THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ON CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-448-2-11-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 17, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-448-2-1 1 -0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
rp SD-iE-r/SENSITIVE
NODIS/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR
June 17, 1970
The Honorable. U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Honorable David Packard
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: The President's Views on Cambodia
The attached summary of the President's views on Cambodia,
which he expressed at the June 15 WSAG meeting, only for your personal use and should not be distributedsolutely
elsewhere.
Attachment
T P i rSENSITIVE
NODIS/EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS /EYES ONLY
Washington Special Actions Group Meeting
with the President
Monday, June 1_5L.1970
White House Situation Room
The President has directed that the following summary of his views
on Cambodia as expressed to the June 15 WSAG meeting be circu-
lated to all principals in that meeting on an "Eyes Only" basis. He
wishes to underline his determination that we take a postive,
imaginative approach to these problems.
Cambodia's Importance
It is our national policy to preserve the neutrality and
integrity of Cambodia.
-_ It is important for such countries as Indonesia, Thailand
and Laos to know that we are standing firm; we must keep the
psychological factor in mind.
~- The Cambodian situation is somewhat comparable to
Laos in March, where our close decisions on air power and the
helped reverse the situation despite the contrary
judgment of many.
-- We have already accomplished a great deal in Cambodia 25X1
with our attacks on the Communist sanctuaries and supplies; we now
have to.ask what more Cambodia is worth to us and what we can
afford to risk, keeping in mind that if Cambodia falls, we will in
any event have to assume some of the responsibility.
-- There is a two-fold advantage in keeping Cambodia
independent: (1) to assure the goals of Vietnamization by denying
use of Sihanoukville and the sanctuaries by the other side, and
(2) to prevent a serious psychological impact if things went the
other way.
-- Together with other countries we must shore up
Cambodia psychologically and militarily; we must take whatever
heat is necessary rather than being passive and fail through not
trying.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS /EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/NODIS /EYES ONLY
Everyone should take a confident line with the press
and in backgrounders. The line that "Cambodia is doomed" must
be stopped.
Arms Supply
-- The Cambodian army should receive arms to the extent
that we could supply them, and we should have a greater sense of
urgency; it is psychologically important to the Cambodians to know
that we are helping.
We should get the Indonesians involved, such as
following up Suharto's suggestion of a modest program of their pro-
viding Soviet arms in return for modernization by us.
Intelligence
- We need to know more of what is going on; our intelligence
must be adequate since so much depends on our assessments.
- It appears that the North Vietnamese are staging hit-and-
run raids to create apprehension in Phnom Penh, but that they do not
have too much muscle or staying power.
Third-Country Assistance
-- He recognizes the legal problems nvolvement, 25X1
but even opposition Senators recognize the principle ol Asians helping
Asians. It should be encouraged.
- Our assistance to the South Vietnamese, Thai, Indonesians,
etc., might be costly, but they need our economic help and psycho-
logically the effect would be positive.
Diplomatic, Action
-- The Djakarta Conference was one of the best things which
had occurred recently, but there should be more attention paid to
the Conference 'and the fact that 11 Asian nations had gathered to be
of assistance.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/NODIS /EYES ONLY
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'
~ ~''~
SEC /SENSI'1"IVE/NODTS/EYES OI~
The diplomatic im
pact of this Conference
an Soviets,
restrain the North Vietnamese might also who Chinese may want an internationa
l conferee e on flaoC cast to the
hina.
There is a need for an international conference on
Cambodia.
South Vietnamese Forces
While the first responsibility of the South Vietnamese
forces is in South Vietnam, the situation there would difficult if Cambodia were completely under Communist ontrol.ore
loose Therefore, the South Vietnamese forces should be ke
, both now and after June 30, to -react to North Vi pt
actions in Cambodia. zetnamese
Possible South Vietnamese actions are one of the main
to North Vietnam; this deterrent effect must n
be maintained.
`- South Vietnamese forces should undertake offensive
spoiling actions,
M Y s
He believes it is understood what we would do between
now and July 1, and that after July 1
diction. , we would continue our inter-
This interdiction should be interpreted broadly and it is
very important that everybody in the Defense Department realizes
this. `- It is necessary to take some' risks now regarding
opinion in order to see that Cambodia maintains its neutrality public
independence, - and
Conclusion
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS/EYES ONLY
-- We must think in positive terms, particularly on the
military and supply fronts where we have been thinking too defe '
nsxv
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W . W
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/ NODIS /EYES ONLY
There must be a daily report on what we are doing
concerning Cambodia in the diplomatic, intelligence, military and
supply fields.
fields.
He will continue to watch developments closely in these
It is worth taking risks.
Our objective is more to maintain a non-Communist,
independent government rather than backing any particular government.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /NODIS[EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-448-2-1 1 -0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-448-2-1 1 -0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-448-2-1 1 -0