WHAT HAPPENS IF THINGS GO SOUR IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-448-8-21-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 20, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

MEMORANDUM
NATIO1AL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
November 20, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
three different ways in which I think things might conceivably start
Drawing on experience from the 1963-68 period, I have sketched out
How Things Could Go wrong
to unravel in South Vietnam within the next year. They are:
A political crisis in South Vietnam coinciding with the
S.VN presidential campaign;
Serious military setbacks in. I and. II Corps;
Overextension of GVN resources in Cambodia.
THROUGH: Richard T. Kennedyx
FROM: John D. Negropont
SUBJECT: What Happens If Things Go Sour in South Vietnam?
Introduction
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second part discusses measures we might consider taking if and when
This paper deals first with how things could go wrong in SVN. The
they actually do.
hold out against almost any military contingency (viz, the Tet offensive).
forecasts. However, I confess. a personal bias at the outset. This is
the belief that., with army unity and political stability, the GVN can
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The scenarios are illustrative only and not intended to be taken as
RVNAF effectiveness, etc.).
unrest, revolving door governments, neglect of countryside, declining
from November .1963 to May 1966 may be upon us again (e, g. , urban
again within RVNAF, the whole cycle of instability which we witnessed
The converse simply isn't true. If a power struggle develops once
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Urban Discontent and Political Instability Coinciding with the
1971 Presidential Election Campaign
.1971 could be a highly disruptive year politically. The ingredients for
trouble are already present: the militant Buddhists have staged a
minor comeback through victory of their slate in the Senate elections;
Tram Van Don and other older generals are working on "Big" Minh's
presidential candidacy;. General Ky is again making noises to the
effect that he will run and according to some intelligence reports, is
saying Thieu should step out of his way; several key national issues
contain tremendously divisive potential depending on how they are
actually handled (e. g., the Paris talks, the economy, etc. ).
A.
The key element in this kind of deteriorating situation would be army
disunity. If, for example, two candidates with current ties to the
military such as Ky and Thieu were to each make bids for the Presi-
dency, then the bitter power struggles of the past might develop again;
civilian political groups such as the Buddhists might succeed in
fomenting urban unrest either at their own initiative because they
felt the army and administration would be too divided to move against
them or because they were being manipulated by one or another of the
rival military factions. This sequence of events might then lead to the
kind of preoccupations with Saigon politics so characteristic of 1964 and
early 1.965, a retrenchment of ARVN units from the countryside and
general administrative paralysis. GVN countryside control figures
would fall off dramatically, leaving territory, population, and resources
to the NVA/VC for whatever follow-up military measures they may
wish to take.
It could be argued that "Big" Minh's candidacy might have similarly
divisive effects; but arguing against the proposition would be the
fact that he has been out of power for more than six years now, he
does not have extensive ties with present military commanders, and
his principal support will likely come from I Corps Buddhists and
liberal Delta Southerners whose combined showing in support of
civilians Suu and Huong in the 1967 presidential elections was not
very impressive.
There are, of course, variants to the scenario sketched out above
which could be equally destabilizing. Thieu could, for example,
decline to run again and refuse to back any one candidate as a
successor, again raising the spectre of a divisive power struggle
in the Army. He could be assassinated, with the same results. He
could conceivably make political concessions to the PRG in Paris
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unacceptable to a substantial part of the military establishment.
in all of these cases, the pattern of deterioration in schematic
terms would look something like this.
Army Disunity-* Urban Unrest- -; Deterioration in Control
of Countrysi,de? NVA/VC Offensive Preparations
The foregoing was, in my judgment, essentially the pattern of
events in South Vietnam from Diem's downfall in November 1963
until June of 1965 when the Directory of 10 Generals (with Thieu
as Chief of State and Ky as Premier) took over.
B. Serious Military Setbacks in I and II Corps
The NVA/VC could, even in the absence of any political developments
in their favor on the national level, conceivably take to the offensive
in lower I Corps and northern II Corps (Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and
Phu Yen and the neighboring mountain provinces of Kontum and
Pleiku). These are traditional communist strongholds and pressure
points; they are close to Laotian lines of supply; and severe setbacks,
particularly along the Binh Dinh/Pleiku axis (Route 19) would entail
the risk of "dividing the country in two, " to use the expression that
was in vogue in 1965. The control picture in Binh Dinh (Vietnam's
largest province with about 1 million people) is already not too bright
and, with declining U. S. force commitments, the strategically located,
though thinly populated, adjacent highland provinces might prove
difficult for RVNAF to cover.
,given the declining U. S. involvement- -probably greater than during
retaliatory measures against the North and those who argue that more
than ever before the military realities of the situation require serious
efforts to accommodate the communists politically. The pressures
on Thieuwould be great, and the demands on his leadership qualities--
might generate at the national level. Political opinions might
polarize, as they have in the past, between those who favor a "war
government, " declaring a national emergency and GVN (and/or U. S.)
It is difficult to speculate what political pressures this contingency
thus jeopardizing solid gains achieved in the south.
I have difficulty pursuing this scenario much further. My own guess
is that a concerted enemy effort in the areas mentioned could lead
to plummeting control figures in the affected areas and the isolation
of I Corps from the rest of the country. It would also force the GVN
to consider redeploying assets from the Saigon and Delta areas northwards,
the 1968 Tet offensive.
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4 Control Losses in Countryside
Conflicting Pressures to Retaliate or Accommodate
Political instability
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Schematically a deterioration along these lines might look like this:
to save its rear or saving Phnom Penh and facing the prospect of
dramatic losses in its own countryside. In the confusion and
pressure of events, it might end up losing on both counts anyway.
As in the case of Contingency B, it is difficult to guess what
immediate effects this scenario might have on political stability in
The GVN might then be faced with the choice of losing Phnom Penh
C. Overextension of GVN Resources in Cambodia
Cambodia could become a serious soft spot for the GVN. Were the
enemy to make a major push in Cambodia, perhaps even threatening
Phnom Penh, there would be pressure on the GVN to help save the
situation. Resources would most likely have to be from. III or IV
Corps, with attendant risks to gains achieved there over the past
couple of years. If I were a planner in Hanoi, I think this is a
strategy I would seriously consider -- a division size threat to
populated rice growing areas in Cambodia designed to suck ARVN
resources away from Vietnam, then regimental or larger-size
moves against province capitals in III.Corps or even a Tet- style
attack against Cholon.
A variant on this contingency would be large scale NVA/VC
operations in Cambodia, followed by attacks in the areas
mentioned in Contingency B (Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, et cetera) - -
in effect, whipsawing the GVN as U. S. combat inputs decline.
Saigon.
What We Could Do
assumptions of this section are (1) we would not want to consider
a simple "bug-out" solution,. yet (2) we would not want to consider
and what some of the political postures are which we might consider
taking both diplomatically and vis-a-vis U. S. opinion. Two working
the context of what we might do on the ground to save the situation
This section of my paper discusses each contingency separately in
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reintroduction of U. S. combat troops. This administration has
pursued a policy of steady redeployments and reversal of this
trend would involve unacceptable domestic political costs.
An important consideration throughout is the fact that the contin-
gencies visualized, should any one of them occur, will be taking
place against the background of pre-election activity in the U. S.
Bi-partisan support of whatever course we choose will be an ob-
jective but one which might be very difficult to achieve in certain
circumstances. I have attempted to sort out those contingencies
and options which I be lieve are susceptible of bi-partisan support
and those which are less so.
Another important consideration is that, in any fast-moving military
contingency, diplomatic action, to the extent that it can be effective,
will be confined to the parties immediately concerned. Multi-
lateral diplomatic efforts involving countries not directly engaged
in the fighting will not be useful in the short-term.
Contingency A. (Urban Discontent and Political Instability)
(a) Steps in Vietnam: In considering this contingency I assume
that GVN stability is essential to success of Vietnamization and
our redeployment schedule. Thieu's reelection of 1971 for another
4-year term would thus appear to be very. much in our interest.
If Thieu decides to run, I think we should back him covertly by
discouraging potential rival military candidates such as Ky.
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In the unlikely event Theiu steps down, we should urge him to throw the
advantages of his incumbency to a candidate acceptable to the military.
In the event of urban unrest, I think we should encourage the GVN in
whatever measures it takes to deal with the situation swiftly and firmly.
If political crisis persisted nonetheless, we would then be faced with the
urgent issue of how the crisis affected our redeployment schedule. Our
dilenuna would be that the deteriorating countryside conditions might
logically call for delay or cessation of redeployment of remaining combat
troops, if any, to help the GVN ride out any such contingency while there
would be other pressures on us to disengage even more rapidly. If we
chose to delay redeployments to help stabilize matters, we would want
to convey to the GVN some time limit to put their house in order, after
which. our, redeployments would resume at their original schedule.
(b) Public Posture: This contingency strikes me as a most
difficult one. in terms of U. S. opinion. The guts of the problem would be
that, in the eyes of public opinion, American boys are out there fighting
communists while Vietnamese nationalists are tied up fighting each other.
Prolonged political crisis could lead to revulsion towards our whole
remaining effort by erstwhile supporters of our policy; and would
certainly lead to chants of "I told you so" by the critics. In brief, the
threatened viability of the GVN could result in a surge of public doubt
concerning our residual efforts out there.
which the political crisis has had on the situation in the countryside.
If we opt for delaying U. S. troops redeployments to help stabilize the
situation,. I think generating broad bi-partisan support would be difficult
and the President himself might wish to avoid staking out a firm public
position. We would want to play the situation as a "temporary setback"
to Vietnamization, leaving the public handling of unpleasant news
regarding delayed redeployments to DOD. In backgrounders and in
private White House dealings with the Hill we would want to emphasize
(a) the temporary nature of the delay which will not affect our longer-
range plans and (b) that in the last analysis it is incumbent on the
Vietnamese themselves to prove the viability of their regime and our
actions can only serve to temporarily offset the adverse consequences
our redeployment schedule.
possible; and we would state that these political difficulties do not affect
statements that we hope the difficulties can be solved as promptly as
If we opt for continued redeployments in this contingency, our predicament
with respect to public opinion is less difficult. Our public posture on the
GVN's political difficulties would be relatively aloof, confined perhaps to
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(c) Diplomatic Posture: On the negotiating front, with or without an
internal GVN crisis, we are always faced with Communist insistence on
negotiating away the GVN's existence directly with the U. S. In the event
of persistent internal political difficulties in Saigon, I would foresee no
change in our present position, although pressure to settle political
issues directly with Hanoi would intensify from some quarters in the U. S.
In this contingency, it does not seem that a diplomatic initiative towards
any third country would serve a useful purpose.
Contingency B. (Military Setbacks in I and II Corps)
The GVN has lived with seemingly intolerable military situations in the
past and can probably do so again, providing the political leadership in
Saigon does not panic or otherwise come unglued. No matter what
option we chose to pursue, one of the first tasks at hand would be to
counter impressions -- which would likely develop in the U. S. and
elsewhere -- that everything was lost and Vietnamization a complete
failure. If the GVN could ride out the Tet offensive, as it eventually did,
without increased U. S. involvement, then it can probably ride out any
contingency in I and II Corps.
(1) Public Posture: In the public affairs field, we would want to
consider playing this as a "temporary" setback to Vietnamization,
recalling past GVN recoveries from even more substantial NVA/VC
pushes such as Tet; we would probably want to blame events on increased
infiltration illustrative of enemy bad faith while the U. S. had been taking
steps to wind down the war and, depending on the military and diplomatic
options we were considering, warn of the consequences these develop-
meats might have both on the ground and at the Paris talks.
How opponents of the U. S. Administration might play this one in a
pre-election atmosphere is obviously difficult to predict. They could
exploit it no matter what course we chose. However, unlike Contingency
A (political instability), blame could be placed squarely on Hanoi's
intensification of military efforts in marked contrast to our own record
of de-escalatory measures and to that extent bi-partisan support might
be easier, to generate.
In seeking support for whatever countermeasures we might take, we
would want to stress our reasonable approach as evidenced by the
President's October 7 proposal, contrasting it with Hanoi's belligerent
attitude. If we chose to delay redeployments, efforts would have to be
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made to persuade Congressional leadership of both houses that Hanoi's
actions called for a show of firmness on our part. Key members of
past administrations might be susceptible to similar persuasion under
the circumstances (LBJ, Vance, Acheson). I do not, however, believe
that efforts to gain. bi-partisan support for dramatic retaliatory measures
such as an invasion of South Laos or a 1-3 day bombing campaign of NVN
(discussed below under Military Steps) would be successful and we would
simply have to weigh the risks of public outcry at home against estimated
advantages of pursuing that course on the ground.
(a) Continue Redeployments: This is one of the two principal
options. Within it we would have some latitude, however. We could,
for example, lift some of the operational constraints on remaining
combat forces, thus risking higher casualties but perhaps increasing
their effectiveness. Or we could keep withdrawing our forces -- but
examine ways in which we might alter the ratio of remaining combat to
support troops so that a higher proportion would be for combat. (The
feasibility of this latter option declines steadily as our combat forces
are withdrawn and the role of remaining support forces is progressively
confined to that of supporting RVNAF. The more this happens the more
difficult it is to alter the "mix'.1 of our combat and support forces without
adversely affecting our support for Vietnamese combat troops. )
Meanwhile, the GVN would not be without resources to deal with
the situation, although we would have to recognize that difficulties in
I and Ii Corps might cause them to divert resources away from Cambodian
border operations and/or the Delta.
There would be variants within the overall framework of
continued U. S. redeployment. An RVNAF invasion into the sanctuaries
of southern Laos is a possibility whose general merits are apparently
(2) Military Steps:
being explored in the military strategy section of NSSM 99. 1 don't have
any personal feel for the military merits or demerits of such an operation.
Another variant would be some kind of brief bombing campaign
over North Vietnam designed to create uncertainties in Hanoi about our
intentions and raise the spectre of a resumed full-scale bombing campaign
if they do not desist. The difficulty here lies in the debatable effectiveness
of any bombing campaign plus the fact that if we wanted to make the threat
implied in a brief bombing campaign credible, we would have to be
genuinely prepared to take even firmer military measures.
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them to pursue such tactics further.
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(b) Stop Redeployments: The other principal option would be
to stop redeployment of U. S. forces. The GVN would welcome this, and
Hanoi would be frustrated in achieving what is now its first priority,
e. g., complete U. S. troop withdrawal. The shift in policy would be
unpopular at home, but the argument would have to be made that continued
withdrawals in the face of this kind of enemy activity would only encourage
Under this option, variants such as those listed under (a) above
would also be possible -- that is, retaliatory measures against southern
Laos with South Vietnamese ground troops or a short-term bombing
campaign against NVN. Lifting operational constraints on remaining
U.S. forces, as well as upping the ratio of U.S. combat to support
troops, could also be considered.
(3)
Diplomatic Steps:
Offensive military activity by Hanoi of the type considered in this
contingency would be designed to embarrass us by demonstrating that
Vietnamization couldn't work and to pressure us into changing our
negotiating stance on withdrawals and/or coalition government.
having been rewarded and they might be encouraged to simply wait for
further changes in our position without any compromising steps of their
Under the military option of continued redeployments, we might want to
move our private negotiating position closer to accepting their demand
for a fixed withdrawal date of our forces. The quid pro quo could be a
cease-fire followed by a tacit "understanding" on mutual NVA troop
withdrawals. This approach could have the short-term effect of
de-escalating the fighting and persuading Hanoi that we are moving
towards a position more conciliatory to its interests. The difficulty
this posture is that Hanoi would perceive its military escalation as
own.
offers for participation by indigenous communists in the electoral
process, etc.). A sign of movement on the GVN's part in this delicate
area might serve to cool.the fighting and facilitate our disengagement.
It might. also serve to break the ice on internal political issues -- since
neither side's flexibility on these has ever really been put to the test. On
a, stiff negotiating position on military matters but urge the GVN to be
more forthcoming on internal political ones (amendment of Article IV of
the Constitution which bans all forms of communist activity, concrete,
Another possibility under the redeployment option would be to maintain
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the other hand, the GVN would perceive this as a risky and potentially
explosive course, and particularly difficult to discuss under intensified
military pressure.
Under our military option of stopping U. S. redeployments, it would seem
logical to pursue our present negotiating tactics. One modification might
be to urge the GVN to be more forthcoming on internal political matters
while maintaining a firm stand on military issues. The rationale under-
lying this approach would be for the GVN to seek to strike a political
bargain from a position of relative strength, e. g., with continued or
increased U. S. military support. Given present GVN attitudes on the
issue of accommodation, this approach would probably require substantial
arm-twisting on our part.
Under this latter option we would want to warn Hanoi both publicly and
privately of the futility of and risks involved in their efforts to resolve
the conflict through increased application of force. If we are contem-
plating an invasion of South Laos or a brief bombing campaign over
North Vietnam, we might consider warning them privately in advance
that the President is considering "strong and effective" measures unless
they desist within a certain time frame -- say, 72 hours. We might
also want to parallel any such diplomatic move vis-a-vis Hanoi with
an approach to the Soviets.. However, I personally doubt that our
message will be rendered any more effective through a Soviet interme-
diary. In Paris in the past they have been "helpful" to us only on minor
tactical matters and never when larger interests were involved.
Contingency C. (Overextension of GVN Resources in Cambodia)
I have difficulties in my own mind sorting out how problems for us would
differ in this contingency as opposed to Contingency B (Military Setbacks
in I and II Corps). . Some of the problems would clearly be the same --
i.e., the issue of U. S. troop redeployments, the possibility of
retaliatory measures against Southern Laotian staging areas and a
possible short-term bombing campaign against North Vietnam. The
public affairs aspect might be quite different. If the GVN were to
intervene heavily in Cambodia and then be dealt stunning blows in its
own backyard, the "I told you so" syndrome would likely be even more
..vocal both amongst the public and in elements of our own government.
There would also be strong public resistance to any commitment of U. S.
ground forces to save Phnom Penh.
(1) Public Posture: Whatever military and diplomatic options we
would consider,..we would want to stress publicly Hanoi's responsibility
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for widening the war and characterize the GVN's intervention as evidence
of a determined regional effort in support of the common goal of
preventing Hanoi's domination of Indochina against the will of the peoples
concerned.
present course of dealing with Vietnam problems in a separate negotiating
context. Another would be to deal with the Cambodia /Vietnam issues in
a more connected fashion than we have heretofore. The latter course
might prove desirable, and even necessary, if we reached the decision
that continued or additional U. S. military inputs required to prevent
some compromise of present objectives in Indochina were impossible.
In such a case, we might consider pressing hard for an expanded Indochina
conference and start examining the trade-offs we might be willing to
or (Z) to beef up our military support for affected areas in in order
to retain RVNAF forces in Cambodia. Using our own ground forces to
save Phnom Penh would, of course, be a new ball game.
(3) Diplomatic Steps: A severe military threat to Cambodia with
accompanying deterioration in SVN raises diplomatic problems beyond
the scope of this paper. One possible scenario would be to continue our
(2) Military Steps: The options here would not be substantially
different from those discussed under Contingency B. The principal
difference would appear to be that somewhere along the line -- a probably
very early on -- the GVN would seek to sharply reduce its commitments
in Cambodia, irrespectiveof the consequences for the latter country. We .,
would then be faced with the problem of what military measures we could
take either (1) to save Cambodia unilaterally 25X1
consider to salvage what we could.
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