ISRAEL'S REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ANALYSIS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-447-5-14-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

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REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 3 b 3
ISRAEL'S
Analysis of. US.. Assistance Option,
A. Israeli Requests
Israel has requested substantial assisstance from the
United States during the next five years in the form of military
equipment, technological aid and foreign exchange. Specifically,
the Israelis would like:
--- Jet aircraft. Israel has requested the sale of
25 F-4 Phantom and 100 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft (a total of approximately
$270 million), with delivery to start in 1971.
-- Other military equipment. The current Israeli re-
quests, the magnitude of their proposed arms imports during 1970-1974,
and the European reluctance to sell major military items, all indicate
the Israelis will request considerable military equipment from the U.S.
during the next five years. Specifically, they will probably attempt
to purchase additional Hawk surface-to-air missiles, tanks, armored
personnel carriers, helicopters, and electronic and communications
equipment.
Capital goods imports. Israel would like to reduce
reliance on foreign arms suppliers by achieving a substantial degree
of domestic self--sufficiency in arms production. Based on Israeli
economic foreca;;ts, they apparently plan to import a substantial
amount of capital goods, raw materials and component parts required
for production of military 'equipment. In addition, Israel is re-
questing production rights and licenses to manufacture a Variety of
U.S. military equipment.
Financial aid. Finally, Israel forecasts a short-
fall in foreign exchange of $1.2 billion during 1970-74 and has asked
for financial assistance from. the United States to close the gap.
This aid would be used to meet forecasted import requirements and
increase the level of foreign exchange reserves. Israel claims that
no additional financial aid will be required after 1974.
B. Significance of the Requests
The current Israeli requests, if approved, would have a
significant impact on the nature and the course of U.S. assistance
.policy in the Near East. Specifically, the Israelis have indicated
a desire for:
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-- More U.S. equipmment. The principal difference
between the current and previous requests is not primarily in the type
of equipment, but rather in the magnitude of the requests. The Israelis
have come to rely almost exclusively on the U.S. for modern arms and
equipment.
Production rights. The magnitude of the Israeli
requests suggests they will attempt to develop a substantial domestic
production capability, largely based on licenses to produce U.S. mili-
tary equipment. The size of this military-industrial.complex suggests
the Israelis will attempt to develop self-sufficiency in most major
military items by 1974.
Multi-year commitment. The Israeli requests strongly
suggest they seek a multi-year commitment from the U.S. to support
Israeli policy in the Near East. Previous U.S. policy has been decided
on a case-by-case basis with no future implications.
C. Key Issues for Decisions
1. What Israeli military strategy if any, should the
U.S. support?
The current Israeli strategy is to maintain the cap-
ability to absorb a well-coordinated attack by all . Arab nations
and inflict defeat on them within a short period. The U.S. must
decide whether or not to support this Israeli strategy or a less
ambitious alternative.
2. Ubat Israeli economic development strategy, if any,,
should the U.S. support?
The Israeli economic development strategy is aimed at
maintaining a full capacity growth rate of 8% without inflation
while developing the domestic production capability to be largely
self-sufficient in military equipment. The U.S. must decide whether
or not to support this Israeli development strategy of rapid growth
and growing military self-sufficency.
3. If the U.S. decides to support some Israeli military
and economic strategy, what level of U.S. assistance is appropriate?
To carry out their military and economic strategies,
the Israelis will request large amounts of military equipment, pro-
duction rights, and $1.2 billion in foreign exchange assistance over
the next five years. The U.S. must decide how to respond to these
requests. If the U.S. decides to support some Israeli strategy, we
must also decide what level of U.S. assistance is appropriate.
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4. If the U.S. decides to provide some level of assistance
to Israel during 1970-74, what is the appropriate mix of military and
economic assistance programs?
In providing assistance to the Israelis, the U.S. has
to choose among a wide variety of programs -- from military credit to
debt rollover --- which would help to meet Israeli needs.
5. If the U.S. decides to permit a wide range of Israeli
military procurement in the U.S., what policy guidelines and means
for enforcing them are necessary?
Because of Israel's intensive effort to develop domestic
military production, they will probably request export licenses or
production rights to a variety of U.S. equipment, some of which relate
to fairly sensitive equipment. Appropriate policy guidelines should
be established,to monitor these programs.
II. CURRENT MILITARY FORCES IN THE NEAR EAST
Force Comparisons. Israel's four principal Arab enemies (Egypt,
Syria, Jordan and Iraq) l/ are numerically superior to Israel in every
category of military equipment. As shown on Page 3A, the Arabs out-
number Israel six to one in army personnel, three to one in jet fighter
aircraft and artillery, and seven to one in anti-aircraft artillery.
The current-Arab/Israeli force ratios, however, are not appreciably
different from those just prior to. the June 1967 war.
Capability Comparions. In spite of the numerical advantage of
the principal Arab nations, Israel retains undisputed military superi-
ority, both on the ground and in the air. Factors contributing to this
Israeli superiority are:
1. Israeli Air Capability. Although outnumbered six to one
in supersonic aircraft and three to one overa-,.l, the Israelis maintain
absolute air superiority.
-- Many Arab aircraft are not assigned to operational
units and others are not flyable because of poor maintenance and repair
capabilities. Consequently, only about half of.the Arab aircraft are
operationally ready at any given time, compared to 85% of Israeli air-
craft. Considering only operational aircraft, the Arab numerical superi-
ority today is reduced to 3.6:1 for high performance aircraft, 1.1:1 for
medium performance aircraft and 1.8:1 overall.
1/ Throughout this paper Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq are referred
to as the principal Arab nations. References to all Arab nations
include these four plus Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Algeria.
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-PAGE S A
JUNE '67
.Arabs- / Israelis
Army Per-
sonnel (000)=-
366
Tanks
2519
Personnel
55
1123
Carriers (AP(,-) 2383 2000
Artillery
3055
AAA
2686
Fighter Aircraft
High per-
formance
280
Medium per-
formance
289
Total
569
877
534
65
140
205
NOVEMBER '69
Ratio
Arabs-I/ Israelis
Ratio
6. 7;1
376 -
65
5. 8:1
2. 2:1
3121 .
1215
2. 6:1
.1. 2:1
.2475
2000
1. 2:1
3..5:1
3175
1016
3.1:1
5..0:1
3507
534
6.6:1
4.3:1
.386
62
6.2:1
2.1.1
295
162
1.8:1
2.8:1
681
224
3.0:1
1 UAR, Syria, Jordan, Iraq.
2 /Approximately 20% of the Arab forces would be needed for internal
security missions and thus not available to fight. On the other hand,
Israel can mobilize up to 300, 000 personnel in one week.
Source: DIA.
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ARAB /ISRAELI FORCE COMPARISON
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~- In terms of combat sorties, the Israelis have
several times more capability than the Arabs. Sortie rates are
determined principally by the number of qualified pilots per air-
craft and the available technical and maintenance capability. Israel
has a substantial advantage in both categories. Current estimates
of Israeli capability indicate that on'the first day of a war, Israel
.could fly approximately 1600 combat sorties.compared to 900 for the
four Arab countries (a favorable Israeli ratio of almost two to one).
During the first week, Israel could average 1000 sorties per day
compared to 200 per day for the Arabs (five to one).
Israel's advantage is even larger in terms of
ordnance delivery capability. Based on U.S. estimates, the Israelis
could deliver about 5200 tons of air ordnance on the first day com-
pared to 1150 tons for the Arabs (five to one). During the first
week of fighting, Israel could deliver 2900 tons per-day compared
to 300 tons per day for the Arabs (ten to one).
In addition to those quantifiable factors, the
Israeli air force has some distinct qualitative advantages over the
Arabs. Israel has approximately 450 combat qualified pilots (about
two per aircraft) while the Arab nations have only 375 (one for every
two aircraft) not all of whom are qualified to fly combat missions.
Long flying hours, excellent training, and years of actual combat
experience have made Israeli pilots among the best in the world. On
the other hand, Arab pilots are poorly trained and lack the experience
and self--confidence of the Israelis. In air to air combat, the
Arab./Israeli loss ratio is approximately fifty to one. The overall
combat loss ratio (to all causes) is five to one.
2. Israeli Ground Force Capability. Numerical comparisons
of Arab/Israeli ground forces also understate Israel's military cap-
ability.
Although outnumbered six to one in active duty
.army personnel, Israel could mobilize to a total of 310,000 well-
trained troops within one week. On the other hand, the. Arabs have
only limited mobilization capability and could probably field a force
.of approximately 400,000 troops in an emergency (compared to 366,000
at present). Moreover, many of the Arab conscripts would likely be
poorly trained and motivated.
The Arabs have a three to one numerical advantage
in field artillery. However, the Arab artillery is highly vulnerable
to Israeli air strikes in an offensive role and would be of little
advantage unless Israel lost air superiority. Although outnumbered
seven to one in AAA, the Israelis-believe their present AAA, Hawk
missiles and interceptor aircraft provide an effective air defense
.system.
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The principal factor restricting the size of the
Arab forces is the limited supply of personnel that are physically
and mentally qualified to operate modern military equipment. The
major Israeli constraint is the quantity, rather than the quality,
of available manpower.
3. Arab Coordination. The degree of coordination and
cooperation assumed to exist between the principal Arab forces is
the key factor affecting Israeli force requirements. Poor coordination
was a principal cause of the Arab failure in 1967 when the Israelis
fought and defeated one Arab nation at a time. Since that time, the
principal Arab nations have formed a Supreme Command to coordinate
operations and separate commands to control the Eastern and Western
fronts. However, there is no evidence of effective coordination to
date, and the Arab nations continue to regard each other with dis-
trust. The Arabs are concerned with defense of their own frontiers
and will probably depend solely on their own resources in the next
confrontation.
III. ALTERNATIVE ISRAELI FORCE POSTURES
Introduction
The military forces desired by Israel will be determined by
(1) Israeli military objectives and (2) the size and capability of
the Arab forces. Different Israeli strategies and Arab capabilities
would require military forces of different sizes and compositions.
At the same time, the capability the Arabs try to build is integrally
related to Israeli military capability. This interrelationship leads
to the cycle of action and reaction that has characterized the Arab/
Israeli arms race since the mid-1950s.
This paper estimates Israeli force requirements under different
assumptions about Israel's military strategy and the speed of the
Near East arms escalation. While any set of :finite alternatives
ignores the dynamic nature of the arms race, it does not mean the
action/reaction cycle will disappear. It clearly will not. However,
the alternative strategies available to the Israelis and the Arab
.responses selected in this analysis establish a range within which
the arms race will probably fluctuate.
One note of caution. The analysis estimates the nature and
the magnitude of the military aid Israel will probably require from
external sources to implement each alternative strategy. The estimates
assume that, given the current international environment, the United
States will be the sole supplier of major military equipment to Israel.
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To the extent that this assumption is wrong, the U.S. arms sales
needed to implement each strategy should be reduced accordingly.'
For example, if the French released their embargo on Israel's fifty
Mirage 5 aircraft, the requirement for U.S. supersonic aircraft would
be substantially reduced.
Alternative Israeli Strategies.
. . Israeli force requirements have been developed to support
three alternative military strategies:
1. Current Israeli Strategyis (a) to maintain the ability
to absorb an Arab attack and then defeat any combination of forces from
all the Arab nations within three weeks, 1/ and (b) to demonstrate the
ability to retaliate against Arab raids, guerrilla actions, and sabotage
so severely as to end them.
2. Alternative Strategy #1 is to maintain sufficient mili-
tary capability to defeat, within three weeks, a coordinated attack
by Syria, Jordan, Iraq and the UAR.
3. Alternative Strategy #2 is to maintain sufficient mili-
tary capability to defeat,. within three weeks, an attack by the
UAR followed by uncoordinated attacks from Jordan, Syria and Iraq.
Several important definitions and qualifications should be
remembered In analyzing these alternative Israeli strategies:
-- First, the Current Israeli Strategy represents our
best approximation of Israel's present military strategy based on
existing capabilities; arms requests, and recant military statements.
It does not necessarily reflect the strategic concepts of Israel's
defense planners.
- Second, Alternative Strategies #1 and #2 represent
slightly less ambitious levels of Israeli military capability developed
for use in this analysis.
Third, these alternative strategies do not preclude
the Israelis from adopting one that is entirely unrelated. However,
the actual Israeli strategy will probably fall within the range de-
fined by .these three strategies.
Athree week period was chosen for illust:-ative purposes and to
indicate that Israel plans to fight a short war. Israeli and
Arab military supplies, POL, and ammunition could not sustain a
full-scale war for longer than 3-4 weeks.
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-- Fourth, the strategies do not necessarily indicate
what the Israelis will actually do under different circumstances;
they merely define the range of what they could do if they so desired.
The strategies establish broad limits of capability, not intentions.
Within any strategy the Israelis would have sufficient military
capability to a^complish a variety of military objectives. For ex-
ample, under the Current Israeli Strategy, they could (a) defeat a
coordinated Arab attack, (b) launch preemptive attacks on any Arab
nation and (c) punish Arab guerrilla operations through attacks on
key cities or installations.
Alternative Arab Responses
Two possible Arab responses to each alternative Israeli strategy
have been defined as follows:
1. Alternative Response #1 is to improve the quality and
operational capability of the Arab forces by providing training and
replacement equipment without increasing current force levels.
2. Alternative Response 462 is to increase force levels as
rapidly as Arab manpower, technical and training capabilities would
permit and as rapidly as-would be militarily useful.
These alternative Arab responses should be viewed in light
of the following limitations:
They represent two arbitrary responses selected from
an infinite! number of possible Arab (and Soviet) alternatives. They
do, however approximate meaningful upper and lower bounds of Arab
activity.
-?- The response desired by the Arabs may not be supported
by the Soviet Union or other potential arms suppliers.
The Arab response will be influenced significantly by
the strategy the Israelis choose to pursue.
Alternative Israeli Force Structures
Enclosure II shows a detailed set of forces required in 1974
for each alternative Israeli strategy and Arab response.
--? Forces under the Current Israeli Strategy represent
our best estimate of what the Israelis believe they will need to im-
plement their strategy. They are based primarily on current force
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levels,, requests already submitted and estimates of future requests.
The estimates have not .been coordinated with Israeli defense planners.
- Forces shown for each of the two alternative Israeli
strategies represent U.S. estimates of the forces required to im-
plement the strategy. Unlike the Current Strategy, the forces do not
represent what we believe the Israelis would request; they are U.S.
projections of what they would need to implement each strategy.
--~ The forces shown are illustrative only. They are not
the only forces that could successfully implement each strategy. They
.do, however, represent reasonable estimates of the forces required
under alternative Israeli strategies and Arab responses.
1. Aircraft Requirements. Israeli aircraft requirements have
been estimated on the basis of alternative Arab inventories, historical
performance factors, and estimates of future capabilities. Arab/
Israeli aircraft ratios used in the analysis are shown below. On
the basis of current ratios, the Israelis have unquestioned air superi-
ority. However, Arab capability is expected to improve by 1975 as
aircraft operational rates increase (from 50% to 60%), pilot quality
improves due to training and combat experience., and sortie rates in-
crease as a result of better maintenance and technical personnel. On
.the other hand, Israeli air capability should also increase as pilot
and maintenance quality improve and if additional U.S. F-4 and A-4
aircraft are added to the inventory. The Arab/Israeli aircraft ratios
shown below should be sufficient to.carry out the alternative Israeli
strategies.
Current
Ratio
Current
Israeli
Strategy
-
Alternative
Strategy #1
Alternative
Strategy #2
High
Performance
6.2:1
4.0:1
5.0:1
? 6.0:1
Medium
Performance.
1.8:1
1.2:1
1.7:1
2.0:1
Total.
3.0:1
2.4:1
3.3:1
3.9:1
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Israeli requirements for procurement of foreign jet air-
craft under each alternative strategy and Arab response are shown
below. These estimates include aircraft needed for force expansion,
attrition and obsolesence (see Enclosures III and IV).
ISRAELI. REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. AIRCRAFT 1,
Number of U.S. Aircraft
Arab Response #1 Arab Res onse #t2
Current Strategy NA 2/
Alternative Strategy #1
Alternative Strategy #2 2 40
1/ Aircraft required in addition to currently scheduled deliveries.
2/ Not applicable. The current Israeli strategy assumes increased
Arab force levels.
2. Tanks. The Arab countries could nct effectively utilize
many more tanks than they have at present. Hcwever, the Israelis
have already indicated a desire to purchase 250 M-60 tanks over
the next few years. They probably contemplatE a force increase of
up to 100 additional tanks, and the remaining 150 would be-used to,
modernize existing forces on a one-for-one basis. No increase in
tank forces would be required under the alterrative strategies, but
replacement and modernization would require approximately 100 tanks
during 1970-74.
3. Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). There is some indi-
cation the Israelis would like to increase their overall ground mobility
by increasing their APC forces from 2000 at present to approximately.
6000 by 1974. The two alternative Israeli strategies would not require
additional APCs, but modernization and attrition would require about
2000 APCs during 1970-74.
4. Hawk Missiles. The Israelis will probably request an
additional Hawk battalion (18 launchers and 160 missiles). This
equipment would probably also be necessary under the highest Arab
response (Response #2) for each alternative Israeli strategy.
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5. Helicopters. Israel is thought to be interested in pur-
chasing additional U.S. transport helicopters. They are also anxious
to develop a helicopter gunship capability. No additional helicopters
are required under either of the alternative Israeli strategies.
The following table summarizes the dollar value of Israeli
import requirements under each alternative strategy and Arab response
(see Enclosure V).
TOTAL ISRAELI ARMS IMPORTS REQUIREMENTS
(1970-1974)
Total Value ($ Millions)
Arab Response #1 Arab. Response #2
Current Strategy NA
Alternative Strategy #1 280
.Alternative Strategy #2 200
390
Impact of Alternative Strate jLes
1. Israeli Military Capability
The Current Israeli Strategy provides convincing deter-
rence of a full--scale-Arab attack. Israel would have sufficient mili-
tary capability to defeat any combination of Arab states and maintain
air superiority at least through 1974. Israrll could, at will, attack
any principal Arab nation with a punitive strike. Israel would be
able to sustain the present, or increased, levels of retaliatory
raids indefinitely.
-- Alternative Israeli Strategy 461 provides convincing
deterrence to a coordinated attack by Syria, Jordan, Iraq and the
UAR. Israeli air superiority is retained through 1974, and Israel
could probably sustain the current conflict for the foreseeable future.
The principal differences between the Current Strategy and Alternative
#1 are that: (a) Alternative 461 assumes the worst possible case
would involve a coordinated attack by four (n