ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-449-5-4-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 5, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

NOT IN SYSTEM
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MEMORANDUM IP r?-?
IP,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Mb ?
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
4,......?...?....."
SUBJECT:
K. Wayne Smith
INFORMATION
April 5, 1971
Assessment of Military Situation in Indochina
At Tab A is a memorandum incorporating the CIA and DIA
assessments of the enemy's strategy options through late 1972.
You should definitely read the first six pages, and pages 7-25
are also worthwhile. The conclusions are on pages 29-32.
DIA has not been able to come to grips with the logistics
Methodology CIA is now employing with ease. DIA's views
are recorded in separate paragraphs on pages 16-19.
DIA pulls numbers out of the air. There is no model or logical
'way to put the numbers together, and one is hard-pressed to see
how the conclusions are related to the numbers.
In several instances,, however, DIA's data series provide a
useful check on CIA's ?numbers.
As I noted in my last memorandum, the JCS refused to provide
a sortie mix for a lower level of interdiction as requested by
Deputy Secretary Packard and yourself. Thus, the analysis
assumes that we will fly the same number of sorties with the
same mix next year as we are currently flying. You may want
to call Packard on this.
The attached paper attempts to meet the requirements you outlined
last Thursday, namely:
NSS, OSD, DIA,
JCS reviews
completed
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
-- Tighten up our March 31 paper and incorporate the results
of the CIA -DIA estimate;
- Use a range of estimates on logistics capabilities to reflect
the uncertainty of enemy performance for the balance of the dry
season;
-- Spell out enemy strategy choices;
-- Briefly identify possible fixes in ARVN (you wanted this
treated in detail by late April);
Assume two U.S. redeployment variants, one fiscal guidance
and another lower.
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c I II
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ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
Introduction
This paper examines the enemy's options in Indochina for the
balance of 1971 and for 1972. This assessment considers the
impact of the following on the enemy's strategy options:
The fall of Sihanouk and the loss of Sihanoukville.
Lam Son.
U S. redeployments.
ARVN ?;capabilities.
The analytical framework encompasses:
an assessment of the etriemy's strategy options in terms of
his logistics and manpower capabilities;
? the state of the 'control war" on the strength of the GVN's
position in the countryside and its effect on the enemy's strategy
options;
-- the state of the "main force war" as reflected in the relative
strength of friendly to enemy main (battalion-size) forces in each
Military Region in South Vietnam and the ability of friendly main
forces to deter or cope with enemy main forces, as U.S. redeploy-
ments continue.
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Separate assessments are provided for 1970, 1971, and 1972 because:
-- the war changed fundamentally between 1970 and 1971 with
the loss of Sihanoukville as a source of supply. In 1970 the enemy's
strategy (planned in 1969) was not constrained by aggregate logistics
considerations (although there may have been distribution problems).
But in 1971 the enemy faced serious logistics problems. In 1972 it
remains an issue whether the enemy will solve his logistics problems.
Friendly air and ground interdiction efforts against the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, including ARVN operations in South Laos, became more
important in 1.971 and will continue to play a key role in 1972.
-- by 1972 the level of U.S. forces will have dropped by 400, 000
to 500, 000 from its 1969 level, a change that will inevitably cause the
enemy to consider new options,
1972 is a Presidential election year in the U. S., possibly
providing the enemy with a political incentive to consider more
ambitious military activities than he undertook in 1969 or 1970.
The analysis herein draws heavily on and is generally consistent with
two recent CIA memoranda "The Impact of Logistics Factors on NVA
Offensive Capabilities During 4971" and "NVA/VC Military Activities
During 1971-72." These CIA assessments, based largely on analysis
undertaken months ago for NSSM,99, are supplemented by "control"
[pacification] and rnAin f,orce (MR) analyses of the friendly situation
derived from previous VSSG work.
Where DIA has taken a separate position or used a different
methodology, DIA's viewpoint is considered.
? 1970: Fall of Sihanouk Facilitates Rapid GVN Control Progress and
Precludes Enemy Challenge to Vietnamization
The military balance in Indochina shifted dramatically in the GVN's
favor in 1970. Where at the outset of the year it appeared that the
scheduled U.S. redeployments of 190,000 men under the Vietnamiza-
tion program would probably permit the enemy to hold his own at
a protracted war level of effort and possibly even provide him with
the opportunity to test Vietnamization, the fall of Sihanouk and US -
RVNAF cross-border operations into Cambodia so disadvantaged the
TOP. SECRET /SENSITIVE
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the enemy (by"' diverting his forces from South Vietnam and constrain-
ing his logistic support) that he was unable to halt GVN progress in
the countryside or mount a serious challenge to Vietnamization.
Enemy Strategy
In April 1969, COSVN 9 was issued, and it was fully played out in
the enemy's unit deployments and activities by the beginning of 1970:
-- manpower infiltration in the l969-70 dry season was only
57,000.
tonnage entering the Ho Chi Minh Trail was around 60,000
tons suggesting that the enemy planned a low-level of activity and
took comfort in his still sizable Cambodian stockpiles refurbished
through late 1969 by shipments through Sihanoukville.
The enemy apparently reasoned that a protracted war strategy would
permit him to _hold his position while U.S. forces redeployed.
Logistics It is significant that 1970 enemy plans, unconstrained
by logistics considerations (before Sihanoukville was closed), did
not appear to envision more than a protracted war effort and perhaps
selected tests of Vietnamizatibn.
Manpower - An ine,sca!pable conclusion is that the enemy, after
sending 250,000 forces td.own the Trail in 1967-68 and 102,000 in
.1968-69, welcomed the respite he believed Vietnamization would
allow him. (From 1965 to 1969 the pool of able-bodied men in
? North Vietnam dropped from 1.8 to 1.2 million, when, under normal
circumstances, it should have risen by around 200,000. An infiltra-
tion level of 80,000 to 100,000 is roughly the amount that can be
sustained without drawing down the manpower pool.) By infiltrating
57,000 in the 1969-70 dry season the enemy signalled this decision
to opt for a protracted war strategy. His course seems to have been
dictated by a desire to conserve manpower and prepare for a pro-
longed struggle.
Top SECRET /SENSITIVE
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1970 Main Force and Control Situations
During 1970 the enemy's protracted war strategy failed to preserve the
status quo despite U.S. redeployments. The fall of Sihanouk and
a successful GVN pacification effort can be credited with keeping
the GVN on top.
-- The GVN Maintained an Upper Hand in the Main Force War
Despite the Redeployment of 190,000 U.S. Forces. One and possibly
two enemy regiments were diverted from MR 1 to South Laos, three
were diverted from MR 2,to South Laos and Cambodia, six from
MR .3 to Cambodia, and two from MR 4 to Cambodia.
These diversions were required if the enemy was to expand his Trail
capacity and defend the Trail against possible U.S. and RVNAF
attacks. Overnight 40,000 FANK forces were added to the friendly
forces opposing the enemy and this number quickly grew to over
1-50,000. To date, enemy diversions to Cambodia and South Laos
still exceed ARVN diversion by roughly 2:1. For example in MR 3
only 43 of the 93 enemy battalions normally deployed in MR 3 before
the fall of Sihanouk are now physically located there.
Thus, even with U.S. redeplRyments, the Main Force (friendly to
enemy combat strength) Ratio (MFR) countrywide actually improved.
MFR
End of 1st Qtr. 1970
MR 1 2.4:1
NIB 2 3.31
MR 3 2.71
MR 4 2.3:1
C aunt r ywide Z. 7:1
End of 1970
2.5:1
2.9:1
5.1:1
2.6:1
3.1:1
In MR 3 in particular from which two U.S. divisions were redeployed
in 1970, the large-scale enemy diversions just noted caused the MFR
to increase. A slight improvement also took place in MR 4, whereas
U.S. redeployments from MR 2 caused the MFR to decline. Because the
bulk of U.S. forces remained in MR 1, friendly main force superiority
was assured.
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TOP SECRET./SENSITIVE
GVN Control Progress Continued. Continued Free World
dominance in the main force war and improved GVN territorial
force performance along with the marginally effective anti-Viet
Cong infrastructure operations, brought about major GVN control gains
in 1970:
Percent (To) Control Gains (VSSG Indicator)
End-1969 End-1970 Change
MR 1
53
73
+20
//IR 2
45
57
+12
MR 3
45
69
+24
MR 4
48
69
+21
Country-wide
48
67
+19
MRs 1, 3 and 4 all experienced major pacification gains. The link
bptween'friendly main force superiority and these gains is observed
in the lagging results for MR 2, where the MFR declined in 1970. At
the end of 1969 MR 2 ranked close to MRs 3 and 4, whereas at the
end of 1970, pacification in MR Z had fallen significantly behind that
elsewhere in South Vietnam.
These military gains were stIpplernented on the political side by
continued GVN political stability and on the economic side by the
stabilization of the, GVN economy after the October 197i) economic
reforms.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the 1970 U.S. Congressional
elections, the Vietnam war was not a major issue. Vietnarnization,
even the Cambodian operations, appeared to be vindicated by these
obvious improvements in the situation in South Vietnam.
? 1971: At the Outset of 1971 the Key Issue was Whether the Enemy
Could Recover his Pre-Lon Nol Capabilities in Cambodia and
South Laos and Return the War to South Vietnam. Could NVA
Forces Rebuild and Protect their Logistics and Rear Base
Capabilities in South Laos and Cambodia while Coping with FANK,
..ARVN Cross-Border Operations into Cambodia, Air Interdiction,
and Lam Son?
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Enemy Strategy
In October 1970 we obtained from a high level Tallier a detailed
description of COSVN 20. According to this source in 1971 the
enemy planned to give highest priority to:
? political organization and military actions in Cambodia to
"destroy" the Lon Nol government.
-- keep up pressure on U.S. units South Vietnam during the
wet season in order to obtain high U.S. casualties and embarrass
President Nixon at home. (This suggests attacks by fire and ground
probes in MRs 1 and 2 where the bulk of U.S. forces are now
stationed.)
? ? attack ARVN forces in Central Vietnam with "intensified high
points" where they have recently taken over from U.S. forces (e. g.,
the highlands) and where VC/NVA supply lines are short. Ground and
artillery attacks were to be employed on population centers in MR 2
(and with a,much lower priority in MR 4).
Manpower - Enemy manpower infiltration in the 1970-71 dry season
(through February) has been 6,7,500. This number is below our
projected 100,000 to sustain a protracted war in 1971, and (assuming
there are no further large inflows this dry season) N.vou41 imply the
enemy intended in 1'971 to again limit his activities in South Vietnam
to a protracted war level. This could, of course, still encompass
high points in MRs 3 and 4, sustained ground attacks in Cambodia,
stand-off attacks and limited ground probes in MR 1, and multi-
battalion ground attacks in the highlands of Central Vietnam (including
? the southern portion of MR 1).
The impact of Lam Son on this strategy is not yet clear. Lam Son
appears to have cost the enemy at least 10,000 KLA. We also know
? that regiments destined for Cambodia and the central highlands were
held up in South Laos to cope with ARVN forces. Most importantly,
Lam Son made credible the threat to South Laos (ARVN operations
in Cambodia had a similar affect there) and increased the prospects
that enemy units now diverted there will not be deployed into South
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Vietnam in 1971. Because the enemy is now required to continue
a full-scale logistics effort up to the end of the dry season (late
May), his combat forces (about 20,000) in South Laos cannot be
diverted fromprotecting the Trail until the wet season is underway.
? Logistics - The enemy clearly made every effort to get his logistics
effort off to an early start in the 1970-71 dry season. Probably for
the first time in the Current Indo-China War, the enemy's strategy
options in South Vietnam and Cambodia were logistically constrained.
Delayed by a late monsoon he still hadsinput some 41,000 tons
by early March. The impact of Lam Son on his logistics situation
was clearly significant.
-- CIA's Logistics Assessment of Lam Son. In the 1970-71
dry season, Hanoi had to fulfill major "additional" logistics
requirements in addition to the "norrnaP' logistics requirements met
by inflows onto the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The normal requirement was that met to sustain a protracted war in
1969-70 using;the Trail(before the fall of Sihanouk). It consisted
of inflows to support forces in southern Laos and nothern South
Vietnam. CIA estimates the inflow tonnage to meet this normal
requirement to be 54,000 tons. (Sihanoukville was the source of
supply for southern South Vietnam.)
The additional requirements for the 1970-71 dry season are itemized
below:
-- (1) to replace Sihanoukville 5,520-8,160
-- (2) to support non-combat consumption for increased
force in South Laos 7,900
-- (3) Lam Son Caches Destroyed or Captured 3,650
- (4) Combat Consumption to Cope with Lam Son 3,070
TOTAL 20,140-22,780
tons
Adding the normal (54,000) to the additional requirements for the 1970-71
? dry season gives a total inflow requirement this dry season of 74,140-
76,780 tons.
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The capacity of the Trail has been estimated by CIA to be between
71,000 tons and 89, 000 tons (the mid-point estimate 80,000) on the
assumption that the Trail is kept open through May 1971 or to
the end of the dry season.
Noting that the requirement exceeds the minimum estimate of
capacity but falls short of the maximum estimate CIA concludes:
?". . will be adequate for the Communists to sustain
military activity at the low levels' observed during 1970
[the "hot war" is at last defined].
"[It] will not permit the Communists to build up any
significant volume of stockpiles and will make it
imperative that their next logistic offensive get off to
an extremely early start next dry season.
"In 'sum, North Vietnam's logistic position over the past
year .bas become greatly complicated. Far from enjoying
a wide range of logistic options to support alternative
strategies, Hanoi appears tied, for 1971 at least, to a
continuation of the low-profile war fought in 1970. While
the enemy's logistic situation does not preclude an
occasional high point of dornbat activity in either South
Vietnam or Cambodia, major sustained warfare seems
definitely to be, ruled out. .
?
DIA concurred in these conclusions but did not endorse the methodology
used.
-- Possible Adjustments in CIA's Estimate. Several assumptions
underlying CIA's analysis need to be spelled out as they can be viewed
as a justification for placing the CIA outcome estimate at the conserva-
tive end of a. spectrum of outcome estimates. These are:
-- CIA's analysis of the additional requirement to support
the non-combat consumption for the enlarged force in South Laos
(item 2 in the above table) is based on a 10, 000 addition to the pre-Lon
Nol force in South Laos. However, CIA Memorandum 71-32 dated
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February, 1971 states: "During 1970 the NVA bolstered its force
structure in southern Laos by 20,000 men concentrated heavily in
the Tchepone area." If the additional requirement to support 10,000
more men than the CIA assumed is included, the inflow requirement
for 1970-71 would increase by another 7,900 tons.
CIA assumes a 25% bomb damage assessment (BDA)
on tonnage moving on the Trail for both 1969-70 and 1970-71. It
is possible to argue that increased truck kills attributable to the
increased gunship effort in 1970-71 justify adding a requirement
to the normal estimate based on the 1969-70 experience. Truck
kills thus far this year are estimated at about 8,000 versus 4,300
a year ago. If we assume half of this increase of 3,700 trucks were
loaded and that half of the four ton load on the loaded trucks is lost,
another 3,700 tons would be added to the 1970-71 inflow requirement.
? CIA does not add any BDA for the Lam Son operations.
There are no firm data on BDA linked to Lam Son despite pilot reports
that large supply depots were destroyed. Another 2,000 tons might
be added as an additional requirement to cover such a possibility.
? CIA assumes the North Vietnamese are able to keep the
Trail open through the end of May and sustain a high rate of logistics
activity to that date. If, on tie other hand, it is assumed this maximum
effort is not achieved, but rather the Trail effort falls short of this
maximum goal_ by the equivalent' of 15 days at an averag'e 280 tons per
day input rate, CIA's Trail capacity estimate would fall by 4, ZOO tons.
adjustments are made, one obtains the following results:
Total Additional Requirements
CIA
Adjusted
20,140-22,780 33,740-36,380
Whereas the CIA total requirement of 74,140-76,780 tons was compared
with CIA's mid-point capacity estimate of 80,000, the "adjusted" total
requirement of 87,740-90,380 would compare with an adjusted mid-
point Trail input capacity estimate of 75,800 tons (80,000 tons minus
4,'200).
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Therefore, the adjusted calculations would be consistent with the
view that the enemy will fall short of his protracted war logistics
requirement in 1970-71, whereas the CIA estimate suggests that
if the enemy strains to his maximum capacity, his Trail effort will
support a protracted war activity level.
Taking these two estimates as the ends of a range of possible
outcomes, the impact of Lam Son in combination with the loss of
Sihanoukville can be summarized as follows:
10
. precluded sustained dry season ground attacks in Cambodia by
insuring that supply through-put would not reach units there until the
wet season when floods will seriously hamper offensive activities,
(Enemy units in MRs 3 and 4 were similarly constrained by Lam Son
but they were already too weak in manpower terms to mount major
attacks. )
-- limited the scope of 1971 enemy offensive activities in southern
MR 1 and MR 2's highlands by denying the enemy the opportunity to
establish forward-based stocks in the highlands and bordering Laos
areas. (This does not preclude probable multi-regiment attacks
in the highlands but it should limit their scope and duration.)
-- strained enemy protracted war activities in other areas, i. e. ,
MRs 3 and 4, and the coastal a!reas of MR 2. Because a maximum
\dry season logistics effort will likely just meet aggregate protracted
war logistic requiremerits, it is probable that local shorges will be
encountered that will'inhibit protracted war activity in other selected
areas. Already in MR 3, for example, standard loads for enemy weapons
have been limited and we have a report from Cambodia that the enemy
is trying to buy AK-47 rounds on the local economy.
-- narrowed the enemy's 1972 options. Because it takes several
months of the dry season to attain a sizeable logistics through-put
rate to Cambodia and South Vietnam, the failure of the enemy to build
up large stockpiles in 1971 will mean that it will be late in the 1971-72
dry season -- late February or early March ? before he can attain
the logistics capabilities to launch a major offensive. This assumes,
of course, the enemy can successfully solve the logistics problems
in 1972 he Was unable to solve in 1971 and no repeat of the Lam Son
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 11
operation. Assuming the enemy intended to mount a major offensive
in 1972 before the "U.S. Presidential elections, a fairly safe
assumption, Lam Son's most crucial benefit is that it has reduced
the enemy's flexibility in 1972.
The Main Force and Control Prospects for 1971
-- Main Force Prospects for 1971. GVN main force superiority
in MRs 3 and 4 seems assured for the rest of 1971. This is due
primarily to: (1) probable continued diversions from these areas
to Cambodia, (2) the fact that U.S. redeployments will have little
effect on the MFR in these areas since there are no U.S. ground forces
iD MR 4 and only a brigade in MR 3, and (3) aggressive ARVN operations
against enemy base areas in MR 4.
In MRs 1 and 2, however, the main force balance could be upset by
continued U.S. redeployments, although given the enemy capabilities
for the balance of the dry season reviewed above, it seems probable
that the challenge will come in 1972 rather than in 1971. In any case,
we do not now:have access to information on projected U.S. recleploy_-
rnents for the balance of 1971 upon which to do an analysis.
-- Control Assessment for 1971. If the GVN could achieve the
control gains in 1971 on the sale of the 19 percent achieved in 1970,
the . enemy's main force options in 1972 in MRs 3 and 4 would be all
but eliminated. Ontthe' other hand, control prospects inl.MRs I and 2
are less encouraging.
January 1971 control data for selected provinces in MRs 3 and 4-show
why the outlook in these areas is encouraging:
MR 3
MR. 4
Binh Duong
72%
Dinh Tuong
69%
Tay Ninh
75
Kien Hoa
50
Long An
77
Chuang Thien
48
Hau Nghia
34
All MR 3 Provinces
70%
All MR 4 Provinces
69%
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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A year ago control in Dinh Tuong was about 35 percent and in
Kien Hoa 25 percent. These VC strongholds are now being penetrated
by aggressive GVN operations. When control reaches about 75 percent
in a province the enemy's only main force option is a costly conventional-
style attack. The NSSM 99 most probable estimate that a division could
? be freed from MR 4 in 1972 may be exceeded if the GVN holds off the
? enemy's current determined dry season attacks and pacifies the An Xuyen
and Kien Hoa base areas by the end of the year.
MR 3 is also encouraging, although Hau Nghia is a critical and lagging
province. Given the "dual" enemy threat to Cambodia and MR 3 (now
occupied by ARVN in Cambodia), the possible redeployment of the last
U.S. brigade from MR 3 in the near future, and the key main force
defense requirement for Saigon, no main force units are likely to be
freed from MR 3 in 1971 or 1972.
MR 2 presents a serious problem. The low GVN control scores for
the key GVN MR 2 provinces listed below show that the control war
has not. favored the GVN in MR Z.
January, 1971
Binh Dinh 43%
Pleiku 43
Phu Yen , 48
.`? Binh Thuan 63
All MR 2 provinces 57%
A U.S. brigade still operates in northern Binh Dinh and two ROK
Divisions along the coast. Assuming the U.S. brigade redeploys
and the ROK forces stay in 1971, the best hope is for moderate
control gains that will not alter the requirement for GVN forces or
deny the enemy main force options in 1972. A most probable
estimate, if one accounts for the likely enemy highlands offensive
this year, is a continued control stalemate in 1971.
The best GVN control performance in 1970 took place in MR 1.
Particularly noteworthy were the gains in Quang Tin which gives
the GVN a strong control position in three of MR l's five provinces:
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January, 1971
Quang Tri 76%
Thua Thien 86
Quang Nam 58
Quang Tin 81
Quang Nghai 66
All MR 1 provinces 73%
While a slight control loss was probably experienced in February
(the data are not yet available), the key determinant of whether 1971
will see further progress is the pace of the redeployment of the three
13.5. divisions now in MR 1.
fThe foregoing control assessment assumes the political situation in
South Vietnam through the 1971 Presidential elections remains roughly
as it is currently -- although pre-occupation with the elections will
divert some GVN attention away from pacification -- and that no ceasefire
is agreed.to in 1971.)
1972: A Probable Major Enemy Offensive in Northern South Vietnam
or Cambodia
Enemy Strategy
There is no captured document or other basis for estimating 1-lanoi's
strategy intentions for 1972. This assessment relies on an analysis
of enemy capabilities to obtain an understanding of the rvige of options
open to the enemy arid hariost probable course of action.
For analytical purposes a base case strategy of protracted war and
four higher strategies ranging from an offensive in MR 1 to a country-
wide offensive were assessed in terms of the enemy's manpower and
logistics capabilities to carry them out:
-- Base Case Strategy: Protracted War - Hanoi attempts to
continue level of activity of last 18 months
-- Variant 1: Major Offensive in MR 1
-- Variant 2: Major Offensive in Cambodia
-- Variant 3: Major Offensives in GVN MR 1 and Cambodia
Variant 4: Major Offensive in Cambodia and in each MR of
South Vietnam.
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 14
Logistics - CIA's logistics analysis assumed:
-- continued air interdiction at 1970-71 dry season levels. (DOD
did not provide an alternative air sortie package requested by the
WSAG for 1971-72, one-third below 1970-71 sortie rates but with a
different mix of aircraft.)
-- in 1972 the enemy maintains 80,000 forces in South Laos, the
same size force deployed at the outset of the 1970-71 dry season.
(CIA believes "there is no evidence to warrant the judgment that
Hanoi will feel free to cut the size of its South Laos force next year
This latter assumption may prove overly optimistic. It is questionable
whether a Lam Son-type threat will be credible against South Laos a year
from now. Therefore a variant to the CIA estimate is provided herein
to cover the possibility that the enemy can decrease his force in South
Laos by 10,000, from 80,000 to 70,000 next year. Such an adjustment
to,CLAts analysis would decrease next year's logistic requirement by
7,900. tons.
The results of the CIA and adjusted estimates are summarized
below;
t
Logistics Input Requirements for 1972 Strategy
Options Assuming no Lam Son in 1972
4
CIA Estimate
3.
Adjusted Estimate
? Protracted War
? 66, 600
56,100
MR 1 Offensive
72,937-77,325
65,037-69,425
? Cambodia Offensive
70,350-72,150
62,450-64,250
MR 1 and Cambodia Offensive
? 76,987-83,175
69,087-75,275
Countrywide Offensive
79,687-87,450
71,787-79,550
If one assumes there is a Lam Son-type operation in 1972 or one with
similar logistics implications for the enemy, the CIA logistics require-
ments estimates can be adjusted as follows:
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TOP SECRET/SETITIVE 15
-- the CIA estimate that 80,000 forces will be deployed in South
Laos becomes realistic if one assumes another Lam Son. Thus the
"adjusted estimate" is no longer necessary because it is based on a
70, 000 rather than 80, 000 South Laos force.
-- direct logistics losses to Lam Son of 3,650 for caches
destroyed or captured and 3, 070 for combat consumption should be
added to the CIA's "no-Lam Son" estimate for 1972.
CIA's 1972 estimates adjusted for a possible Lam Son-type operation
in 1972 are shown below (6,720 tons axe added to CIA's basic estimate
Protracted War
MR 1 Offensive
? Cambodia Offensive
? MR 1 and Cambodia Offensive
Countrywide Offensive
? 73,320
79,657-84,045
77,070-78,870
83,707-89,895
86,407-94,170
When the mid-points of the CLA, Adjusted, and Lam Son estimates
are compared with the mid-point estimate of CIA's capacity as
for the Trail in 1972, the logistics implications of the various
strategies are shown below:
Without Lam Son'72 With Lam Son '72 Capacity
CIA est.
PrOtracted War 6,6,600
MR 1 Offensive t?7, 000
Cambodia Offensive 71,000
MR 1 and Cambodia
Offensive 80,000
Countrywide Offen-
sive 84, 500
t Adjusted
56,000
73,000
80,000
67,000
82,000
80,000
63,000
78,000
80,000
72,000
86,000
80,000
75, 500
90, 000
80, 000
On logistics grounds alone it appears that without a Lam Son 1972 or its
equivalent (using either the CIA and adjusted capacity estimates) all
enemy strategy options ranging from protracted war to a combined MR 1
and Cambodian offensive are feasible. Only a countrywide offensive is
logistically infeasible.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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11.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
With a Lain Son 1972 or its"equivalentn
-- using the mid-point of CIA's capacity estimate, a protracted
war, an MR 1 offensive, and a Cambodia offensive would appear feasible.
Both a combined Cambodia and MR 1 offensive and a countrywide offensive
would appear infeasible.
-- if the upper end of CIA's capacity estimate is used (89,000)
all strategies except a country-wide offensive would appear to be
feasible.
Manpower - Manpower remains the primary constraint on the enemy's
strategy choices. The manpower requirements for the alternative
enemy strategies are shown in the following table.
Protracted War
MR 1 Offensive
Cambodia Offensive
MR 1 and Cambodia
Offensive
Countrywide Offensive
Infiltration
Requirements
CIA
DIA
100,000
75,000
130,000
105,000
150,000
125,000
180,000
155,000
250,000-300,000
175,000-225,000
DIA'-s estimates are 25,000 below CIA's for each strategy. This
difference is attributable to CIA's belief that the enemy'. losses in
1972 will equal the 2b0,000 losses he suffered in 1970. It is not
clear how CIA justifies this judgment considering that enemy losses
may fall significantly below this level in 1971 as U.S. redeployments
continue.
DI.A's estimate is based on the Infiltration that w-01).-id be -required to
overcome the force decline the enemy suffered in 1970 (25,000)
plus the 1969-70 infiltration that sustained 1970's protracted war
(with the 25,000 decline in the force structure).
(This discrepancy needs to be sorted out. CIA should be asked to
jstjfy their assumption that enemy losses will not decline as U.S.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
17
Infiltration above 100,000 would draw down the enemy's manpower
pool. But as noted ea.rlier, in 1968 the enemy sent 244,000 south
and in 1969, 105,000. Clearly the enemy has the capacity with a
1.3-1.4 million man able-bodied manpower pool to repeat his 1968
performance. While our knowledge of the military and economic
strains on North Vietnam is limited, there is some evidence,
including the low 1969 and 1970 levels of infiltration, that the enemy
will be reluctant to pay too high a price in 1972.
Prudent military planning would, however, count on infiltration in
the 100,000 to 160,000 range in 1972. Such an allowance would place
all enemy military strategies except a combined MR 1 and Cambodia
offensive and a countrywide offensive within enemy manpower capabilities
using CIA's estimates. According to DIA's estimates all strategies
except a countrywide offensive would be feasible.
Friendly Capability and Enemy Options. The type of offensive the enemy
could mount in 1972 depends in part on what the friendly side does in
the following areas:
-- Whether or not FANK increases its capabilities relative to
Communist forces in Cambodia, thereby freeing ARVN units from
permanent cross-border operations in Cambodia (12-14 battalions)
or causing the enemy to put in more troops to hold his own. We
presently know very little about FANK performance and growth potential.
-- The effectiveness of the cdrnbined air interdiction'Trogram in
South Laos in 1971-72. This depends not only on sortie rates but on
the mix between fast-movers and slow movers and gunships. We need
an assessment of alternative sortie level and mix packages for the
1971-72 dry season.
- The effectiveness of the ground interdiction program in South
Laos in 1971-7Z. The large scale enemy deployments in South Laos,
including roughly ZO, 000 NVA combat forces in addition to 45,000 NVA
logistics and 5,000 anti-aircraft forces raise a basic interdiction issue
not yet addressed by this government: The relative effectiveness of
ground versus air interdiction. By comparing the annual cost of a 10
percent reduction in air sorties and support
the cost side of this trade-off is vividly
illustrated:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
25X1
25X1
25X1 -
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11.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
18
10 percent air sortie and support reductions - $132 million
.25X1
We need to address seriously the possibility of increased ground
interdiction in South Laos in 1972 in the ,hope of obtaining the force
diversion and logistics benefits we obtained fr cm Lam Son and SGU
operations which tied down enemy forces in 1971.
-- Whether or not_the GVN achieves decisive control results
in the MRs in 1971. If the GVN achieves decisive control gains
in MRs 3 and 4 in 1971, the enemy's main force options will be all
but eliminated in these areas, except for costly conventional-style
attacks. Similar (but not expected) control results in MR 2 and
MR 1 would 4,3ewise force the enemy to fight as a conventional
army. From-the point of view of the support his main forces can
obtain from local force s,the enemy would prefer to mount a 1972
main force attack in MR 2 first and MR 1 second.
25X1.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 19
-- Whether or not measures are taken to strengthen RVNAF.
We need to consider: (a) combat pay for ARVN, (b) adding one to
two divisions to the ARVN force structure, or (c) de-mobilizing
ARVN units in MRs 3 and 4 and adding them in MRs 1 or Z.
The need to strengthen ARVN results from a probable main force
deficit in MRs 1 and 2 in early 1972, the magnitude of which
depends on the pace of U.S. redeployments.
Main Force Ratio imFq Comparisons
Assuming Current Threats in MR
Mid-72 Assuming 1:50,000 Mid-72 Assuming
End 1970 U.S. Force Level 50, 000 US Force Level
1
1.8 1.21
1
2. 5 2.31
3.2 3.2
2.5 1.8
MR 1 2.5
.MRZ 2.9
MR. 3 5.1
1VIR 4 - 2.6
Countrywide 3. 1
1
Assumes all ROK Units remain in MR Z but ROK Marine Brigade is
redeployed. from MR 1.
One way to look at the prospects in the MRs assuming a 150, 000
(Fiscal Guidance) force level in mid-1972, is to recognize that RVNAF
main forces in MR 2 With the same Z. 5 to f MFR advaap..ge MR l's forces
had at the end of 1470 must cope with an enemy in MR 2 with only 55
percent GVN control whereas in MR 1 at the end of 1970 the GVN had
73 percent control. In the past in MR 2, whenever the MFR fell below
3.0 for several months the GVN lost control.
?' ?
IN MR 1 the situation is also serious. Friendly main force combat
strength relative to enemy combat strength will drop 25 percent if in
mid-1972 U.S. force levels in Vietnam are 150,000 and by 50 percent
if the U.S. force level drops to 50, 000. We have no way of gauging
from past experience what MFR is required to maintain a main force
stalemate in MR 1. We do know that in the second and third quarters
of 1970 the MFR fell to 1.8 and 1.9 respectively when the enemy built
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TOP SECRETJSENS TIVE 20
up his forces, yet the GYN continued to register control gains.
We also must consider that the enemy can easily and quickly increase
the threat to MR 1.
We projected a most probable case main force requirement against
a major enemy offensive (with a one-division reinforcement) in MR 1
and a three-regiment augmentation for a highlands offensive in MR 2.
This case approximates the enemy's most likely effort in 1972 if he
decides to mount a major offensive. We assume U.S. redeployments
are in accordance with current Fiscal Guidance. The following table
shows the projected friendly main force surpluses and deficits
necessary to maintain a main force stalemate in each MR and country-
wide at the time of such an offensive. March, April, or May 1972
would be the probable period for such attacks given the enemy's
logistics problems.
Battalion Surpluses (+) and Deficits (-)
.MR 1. -15
MR 2 -11
MR 3 +5
MR 4 +13
Countrywide - 8
These results illustrate that serious consideration
to the options outlinedtabove, namely (a) possible exparksions in
RVNAF, (b) a possibletrestructuring of RVNAF to eliminate units
in MRs 3 and 4 and add them in MRs 1 and 2, and (c) quality improvement
measures for RVNAF including combat pay and additional hardware.
should be
given
,
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StUKi1 III
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SENSITIVE
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
NVA/VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING 1971-72
2 April 1971
PREPARED JOINTLY BY
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ANO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR1HE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP
SENSITIVE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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1111,
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
IXCED.:1315AT
arr20,0
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l.1.121?,...A.1:1/4-1:,
No Foreign Dissem
NVA Military Activities During 1971-72
Introduction
The purpose of this memorandum is to assess,
the logistic and manpower considerations likely
to influence Hanoi's choice of military strategy
over the next 18 months. The memorandum also
estimates the logistic and manpower resources
that the North Vietnamese would have to commit
to support a variety of military options. These
range from a low option which would be a contin-
uation of the 1970 pattern -- Protracted warfare,
including occasional high points -- to a high
option involving sustained offensive activities
throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia. The
analysis also considers three possible inter-
mediate strategies. These are an offensive
campaign confined to Military Region 1, a
campaign confined to Cambodia, and, finally,
offensive campaigns carried out simultaneously
in Military Region 1 and Cambodia.
The methodology underlying this analysis
involved estimating the manpower and logistic
resources which the North Vietnamese would have
to commit in support of a given strategic option.
The resource commitments for each strategy were
then compared with North Vietnamese logistic per-
formance during the current dry season and with
previous infiltration patterns. On the basis of
these comparisons, estimates are made on the
feasibility of each of the various strategic
options being attained and, when applicable, the
time required to do so.
The terms "protracted war", "high points" and
"major" or "general offensive" are defined as
follows:
Protracted war -- the level of activity
in which the Communists were engaged in
South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos during
1970. This period was marked by the absence
of multi-battalion attacks, a very limited
number of battalion attacks, and periodic
increases in harassment, attacks by fire,
ground and ambush attacks, and terrorism.
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1-1 .C.A.-4
1111
High point -- an enemy term used to
describe a period -- usually of short
duration -- during which he intensifies
or sharply increases his level of mili-
tary. activity. High points are character-
ized by widespread attacks against both
military and civilian targets.
Major offensive -- a campaign involving
multi-battalion attacking forces of two to
five battalions fighting for a period of
at least five to ten days in three or more
simultaneous actions. The concept includes
sufficient stockpiling to enable the of-
fensives to be continued for longer, periods
if conditions warrant.
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11111 0-12-ik?A-1:"...1.:d
I. Overview: March - October 1971
1. The Communists will not be in a position
to mount a sustained countrywide main force mili-
tary action in South Vietnam over the next six to
nine months, although significant high points may
occur in any of the military regions. The enemy
forces in South Vietnam have been depleted over
the past year by the deployment of some Main Force
Units into Cambodia or Laos. For example, only
43 of the 93 battalions normally deployed in
South Vietnam's Military Region UM 3 are now
physically located there.
2. The predominant threat in MR 1 is from
forces in the Lam Son 719 area of Laos and north
of the DMZ area. The recent shift of 324B Division
elements to the Lam Son 719 area of Laos has some-
what eased the threat of multi-battalion attack in
Quang Tri. In the Front 4 area of operation, the
recent move of the 4th Regiment to within 20 miles
of Da Nang increased the threat to Da Nang and Hoi
An.
3. The most significant Main Force threat the
enemy poses in MR 2 is in the Central Highlands
area of Pleiku and in Kontum Provinces. The enemy
is apparently preparing to use two infantry regi-
ments with associated artillery elements to conduct
an attack against isolated ARVN positions in that
area. Other significant force dispositions in the
region consist of the 3rd Division with two sub-
ordinate regiments in Binh Dinh Province and six
battalions in Binh Thuan Province. Both of these
forces appear to be suffering from personnel and
logistic shortages.
4. In MR 3, only 50% of the enemy combat per-
sonnel, excluding guerrillas, threatening the area
are physically located within the country. In-
country units have experienced great difficulty in
establishing an offensive posture. The enemy has
been forced to recombine, reconstitute, and down-
grade Main 'Force regiments and battalions to Local
Force Units, because of the lack of supplies, re-
placements, and materiel. While many of the units
currently operating in Cambodia have the capability
to deploy against targets within MR 3, they have
been tied down by ARVN operation TOAN THANG 01/71
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`....J-1/
IIIP
and would not be available to protect base areas
and LOCs in Cambodia if they returned to South
Vietnam at this time.
5. Enemy forces in MR 4 have been seriously
eroded during the past year, and have had difficulty
in securing supplies. Unless personnel and supply
losses can be made up in the next several months,
the enemy's military capabilities there are unlikely
to improve significantly during 1971.
6. The current enemy strength in Cambodia is
estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 personnel (excluding
5,000 to 10,000 Khmer Communists). The dispositions
of these enemy forces are mostly in the south and
eastern third of the country. The major enemy
threats in Cambodia are in three strategic areas.
Approximately 15 battalions are deployed in the
general vicinity of Route 4; 7 in the Kompong Thom-
Skoun-Kompong Cham area, and 55 battalions in the
northeast and TOAN THANG areas.
7. In South Vietnam we expect the Communists
to continue the current spring campaign for a few
weeks before settling into a rainy season that
should be similar to those of the past two years.
However, they could maintain a relatively high
rate of terror, harassment, and small unit attacks
into the-rainy season. The exception here, as
always, is northern MR 1 where because of short
LOCs and a unique weather cycle -- the dry season
runs from Maythrough September -- Hanoi's capa-
bilities are not governed by the same manpower
and logistical constraints that pertain to the
south. In Cambodia, Communist efforts over the
next six to nine months will remain focused pri-
marily on reconstituting and securing supply
routes and base areas, just as they are in
southern Laos. Stronger military action may also
be initiated elsewhere in portions of Cambodia or
Laos.
8. Hanoi's actions during the current winter/
spring campaign have been limited. Manpower needed
to be fed into the COSVN area (MRs 3 and 4 and
Cambodia) to rebuild forces in order to maintain
a credible military threat and to support the effort
to build an expanded insurgency base and logistic
system in Cambodia. Beyond that, the defense of
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the logistic system in Laos was the principal task.
The bulk of the 35,000 personnel destined for COSVN
were dispatched early in the 1970-71 infiltration
cycle. The manpower requirements of Communist
forces in Cambodia for reorientation of the supply
system and for security apparently have been sub-
stantial. Few infiltrators have been detected
being allocated to enemy units in MRs 3 and 4 despite
the fact that the enemy's position in these MRs has
continued to erode.
9. Clearly one of the primary manpower require-
ments during the 1970-71 dry season was seen by Hanoi
to be the operation and defense of the Laos Panhandle
supply system. From April 1970 to early 1971 some
20,000 personnel were sent to southern Laos. During
February an additional 20,000 troops were deployed to
the Lam Son 719 area from North and South Vietnam.
The 35,000 personnel sent to the COSVN area plus the
40,000 deployed to the Laos Panhandle represent about
75% of the total detected manpower allocated to South
Vietnam and southern Laos this dry season.
10. We cannot predict with any large degree of
confidence what immediate course the enemy will
follow with its forces currently deployed in the
Tchepone area. Clearly personnel losses have been
considerable and, although enemy forces maintained
heavy pressure on ARVN forces as they withdrew from
Laos, they are not expected to move on into South
Vietnam in any significant numbers at this time. Most
of the Communist units that participated in the defense
against Lam Son 719 will need rest and to be refitted
and are hardly in shape at this time to engage in major
offensive activities against the present heavy concen-
trations of Allied forces in MR 1. Action has picked
up in MR 1 but this is largely the work of units which
were already deployed in the area and were not directly
involved in the fighting in Laos.
11. As the rainy season in Laos really begins to
set in, however, some of the enemy's forces now there
are expected to redeploy to South Vietnam as well as
North Vietnam. If Hanoi wishes to heat up the war
with Main Force activity some of the sizable force
now tied up in Laos could be deployed into MR 1.
However, Allied forces should be able to contain
even heavy attacks in this area.
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LJA1.CI .L
12. Given the enemy's already reduced capabilities,
and the fact that the inputs of both supplies and man-
power during this dry season were modest, heavy main
force military pressure in MRs 2, 3, and 4 are not
expected during the upcoming spring and summer months.
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II. Logistic Performance 1971-72 Dry Season
A. The Analytical Approach
The CIA View
Paragraphs 13-38 present the CIA
methodologies and estimates of pos-
sible levels of NVA logistic perform-
ance during the 1971-72 dry season.
The DIA view is presented in para-
graphs 39-44.
13. The level of logistic activity in the Laos
Panhandle during the 1971-72 dry season (October
1971-May 1972) will depend on a wide range of
variables. These include the size of the forces
deployed in southern Laos, South Vietnam, and
Cambodia; the level of the US air effort and the
degree of its effectiveness in interdicting the
supply system; the extent of ground operations
by RVNAF forces and by friendly guerrillas; and
the choice of strategic and tactical options
which Hanoi and Saigon may try to follow in the
12 months following the opening of the dry season.
14. The latter is a critical variable since
it presumably will be a large factor in estab-
lishing the logistic target which the supply
system in Laos will seek to attain during the
next dry season. It is also the most difficult to
come to grips with because it raises the funda-
mental question of the extent to which Hanoi's
strategic and tactical options are circumscribed
by logistic constraints. Given our lack of knowl-
edge on what these targets are, it is impossible
at this early date to project any meaningful quanti-
fication of what the actual level of logistic
performance will be during the next dry season.
15. We can, however, compute with reasonable
accuracy the logistic requirements which must be
met to satisfy a broad range of strategic and
tactical options, and on the basis of previously
observed performance, we can assess the capability
of the system to meet these requirements. Using
this approach, we analyze in this section the logistic
requirements ranging from a minimum required to keep
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the war going at the low levels of 1970 to the maxi-
mum required to obtain a capability for a sustained
and widespread military offensive. We then, on the
basis of assumed alternative levels of air inter-
diction, assess the extent to which the system is
likely to meet these varying requirements for the
1971-72 dry season.
B. The Minimum Goal
16. In this discussion we assume that Hanoi has
set as its minimum goal a logistic performance ade-
quate to enable the war in South Vietnam and Cambodia
to continue at the low levels of protracted warfare
observed over the past 18 months. To meet this
minimum goal, the North Vietnamese must provide suf-
ficient input along the entry routes from North
Vietnam into Laos to reestablish depleted stockpiles,
to meet the requirements of its forces in southern
Laos, to offset supply losses resulting from inter-
diction, and to provide an adequate throughput of
supplies for its forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Southern Laos
17. In an earlier analysis of the logistic flows
through southern Laos during the 1970-71 dry season,
the normal flow of supplies was estimated to require
a daily input from North Vietnam into southern Laos of
224 tons a day. It was further estimated that the
need to replace the loss of Sihanoukville as well
as the expansion of logistic and security forces
required to maintain and defend the logistic system
increased the minimum required daily input of sup-
plies to 278 tons a day. For this analysis we now
assume that the higher input requirement has in
effect become the normal burden imposed on the
system -- first, because the Communists are still
denied access to Sihanoukville and, second, there
is no evidence to warrant a judgment that Hanoi
would feel able in late 1971 to maintain a smaller
force in southern Laos than it had there at the
beginning of the 1970-71 dry season. This force is
estimated at 80,000 troops.
18. In measuring the logistic flow for forces
in southern Laos, we have assumed that by the end
of this dry season Hanoi will probably withdraw the
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forces deployed to southern Laos in reaction to Lam
Son 719. We have also assumed that Hanoi will not
redeploy these forces at the start of the next dry
season, preferring to keep them in southern North
Vietnam or in South Vietnam so long as it perceives
no immediate threat of a renewal of incursions of
the scale of Lam Son 719.
19. These assumptions reduce somewhat the esti-
mated burden imposed on the logistic system during
the next dry season. The incremental consumption
and ground losses of supplies by the forces committed
against Lam Son 719, for example, would be equivalent
to an added daily drawdown of 28 tons of supplies
throughout the dry season. Simply maintaining these
forces in southern Laos without their being committed
to combat would increase the daily consumption in
Laos by 15-20 tons a day.
South Vietnam and Cambodia
20. The minimum goal of sustaining the war at
the low levels of 1970 assumes that enemy forces in
South Vietnam and Cambodia will be kept at their
mid-1970 level of about 220,000 troops, of which
50,000 - 60,000 were deployed in Cambodia.
Input Requirements
21. The forces in southern Laos, South Vietnam,
and Cambodia would have a total daily requirement
of 164 tons a day in the 1971-72 dry season and 114
tons a day during the wet season. If the North
Vietnamese attempt to carry out a full year's re-
supply of these forces during the 1971-72 dry season,
the total daily input, including allowances for
air and ground losses, would be 278 tons a day, as
shown in the tabulation below:
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Short Tons
Cumulative
Daily Dry Season
Requirement for forces
in southern Laos
1971/72 dry season
120
36,000
1972 wet season
70
10,500
Minimum requirement for
forces in South Vietnam
and Cambodia
44
20,100
Total
66,600
Daily input requirement
(66,600 240)
278
22. On the basis of past performance, this in-
put requirement appears to be well within the capa-
bilities of the North Vietnamese logistic system.
We currently are estimating that during the 1970-71
dry season the Communists will have maintained a
daily average input of 295-370 tons of supplies into
the Laos Panhandle.* If this level of input is sus-
tained during the 1971-72 dry season, it would
clearly be adequate for maintenance of combat activi-
ties at 1970 levels.
23. The lower input -- 295 tons a day -- would
impose a much tighter condition on the North Viet-
namese and quite possibly could enforce some further
drawdowns on existing stockpiles to maintain the
1970 pace of the war. The higher input -- 370 tons
a day -- would present a more comfortable position
from Hanoi's point of view. It would, for example,
* This estimate is based on the assumption that
the additional burdens and disruptions imposed on
the logistic system this year will cause the North
Vietnamese to try to maintain a high level of input
past the normal end of the dry season and through
the month of May. If the monsoon rains appear early
in the month, it will become increasingly difficult
to maintain the flow of supplies at this level.
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provide Hanoi with more resources to support a some-
what broader range of strategic or tactical opera-
tions.
24. In neither case, however, should the gross
difference between daily input represented by our
performance figures of 295-370 tons a day and the
input requirements shown in Table 1 be regarded as
a residual throughput into South Vietnam or Cambodia.
Part of the residual, of course, would be subjected
to air interdiction as it moved through the Pan-
handle. An unknown share of the apparent input
surplus, particularly at the higher level of 370
tons a day, would probably be used to expand stock-
piles within southern Laos. Much would also depend
on how much of the residual flow could actually be
moved into South Vietnam and Cambodia and placed
into forward supply caches by Rear Services Groups.
25. The problems of distribution to combat units
from storage areas in South Vietnam and Cambodia
have become increasing complex. Enemy deliveries to
combat units have been spotty for sometime because
of Allied operations. Supply distribution has been
disrupted and caches have been captured or destroyed.
Improvements in RVNAF and FANK capabilities over the
past year and an increase in their operations over
the next year or so may further increase Communist
distribution problems.
26. The extent to which the actual input of
supplies during the next dry season influences Hanoi's
capabilities and thus its choice of strategies for
the 1971-72 period will also be affected by logistic
performance during the coming wet season. The analysis
just. presented imposed a full year's logistic burden on
an eight-month dry season. Throughput during the next
wet season would reduce the required input during the
next dry season or give the Communists more tactical
flexibility by drawing on stockpiles to expand combat
rates.
27. We estimate that with a major effort the
Communists could continue to move supplies through
the Laos Panhandle during the 1971 wet season. De-
pending on the length and severity of the monsoon
rains, this throughput could range between 10% and
20% of normal dry season throughput, or from 1,200
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to 3,000 tons. This amount would be equivalent to
from 30 to 70 days of supply requirements at 1970
combat levels.
C. The Maximum Goal
28. In this discussion we assume that Hanoi has
set as its goal a buildup of stockpiles in South
Vietnam and Cambodia sufficient to permit the launch-
ing of a sustained offensive in both countries.* In
addition, the discussion considers strategic
variants which would involve general offensives of
less universal proportions. The three other variants
analyzed are offensives limited to:
(a) Military Region 1;
(b) Cambodia; and
(c) Military Region 1 and Cambodia
The Logistic Burden
29. The following discussion outlines the
logistic burden under each of the four strategic
variants. The derivation of these factors is dis-
cussed in the Appendix. In each case the flow of
supplies required to support forces in southern
Laos is held at 1970-71 levels as discussed for
the minimum case.
30. As shown in Table 1, the dry season input
flows would range from a low of 293-301 tons in
the case of an offensive limited to Cambodia,
* For this analysis, stockpiling requirements are
judged to be one and one-half times the average
daily expenditures of externally procured supplies
(Classes II, IV, and V for Cambodia and South Viet-
nam's MRs 1, 2, 3, 4 and Class I for South Vietnam's
MR 1) during 1968 for a six-month period. This is
thought to provide adequate supplies to sustain a
continuation of low-level combat during the pre-
offensive phase and to provide ample support for a
major offensive. To this total was added a six
month's resupply flow requirement of the low combat
level of 1970 to round out the annual requirement
for 1971-72.
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Table 1
1971/72 Dry Season Supply Flows Needed
to Meet Requirements for Sustained Offensive
Operations
Short Tons
Daily Cumulative
Requirement Dry Season Inputs
Southern Laos
1971/72 dry season
1972 wet season
Case 1
120
70
73-90
36,000
10,500
33,187-40,950
79,687-87,450 gy
Country-wide South
Vietnam and Cambodia
Total
Daily input require-
ment
332-364 b/
Case 2
Cambodia; low combat
elsewhere
52-56
23,850-25,650
Total
70,350-72,150
a/
Daily input require-
ment
2937301 b/
Case 3
Military region 1,
low combat elsewhere
58-68
26,437-30,825
Total
72,937-77,325
a/
Daily input require-
ment
304-322 b/
Case 4
Military region 1 and
Cambodia, low combat
elsewhere
67-80
30,487-36,675
Total
76,987-83,175
a/
Daily input require-
ment 320-347 12/
a. Including southern Laos tonnages, above.
b. The daily input requirement is calculated on the
basis of a 240 day dry season (October-May) and in-
cludes an allowance for air losses.
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to 332-364 tons in the case of an offensive mounted
throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia.
31. Using the same technique as that presented
in the analysis of the minimum goal, we will compare
the input requirements of each variant with capabili-
ties as measured by logistic performance during the
1970-71 dry season.
? I -- Maximum Offensive
32. In this case a general offensive throughout
South Vietnam and Cambodia would require an average
daily input of 332-364 tons during the 1971-72 dry
season. On the basis of the 1970-71 dry season,
we can anticipate that actual input will range be-
tween 295 and 370 tons a day. The low end of this
range is so far short of required inputs that a
general offensive of this magnitude would not seem
feasible during the 1971-72 dry season. The re-
quisite stockpiles would probably not be in place
until the approach of the 1972-73 dry season (October
1972-May 1973).
33. On the other hand, if the higher range of
estimated input -- 370 tons a day -- is achieved
during the 1971-72 dry season then the logistic
imperatives to enable a general offensive will be
close to satisfaction some time toward the end of
the season. Because the margin is narrow and be-
cause a reliable means of resupply during the rainy
season would be less certain, the Communists would
probably prefer to wait out the wet season before
launching the offensive. Moreover, their problems
in moving supplies from Laos and distributing them
to combat units in South Vietnam and Cambodia would
further complicate the launching of such a wide-
spread offensive. Much will depend upon the impact
of Allied operations in 1971-72 and the degree to
which the Communists are determined to expand the
war. Their prudence would be cast aside, however,
if the developing situation in Cambodia or South
Vietnam revealed opportunities which gave the
promise of highly successful operations. There is
a greater chance that the Communists would attempt
one or more of the variants discussed below.
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SEC.:Rh:1
The Intermediate Cases
34. The variants for less extensive offensives
would require the following daily inputs during the
1971-72 dry season:
Short Tons
Case 2 - Military Region 1 304-322
Case 3 - Cambodia 293-301
Case 4 - Military Region 1 and
Cambodia 320-347
Intermediate Options
35. In these cases we assume that Hanoi will
desire to undertake sustained heavy offensive
activity in only one or more regions of South Vietnam
and/or Cambodia. Analytically, the logistic flows
required for these intermediate models have been
constructed in the same manner as in the "maximum
goal" strategy. For the region where a high level
of offensive activity is postulated, the flow of
supplies needed to establish stockpiles is calculated;
elsewhere, the enemy requirements are based on the
1970 expenditure rates.
36. The input requirements of all of the three
"intermediate" strategy options fall within the
range of estimated 1970-71 dry season daily average
input of 295-370 tons of supplies into the Laos
Panhandle. At this level of input, particularly
as we move away from the low end of the range, each
of these strategies is more feasible.
37. The high range of the estimated input --
370 tons a day -- is slightly above average daily
input requirements for building up to a sustained
high level of combat in Cambodia and MR 1; it is
well above the requirements needed to build stock-
piles for high combat in Cambodia or MR I separately.
This suggests that the enemy, operating from the high
end of the estimated input range, could probably
undertake extended offensive actions in either
Cambodia or MR 1 some time before the end of the
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1971-72 dry season provided that supplies reach the
combat units concerned. This is particularly so in
MR 1 where the Communists could concentrate the through-
put of supplies on Routes 926 and 922 and quickly
deploy the required forces. In the case of MR 1,
general offensive activities could probably be
undertaken early in the 1971-72 dry season because of
its location. The time required to build stockpiles
for both MR 1 and Cambodia would indicate that simul-
taneous offensives in both areas could probably not
be undertaken until the end of the dry season, in
which case the Communists might await the start of
the 1972-73 dry season.
38. A somewhat different picture emerges if one
considers the low end of the estimated input -- 295
tons per day. This amount would appear to be in-
sufficient to undertake any of the "intermediate"
strategies very early during the 1971-72 dry season.
Again, MR 1 would be an exception for the reasons
discussed above. The Cambodia strategy alone would
appear to be feasible toward the end of the period,
and somewhat sooner if stockpiles in Cambodia have
not been seriously depleted.
DIA POSITION
39. DIA finds it difficult to work from an
"input requirement" or a "supply flow" approach.
As an alternative to that methodology, DIA first
calculates enemy requirements to support combat
activities in South Vietnam and Cambodia. These
calculations are then compared with DIA estimates
of supplies throughput to South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, estimates of supplies stockpiled in Laos
for later throughput, and estimates of enemy
input to the system at the Laos border. Thus an
overall estimate of enemy logistic performance is
achieved. The DIA estimates for October 1970 to
October 1.971 is set forth below:
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DIA ESTIMATE
Period - 1 Oct 1970
Input
Throughput
Stockpile - Laos
(for later throughput) a/
Requirements - RVN/CB
(external from Laos) a/
- 1 Oct 1971
Short Tons
75,000-85,000
10,000-13,000
7,000-9,000
16,000-18,000
(80,000)
(11,500)
( 8,000)
(17,000)
a. Subject to additional ground/air interdiction.
b. To conduct a protracted war of the type
observed since 1 Oct 1970.
This estimate suggests the enemy is barely able to
sustain the current level of effort.
40. It is unlikely that enemy logistic input
effort will increase significantly during the
1971-72 period. The estimated input for 1970-71
is measurably higher than in any previous year.
The toll the enemy would pay in consumption and
losses to air and ground interdiction in Laos
would increase sharply were the enemy to turn to
daylight operations, increased road building, in-
creased security troops, and increased wet season
operations. Moreover, even though the enemy may
calculate that during the 1971-72 period he will
not have to contend with the losses of another
Lam Son 719 operation, he must consider carefully
the new vulnerabilities of his Laotian stockpiles.
He might be able to stockpile the rough equivalent
of his Lam Son losses but these would remain tar-
gets for RVNAF and allied air and ground opera-
tions.
41. In view of the air and ground interdiction
of the supply system over the past year, the
Communists have no assurance that they would be
able to deliver sufficient supplies to their
forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1971 to
maintain the 1970 levels of combat. Although
interdiction losses at the 1970-71 rate in Laos
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and consumption by enemy forces in Laos have been
considered, the loss of supplies in South Vietnam
and Cambodia and the problems of distribution to
combat units from storage areas in Cambodia and
South Vietnam further reduces the amount of supplies
which these combat forces would actually receive.
Enemy deliveries to combat units have been spotty
for some time due to Allied operations. Supply
distribution has been disrupted and caches have
been captured or destroyed. Improvements in RVNAF
and FANK capabilities over the past year and an
increase in their operations over the next year
or so would further increase Communist supply
problems. Thus even at the projected supply inputs
maintenance of the 1970 combat levels would become
increasingly difficult by 1972.
42. In postulating possibly enemy courses of
action for the period 1 October 1971 - 1 October
1972, four cases have been constructed. Enemy
requirtments in these situations have been de-
veloped and are compared with estimate of the ex-
pected enemy logistic performance.
CHART
Action Requirements Short Tons
Case
1
Case
2
Case
3
Case
4
21,000
-23,000
17,000
-19,000
18,000
-20,000
19,500
-21,500
For computing logistical requirements for the
four cases involving the General Offensive,
DIA assumed the following:
CASE ONE: (TOTAL RVN AND CAMBODIA)
Nine to 15 combat battalions fighting
simultaneously for at least five to ten
days in Cambodia and each Military Region
of the Republic.
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CASE TWO: (CAMBODIA ONLY)
Nine to 15 battalions fighting simul-
taneously for at least five to ten days
in Cambodia with the RVN remaining at a
low level.
CASE THREE: (GVN MR 1 ONLY)
Nine to 15 battalions fighting simul-
taneously for at least five to ten days
in MR 1 with the rest of the RVN and
Cambodia remaining at a low level.
CASE FOUR: (GVW MR 1 AND CAMBODIA)
Wine to 15 battalions fighting simul-
taneously for at least five to ten days
in both Cambodia and GVN MR 1 with the
rest of the Republic remaining at low
level.
43. The added tonnage required represents pri-
marily additional ammunition expenditures and food
requirements. Ammunition requirements increase in
proportion the number of engagements whereas food
requirements are a function of the numbers of per-
sonnel involved and the location.
44. On balance, it can be seen that under the
estimated conditions of supply the Communists
probably would not be capable of Case 1, a general
offensive throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia.
The risk of such an operation would not only in-
volve a serious drawdown of supplies but also high
losses. Thus, it would probably notbe acceptable
to them. Case 2 would at best be only marginally
within his capability, but could be prohibited by
losses to his stockpiles and supply movements
through air and ground interdiction. Case 3 would
appear feasible due to its location nearest the DMZ
and his stockpiles in Laos. Case 4 would seriously
tax his supply capabilities in 1971-72 and might be
well beyond any action he might undertake in this
time period.
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D. Levels of Air Interdiction
45. The previous analysis assumed that the
level of air interdiction in southern Laos during
the 1971-72 dry season would be the same as that
maintained during the current dry season. If the
US air effort during the 1971-72 dry season should
be altered then we would have to make adjustments
in our estimates of the constraints imposed by
air interdiction upon the NVA logistic system.
If, for example, the US air effort were reduced
by 30% and the sortie mix remained essentially
as it is under current programs, we would antici-
pate a proportionate and significant loosening of
the logistic constraints the enemy experiences
in southern Laos.
46. The effects of changing levels of air
activity in southern Laos are currently being
studied by a working group panel of the Vietnam
Special Studies Group. When its work is completed,
more specific analysis of the effects of a reduc-
tion in the US air effort will be possible.
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III. Manpower Constraints
47. Even with the war at the low levels observed
during 1970, the drain on Communist manpower has
been substantial. Over the past few years, North
Vietnam has had to bear an increasing share of man-
power losses as Communist ability to recruit in
South Vietnam declined to low levels. The manpower
drain during 1968 and successive years was one of
the principal determinants of Hanoi's electing to
follow a course of protracted warfare. A reluctance
to make continuing large inputs of power is reflected
in statistics on infiltration arrivals in South
Vietnam/Cambodia, which declined from about 250,000
in 1968 to 100,000 in 1969 and to only 55,000 in
1970. These declining inputs have brought about a
steady erosion of NVA/VC combat forces in South
Vietnam/Cambodia which totaled only 110,000-125,000
at the end of 1970.
48. If Hanoi chooses now to increase its offen-
sive capabilities by the end of the 1971-72 dry
season, its forces in South Vietnam will have to
be augmented substantially. The estimated current
disposition of NVA/VC combat forces and the in-
creased force required to support the alternative
offensive strategies are shown in Table 2.
49. The force augmentations shown in Table 2
reflect a strategy of offensive operations roughly
akin to those observed during the Tet and May of-
fensives in 1968. There are several favorable as-
pects about the actual pre-Tet manpower situation
which will be difficult for the enemy to recreate.
The buildup of the enemy combat force structure
during 1967 was accomplished with South Vietnamese
rural manpower recruited from territory not under
South Vietnamese control. Similarly, the major part
of the fighting during the 1968 campaign was under-
taken by southern Main and Local Forces units, As
these forces were drawn down by high losses, however,
replacements were made by the infusion of NVA
personnel. Given the current status of the enemy
force structure, and the Communists' limited capa-
bility to recruit manpower from the largely GVN-
controlled population, the enemy could only simulate
a true pre-Tet manpower situation through large
infusions of NVA personnel.
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. .
11.
50. As Table 2 shows, these augmentations
range from 20,000 to prepare for general offensive
campaigns in either MR 1 or Cambodia, to 40,000 for
simultaneous offensives in both MR 1 and Cambodia,
to 60,000 for Case 1 -- a general offensive through-
out South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Table 2
Current Disposition and Estimated Combat Force
Levels Required to Support Alternative
Offensive Strategies a/
,Thousand
May 1972, Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
MR]. 35 55 55 35 55
MR 2 23 33 23 23 23
MR 3 17 27 17 17 17
MR 4 15 20 15 15 15
Total 115 175 135 135 155
a. Case 1, general; oftenal-ve throughout South
Vietnam and Cambodia; Case 2, general offensive
in Military Region 1; Case 3, general offensive
in Cambodia; and Case 4, general offensive in
Cambodia and Military Region 1.
Case 1
51. An augmentation of 60,000 troops would be
required for this strategy. Losses during 1970
were reported from the field as over 200,000, and
if we accept them for analytical purposes then
infiltration arrivals in South Vietnam would have
to be on the order of 250,000-300,000 troops. We
have estimated that since 1968 infiltration on the
order of 100,000 troops a year would generally be
adequate to maintain force levels. If a country-
wide offensive were initiated, however, casualties
would increase dramatically and infiltration re-
fl
quirements would undoubtedly soar as they did in
1968. Infiltration at such a rate would take a
considerable period of time to organize and
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implement. Moreover, a manpower drain of this
magnitude would draw deeply from North Vietnam's
manpower pool, and severely strain the training
capacity of the North Vietnamese armed forces,
particularly if such training had not been pro-
ceeding apace, and contribute to further disrup-
tion of the North Vietnamese economy.
52. DIA believes that the enemy could increase
his force structure by 60,000 with an infiltration
arrival of approximately 125,000 to 150,000 per-
sonnel. This is based upon his current strategy
of attempting to maintain his 1970 force structure
with approximately 55,000 arrivals last year.
The estimated decrease in his order of battle was
about 20,000 (240,000-290,000 in December 1969 to
220,000-270,000 in December 1970). Adding his OB
losses and infiltration, the enemy needed only
about 75,000 arrivals to maintain his end 1969
level of forces. For lesser amounts of buildups,
infiltration requirements would be reduced.
53. All of these factors plus the knowledge
that a 1971-72 offensive of these dimensions would
probably result in high casualties would give
Hanoi much food for thought. Any decision to
commit these forces would be reached not simply
by considering numbers but by hard consideration
of many other factors including the increasing
social and psychological pressures that would
ensue, balanced against the likely results of
such action.
The Intermediate Cases
Case 2
54. The military options open to the enemy in
MR I are unique in several ways. The proximity to
North Vietnam, the relatively short distance to move
supplies and personnel in short periods of time, and
the capability to withdraw units back into North
Vietnam for retrenchment safe from Allied ground
forces give MR 1 a unique position.
55, For the purpose of this analysis, it is
estimated that a strength augmentation of 20,000
would be necessary to mount-e sustained offensive
in MR 1, Assuming no logistical constraints and
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1111 SECRET 111
a low level of activity in the area over the next
month or two, this increase could be achieved within
a relatively short period. This number of personnel
would not appear to create an inordinate strain on
the infiltration system nor would it impose any
serious drawdown on the manpower pool in North Viet-
nam. A key factor in assessing enemy options in
MR 1 appears to be the current availability of
units now in southern Laos used to counter the Lam
Son 719 operation. Once they are refitted, approxi-
mately half of the 20,000-man augmentation could
be deployed from enemy units currently in the Laos
Panhandle into MR 1 within a week's time. The
additional 101000 combat personnel required to
mount and sustain a high level of military activity
would have to be infiltration personnel and at best
could not be expected to be in an offensive position
until mid-year.
Case 3
56. The buildup of a general offensive capability
in Cambodia is also estimated to require a force
augmentation of about 20,000 troops. The lateral
redeployments of enemy units from adjacent military
regions in South Vietnam does not seem a likely
source of manpower for this strategy, because of
the already weakened force structure in, these areas.
Thus the major source of manpower for troop aug-
mentation in Cambodia would be from infiltration
of units and filler personnel. Assuming a continua-
tion of a low level of combat activity until such
time that a force buildup can be implemented in
Cambodia, it is estimated that some 50,000 infil-
trators would have to be directed to Cambodia in
order to result in an overall force strength of
about 450000. If force levels in South Vietnam are
also maintained, infiltration arrivals through 1971
would have to be about 150,000. Although several
regimental-sized units could be dispatched from
southern Laos in a matter of weeks if Hanoi were
willing to weaken its defenses there, it does not
seem likely that overall requirements for a troop
buildup in Cambodia could be met until early 1972.
Case 4
57. This variant considers the manpower re-
quirements to sustain a general offensive capability
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6t,t_crCE
in both MR 1 and Cambodia. The forces in each region
would have to be augmented by 20,000 troops. Al-
though enemy troop strength in MR 1 could be built
up in a relatively short period, the necessary man-
power inputs to permit simultaneous offensive opera-
tions in Cambodia would not appear to be possible
until sometime early in 1972. This time would be
required for a force buildup in Cambodia and, in
addition, allow time to deploy replacement personnel
to depleted units in the other areas of South
Vietnam. The infiltration requirements for this
option would be on the order of 180,000 personnel,
of which 50,000 would be committed to Cambodia and
the remaining 30,000 to MR 1. The deployment of
sufficient troops to Cambodia and MR 1 in time to
launch an offensive by early 1972 would be exceedingly
difficult and would pose some strains on trained man-
power reserves and training capabilities in North
Vietnam through the remainder of this year.
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IV. Overview: October 1971 - October 1972
58. Our analysis to this point has focused
on one of the prime factors that affects Communist
military capabilities in South Vietnam and
Cambodia -- Hanoi's ability to move men and supplies
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But we recognize that
there are other equally important factors determin-
ing the Communists' capacity to fight.
59. The Communists are not likely to be able
to fight -- nor are they likely to choose to
fight -- simply at whatever level of intensity their
logistic situation permits a year from now. This
would, among other things, fly in the face of what
we still believe to be basic Hanoi strategy -- to
rely mainly on the staying power of its forces to
outlast US patience with the war.
60. The North Vietnamese have relied heavily
at times on the kind of strong military force that
can be applied only by big units that require sub-
stantial logistics support. They still have many
such units engaged in the fighting, but for the
past two years, particularly in South Vietnam,
the Communists have soft pedaled big-unit warfare.
This kind of warfare is extremely expensive, and
the chances of achieving significant gains are re-
mote, given the current balance of forces. More-
over, the Communists' ability to sustain large-scale
action in many areas has been degraded significantly
since the loss of Sihanoukville. None of the evi-
dence we now have in hand suggests they expect these
obstacles to be overcome easily or soon.
61. Indeed, all the current evidence from South
Vietnam suggests that the Communist forces have
been told in no uncertain terms that they should
not expect much more than brave words from higher
authorities and that they cannot count on being
bailed out by big units. In many ways the wheel
has come full circle for the Communists in South
Vietnam; they are back trying to fight what they
call a "people's war." Its precepts include local
initiative, self-sufficiency, economy-of-force
military tactics, and heavy reliance on subversion
and the organizational groundwork of an insurgency.
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? SECRET
62. The results of these low-profile tactics
are likely to affect Communist capabilities to
fight in South Vietnam next year, as well as their
long-term prospects, at least as much as their
ability to move men or supplies south. Indeed their
need for supplies from North Vietnam could be re-
duced to some extent if they succeeded in living off
the land and in obtaining supplies from South Viet-
namese sources.
63. We are uncertain about South Vietnam's
ability to cope with Communist terrorism, sub-
version, and political agitation over the long
haul, nor can we be sure of how to measure the
results of this sort of warfare at any given time.
But the Communists probably are not confident of
their long-term prospects either, and we doubt
very much that they are doing well enough now to
provide the essential underpinning for a success-
ful return to main force warfare in South Vietnam
in the next year or so, even if enough men and
supplies can be moved south through the Laotian
corridors. Nevertheless, Hanoi has other options.
It could, for example, raise the level of military
action significantly in the form of more frequent
high points and more extensive small-unit actions.
These would not require large inputs of supplies
or manpower but would make the Communist military
presence more visible. One can also easily conjure
up a situation 12-18 months from now in which Hanoi
has concluded that a strong attack, such as the
offensive variants analyzed for MR 1 or Cambodia,
would be worth the effort.
64. Whether Hanoi actually makes such efforts
or whether it sticks to the lower profile tactics
of most of the past two years will, of course,
depend on other key variables not discussed in
this memorandum. Elections in South Vietnam this
year may have an important influence on Hanoi's
tactics -- not just their outcome but how the
elections are conducted and whether they prove a
force for cohesiveness or for divisiveness among
the South Vietnamese.
65. The elections in the United States will be
a prime consideration in Hanoi as the Communists
try to chart their course for 1972. Hanoi may
well decide that it must make a major effort to
undercut long-term US support for an anti-Communist
regime in South Vietnam, either by trying to bring
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GP SEC.;KET
about changes in President Nixon's policies or by
trying to make Vietnam a major liability for his
administration in 1972. Thus, what the Communists
set out to do next year is not likely to be governed
rigidly by their raw capabilities to move supplies
from North Vietnam. An equally important considera-
tion could be a determination in Hanoi that it
must do whatever possible to alter the impressions,
if not the realities, of the current situation in
South Vietnam by pumping in more North Vietnamese
manpower and by ordering its forces to attack in
whatever ways they can.
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? SECRET 11,
Conclusions
66. Logistic considerations during 1971-72
will still loom large in Hanoi's strategic planning.
Even though the Communists' resupply capability is
substantial, the strategic options which it will
support are by no means unlimited. Moreover, there
are a number of key factors other than the volume
of supplies moved down the Ho Chi Minh Trail which
Hanoi must weigh in making its decisions on future
strategies. These include such issues as how much
further Hanoi is willing to drawdown its manpower
and how it assesses the likely results if the level
of military action were raised significantly. The
North Vietnamese must also continue to wrestle with
the complications arising from the loss of their
Cambodian sanctuaries and the need to reestablish
viable supply corridors from the southern Panhandle
of Laos to MRs 3 and 4. Finally, the deterioration
of the Communist infrastructure in South Vietnam
and the stronger position of the GVN are major con-
straints on Communist capabilities.
67. Viewed strictly from the point of view of
North Vietnamese logistic capabilities, a number
of conclusions can be drawn about the type of
military action Hanoi might pursue over the next
18 months.*
68. On the basis of its performance during the
current dry season -- an average of 295-370 tons
of supplies moved into the system daily -- the
Laos supply system, by repeating this performance
during the 1971-72 season, can continue to handle
the volume of supplies needed to support the war
at the protracted level observed during 1970. We
estimate that support of the Communist forces in
southern Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia during
the 1971-72 period would require a daily input of
278 tons of supplies from North Vietnam. In the
absence of operations similar to those of Lam Son
719, the logistic burden on the Laos system during
the 1971-72 dry season would be less than it was
during the current dry season.
* DIA ofoes not concur in those portions of these
conctusions, and other portions of the paper that
are based upon "input requirements." The DIA
position appears on page 16 beginning at paragraph
39.
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?
StUKE
69. The capabilities of the logistic system
would be more taxed if it were called upon to
support the various options for offensive campaigns
analyzed in this study. These options require in-
puts of supplies from North Vietnam ranging from
293 to about 364 tons a day.
70. The option requiring the greatest inputs of
supplies -- a major offensive throughout South
Vietnam and Cambodia -- would clearly not be
feasible before the start of the 1972-73 dry season
if inputs from North Vietnam are at the low end of
the range ? 295 tons a day. On the other hand, if
input were at the higher end of the range -- 370 tons
a day -- the Communists could, from the logistic
point of view, consider the possibility of a major
offensive toward the end of the 1971-72 dry season.
71. We believe, however, that a number of
constraints would cause them to avoid such an offen-
sive. These constraints include the uncertainty of
continued resupply during the wet season, the prob-
ability of extremely high casualties, the uncertain-
ties of the results of such an offensive, and problems
of distributing supplies within Cambodia and South
Vietnam, particularly in the far reaches of MRs 3 and
4.
72. If Hanoi's plans were directed to the inter-
mediate offensives analyzed in this memorandum --
MR 1 alone, Cambodia alone, or MR 1 and Cambodia
combined -- the logistic constraints are relaxed
considerably and the options are considerably wider.
73. If North Vietnam were able to achieve in-
puts at the high end of the range, any of the inter-
mediate options would appear to be feasible. The
offensives in Cambodia alone or in MR 1 could be
feasible logistically before the end of the 1971-72
dry season. Given the proximity of MR 1 to North
Vietnam, offensive activities could probably be
undertaken early in the season. To launch an
offensive in both MR 1 and Cambodia simultaneously
would put greater pressure on the logistic system,
and it would probably not be possible until the end
of the dry season.
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? SECRET
74. If the inputs into the system are at the
low end of the range, none of the intermediate
strategies would appear to be feasible very early
in the dry season. Again, MR I would be an ex-
ception because of its proximity to North Vietnam.
The timing of offensive activities in Cambodia
would depend in large measure on whether a crash
program of resupply were undertaken and to what
extent existing stockpiles have been depleted.
75. From the manpower point of view, all of
the strategic options are within North Vietnamese
capabilities. Force augmentations for the inter-
mediate strategies and the maintenance of force
levels would require inputs over the next year
ranging from 120,000 to 180,000. These forces
generally could be in place by early 1972 and much
earlier in MR 1. The manpower requirement for a
countrywide offensive (including Cambodia) are so
large and the prospects of heavy losses so great
that we estimate Hanoi would be unwilling to under-
take such a commitment.
76. Despite the several options that would be
available to Hanoi from the point of view of logis-
tic and manpower considerations, we estimate that
the overall course of the war is unlikely to under-
go radical changes in the next few months. Hanoi
is still bent on outlasting the United States and
in South Vietnam is concentrating on the fundamentals
of a "people's war" in an effort to correct its pres-
ent weaknesses. It recognizes the deterioration of
its position in South Vietnam since 1968, the dif-
ficulties of rebuilding an adequate base to support
main force warfare, and the adverse longer term con-
sequences of mounting a major military effort that
fails to produce really decisive results.
77. But Hanoi has other options falling well
short of a do-or-die military offensive in all of
South Vietnam. It can still raise the level of war-
fare significantly without a proportionate increase
in supply and manpower requirements by relying on a
high rate of small-scale activity, or it could opt
for a major offensive in MR 1. Whether Hanoi would
make such a decision depends not only on its logistic
capabilities but also on a host of key variables.
The Conduct and outcome of South Vietnamese elections
this year will have some impact on Hanoi's view of
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the war, and we believe the US presidential
elections will loom very large in Communist think-
ing as 1972 approaches.
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APPENDIX
Introduction
The following discussion presents the meth-
odology which has been used to develop numerical
appreciations of the enemy's supply requirements
to support various military strategies during 1971-
72. In general, two historical records have been
used to obtain factors for enemy requirements: the
1970 expenditure and ground loss rates in South
Vietnam and Laos and the 1968 expenditure and ground
loss rates in South Vietnam. Our knowledge of
the enemy's requirements in Cambodia is very slight.
Consequently, the methodology extrapolates from the
South Vietnam experience to arrive at some apprecia-
tion of Cambodian expenditures.
Southerp Laos
The projected expenditure rates for southern
Laos for the 1971-72 dry season are based on the
1970-71 Pre-Lam Son dry season experience. The
expenditure rates for the 1972 wet season are es-
sentially those of the 1970 wet season. The fol-
lowing tabulation present these factors.
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j.
IIP
1971/72 Dry Season (240
Days)
Tons
Class I
Classes 11 & IV
Short
Daily
Cumulative
46 X
12 X
(240)
(240)
11,040
2,880
Class III
46
X
(240)
11,040
Class V
16
X
(240)
3,840
Total
120
X
(240)
28,800
Total with 25% bomb
damage (BDA)
150
X
(240)
36,000
1972 Wet Season
(120
Days)
Class I
46
X
(120)
5,520
Classes 11 & IV
12
X
(120)
1,440
Class III
9
X
(120)
1,080
Class V
3 X
(120)
360
Total
70
X
(120)
8,400
Total with 25% BDA
87.5
X
(120)
10,500
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OIL
South Vietnam and Cambodia
Four classes of externally procured supplies
are considered in all the following models: food
(Class I); weapons and equipment (Classes II and IV)
and ammunition (Class V). All Military Regions of
South Vietnam and Cambodia have a requirement for
Classes II, IV and V. Only South Vietnam's MR 1
is assigned a Class I requirement, food for the
other regions being supplied by other than the
logisticw channel from North Vietnam.
Model One: Minimum Requirement for Forces
MR 1
in South Vietnam and Cambodia
Tons
Class I
Short
Daily
Cumulative
24
(365)
8,760
Classes
II,
IV, V
5
(365)
1,825
MR 2
Classes
II,
IV, V
2
(365)
730
'IR 3
Classes
II,
IV, V
5
(365)
1,825
MR 4
Classes
II,
IV, V
2
(365)
730
Cambodia
Classes
II,
IV, V
6
(365)
2,190
Total
44
(365)
16,060
Total with 25% BDA
20,100
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IIP-.411.-11.,
Model Two: Requirement for Forces
in South Vietnam and Cambodia
to Prepare for General Offensives*
MR 1
Class I
(low
Short Tons
Daily
Cumulative
combat)
24
(180)
4,320
(buildup)
25x1.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750- 9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.?
(180)
3,780- 5,040
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(180)
360
(buildup)
4x1.5
(180)-
4x2.0
(180)
1,080- 1,440
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
7x1.5
(180)-
7x2.0
(180)
1,890- 2,520
MR 4
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(180)
360
(buildup)
3x1.5
(180)-
3x2.0
(180)
810- 1,080
Cambodia
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
6
(180)
1,080
(buildup)
16x1.5
(180)-
16x2.0
(180)
4,320- 5,760
Total
Total with 25% BDA
26,550-32,760
33,187-40,950
* Buildup for a sustained (stx months) high level
of combat was developed analytically by applying a
range of [footnote continues on p. A-5]
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? o_LA_Ar....c,
Model Three: Requirement for High Level of Combat
in Cambodia, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere
MR 1
Class I
(low
Short Tons
Daily
Cumulative
combat)
24
(360)
8,640
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(360)
1,800
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(360)
1,800
MR 4
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Cambodia
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
6
(180)
1,080
(buildup)
16x1.5
(180)-
16x2.0
(180)
4,320-
5,760
Total
Total with 25% BDA
19,080-20,520
23,850-25,650
factors 1.5-2.0 to the average daily enemy require-
ments (consumption and ground Zosses) during 1968,
then multiplying this by 180 days. The stockpiling
factors are consistent with those derived from an
analysis of the data available on base area deploy-
ment of supplies shipped to the enemy forces via
the port of Sihanoukville during 1966-69 and con-
forms to our understanding of enemy stockpiling
practice. The stockpile buildups represented by
the 1.5-2.0 factor was considered also to reflect
the accumulation of sufficient supplies to maintain
a low level of enemy activity during the time that
the buildup was taking place.
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fit
Model Four: Recpirement for High Level of Combat
in MR 1, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere
MR 1
Class I
(low
Short Tons
Daily
Cumulative
combat)
24
(180)
4,320
(buildup)
25x1.5
(180)-
25x2.0
(180)
6,750-
9,000
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(180)
900
(buildup)
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780-
5,040
MR 2
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
MR 3
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
5
(360)
1,800
MR 4
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
2
(360)
720
Cambodia
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
6
(360)
2,160
Total
Total with 25% BDA
A-6
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21,150-24,660
26,437-30,825
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? Jr
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IIIP
Model Five: Reciuirement for High Level of Combat
in MR 1 and in Cambodia, Minimum Requirement
EiSewhere
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4
Class I
(low
combat)
(buildup)
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
(buildup)
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
Cambodia Classes II,
IV, V (low
combat)
(buildup)
Total
Total with 25% BDA
Short Tons
Daily
Cumulative
24
25x1.5
25x2.0
(180)
(180)-
(180)
4,320
6,750- 9,000
5
(180)
900
14x1.5
(180)-
14x2.0
(180)
3,780-5,040
2
(360)
720
5
(360)
1,800
2
(360)
720
6
(180)
1,080
16x1.5
(180)-
16x2.0
(180)
4,320- 5,760
A-7
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24,390-29,340
30,487-36,675
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?
SECRET IP
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
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