DAILY REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 3, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
MEMORANDUM
SENSITIVE
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
7 FORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
ARMY Review
Completed Pgs 3-6
ONLY.
HENRY A. KISSINGER
USAF review
completed. Pgs 3-6
ONLY
SUBJECT: Daily Report on Southeast Asia Situation
Secretary Laird's daily report on the Southeast Asia situation for
March 2 is at Tab A. He report&/that there was an overall lull in
combat during March 2 and on the morning of March 3 the ARVN
3d division launched .a seven-blttalion operation in northernmost
Quang Tri Province. No conact has been reported.
discrepancy are:
Secretary Laird's paper also contains a discussion of the infiltration
and logistics situation. H4 notes that there is an apparent anomaly
between the high level o enemy infiltration and proportionately lower
level of logistics flow. Among the explanations he offers for this
-- There are inherent limitations on our intelligence gathering
in regard to enemy/"~logistics flow and unknown stockpiles in South Laos
and the Republic o~ Vietnam.
-- Supply iut figures for 1972 have lagged more than one-third
behind the san period in 1971, but throughput is judged to be thirty
percent highe .
-- An'iinconfirmed possibility exists that ARVN forces left behind
supplies i last year's Lam Son 719 operation which might be available
now for a by the enemy in the highlands.
-- Irhe possibility of a feint for propaganda and political purposes
without actually mounting a sustained attack or simply conducting a
short period of maximum combat which would not require a large
logistics build-up.
Secretary Laird concludes that available logistic and infiltration data do
not provide clear evidence of the NVA's offensive capability or intentions
TOP SE;GR-F7T-/ SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
TOP SECRET [SENSITIVE 2
for this dry season and the ambiguities surrounding present enemy
deployments will require clarification from prisoners, captured
documents and demonstrated enemy actions before a firm assessment
is possible.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
~ 1~k )0 40'r 0_3
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE c79
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301 3 MAR 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Daily Report on Southeast Asia Situation
The following information is provided on recent US air activity in
SEAsIa:
a. US Air Sorties flown on 2 March 1972:
TacAir 2 Gunships Non-Attack Total
317 51 23
b. Distribution of sorties was as follows:
Cambodia
B52
Gunship
TacAir-Attack
Non-Attack
SVN
3
0
30
0
B-52 36
Gunship I
TacAir-Attack 19
Non-Attack 0
TacAir-Attack 6
Non-Attack 26
North Laos
B-52 6
Gunship 4
TacAir-Attack 32
Non-Attack 6
South Laos
'B--52 6
Gunship 1$
TacAir-Attack 230
Non-Attack 35
67
458
USAF review completed. Pgs
3-6 ONLY
ARMY Review Completed Pgs
3-6 ONLY
TOTAL
8-52 51
Gunship 23
TacAir-Attack 317 1038
GROUP-1 Non-Attack 67 Sea Def Coat Nr. X-------------
Exaluded from nntomatia - -- - -- - - - -- -- -- - - -- ------~
dovmgrnding No Objection to Declassification-
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c. CVAs (and aircraft assigned) on YANKEE STATION.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
iur JLVI%I-I vo -- - _
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19
24 F8,1
34 A4F
3 RF8G
3 EKA3B
2 E1B
3 UH2C
d. ARC LIGHT sorties, by Launch Base.
Anderson (Guam) 12
U Tapao (Thailand) .31
Total 51
The following is a continuation of yesterday's discussion concerning
enemy logistic and personnel infiltration.
Intelligence agencies have noticed an apparent anomaly between the
rates of enemy manpower and supply infiltration (the southward flows
through the Laos Panhandle). The divergence which raised the question
was an apparently high rate of personnel infiltration, while logistic flow
appeared to be proportionately behind the previous levels. These apparently
contradictory indicators have caused some doubt concerning the enemy's
capability and intentions to launch a major offensive in the RVN.
Two reasonable approaches to explain the apparent anomaly are possible:
USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
23 1=4B
22 A7E
9 A6A
4 KA60
3 EKA3B
3 EIB
4 SH3G
_.. The data describing supply infiltration Is "soft", so that no real
discrepancy between the personnel buildup and the accompanying
logistic flow exists. The "softness" in the supply data is due to
an expanded enemy road net, rainy weather which slowed the NVA dry
season supply surge, and inherent limitations in the intelligence-
,gathering system. Furthermore, the NVA has an unknown stockpile
in Southern Laos and the RVN that may be able to support an offensive
surge without a corresponding supply increase through the Trail.
-- The apparent anomaly in logistic and personnel data may have been
rectified in recent weeks because supply Indicators have increased
to appear to be commensurate with the personnel flow indicators.
Although supply input figures for 1972 have lagged more than one-
third behind the same period of 1971, supply throughput is 30 percent
greater this year, perhaps because of forward movement of stock-
piled materiel.
7no. Ct:rRcT_cFNSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
W TOP ' SECRET-StNZ)11 1~ W
Neither of the above explanations helps to explain satisfactorily
the current enemy picture in and near South Vietnam. LAMSON 719 distorted
enemy infiltration patterns last year, and the NVA build-up to counter
the ARVN thrust may have left behind large stockpiles in South Laos which
are available to support the enemy troop concentration near Kontum. This
possibility has not been confirmed. The pattern of past years also is
distorted by increased NVA emphasis on growing food at the way-stations
along the infiltration routes in Laos. In addition, food supplies are
available from Cambodia. These additional sources of foodstuffs may make
it possible for a larger proportion of throughput from North Vietnam to
consist of arms and ammunition.
Enemy tactics also may offer a partial explanation for his apparent
offensive posture. The laborious "preparation of the battlefield" by
stockpiling supplies outside of base areas along the path NVA forces will
follow in an attack has not been noticed extensively this dry season.
However, if the enemy plans to conduct a quick attack followed by a
maximum supply surge from his rear areas, precedents in supply patterns
would be broken.
A final uncertainty which should be considered when reviewing the
present posture of enemy forces is the political motivation for their
conduct. Feigning an attack by concentrating sizable forces without
"planning an actual attack would serve propaganda purposes. On the other
hand, a short period of maximum combat probably would not require a large
logistics build-up and such a thrust could have a variety of political
objectives.
In summary, it is apparent that logistic and personnel infiltration
data do not provide clear evidence of the NVA's offensive capability or
of his intentions this dry season. The ambiguities surrounding the
present enemy deployments will require clarification from prisoners,
captured documents and demonstrated enemy actions before a firm assessment
is possible.
The CJCS assessment of the current and prospective military situation
is as follows:
a. The overall lull in combat activity within the Republic continued
during the past 24 hours. Since 27 February, six attacks by fire have been
directed at friendly elements just south of the eastern sector of the DMZ.
This morning, the 3d Division launched a seven-battalion operation in
Quang Tri. The purpose of the operation is to clear the area south-southwest
of Quang Tri City where the old enemy Base Area 101 was once located. No
contact has been reported.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7
lur ,~~u1?W. --
V
b. In NVN, aerial photography has revealed two 122mm field guns in
travel mode approximately one NM south-southwest of Dong Hoi. It also
confirmed the continued presence of armor in southern Quang Binh Province
where six T-34 and five PT-76 tanks were noted in an armor training area
north of the western DMZ.
TflP SECRET-SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-1-2-7