CABLE TO AMBASSADOR KINTNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

MPATr1t2ATVT-1TTM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
JP NATIONAL SECURITY COUNO
-S-9 GR ET
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: W.R. Sm.yse
SUBJECT: Cable to Ambassador.Kintner
c GE
Ambassador Kintner has sent us a very useful cable an troop
reductions in Thailand (see Tab B). I would like to let him
know our appreciation.
Recommendation
That you send the attached cable (at Tab A) to Ambassador
KInt aer,
Approve
Disapprove
.
sreTt - XGDS
BYAUTH - HAKISSINGER; DECLAS - IMPDET
NSS, ARMY, OSD, USAF,
State Dept. reviews
completed
ACTION
March 18, 1974
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 1 V~.7-+t1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
ax.uxc ~. a - i3ackchannel
TO: AMBASSADOR KINTNER
BANGKOK
FROM:
VIA:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
1. Dick Smyser has shown me your cable. We deeply
appreciate your detailed look at the Thai domestic pressures
for our withdrawal and your thoughtful recommendations.
2. We will be in touch as soon as decisions are made,
and we will handle them in a way that will give you a full
opportunity to consult with the Thai.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
w
#0850/1 07714425X1
0 181444Z MAR 74 ZYH
FM BANGKOK
TO WHITE HOUSE
S E C R E T 181136Z MAR 7
FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER 5ANGvOK 850 SECTION 1 OF 4
TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR RICHARD SMYSER
FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS DEAL Y'ITH THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN
YOUR R SSAGES OF MARCH 2 A,4D 15.
POLITICAL ISSUES
YOUR FIRST QUESTION ON THAT INTERNAL PRESSUcES FOR TROOP
REDUCTIONS RELATES ALSO TO THE TI''ING OF THE ELECTION. THc
JUSTICE MINISTER, WHO IS SPEPHERDING THE CONSTITUTION THRO1.1flH
THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (NLA), TOI0 THE DCM MARCH
15 THAT HE EXPECTS THE NL4 TO COMPLETE THE CIRST READING Op
THE CONSTITUTION BY MID-APRIL. THE NEXT ST=P IS THE SECOWn
RFAOING FOR FULL NLA APPROVAL, WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL TAKE
TWO MORE MONTHS, MAKING PROMULGATION LIKELY ABOUT MID-JUNE.
SINCE ELECTIONS CANNOT TAK= PLACE SOONER THAN 90 DAYS AFTEP
THE CONSTITUTION IS PROMULrATED, THE LIKELY ELECTION DATE L-ULD
THEN BE SOMETIME IN SEPTEMOER OR OCTOBER. 4./HILE WE HAVE RF_,
CEIVED SEVERAL ESTIMATES OF HOW LONG THIS TOTAL PROCESS Ml-,HT
TAKES THE JUSTICE MINISTER'S IS AS GOOD A Pc,EOICTION AS WE
CAN COME UP WITH AT THIS TIME.
THERE ARE MANY WAYS 1 !, ( S SCHT'LLEDUlC COULD GO nO SO ' THE ASSP:~BLY
, UV y~A RV? ~
COLD MOVE MORE QUICKLY THAI: MOST PEOPLE EXPECT; ON THE OTHFc
HAND, SEVERAL FACTORS LIKE EURTuER STUDENT I)NREST, LABOR STPIKES,
RAMPANT INFLATIONS THE OIL CRISIS, OR A DECLINE OF SECURITY IN
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES COULn CAUSE DELAYS. 1,,E STILL CONSIDc= THAT,
WHATEVER OCCURS, CAMPAIGNI%G IS MnST LIKELY TO 9E IN FULL S'?'ING
BY EARLY SUMMER.
ASSUMING THAT THE ELECTION RESULTS PRODUCE A MAJORITY OF LEIISLATORS
WHOSE LEADER AND PROGRAM APE NOT ONACCEPTA9i_E TO THE THAI ~STA5LISH-
MENT (INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE KING AND TLE ARMY), THE NF'-.
GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE OVEq SHORTLY AFTER THE ELECTION.
WHEN THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS, THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THATLAND
WILL BE A PROMINENT ISSUE, NOT BECAUSE A LOT OF THAI WANT US TO
LEAVE COMPLETELY BUT MORF PECAUSE OF THE "FOREIGNNESS'", SIac,
AND VISIBILITY OF OUR FORCES. WHEN SO MANY OP THAILAND'S
PROBLEMS ARE INCAPABLE OF SHORT-TERM SOLUTI1NS, THE AMERICA^I
* # * * * * * * * * * * * * * *WHSR COMMENT * # # * # * * * * * # # *
SCOWCROFT,MCFARLANE,SMYSER
RECALLED
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
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PRESENCF ALSO OFFERS A CON\/ENTENT WHIPPING uOY FOR POLITICIANS
OF ALL PERSUASIONS. THE P'!LITICIANS WHO FORM THE NEW GOVERt-
MENT MAY WELL COME INTO OFGICE ALREADY SUBSTANTIALLY COMMITTEn
ON AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL; WE BELIE'VF THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEFUSE THE
ISSUE DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOn IS TO AGRE WITH THE RTG NnW ON
A PLAN FOR ORDERLY REDUCTIONS LASTING THR^Ur,H THE CALENDER vEAR
WHICH WILL STAND AS EVIDENCE OF OUR RESPONSIVENESS.
YOUR SECOND QUESTION WAS Hr?W DO DIFFERENT T,;AI PRESSURE GRrf)!PS
FEEL ABOUT WITHDRAWALS. T~iE SENIfR MILITAR', LEADERS AND T-z
MnNARCHY FAVOR A CONTINUED U.S. PRESENCE ALTHOUGH EVEN SO-
Mr-IN THIS GROUP EELIEVE IT Cr'ULD AND SHOULD AP MUCH SMALLER.. THE
STUDENTS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE ARE DIVIDED AMONG THEMSELVESA)N
THIS'I$SUE. !!DST OF THE P.OFESSOPS AND INTELLECTUALS FAVOR
GQATUA' BUT PROBABLY TOTAL WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE THEY DISAGREE
WITH THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THREAT Tn
SOUTHEAST ASIA. MOST UPCOUNTRY FARMERS ARE POLITICALLY UN.A;?-ARE.
T6E EVOLUTION OF GROUP ATTITUDES AS THEY INTERACT DURING THr- COMING
ELECTION CAMPAIGN, AND THE EFFECT OF OUR WITHDRAWALS, OR FAILURE
TR WITHDRAW AT A RATE COMMENSURATE WITH THE ATTITUDES OF TH= THAI
BODY POLITIC, ON OUR POSITION HERE IS CENTRAL TO OUR ARGUMc?,VT FOR
FLEXIBILITY IN ADAPTING TO THE NE'4 SITUATIOtI IN THAILAND. iF
WE APE SEEN TO BE REMOVING SOME FORCES, WHILE MAINTAINING FittR
DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE 14TLL
STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF OUR FRIFNnS AGAINST THE DEMANDS FOR TOTAL
WITHDRAWAL. FURTHERMORE AS WE nRAW DOWN, RECOGNITION IN RE-
SPONSIBLE THAI QUARTERS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY BENEFITS
OF OUR PRESENCE MAY AFFECT THE ATTITUDES OF SIGNIFICANT ELE'?-ENTS.
ON THE OTHER HAND, IF INTERNAL PRESSURES AGAINST OUR MILITARY
tITAOV
PKGrr ~.E CCSEINC i?ra~v OJrrNt, WE nrvr\ T E/A. ur? Cl r1A1 THE THAT, :'il,.rn?rr
CittieNr J*OT 1ur~t
STAND UP PUBLICLY TO DEFENn US; THE S4NYA CARETAKER GOVERNmPNT
HAS PUBLICLY ENDORSED GRAD?AL AND EVENTUAULV TOTAL WITHDRAWAL,
WHILE JUSTIFYING OUR PRESE\,CE IN THE TOTAL SOUTHEAST ASIA SECURITY
CONTEXT. THIS WISHY-WASHY GDVERNAIENT COULD EASILY BE PRESS!!RED
INTO A FAR LESS HELPFUL POSITION!.
YOUR THIRD QUESTION ASKED ;THAT THE STUDENTS ARE REACTING Tr.,_
THE STUDENTS LOOK ON THE U.S. MILITARY PRESFNC.E AS A LIMITATION
ON THAI SOVEREIGNTY AND INUUEPENDENCE OF ACTTON IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS A THREAT TO TRADITIONAL THAI SOCIETY ANn A
DANGER TO THAI MORALITY. (THEY APE UNAWARE HOW IMMORAL THAILAND
SEEMS To WESTERNERS.) THE STUDENTS HAVE NOT COME UP WITH A
COORDINATED PROGRAM AGAINST THE U.S. PRESENCE COUNTRY-WIDE,
ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE TAKEN UP SPECIFIC PROBLE^'S SUCH AS DOI INTHANON
AN;D AIR AMERICA OPERATIONS IN UnOPN. THE STUDENTS HAVE NOT
DEMONSTRATED AT THE GATES ^F OUZ RASES NOR HARASSED AMERICAv
MILITARY IN THE CITIES. THE BEST ANSWER TO THE TYPE OF PRESSURE
WHICH THE STUDENTS HAVE THUS FOP. BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE GOVPRNMENT
APPEARS TO BE EVIDENCE THAT THAI/U.S. CONSUii_TATIONS ARE RES?LTING
IN CONTINUING REDUCTIONS CnNSISTENT WITH THAI NATIONAL INTP ESTS.
YUU ALSO ASK HOW THE THAI .ILITARY VIEW OUR WITHDRAWALS. T4EIR
RECALLED
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 J
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
******* S E C R E T *******S COPY
APPROACH IS MORE PRAGMATIC. THEY DON'T WANT TO BE TROUBLE7; BY
UNINFORMED AND INTEMPERATE CRITICISM FROM POLITICIANS, STU"FNTS,
AND NEWSMEN. THEY FIND IT HARD Tn EXPLAIN WHY SO ,,'ANY AIRCRAFT
AND SERVICEMEN MUST REMAIN MORE T-AN SIX MONTHS AFTER CONGRI-SS
ENDED OUR AIR WAR OVER IND_1CHINA. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE INTcND TO
REDUCE CUR FORCES HERE, PROBABLY SOONER THAN LATER, AND WANT
TD CASH IN ON OUR DEPARTURw BY TAKING OVER 4S MUCH EXCESS FiUIP-
MENT AS POSSIBLE FOR.MILITARY USE, OR DISPOSAL FOR THE BENEFIT OF
THE GOVERNMENT OR THEMSELVES. AT THE SAME TIME,.THEY HOPE rO
USE CUR INTEREST IN STAYINn HERE AS A MFA-NS OF GETTING EXTPA
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ONE WA" OR ,ANOTHER. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS
THAT, AI' FACTION IN THE THeI MILITARY WISHES US TO WITHDRA,:
T MPLETFLY SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, AT LEAcT, VALUE OUR
CURITY GUARANTEE AND WOULD WISH TO RETAIN CLOSE TIES WITw U.S.
MILITARY SERVICES UNDER ALL FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.
YOURR NEXT QUESTION WAS ?WNcTHER THE RTG COULD MAKE A VALID
COMMITMENT ON REENTRY. DUPING THE FORCE LEVEL TALKS LAST yFAR,
THE THAI SIDE TOOK FOR GRANTED OUR RETURN IN CASE OF NEED, 1?HILE
PRESSING FOR MOVEMENT OF 9-52S AND OTHER AIRCRAFT FROM THET'
BASES. WE BELIEVE THAT THc SANYA GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EXTRF'ELY
RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY SUCH COMMITMENT PUBLICLY, BUT IT HAS SHOWN
NC SIGN OF RENEGING ON PAST UNDERSTANDING. WE EXPECT THAT
SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS WOULD ALSO BE DISPOScD TO HONOR THEIR
PREDECESSORS' COMMITMENTS. WE ALSO CONSIDE? IT LIKELY THAT
900
RECALLED
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
osso/2 07714025X1
1 AR 74 ZYH
FM BANGKOK
S E C R E T *******S COPY
S E C R E T 1911362 MAR 7
FM AMBASSA0O KINTNER gANGKOK 850 (SECTION OF 4 25X1
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR RICHARD S YSER
DEVELOPMzNTS IN INDOCHINA ?)HICH w-iULD WIN SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR
REDEPLDY13ENT AND COMBAT ACTION .OULD BE EQU..LLY PERSUASIVE
TD THE THAI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. NEVERTHFLESSY WE SHOULD
SEEK TO GET AS FIRM AN UNDERSTANDING AS POSSIBLE FROM THE PRESENT
THAI LEADERSHIP IN CONNECTION WITH OUR NEXT ROUND OF TALKS. WE
BELIEVE THAT ARRANGEMENTS rOULD BE MADE WITH THE THAI GOVEPA'MENT
NOW TO MAINTAIN OUR OASES fPERATIONALLY READY EVEN WITHOUT o,,
RESIDUAL AMERICAN PRESENCE AT EACH BASES IN WHICH CASE WE
PROBABLY ARRANGE IN ADVANC- FOR PERIODIC TRAINING EXERCISES OR
OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS OF OU? ABILITY TO MOVE IN UNITS FROM r,tJAM
OR THE CONTINENTAL U.S. Wc. THINK THE MOVEMrNT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT
IN .AND OUT OF THAILAND WITS MATTER-OF-FACT PRESS .ANNOUNCEMF`,TS
WOULD ATTRACT AS MUCH ATTF'TION IN HANOI AS KEEPING A MUCH
LARGER NUMBER PRESENT IN T',AILA~ID WITH AN EXCESSIVELY LOW PROFILE
TO AVOID) EMBARRASSING OUR 'OST GOVERNMENT.
FORCE REDUCTIONS
WTTH REGARD TO WHAT TYPES nF WITHDRAWALS ARC MOST ESSENTIAL;
THE THAI HAVE GIVEN THE HirPEST PRIORITY TO sir -N
REDUCTIONS IN B-52'S. THEY MADE THIS OFFICIAL DURING THE
SEPTEMBER NEGOTIATIONS HERE, AND CHARTICHAI ALSO RAISED THE'
WITH OR. KISSINGER IN NEW YORK. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, ACCEPTED
OUR ARGUMENT THAT WE MUST mAINTAIN OUR PRESENT FORCES IN BEING
DURING THE CURRENT DRY SEASON AND HAVE NOT HARPED ON THE SU=--
JECT NECESSARILY BETWEEN NEGOTIATING SESSIOIiS. KNOWING THE
CWARACTFRISTICS OF THE B-52 AND HOW QUICKLY THEY COULD BE RACK
FROM GUAM, OR EVEN FROM CONUS BASES, THEY FIND IT HARD TO UN!DER-
STAND WHY WE INSIST ON KEEPING ALL 50s INCLUDING EVEN THE R
TOY PLANESs IN PLACE AT UTAPAOs WHILE AT TH= SAME TIME WE ii VE
REMOVED MOST OF THE BACK-Up BOMBER FORCE FROM GUAM. I WAS TN-
TERESTEO TO LEARN AT UTAPAn LAST WEEK THAT IN FACT SAC KEEPS
ONLY 30 B-52 CREWS IN THAILAND FOR THE 50 BOMBERS; RELYING ^N
PROMPT AUGMENTATION FROM GUAM IN THE EVENT OF ORDERS TO LAUNCH.
TO TAKE AN EXTREME CASEY WE SUGGEST IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE T,'j
RECALLED
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
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R>=DFPLOY ALL THE 8-52'S OFFICIALLY TO GUAM, WHILE KEEPING Fl!LL
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AT UTAPAD TO SERVE
AIRCRAFT VISITING FOR TRAI^ING nR SERVICING. THUS IN EFFECT
REVERSING THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF ROTATING S01E OF THE B-57'S
BASED AT UTADAO TO GUAM FO? SPECIAL TRAINING AND KEEPING THE
RESERVE CREWS AT GUAM.
FOR SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT REASONS REDUCTION IN THE USSAG HEAD-
QUARTERS IS ALSO HIGH PRIORITY-FOP THE RTG. ALMOST SEVEN
MONTHS AFTER THE CONGRESSIrNALLY-DICTATED BnMBING HALT, THE
RTG FINDS IT INCREASINGLY nIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE CON-
TINUED PRESENCE OF A FOUR-STAR GENERAL AND AATTLE.STAFF IN
THAILAND. FORTUNATELY BOTH GENERAL VOGT ANn GENERAL O'KEECE HAVE
KEPT,SU.tH A LOW PROFILE THaT LITTLE PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS BEEN
D/IRECTED To THE USSAG HEADQUARTERS AND IT HAS NOT BECOME A
MAJOR TARGET FOR CRITICISM.
CURRENT PLANS FOR A PRESS VISIT TO USSAG IN EARLY APRIL MAY
STIMULATE PUBLIC INTEREST. SINCE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAS
ALREADY RECOMMENDED STEPS "TO PLASE DOWN ANn ELIMINATE" USSAG/
74F BY JUNE 30, 1975, WE U?GE THAT IT BE PHASED DOWN NOW, AFTER
THE CURRENT DRY SEASON, MAINTAINING ONLY A STANDBY HEADQUARTERS
FACILITY IN CASE OF NEED DI,RING THE NEXT YEAR.
BYONO THESE TWO PARTICULAR ITEMS, RTG ATTENTION SEEMS TO FnrUS
ON TOTAL NUMBER OF PEaSONN::L TO A FAR GREATER EXTENT THAN T-7TAL
NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT OR THE REMOVAL OF IDENTIFIABLE UNITS
AND SQUADRONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENTHUSIAST WITH WHICH THE
SUPREME COMMAND WELCOMED Ol'R DECISION TO MOVE OUT THE LAST nF
THE U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCE-S FRnM THAILAND THIS MONTH WAS Tr
US A CONVINCING REAFFIRMATION OF THE RTG'S INTENSE CONCERN TO
r Cc~TI1.iNG r T~.~
DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR 9ILAT=kAL DISCUSSION, ARE RESUL
TANGIBLE AGREEMENTS AND VISIBLE RFDEPLOYMENTS.
THE RTG INTEREST IN NUMBERS CAME OUT VERY CLEARLY DURING Tar-
AUGUST AND DECEMBER DISCUSSIONS WHEN THE THAI SIDE INSISTEr'
ON COMING UP WITH CONCRETE AND oRnGRESSIVELv LARGER TOTALS.
DURING SEPTEMBER THEY GRADUALLY WfRKED ^UR I,500 WITHDRAWAL
FIGURE UP TO 3550 AND 3650, AND IN DECEMBER INSISTED ON AN-
NOUNCING A LARGER TOTAL RFnUCTInN OF 3700. WE WERE ABLE
TO ACCOMMODATE THESE DESIRES BECAUSE IN THE PAST THERE HAS
BEEN A GENERAL SLIMMING nO-?N OF EXCESS PERSnNNEL AND OUR
ACTUAL STRENGTH HAS RUN WELL BELOW THE AUTHORIZED MANPOWER
SPACES USED FOR PLANNING AND BUDGETING PURPr1SES. IN DECEMQ=R
WF AGREED TO ANNOUNCE OUR TOTAL FORCE LEVEL AS ABOUT 35,000,
RUT OUR ACTUAL STRENGTH IS STILL RUNNING CLnSER TO 36,000.
WHEN WE GO INTO OUR NEXTUQ FPTEF DISCUSSIONS IN APRIL, WEExDECT
THE RTG TO PRESS US FOR A REDUCTI!DN FIGURE LARGER
THAN THE TWO PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS WHICH, CONSIDERING THAT
WE HAVE ALREADY ANNOUNCED i00 MEN LEAVING WITH THE SPECIAL
FORCES, WOULD DROP OUR ANN,'UNCEri FORCE LEVEL TO 31,000 OR I_c55.
WE ARE AWARE THAT WASHINGT;,N PLANNING HAS E\,VISAGEP CUTTING
BACK TO THE 32,200 LEVEL By JUNE 30. THIS IS AN OLD BENCH~!1NRK
RECALLED
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
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BECAUSE IT WAS THE LOWEST CEILING NEGOTIATE IN 169 AND '7n
AND THE BASE FROM WHICH WE BUILT UP AGAIN T1J COUNTER THE 1912
COMMUNIST EASTER INVASION IN SOIJTy VIETNAM. IT WAS ALSO
CHARTICHAI'S STATED GOAL L.ST SEPTEMBER. ITS SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE THAI HAS BEEN SOMEW-AT O4SCUREO 9Y T-E IRRESPONSIBLF
DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS OTHE RFORCE FIGURES RECENTLY, SUCH AS
THE 25,000 MENTIONED BY NEwSWEEK AND 20P000 IN THE BANGKOK NATION,
BOTH OF WHICH FIGURES !ERE RAISED WITH SECRETARY RUSH. WE
THINK THAT, GIVEN THE NUMB=R OF AIRCRAFT ANn IDENTIFIABLE u,!ITS
WHICH CAN BE PUBLICIZED AS PART OF A MAY-.UN: REDUCTION,...THF.
RTG WILL PROBABLY ACCEPT THE 32,20Q TARGET FOR JUNE 30 IF T4IS
IS ONLY A WAY STATION ON A GRADUAL AND ORDEOLY WITHDRAWAL
PLAN FOR.THE BALANCE OF THc CALENnER YEAR. WE 00 NOT THINk
IT ,`Ct;OLDBE TENABLE OR ADVISABLE TO TRY TO. HOLD FIRM AT 32,700
FROM JULY '74 TO MAY '75.
THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE ARE ADVOCATING AN IMMEDIATE DRAwnOWN
TO 25.000 BETWEEN MAY I ANn JUNE 30, AS ENVISAGED BY ONE
MILITARY PLAN. THE THAI On NOT WANT TO BE cACED WITH THE
SUDDEN ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS ANn THE SECURITY QUESTIONS WHIrH
WOULD OF RAISED BY SUCH AN APPARENT DECISION! BY US TO GET nrUT
FAST, WHAT THEY WANT, AS THE THAI LEADERS HAVE MADE ABUNDA*ITLY
CLEAR IN THEIR TALKS WITH =E, IS TO SHARE 1\1 OUR PLANNING FnR
PROGRESSIVE, GRADUAL AND STEADY REDUCTIONS 50 THAT THEY CAN
T!-UEMSELVES ADAPT TO OUR WITHDRAWALS AND TO BIND NEW JOBS Fria
THE THOUSANDS OF THAI EMPLrYEES W-+O WILL BE RELEASED. AND
OF COURSE THEY EXPECT US In BE r,ENEROUS FINANCIALLY IN
ASSISTING THEM IN THEIR RE?,DJUSTM;=NTS.
THE KEY THAI LEADERS WITH r,HOM I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATER
HAVE PLACE PARTICULAR STRFSS ON THE NEED FOP REAL COORDINATTON
IN ACOVANCE; I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WIN THEIR FIRM AND CONTIN!,JING
SUPPORT IF WE TAKE THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE REGARDING OUR
900
RECALLED
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05: LOC-HAK-45-1-20-8
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D 18150OZ MAR 74 ZYH 25X1
F+.4 BANGKOK
S E C R E T 1811362 MAR 74
FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER PANG