ESCALATION?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 25, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
MEMORANDUM
'T'OP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: Winston Lord
SUBJECT: Escalation?
Frustrated by the November elections, the economy, and Hanoi's
intransigence in Paris, the search is on for dramatic recoups.
Are the Soviets playing games in Cienfuegos and with our generals?
Never mind, pant after them for a Summit and a splashy trip to the
Soviet Union.
Disaster in Pakistan? Certainly we are worried about the human
tragedy, but let us also get some PR benefits as well as gainful
employment for a discredited Vice President by sending him to the
scene. (No matter that the Pakistanis do not want anybody and have
their own. internal political problems.)
nam that maybe will make the other side negotiate.
Above all, let us see if we can do something dramatic in North Viet-
to justify rehearsing the follies of escalation which one would like to
This is a dangerous mood. It is apparently flowing strongly enough
think were self-evident by now.
tions as presented to the. President. One could justify the decision
activities. I have no way of judging the risks of the rescue opera-
re not escalation per Le. A case can be made for both weekend
The POW raid, certainly, and the 24 hour bombing, less certainly,
Lessons from the Weekend
by the mission, even if successful. On balance, I would have favored
balance the welfare of our POW's would be advanced or jeopardized
on humanitarian grounds -- the fundamental question was whether on
it if,I were told that POW's were almost certainly there.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19
LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
'The President's soothing reaction to the dry hole was humane and
admirable given the deep disappointment he must have felt. However,
I cannot believe that he would have authorized the raid without pretty
solid assurance that there were some POW's in the target area. It is
now clear that they had been moved not only weeks before, but probably
months.. I assume that there will be a thorough investigation of the
intelligence given to -- and withheld from -- the President and that some
heads will roll in addition to honoring the courage and skill of the team
and the call for additional daring schemes.
We were fortunate that the intelligence failure cost us so little. . Our
response should be much greater caution about such "bold" moves
rather than eagerly ordering up plans for new ones. Above all, let
us look hard at the intelligence fiasco (it is self-delusion to call it
anything else) not only in terms of this mission but also for any broader
implications about the intelligence apparatus servicing the President.
What, if anything, does our intelligence gap on this raid tell us about
our overall intelligence on the Southeast Asia conflict? Did the extreme
sensitivity of the operation mean that key intelligence analysts were not
consulted? . Is this pattern repeated elsewhere in clandestine operations,
not only in Indochina but around the globe?
As for the "protective reaction" strikes, a case can be made for
socking the enemy now and then. It is difficult to argue that one day
bombing sets back negotiations: negotiations haven't been going any-
where; the other side's response to the raids in Paris has been minimal;
and they can hardly be indignant when one of their tactics is to couple
negotiations with offensives. The basic calculation is that we must burn
the enemy occasionally to remind them they cannot embarrass us as we
withdraw. If we do not respond to their nibbles of a city shelling or a
recce plane shootdown, they will be tempted to step up these actions.
The problem is that they must be tempted anyway in order to induce
escalation on our part. They see domestic support for Administration
policy as the biggest obstacle to their aims. They are sufficiently
perceptive to recognize that this support is fragile and that escalation
is the surest means of unravelling it. To achieve this basic objective
.in surely worth putting up with some bombing of their country.
Hanoi will recognize that the single most significant result of the week-
end is that Vietnam is once again in the U. S. front and center on the TV
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
V
TOP SECRET IS ENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
screen and in newspapers. It is in their interest to keep it there.
Whether or not Secretary Laird outpointed the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is not very important. The fact that the national networks
televised the session live is.
The great danger of these one-day operations, therefore, is that they
move us to the edge of escalation. The enemy, if they choose, can
pull us over the edge with continued shootdowns or shellings. And
escalation is disfnctly to the enemy' s advantage.
Future Plans
We will now see a panoply of other imaginative plans for raids, or
sustained bombings, or mining Haiphong Harbor, or sealing the Ho
Chi Minh Trail with ground forces. If the other side will not negotiate,
the theory goes, we must move militarily while we still have some
assets.
I am sure you are more than familiar with all the arguments against
escalation, but it's worth recalling them since no one else will,
except maybe State which does not count. It is almost incredible
after the experience of the last several years that we might seriously
consider this path and that its senselessness must be pointed out once
again.
Military gains? This consideration is almost irrelevant if you are
talking about one-day raids which garner a few trucks, a few SAM's,
a few supply dumps, and a few civilians. Such raids are primarily
a signal. Their political fallout -- as long as they happen at long
intervals -- is manageable just as their military significance is
marginal.
Measurable military impact would come only after lengthier bombing,
ii. e. , for at least a week, by which time the fig leaf of protective
reaction is dropped and the political costs, as well as civilian casualties,
mount geometrically. Bombing supply areas for a week would hamper
the enemy, perhaps disrupt his plans. At most it would buy some time
on the ground - - but it would lose even more time at home.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
w
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
Sustained bombing along the lines of 1965-1968 certainly would have
significant military impact. We have ample evidence that the impact
would not be decisive. The argument might be made that North
Vietnam is in a weaker position now than then, but I doubt that anyone
would contend that such a campaign would stop their aggression against
the South. Rather it would serve to unify the population again and lift
their fighting spirit (which has been sagging ever since we stopped our
bombing). Furthermore, their air defenses are much more formidable
and consequently our own losses would be much greater.
A list of the costs of renewed bombing on an open-ended basis should
be familiar litany by now.
There is first and foremost the uproar in this country and the impact
on an already strained and bitter society. The reaction would be all
the more magnified because of the wounds of Cambodia and the general
feeling that the war is winding down. One can imagine the passions
among a weary public that the nightmare is starting up all over again.
We would fire up Congress. "Ideological majority" or not, a complete
reversal of the downward trend of the war is bound to prompt, at the
very least, close votes on restrictive legislation in the Senate. There
would be a serious spillover effect on other parts of the President's
program, whether the foreign aid supplemental, ARM, or even welfare.
The Paris talks would almost certainly be broken off. Admittedly
they are getting nowhere anyway, but the loss of even the symbol of a
possible negotiated settlement would add to the shock effect.
This would be one issue which could rally Soviet/Chinese cooperation;
whose relations are already warming up. The Soviets and Chinese would,
as a minimum, step up their assistance to Hanoi and there would be a
genuine danger of their direct involvement.
One could probably count on the demise of SALT and a heating up of
the arms race.
The list goes on and on and hardly requires further elaboration.
The only type of offensive that might bring Hanoi to its knees would be a
massive campaign, dropping the self-imposed 1965-68 restrictions,
against all significant military and industrial targets. This would
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Cambodia and South Vietnam? Would Souvanna go along? Etc.
be needed.? How much would this weaken trienaiy pos3xions a.n
about still another scheme which will finally turn the tide, there are
a host of questions to answer. For example, how many troops would
forces or advisers were needed, this looks less unappealing than
other alternatives and at least merits study. However, aside from a
natural suspicion and cynicism, fed by the painful history of the war,
produce untold civilian casualties and public outrage. All the costs
cited above, and more, would be incurred. While an intensive
bombing campaign might, over time, have a decisive military impact,
the American society would be torn apart first and whatever benefits .
that are salvaged from the military impact would be heavily outweighed
by the costs at home and abroad.
duce negotiations? The argument might be made that a large-scale
offensive could quickly produce negotiating movement before some of
the heavy costs listed above have to be paid. This theory has never
worked in the past and there is no reason to think it will work in the
future. We can count on Hanoi battening down and waiting for the
inevitable foreign and domestic pressures to work against us. We
have said that they cannot be tricked out of their objectives after 25
years. Would we really think they will be bombed out?
Mining of Haiphong Harbor or a broader quarantine would entail
essentially the above calculations, i. e., all hell would break loose
long before there was decisive military impact and even if it were to
"succeed" (whatever that means), the costs in other areas would out-
weigh the benefits. In any event, North Vietnam could still get suffi-
cient supplies overland, as Larry Lynn's memo to you last summer
demonstrated. This option has the added disadvantages of inter-
national legal complications and the likelihood of direct confrontation
with the ships of many countries, including the Soviet Union.
A better case could probably be made, both on military grounds and
on domestic political grounds, for using Cambodian/South Vietnamese
forces to choke off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Assuming no U. S. ground
would seem to boil down to either continuing present policy or trying to
natives -- assuming the other side still refuses to negotiate seriously --
I recognize this memo only tells you what we should not do, but as
as you have said, there are no brilliant answers any more. The alter-
Alternatives to Escalation
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7
V
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
bargain a fixed date for our total withdrawal for concessions by the
other side. (I rule out replacing the present GVN, for which we have
no incentive and which I find morally indefensible. I also rule out a
rapid bug-out, although a sound case for this can be made and, in
many ways, it is an honest as well as honorable position. I reject
it because I do think the costs would be great and because I am not
convinced we can get nothing in return for the withdrawal of our forces.)
Continuing present policy would mean that we calculate that the enemy
would not -- or could not -- embarrass us as we move ahead with
Vietnamization and withdrawals. The danger is that such a policy may
turn out to be an illusion, that with or without threats and 24 hour
protective reactions, the enemy one day will be willing and able to
present us with the bullet-biting choice between escalation and an
ignominious exit.
violate any agreements that they do negotiate.
Bargaining a fixed date for our withdrawal would attempt to use our
remaining military assets not for escalation but for agreements with
the other side that would not only make our exit graceful but also
perhaps give the non-communist forces a chance to survive. The
danger of this course is that the other side will not negotiate meaning-
fully in exchange for only one of their "demands" or that they would
Conclusion
There are two related problems. If the President is seriously considering-
escalation, how does one persuade him not to do it? What should we do
instead? I wi.ll.give you further thoughts on these.
we should stop eagerly pursuing a Summit until relations are greatly
into a steady, sound overall approach to the Soviet Union. As a starter,
counter Soviet unpleasantness, we should not translate this judgment
(unconsciously or not) into escalation against North Vietnam but rather
In any event, if we feel that in a broader sense something is needed to
improved and real results can be foreseen.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/19: LOC-HAK-448-8-27-7