PHNOM PENH 1646

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-1-16-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 14, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part2011/02/02: LOC-HAK-451-1-16-2
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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INFORMATION
J~~L
KENNEDY
RICHARD T
.
JOHN D. NEGROPON'T1' b
Phnom Penh 1646
Ladd has replied to your queries (Tab A). His views and our comments are
summarized as follows:
1. Dampeni4g of Khmer Nationalist Fervor: Ladd doesn't think this is
happening. Rather he sees it as a maturing process and an adjustment to
the facts of life, including acceptance of the fact that we are not bankrolling
them to the extent we have countries elsewhere. In any event, Ladd thinks
we are giving them as much as they could possibly absorb.
Comment: All the evidence we have suggests that Ladd is absolutely right
in his estimate that we will provide everything the Cambodians can absorb.
We know of no instances in which they did not have available what they needed.
Moreover, we have continued to deliver at a rate calculated to develop
and support their forces in accordance with the plan we had about
200-220, 000, whereas they have not actually been able to recruit and hold
anywhere near this total figure. There is a long way to go in terms of
organization and planning for the force expansion which has brought the
GKR from less than 40, 000 to somewhere near 180, 000. Our efforts should
be concentrated on helping them develop an organizational structure,- command
and control, and a logistic support system which the new forces need.
Cleland is well aware of this need and is moving in that direction.
2. Discouragement as the Realities of the Long-term Conflict Crystalize:
Ladd says this- is evident among some sectors of Khmer Society but Ladd
would classify most Khmer as stoics rather than optimists or pessimists.
He thinks the Khmer will continue to do the best they can although we must
expect a certain feeling of discouragement so long as the light at the end
of the tunnel doesn't seem to get noticeably brighter.
Comment: Given their history and their tendency toward taking things as
they come, some discouragement is inevitable as they see a quick solution
to be impossible. Clearly Lon Nol's earlier concept of a quick and decisive
ARMY and JCS reviews
completed.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 2
move to rid the Northeast of the NVA was just one manifestation of the lack
of realism with which they earlier faced their situation. Now the realities
have begun to sink in and they know that they have a long term problem for
which they are at best ill-prepared. Our task will be to get them to increas-
ingly view the problem realistically and to take steps necessary to concentrate
their efforts on doing the attainable rather than dissipating their resources
in futile efforts to do the impossible in the short run. Our country team must
keep hammering home the message that they can do much more than they
have and can succeed if they have the will to do so. We will help, but they
have to look forward to a long hard fight. We want to encourage them to do
what is possible as a means of building their confidence. There is a new'item.
.n suggesting tha FANK is planning a more realistic strategy. We are sending
3 rw FFd se rate
Lack o?a Iosiytlve Attitude Within Our Country Team: This concerns
Ladd, particularly what he considers to be a contempt on the part of the
Ambassador and DCM for everything the Khmer do. Ladd has never heard
a word of praise from them for the way the Khmer care for their war victims,
keep their streets clean, withstand enemy probes, have lost only two
M-113's in Cambodia and kept all major LOC's open. Additionally Ladd
does not believe the Embassy is staffed with first-team quality people at
the operational level and the top leadership does not inspire or demand first
team efforts from anyone.
Comment: This goes to the point made in the preceeding paragraph. Our
country team must take a positive attitude of encouragement. We should,
of course, bring shortcomings to the attention of the GKR, but in a positive
way which gives them both incentive and ideas to overcome the shortcomings.
They look to us for counsel and evidence of support. We must provide both.
4. MACV's Lack-of Interest in the Affairs of Cambodia and General Preoccu-
pation with Their Own Withdrawal Problems: Ladd speculates that the MAC V
staff sees the dumping of MEDTC support to be a neat way to save spaces.
Referring back to the period of 1962 Ladd notes that MAAG had no more
than 10 or 12, 000 people and supported its people adequately--so he does
not understand why admin and aircraft support of a 113 man MEDTC cannot
be worked into MACV residual missions. Ladd further speculates that
pressures are being applied to MACV from CINCPAC and possibly others and
hopefully establish MEDTC as a separate command based in Cambodia. Ladd
believes this could lead to political embarrassment and contribute to the
possible loss of the entire program.
[John Negroponte informally asked the JCS about aspects of this issue without
giving the reasons which prompted the inquiry. The action officer explained
that informal negotiations are now underway between MACV and Embassy
Phnom Penh to eliminate the MEDT spaces in Saigon and transfer what-
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/02: LOC-HAK-451-1-16-2
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 3
ever is needed to Phnom Penh. I
Comment: As Ladd points out in his Phnom Penh 1648, the JCS is apparently
moving ahead to relocate the MEDT-rear to Cambodia. This is going to
give serious problems if it is allowed to continue. We will face the necessity
of increasing the authorized personnel ceiling with attendant political flak
on Capitol Hill. This could work against our efforts to keep a high level
and viable program, put an administrative burden on the MEDT in Cambodia
which will detract from its already strained capability to give the Cambodians
the kind of help they need to make good use of our assistance, and necessitate
developing all kinds of logistic support for our own people. We see no reason
why MACV could not continue to provide this sort of administrative support
and lessen the burden on the MEDT. We have incorporated this question in the
new revised Vietnam NSSM sent forward to you today.
5. Political and Diplomatic: Most of Ladd's comments are essentially over-
taken by political developments and our exchange with Swank on the negotiating
issue. We can only hope Ladd is right in his judgment that the GKR is
willing and able to provide a responsive link in the free world chain of
influence in Indochina if we are prepared to continue to provide it with
sufficient material and economic assistance.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/02: LOC-HAK-451-1-16-2
T 0 P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EXCI.1T;>TVEfY EYP;3 ONLT
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PHNOM PENH 1646
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/02 : LOC-HAK-451-1-16-2