CIA ESTIMATE OF CHINESE INTENTIONS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-448-1-18-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 28, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-448-1-18-4
REC'A FROM C~a ON L FOR FILE
NO INDICATION OF ORIGINATOR OR ADDRESSEE'S
'III PIN UP ACTION, nt,ST?. OR DISTRIBUTION......,..
T 00P ?'G,'? V-VCODEWORt ATTACHED
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
John H. Roldrtdge
ACTION
,,,May 28, 1970
NSS Review
Completed.
MORI
f UBsCf,T: CIA Estimate of Chinese Intentions in Indochina
CIA has prepared an estimate as to what the Chinese %nay do in
Indochina, at our request.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached memorand to the President.
'PO 9 i6- EVCQDEW%'RD ATTACHED
JHH: LG:mlr:5 /28/70
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-448-1-18-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-448-18-4
INFORMATION
TOP S ECItET /CODEWORD ATTACKED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: CIA Estimate of Chinese Intentions in Indochina
There have been recurrent rumors, some of them probably inspired
by Hanoi, that Chinese troops either are or will soon be engaged in
Laos and Cambodia.
At our request, CIA has prepared an estimate of the possibility of
deeper Chinese involvement in Indochina (Tab A).
The CIA estimate, with which I agree, is that the Chinese will not
change their present cautious policy of encouraging and aiding the
North Vietnamese while they carefully keep out of the line of fire.
The estimate discounts ti, rumors of a Chinese presence, aside from
the 8, 000-10, 000 engineer troops in North Vietnam and AAA, security
and road building forces of some 10, 000. 14, 000 in northwestern Laos.
Chinese military dispositions near the border areas are defensive in
nature, and the trend has been to thin out the border forces, if anythin
The continuing willingness of Hanoi to pursue a policy of protracted
war, plus the fortunate accident that placed Sihanouk in their hands,
both serve Peking's strategy and aid it in competition with the Sovietet
for influence over Communist movements in Southeast Asia. Peking
probably does not believe that our entry into Cambodia has imperiled
Hanoi's ability to maintain its policy and continue the war. Under this
combination of circumstances, Peking must believe that things are going
they wall and that it has little reason to change its policies.
Attachment
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHED
JHH: LG:mlr:5/28/70
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-448-1-18-4