand, there is a considerable requirement for the PRG,
if it is to be taken seriously and used as a major instrument in the
political process, to gain and hold territory which it can claim as its
own. It is hardly to be expected that the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
Poland, and other such nations would name Ambassadors accredited
to the PRG who would spend their time cringing in caves or underground
bunkers in the jungles of Tay Ninh, always subject to capture or
destruction by. U. S. and Allied forces. They must have some location
that they can call a "capital, " where they can reside, as they did in
Khang Khay during the Laos fighting In 1060.62. .
4. The problem of gaining an Invulnerable piece of territory and a
1'capital", while at the same time relying less on military forces, would`
pose a real dilemma for the PRG. Even if greater reliance were to be
placed upon military force, it Is quite Improbable to expect that a
truly secure territory could be held, safe from the destructive power
of U. S. air strikes, mobile infantry, and the general ability of U. S.
and Allied forces to penetrate anywhere in South Viet-Nam, if a
decision is made to do so.
5. It would therefore appear that a way out of this dilemma might be
for the PIRG to call for a cease-fire and military standstill. We
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection
o Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
TOP SECRET
conclude that there is some prospect that such a call might be made,
even though the last private talks indicate NVN thinking at that time
a "provisional coalition government divested of all significant members
of both the GVN and the PRG and centered mainly around a weak group
coalition government. We consider it likely that several non-committed
"neutralist" Vietnamese personalities, particularly among the overseas
exiles, may have already been prepared for a willingness to respond
to such a call for a coalition arrangement with the PRG, and that a
major effort will be made to use the PRG as the element around which
such a coalition would be structured. Some of the more hard-line
(and therefore least presentable) members of the PRG might be
proposed for sacrifice, as the condition for a similar "sacrifice" by
members of the GVN. The purpose of this maneuver would be to create
to be a cease-fire after conclusion of an agreement. Viewing the PRG
in the light of Point 5 of the NLF 10 point program, we consider that
such a call for cease-fire would be linked with the demand for a
of amenable "neutralists. It
6. Such a proposal, coming from the PRG at this time, would cause
us serious problems. Political sentiment in this country, articulated
through powerful voices in both branches of our Congress, and
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
supplementedbyy broad support from outside the United States would
make it difficult for'us to reject a call for a cease-fire. ` 1'e feel that
a cease-fire In and of itself would be manageable., but we also assume
that the PRG proposal will be put forward as an "inseparable package. "
We would then be faced with the difficult task of attempting to "break"
the package, in the face of political pressure on us, both domestic
and international to accept it in order to end the war. We also assume
it might be timed to coincide with the Communist "summer offensive",
during which U. S. casualty figures would be steadily climbing as a
result of deliberate enemy targetting. Such a situation would be designed
to maximize friction between us and the GVN, as well as to force us
into negotiations on Communist terms.
~i. we have considered possible steps which might be taken to preempt
such a move and suggest the following as one we'think worth ccsidering:
8. It would be proposed that President ThIeu, after minimum consultation
with his key associates, issue a call for elections, and a cease-fire
in the following terms:
A: "The Communists have, in recent days, enacted the farce of
constituting themselves into a so-called Provisional Revolutionary
Government. Although this government has neither territory, nor a
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
w
capital, nor any popular support except from among its own ranks, a
small number 'of nations have recognized it, and apparently accept the
pretension that it has the attributes of support which it claims.
B. "In order to' expose the true attitudes of the people of SVN to
the world at large, I think it is only appropriate that the people of
South Viet-Nam be given an opportunity to express themselves freely
on the subject. I therefore propose that a clear choice be offered the
people of South Viet-Nam in the form, of a referendum. The subject
on the ballot should be the one direct question' Which do you accept
as governing system of South Viet-Nam, that of the Government of the
Republic of Viet-Nan, or that of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government?.' as it now calls itself.
ganized, perhaps, by the United Nations, with provisions for equitable
membership of each state. I would also propose that the arrangements
acceptable nations who wish to participate in an observer group, or-
C. "To assure that voting on such an issue is honest and free,
I would propose that It be supervised by representatives of mutually
and the rules for voting be worked out`
between the two sides,
through our representatives who are currently seated at the negotiating
table- In Paris.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
D. "Moreover., in order to make this exercise of free democratic
expression accessible to all the citizens of South Viet-Nam, I propose
the institution of a cease-fire or a series of local cease-fires immediately
upon the achievement of an agreement to settle the political future by
such a vote of the populace. My representatives are ready to meet, as
of today, with designated representatives of the other side to arrange
the terms of such a cease-fire or cease-fires. These representatives
could convene at some location acceptable to both sides, such as in the
southern half of the Demilitarized Zone.
E. "It should be understood in advance that both sides will be
prepared to abide by the consequences of this popular referendum.
For my part, and on behalf of my Government, I can state that, if the
popular will repudiates our system and prefers the system of the other
side, we will accept that mandate and act accordingly.
F. "I make these proposals earnestly, with the sincere conviction
that they are for the good of the people of my country, and in the
profound hope that they will be supported by men of good will everywhere
in this world.
I await with eager attention the reply
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
w
and would undertake a diplomatic and information campaign designed to
obtain maximum support for it throughout the world. We believe that it
would place a heavy onus on the other side. We have doubts that the
other side would accept the proposals, but we believe we can use the
pressures they generate to press for truly serious negotiations on terms
which would be congenial to us.
9. The United States would then promptly endorse Thieu's proposal
10. It would be our intention to have you arrange an appointment with
Thieu as soon as possible, rehearse with him the arguments contained
in-the first five paragraphs of this telegram and propose to him the
text of the statement contained in paragraph 8. We expect that your
initial approach will meet with considerable resistance, but wish you
to stress to Thieu the serious consequences we might have to face if
the Communists were to make the first move by proposing a cease-fire
coupled with a coalition.
least their "capital, " probably in some obscure southern town, but would
11. We also assume that Thieu might raise with you the prospect that
the Communists would, indeed, accept his proposal for a cease-fire,
while at the same time rejecting the proposal for a referendum. Such
a response would be'calculated to give them their ''territory," or at
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
TOP SECRET
leave them free from the humiliating exposure that would result from a
popular referendum.
12, If Thieu raises this point, you would tell him that we have considered
this possibility and recognize. it as a genuine potential. In our view, if
the terms are right, it would be an acceptable situation, and we would
be prepared to go into immediate talks to conclude a supervised cease-
fire. We feel that a cease-fire which took place in the current military
balance, with the negotiating initiative on our side, and with the Commu-
nists on the defensive politically and psychologically, would leave us in
an advantageous posture. From this position, we would feel able to
carry forward negotiations towards a political solution by elections
with confidence and with a broad base of public support both in the
United States and throughout the world.
13. You would
of course, stress to Thieu the absolute need for secrecy
In this matter. Only a handful of people in Washington are aware of
this proposal. If any hint should reach the Communists that we are
attempting to pre-empt them on this issue, they might in turn move to
pre-empt us. 'Therefore, Thieu's ability to consult with his colleagues
would have to be extremely limited both as to the numbers consulted and
the time over which such consultations can take place.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7
TOP SECRET
14. If Thieu should agree in principle with this proposal, we would
wish you to work out a date with him In the near future which would be
occasion on which he would make his statement. We believe his con-
sultations should take place in the span of just a few hours prior to
the time when his statement Is scheduled.
15. Our own Internal consultations on this matter would be similarly
limited here, We would have to consider any suggestions or modi-
fications that Thieu or you may have in a small circle of advisers, but
we would not repeat not contemplate any staff planning at all on the
consequences of this proposal. We would consult with our Allies in
the most limited way feasible,
16. In summary, we feel we are faced with a risky situation which
justifies pre-emptive action. That action itself is not without risks.
On balance, however, we feel the risks which it entails are not only
manageable, but provide us with the prospect of a net advantage. We
realize we would be confiding a most delicate assignment to you and that
Its delicacy Is compounded by the extreme requirements for security.
We regret we cannot repeat not authorize you to consult on this matter
with your colleagues, but request your views on the 44ttils of the
proposal we are contemplating for you to 'make to Thieu.
GP-1
END TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-447-2-6-7