ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Content Type: MISC

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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
~MORI C03235308
Introduction
This paper examines the enemy's options in Indochina for the
balance of 1971 and for 1972. This assessment considers.the
impact of the following on the enemy's strategy options:
-- The fall of Sihanouk and the loss of Sihanoukville.
-- Lam Son.
-- U. S. redeployments.
ARVN capabilities.
The analytical framework encompasses:
-- an assessment of the enemy's strategy options in terms of
his logistics and manpower capabilities;
they state of the "control war" or the strength of the GVN's
position in the countryside and its effect on the enemy's strategy
options;
-? the state of the "main force war" as reflected in the relative
strength of friendly to enemy main (battalion-size) forces in each
Military Region in South Vietnam and the ability of friendly main
forces to deter or cope with enemy main forces as U. S. redeploy-
ments continue.
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beparate assesslnts are provided for 197U, 1 and 1972 because:
-- the war changed fundamentally between 1970 and 1971 with
the loss of Sihanoukville as a source of supply. In 1970 the enemy's
strategy (planned in 1969) was not seriously constrained by aggregate
logistics considerations (although there may have been distribution
problems). But in 1971 the enemy faced serious logistics problems.
In 1972 it remains an issue whether the enemy will solve his logistics
problems. Friendly air and ground interdiction efforts against the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, including ARVN operations in South Laos, became
more important in 1971 and will continue to play a key role in 1972.
. -- by 1972 the level o1.' U. S. forces will have dropped by 400, 000
to 500, 000 from its 1969 level, a change that will inevitably cause the
enemy to consider new options,
-- 1972 is a Presidential election year in the U. S. , possibly
providing the enemy with a political incentive to consider more ambitious
military activities than he undertook in 1969 or 1970.
The analysis herein draws heavily on and is generally consistent with
two recent memoranda, CIA's "The Impact of Logistics Factors on
NVA Offensive Capabilities During 1971" and'CIA/DIA's "NVA/VC
Military Activities During 1971.72. " These assessments, based in
part on analysis undertaken for NSSM 99, are supplemented herein
by "control" [pacification] and main force (MR) analyses of the friendly
situation derived from previous VSSG work.
1970: .Fall of Sihanouk Facilitates Rapid GVN Control Progress and
Precludes Enemy Challenge to Vietnamization
The military balance in Indochina shifted dramatically in the GVN 's
favor in 1970. Where at the outset of the year it appeared that the
scheduled U. S. redeployments of 190, 000 men under the Vietnamiza-
tion program would probably permit the enemy to hold his own at
a protracted war level of effort and possibly even provide him with
the opportunity to ter'. Vietnamization, the fall of Sihanouk and US-
RVNAF cross-border operations into Cambodia so disadvantaged the
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 the enemy (by diverting his forces from South Vietnam and constrain-
inghis logistic support) that he was unable to halt GVN progress in
the countryside or mount a serious challenge to Vietnamization.
Enemy Strategy
In April 1969, COSVN 9 was issued, and it was fully played out in
-the enemy's unit deployments and activities by the beginning of 1970:
manpower infiltration in the 1969-70 dry season was only
57,000.
tonnage entering the Ho Chi Minh Trail was around 60, 000
tons suggesting that the enemy planned a low-level of activity and
took comfort in his still sizable Cambodian stockpiles refurbished
through late 1969 by shipments through Sihanoukville.
The enemy apparently reasoned that a protracted war strategy would
permit him to hold his position while U. S. forces redeployed.
Logistics - It is significant that 1970 enemy plans, not seriously
constrained by logistics considerations (before Sihanoukville was
closed), did not appear to envision more than a protracted war effort
and perhaps selected tests of Vietnamization.
Manpower - An inescapable conclusion is that the enemy, after
sending 250, 000 forces down the Trail in 1967-68 and 102, 000 in
1968-69, welcomed the respite he believed Vietnamization would
allow him. (From 1965 to 1969 the pool of able-bodied men in
North Vietnam dropped from 1. 8 to 1.2 million, when, under normal
circumstances, it should have risen by around 200, 000. An infiltra-
tion level of 80, 000 to 100, 000 is roughly the amount that can be
sustained without drawing down the manpower pool.) By infiltrating
57, 000 in the 1969-70 dry season the enemy signalled this decision
to opt for a, protracted war strategy. His course seems to have been
dictated by a desire to conserve manpower and prepare for a pro-
longed struggle. . .
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1970 Main ForceRnd Control Situations
During 1970 the enemy's protracted war strategy failed to preserve the
status quo despite U. S. redeployments. The fall of Sihanouk and
a successful GVN pacification effort can be credited with keeping
the GVN on top.
-- The GVN Maintained an Upper Hand in the Main Force War
Despite the Redeployment of 190, 000 U. S. Forces. One and possibly
two enemy regiments were, diverted from MR 1 to South Laos, three
were diverted from MR 2 to South Laos and Cambodia, six from
MR 3 to Cambodia, and tw from MR 4 to Cambodia.
These diversions were required if the enemy was to expand his Trail
capacity and defend the Trail against possible U. S. and RVNAF
attacks. Overnight 40, 000 FANK forces were added to the friendly
forces opposing the enemy and this number quickly grew to over
150, 000. To date, enemy diversions to Cambodia and South Laos
still exceed ARVN diversion by at least 2: 1. For example, in MR 3
only 43 of the 93 enemy battalions normally deployed in MR 3 before
the fall of Sihanouk are now physically located there.
Thus, even with U. S. redeployments, the Main Force (friendly to
enemy combat strength) Ratio (MFR) countrywide actually improved.
MFR
End of 1st Qtr. 1970
End of 1970
MR 1
2.4:1
2. 5:1
MR 2
3.3:1
2. 9:1
MR 3
2.7:1
5. 1:1
MR 4
2.3:1
2.6:1
Countrywide
2.7:1
1/ From Appendix B Table 2 of NSSM 99 RVNAF Force Variant paper.
Dual threat is excluued from both observations.
.In MR 3 in pax*icular from which two U. S. divisions were redeployed
in 1970, the large-scale enemy diversions just noted caused the.MFR
to increase. A slight improvement also took place in MR 4, whereas
U.S. redeployments from MR 2 caused the MFR to decline. Because the
bulk of U. S. forces remained in MR 1, friendly main force superiority
was assured.
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~- GVN Control Progress Continued. Continued Free World
dominance in the main force war and improved GVN territorial
force performance, along with the marginally effective anti-Viet
Cong infrastructure operations, brought about major GVN control gains
in 1970:
Percent (%) Control-(VSSG Ir dicator j" _"
End-1969
End-1970
I Change
MR 1.
53
73
+20
MR 2
45
57
+12
MR 3
45
69
+24
MR 4
48
69
+21
Countrywide
48
67
+19
MRs 1, 3 and 4 all experienced major pacification gains. The link
between friendly main force superiority and these gains is observed
in the lagging results for MR 2, where the MFR declined in 1970. At
the end of 1969 MR 2 ranked close to MRs 3 and 4, whereas at the
:end of 1970, pacification in MR 2 had fallen significantly behind that
elsewhere in South Vietnam.
These military gains were supplemented on the political side by
continued GVN political stability and on the economic side by the
stabilization of the GVN economy after the October 1970 economic
reforms.
1971: At the Outset of 1971 the Key Issue was Whether the Enemy
Could Recover his Pre-Lon Nol Capabilities in Cambodia and
South Laos and Return the War to South Vietnam. Could NVA
Forces Rebuild and Protect their Logistics and Rear Base
Capabilities it South Laos and Cambodia while Coping with FANK,
ARVN Cross-Border Operations into Cambodia, Air Interdiction,
and Lam Son?
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Enemy Strateg
In October 1970 we obtained from a high level rallier a detailed
description of COSVN 20. According to this source in 1971 the
enemy planned to give highest priority to:
-- political organization and military actions in Cambodia to
#$destroy" the Lon Nol government.
maintaining pressure on U. S. units in South Vietnam during the
wet season in order to obtain high U. S. casualties and embarrass
President Nixon at home. (This suggests attacks by fire and ground
probes in MRs 1 and 2 where the bulk of U.S. forces are now
stationed. )
.,_ attacks on ARVN forces in Central Vietnam with "intensified high
points" where they have recently taken over from U. S. forces (e. g. ,
the highlands) and where VC/NVA supply lines are short. Ground and
::artillery attacks were to be employed on population centers in MR 2
(and with a much lower priority in MR 4).
Manpower - Enemy manpower infiltration in the 1970-71 dry season
has been about 75, 000. This number is below the NSSM 99 estimate of
100, 000 as being necessary to sustain a protracted war in 1971, and
(assuming there are no further large inflows this dry season) would imply the
enemy intended in 1971 to again limit his activities in South Vietnam
to a protracted war level. This could, of course, still encompass high
points in MRs 3 and 4, limited ground attacks in Cambodia, stand-off
attacks and limited ground probes in MR 1, and multi-battalion ground
attacks on a small number of targets in the highlands of Central Vietnam
(including the southern portion of MR 1).
The impact of Lam Son on this strategy is not yet clear. Lam Son
appears to have cost the enemy at least 10, 000 KIA. We also know
that regiments destined for Cambodia and'tha central highlands were
held up in South Laos to cope with ARVN forces. Most importantly,
Lam Son made credible the threat to South Laos (ARVN operations
in Cambodia ha i a similar affect there) and '.ncreased the prospects
that enemy units now diverted there will not be deployed into South
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Vietnam in 1971. Because the enemy is now /required to continue
a full-scale logistics effort up to the end of the dry season (late
May), his combat forces (about 20, 000) in Sot th Laos cannot be
diverted fromprotecting the Trail until the wet season. is underway.
Logistics - The enemy clearly made every effort to get his logistics
effort off to an early start in the 1970-71 dry season. Probably for
the first time in the current Indo-China War, the enemy's strategy
options in South Vietnam and Cambodia were logistically constrained.
Delayed by a late monsoon he still had input some-41, 000 tons
by early March. The impact of Lam Son on his logistics situation
was clearly significant.
CIA's Logistics Assessment of Lam Son. In the 1970-71
dry season, Hanoi had to fulfill major "additional" logistics
requirements in addition to the "normal" logistics requirements met
by inflows onto the Ho Chi, Minh Trail.
The normal requirement was that met to sustain a protracted war in
1969-70 using the Trail(before the fall of Sihanouk).' It consisted
of inflows to support forces in southern Laos and nothern South
Vietnam. CIA estimates the inflow tonnage to meet this normal
requirement to be 54, 000 tons. Actual inflows in 1969-70 were 60,000
tons." (Sihanoukville was the source of supply for southern South Vietnam. )
The additional requirements for the 1970-71 dry season are itemized
below:
(1) to replace Sihanoukville
(2) to support non-combat consumption for increased
force- in South Laos
-- (3) Lam Son Caches Destroyed or Captured
-- (4) Combat Consumption to Cope with Lam Son
TOTAL
5,520-B, 160
7, 900
3, 650
3, 070
20,140-22,78C
tons
Adding the normal (54, 000) to the additional -requirements for the 1970-71
dry season gives a total inflow requirement tnis dry season of 74, 140-
76, 780 tons.
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The capacity of the Trail has been estimated by CIA to be between
71, 000 tons and 89, 000 tons (the mid-point estimate 80, 000) on the
assumption that the Trail is kept open through May 1971 or to
the end of the dry season.
Noting that the requirement exceeds the minimum estimate of
capacity but falls short of the maximum estimate CIA concludes:
throughout will be adequate for the Communists to sustain
rp.ilitary activity at the low levels observed during 1970
"'[It] will not permit the Communists to build up any
significant volume of stockpiles and will make it
imperative that their next logistic offensive get off to
an extremely early start next dry season.
!'In sum, North Vietnam's logistic position over the past
year has become greatly complicated. Far from enjoying
a wide range of logistic options to support alternative
strategies, Hanoi appears tied, for 1971 at least, to a
continuation of the low-profile war fought in 1970. While
the enemy's logistic situation does not preclude an
occasional high point of combat activity in either South
Vietnam or Cambodia, major sustained warfare seems
definitely to be ruled out. "
'DXA concurs in these conclusions.
-- Possible Adjustments in CIA's Estimate. Several assumptions
underlying the foregoing analysis can be viewed as placing the resulting
outcome estimate at the conservative end of a spectrum of outcome
estimates. These are.
-~ The analysis of the additional requirement to support
the non-combat consumption for the enlarged force in South Laos
(item 2 in the above table) is based on a 10, C30 addition to the pre-Lon
Nol force in South Laos. However, CIA Memorandum 71-32 dated
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February, 1971 states: "During 1970 the NVA bolstered its force
structure in southern Laos by 20, 000 men concentrated heavily in
the Tchepone area. " If the additional requirement to support 10, 000
more men than the CIA assumed is included, the inflow requirement
for 1970-71 would increase by another 7, 900 tons.
-- CIA assumes a 25% bomb damage assessment (BDA)
on tonnage moving on the Trail for both 1969-70 and 1970-71. It
is possible to argue that increased truck kills attributable to the
increased gunship effort in 1970-71 justify adding a requirement
to the normal estimate based on the 1969-70 experience. Truck
kills thus far this year are estimated at about 8, 000 versus 4, 300
a year ago. If we assume half of this increase of 3, 700 trucks were
loaded and that half of the four ton load on the loaded trucks is lost,
another 3, 70.0 tons would be added to the 1970-71 inflow requirement.
-- CIA does not add any BDA for the Lam Son operations.
There are no firm data on BDA linked to Lam Son despite pilot reports
that large supply depots were destroyed. Another 2, 000 tons might
be added as an additional requirement to cover such a possibility.
-- CIA assumes the North Vietnamese are able to keep the
Trail open through the end of May and sustain a high rate of logistics
activity to that date. If, on the other hand, it is assumed this maximum
effort is not achieved, but rather the Trail effort falls short of this
maximum goal by the equivalent of 15 days at an average 280 tons per
day input rate, CIA's Trail capacity estimate would fall by 4, 200 tons.
If these adjustments are made, one obtains the following results:
CIA Adjusted
Total Additional Requirements 20, 140-22, 780 33,740-36,380
Whereas the CIA total requirement of 74, 140.76, 780 tons was compared
with CIA's mid-point capacity estimate of 80, 000, the "adjusted" total
requirement of 87, 740-90, 380 would compari with an adjusted mid-
point Trail input capacity estimate of 75, 800 tons (80, 000 tons minus
4,?200),
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Therefore, the adjusted calculations would be consistent with the
view that the enemy will fall short of his protracted war logistics
requirement in 1970-71, whereas the CIA estimate suggests that
if the enemy strains to his maximum capacity, his Trail effort will
support a protrarted war activity level.
Assuinirig these two estimates,one-conservative one generous, bound the
possible outcomes, the impact of Lam Son in combination with the loss of
Sihanoukville can be summarized as follows:
-- precluded sustained dry season ground attacks in Cambodia by
insuring that supply through-put would not reach units there until the
wet season when floods will seriously hamper offensive activities.
(Enemy units in MRs 3 and 4 were similarly constrained by Lam Son
but they were already too weak in manpower terms to mount major
attacks. )
-- limited the scope of 1971 enemy offensive activities in southern
MR 1 and MR 2's highlands by denying the enemy the opportunity to
establish forward-based stocks in the highlands and bordering Laos
areas. (This does not preclude probable multi-regiment attacks
in the highlands but it should limit their scope and duration.) _ _
-- strained enemy protracted war activities in other areas, i. e. ,
MRs 3 and 4, and the coastal areas of MR 2. Because a maximum
dry season logistics effort will likely just meet aggregate protracted
war logistic requirements, it is probable that local shortages will be
encountc red'that will inhibit protracted war activity in other selected
areas. Already in MR 3, for example, standard loads for enemy weapons
have been limited and we have a report from Cambodia that the enemy
is trying to buy AK-47 rounds on the local economy.
narrowed the enemy's 1972 o tp ions. Because it takes several
months of the dry season to attain a sizeable logistics through-put
rate to Cambodia and ' .ouch Vietnam, the failure of the enemy to build
up large stockpiles in 1971 .will mean that it will be late in the 1971-72
dry season -- e- g. late February or early March -- before he can attain
the logistics capabilities to launch a major offensive. This assumes,
of course, the enemy can successfully solve the logistics problems
in 1972 he was ui.able to solve in 1971,
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If the enemy intended to mount a major offensive in early 1972 a.key
Lam Son benefit is that it may have reduced the enemy's flexibility
in 1972.
The Main Force and Control Pros ects for 1971
-- Main Force Prospects for 1971. GVN main force superiority
in MRs 3 and 4 seems assured for the rest of 1971. This is due
primarily to: (1) probable continued NVA diversions from these areas
to Cambodia, (2) the fact that U. S. redeployments will have little
s
r
o
ce
f
d
S. groun
there are no U
in
.
ce
MFR in these areas s
effect on the in MR 4 and only a brigade in MR 3, and (3) aggressive. ARVN operations-
against enemy base areas in MR 4.
In MRs 1 and 2, however, the main force balance could be upset by
continued U. S. redeployments, although given the enemy capabilities
for the balance of the dry season reviewed above, it seems probable
that the challenge will come in 1972 rather than in 1971. In any case a
final assessment would depend on information on projected U. S. redeploy-
fiie"nts for the balance of 1971.
Control Assessment for 1971. If the GVN could achieve the
control gains in 1971 on the scale of the 19 percent achieved in 1970,
the enemy's main force options in 1972 in MRs 3 and 4 would be all
but eliminated. On the other hand, control prospects in MRs `1 and 2
are less encouraging.
January 1971 control data for selected provinces in MRs 3 and 4 show
why the outlook in these areas is encouraging:
MR 3
MR 4
Binh Duong
72%
Dinh Tuong
69%
Tay Ninh
75
Kien Hoa
50
Long An
77
Chuong Thien
48
Hau N ghia
34
All MR 3 Provinces
70%
All MR 4 Provinces
69%
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 12
A year ago control in Dinh Tuong was about 35 percent and in
Kien Boa 25 percent. These VC strongholds are now being penetrated
by aggressive GVN operations. When control reaches about 75 percent
in a province the. enemy's only main force option is a costly conventional-
style attack. The NSSM 99 most probable estimate that a division could
be freed from MR 4 in 1972 may be exceeded if the GVN holds off the
enemy's current determined dry season attacks and pacifies the An Xuyen
and Kien Hoa base areas by the end of the year.
MR 3 is also encouraging, although Hau Nghia is a critical and lagging
province. Given the "dual" enemy threat to Cambodia and MR 3 (now
occupied by ARVN in Cambodia), the possible redeployment of the last
U.S. brigade from MR 3 in the near future, and the key main force
defense requirement for Saigon, no main force units are likely to be
freed from MR 3 in 1971 or 1972.
MR 2 presents a serious problem. The low GVN control scores for
the key GVN MR 2 provinces listed below show that the control war
has not favored the GVN in MR Z. as much as it has elsewhere in South
Vietnam.
January,
1971
Binh Dinh
43%
Pleiku
43
Phu Yen _
48
Binh Thuan 63
All MR 2 provinces 57%
A U. S. brigade still operates in northern Binh Dinh and two ROK
Divisions along the coast. Assuming the U.S. brigade redeploys
and the ROK forces stay in 1971, the best hope is for moderate
control gains that will not alter the requirement for GVN forces or
deny the enemy main force options in 1972. A most probable
estimate, if one accounts for the likely enemy highlands offensive
this year, is a continued control stalemate in 1971.
The best GVN t ontrol performance in 1970 .t -)ok place in MR 1.
Particularly noteworthy were the gains in Quang Tin which gives
the GVN a strong control position in three of MR 1's five provinces:
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vr bz U xr:%u / b i'.L l v 1; 13
January, 1971
Quang Tri,
76%
Thua Thien
86
Quang Nam
58
Quang Tin
81
Quang Ngai
66
All MR 1 provinces
73%
C
While a slight control loss was probably experienced in February
(the data are not yet available), a determinant of whether 1971
will see further progress is the pace of the redeployment of the three
U. S. divisions now in MR 1.
(The foregoing control assessment assumes the political situation in
South Vietnam through the 1971 Presidential elections remains roughly
as it is currently -- although pre -occupation with the elections will
divert some GVN attention away from pacification -- and that no ceasefire
is agreed to in 1971.)
1972: A Probable Major Enemy Offensive in Northern South Vietnam
or Cambodia
Enemy Strategy
There is no captured document or other basis for estimating Hanoi's
strategy intentions for 1972. This assessment relies on an analysis
of enerry capabilities to obtain an understanding of the range of options open
to the enemy and the best, most, and worst probable courses of enethy action.
For analytical purposes a base case strategy of protracted war and
four higher strategies ranging from an offensive in MR 1 to a country-
wide offensive were assessed in terms of the enemy's manpower and
logistics capabilities to carry them out:
-- Base Case Strategy: Protracted War - Hanoi attempts to
continue level of activity of last 18 months
-- Variant 1: Major'Offensive in MR 1
Variant 2: Major Offensive in Cambodia
-- Variant *A: Major Offensives in GVN MR 1 and- Cambodia
Variant 4: Major Offensive in Cambodia and in each IvMP of
South Vietnam.
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TOP SECRET ISIMITIVE
Logistics - CIA's logistics analysis assumed
-- continued air interdiction at 1970-71' dry season levels.
-- in 1972 the enemy maintains 80, 000 forces in South Laos,
the same size force deployed at the outset of the 1970-71 dry
season.
It may be questionable whether a Lam Son-type threat will be credible
against South Laos a year from now. Therefore a variant to the CIA
estimate is provided herein to cover the possibility that the enemy can
decrease his force in South Laos 'by 10, 000 from 80, 000 to 70, 000
next year. Such an adjustment to CIA's analysis would decrease
next year's logistic requirement by 7, 900 tons.
The results of the CIA and adjusted estimates are summarized
below:
.Options Assuming no Lam Son in 1972
CIA Estimate
Adjusted Estimate
Protracted War
66, 600
56, 100
MR 1 Offensive
72,937-77'3Z5
65,037-69,425
Cambodia Offensive
70,350-72:150
62, 450-64, 250
MR 1 and Cambodia Offensive
76,987-83,175
69,087-75,275
Countrywide Offensive
79,687-87,450
71,787-79,550
If one assumes there is a Lam Son-type operation in 1972 or one with
similar logistics implications for the enemy, the CIA logistics require-
ments estimates can be adjusted as follows:
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Logistics Input Requirements for 1972 Strategy
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 TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 15
the CIA estimate that 80, 000 forces will be deployed in South
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W
Laos becomes realistic if one assumes another Lam Son. Thus the
"adjusted estimate" is no longer necessary because it is based on a
70, 000 rather than 80, 000 South Laos force.
-- direct to istict losses, to Lam Son. of 3, 650 for caches
destroyed or captured and 3, 070 for combat consumption should be
added to the CIA's.''no-Lam Son". estimate for 19.7 2.
CIA's 1972 -.estimates .adjusted for a possible Lam Son-type operation
in 1972 are shown below (6, 720 -tons-are added to CIA's-basic estimate):
Protracted War 73, 320
MR 1 Offensive 79,657-84,045
Cambodia Offensive 77, 070-78, 870
MR land .Cambodia Offensive _ 83,707.-89,895
Countrywide Offensive. 86,407-94;170
When the mid-points of the CIA, Adjusted, and Lam Son estimates
-are compared with the-.xni4.# o ~n.t. e-s.timate-of . C.IA,'.-s capacity- asses s---.
ment for the Trail, in 1972, the -logistics implications of the various-.-
strategies are shown below:
Without Lam Son' 72
With Lam Son '72
Capacity
CIA est.
Adjusted
(mid-point)
Protracted War
66, 600
56, 000
73, 000
80, 000.
MR 1 Offensive
75 40-
67,000--
82, 000
80, 000
o---,Cambodia Offensive
71,000
63,000
78,000
80, 000
MR 1 and Cambodia
Offensive
80, 000
72, 000
86,000
80,000
Countrywide Offers-
:sive
84
75,'500
90, 000
80, 000
On logistics grounds alone it appears that without a Lam Son 1972
or its equivalent, all enemy strategy options ranging from protracted
war to a. combined MR 1 and Cambodian offensive are feasible. Only
a countrywide offensive is logistically infeasible.
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wztn a .Lam on 1 or its equivaient-
-- using the mid-point of CIA's capacity estimate, a protracted -
war, an MR 1 offensive, and a Cambodia offensive would appear feasible-.
Both a combined Cambodia and MR. 1 offensive and a countrywide offensive:--
would appear infeasible.
-- if the upper end of CIA's capacity estimate is used (89, 000)
all strategies except a countrywide offensive would appear to be
Manpower - Manpower remains the primary constraint on the enemys
strate choices. The. manpower requi,rements for'the alte ative
gy
enemy strategies are shown in the following table.
Protracted W V
MR 1 Offensive
Infiltration Re uq irements
Cambodia Offensive
MR 1 and.. Cambodia
Offensive
Countrywide Offensive
A ' -strategy. This
n estimates 000 below CIA's is provided far---each
adjustment is intedned as a crude approximation (in the absence
of. detailed analysis) of a possible decline in enemy losses. from the
200, 000 CIA assumed for 1972.. Such a decline could result from.the
CIA = 25, 000
100, 00-0
75,000
130,000
105,000
1.50, 0.00
12.5, 000
180, 000
155,000
redeployment off. U. S. forces.
Infiltration above 100, 000 would draw down the enemy's manpower
pool. But as noted earlier, in 1968 the enemy sent 244, 000.. south
and in 196, 1'05'000. Clearly.the. enerriy has the capacity with a-
1.'3.1.4 million man able-bodied manpower pool to repeat his 1968
performante. ` While our knowl-edge of the military and economic
strains on North Vie.nam is limited, -there is some evidence,
including the low. 1969 and _1970 levels of infiltration-,- that the enemy
Prudent military' planning might, however, count on infiltration in
the 100, 000 to 160, 000 range in 1972. Such an allowance would place
all enemy military.. strategies except a combined MR 1 and Cambodia
offensive and a countrywide offensive within enemy man ower capabilities
using CIA's estimates. According to-DlA's estimates all strategies
except a countrywide offensive would be feasible.
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TOP SECRET LS ITIVE 17
Best, Most, `and Worst Probable Strategy Estimate for 1972
The. foregoing- iogistica and manpower, analysis does not provide a
final basis for assessing probable enemy strategies. The enemy must
weigh carefully the costs of a particular strategy against the probability
of military and/or political -success. In our selection of strategies.
we have already exc-luded imprcibable alternatives such as anMR..3
offensive. The high alternative of a country-ride offensive can also
be excluded as improbable, 0
Other Factors Bearing on Enema 1 Strate Choice - The local
logistics, situation will-affect the enemy's choice-. If he- cpts for- a major
offensive in 1972, the short supply lines in MRs 1 and 2, might favor
that are a in comparison with Cambodia.
The monsoon might also influence his choice. A major offensive in
Cambodia and all of South Vietnam south of northern MR 1 would
almost certainly be launched before mid-May 1972 at the latest..
Yet logistics considerations may make it dif ficult to- get supplies. in.
place in Cambodia and MRs 3 and 4 of South Vietnam in time to launch
a major ground offensive before the wet season.
-The northern MR I area is. subject to the northeast-monsoon which
puts the- dry- season. for, this area in the May to Septerxxbe.r-.period. The
enemy might find this area attractive .h6t'only-for its short LOC's
but also because the dry season is close to the time of the 1972 U. S.
Presidential elections.
Control is an im ortant. determinant of the area and nature of probable
enemy activities. High GVN control in MRs 3 and 4 greatly inhibit the
local manpower. and logistics support. the enemy can count on. NVA
-units in most of.MRs 3 and 4 and Quang. Tri and Thua Thien of MR 1
must fight like a conventional army with a logistics tail. On the other
hand the enemy's most advantageous: control situation ,is in MR 2,
a. circumstance that suggests an attack' either in the Central Highlands or
as- an enemy strategy option and-should be added to the foregoing analysis.
The area from which U. S. tro.ops.. redeploy and their. rate of redeploy-
ment ni,-.y bear on the kind of offensive Hanct may mount. The following
table compares the end 1970 MFR with mid-1972 MFR's based respectively
on a 150, 000, and 50, 000 residual force level.
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End 1970
MR 1
2.5.
MR.2
2.9
MR 3
5.1
MR 4
2.6
Countrywide
3. 1#
Main Force Ratio (MFR) Comparisons!
Assuming Late 1970,Threat
Mid-72 Assuming ; 50,000
U. S. Force Level
1.82
2. 5
3.2
2.6
. -2.5
.
Mid-72 `A s suining
50, 000 US Force Leve
1.21
2.3X-'
3.2
2.6
-1.8
1Preliminary. calculations derived from Appendix B ,to NSSM 99 RVNAF
Ground FdreeVariants paper and excluding dual threat forces.
2Assumes all ROK Units remain in MR 2 but ROK Marine Brigade is
redeployed from MR 1.
One way to look at the prospects in the MRs assuming a 150, 000
Fiscal Guidaar ce) force level in mid-1972, is_ to recognize that RVNAF
main forces in MR 2 with.the same 2. 5 to,
1E: MFR advantage as MR l's forces
at the end of 1970jmust cope with an enemy in MR 2 with only 55
percent GVN control whereas in MR 1 at the end of 1970 the GVN had
73 percent.control.. In the past in MR 2, whenever the MFR fell below
3. 0 for several months the GVN lost control.
In MR 1 the situation could also be serious. Friendly main force combat
strength relative to enemy combat strength will drop 25 percent if in
mid-1972 U. S. force levels in Vietnam are 150, 000 and by 50 percent
if the U. S. force level drops to 50, 000. We have no way of gauging
from past experience what MFR is required to maintain a main force
stalemate in MR. 1. We do know that in the second and third quarters
of 1970 .the MFRfell to 1. 8 and 1.9 respectively when the enemy biuilt
up his forces; yet-:the GVN continued-to register control gains.
We alto must consider that the enemy can easily and quickly increase
the threat to M"t. 1.
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TOP SF CRET /S ITIVE JP . - 19
Our analysis should encompass best, most, and worst probable
oitcomes. Illustrative choices for these categories and the reasons
for their possible inclusion are:
--- Best Probable:. Continued Protracted? War with Limited
Ground Attacks in MR 2 Highlands. This alternative could be
justified on the following grounds: (a) FANK does well, (b) logistics
problems preclude preparation for a major offensive in Cambodia. or MR 3
and 4 in 1972, (c) a residual 1972 U. S. force of one 'division remains
in northern MR I through late 1972 and in combination with ARVN
and U. S. air support jeters an attac1c n MR 1 or ARVN units in
MR lare greatly expanded by at least a division equivalent while
U.S. ground combat forces are withdrawn, and.(d) the control
situation in MR 2 persuades the enemy that his greatest opportunity
for low cost high visibility gains is in MR 2.
-- Most Probable: Sustained Ground Attacks in MR 1 and MR 2
Highlands with Protracted War in Cambodia and MRs 3 and 4.
This alternative could be the enemy's choice because: (a) high GVN
control levels and main. force superiority in MRs 3 and 4 make enemy
attacks too costly, (b) FANK holds its own in Cambodia with the current
level of ARVN support or FANK loses ground but ARVN capabilities
are still adequate to fill the gap without jeopardizing ?GVN control in
MRs 3 and 4, (c) logistics problems on the Trail preclude adequate
logistics support. for sustained ground attacks south of northern MR 2,
(d). short LOC's encourage enemy attacks in MRs 1 and 2, (e) poor
GVN c _~ntrol and -intact VCI and local forces in Binh Dinh, Quang Nam
and Quang Nhai,.. provide enemy with possible low cost high effectiveness
gains, (f) rapid enemy reinforcement capability from North Vietnam
makes. MR 1. attack attractive.
Worst Probable! Cambodia, MR 2 Highlands, and MR 1
Offensive. The enemy chooses to make a maximum effgrt to defeat
Vietnamization in 1F 72. He attacks in Carr?bodia and MRs 1 and 2
because of FANK's . vulnerability, and short 'LOC's in MR 1 and
MR 2's highlands.
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MR Outcome A ainst Most Probable Threat
We projected amosfirobable case friendly main force requirement
against the most probable enemy strategy -- a major enemy offensive
? (with a one division reinforcement) in MR 1 :.nd a three-regiment
augmentation for highlands offensive in MR Z. We assume U.S.
redeplsyments are in accordance with current Fiscal Guidance, i.e.
150, 000 in mid-CY 1972. The following table shows the projected
friendly main force surpluses and deficits necessary to maintain
a main force. stalemate in each MR and countrywide at the time of such
an offensive. March, April, or May 1972 would be- the probable
periqd for such attacks given the.enemy's logistics problems.
]Battalion Surpluses (+) and Deficits (-)
MR1
-15
MR Z
-11
MR3
MR4
+13
Countrywide
- 8
The foregoing analysis suggests several issues that might be addressed
in order to lessen the probability that the enemy can successfully carry out
.the strategy alternatives postulated above.
Whether or not FANK increases its ca abilities relative to
Communist forces in Cambodia, thereby freeing ARVN units from
permanent cross-border operations in Cambodia (12-14 battalions)
or causing the enemy to put in more troops to hold his own. We
~resently know-very little about FANK performance and growth
potential.
-- The effectiveness of the combined-a.ir..inter diction program
in South Laos in 1971-72. This depends not"only on sortie rates but
on the mix.between fast-movers and slow movers and gunships.
An assessment of alternative sortie level and mix packages for the
1971-72 dry season would clarify the alternatives in this area.
20
3'crssilie'riel7 : z4d"ustments to'-Cope with Enem Strategies in 1972
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W
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
Uk' Z>P k -K k!;'l" / 3k~1'1' 1 V ;
s-~-
21
-- The effectiveness of. the ground interdiction program in South
Laos in 1971-72, he large scale enemy deployments in South Laos,
including roughly 20, 000 NVA combat forces in addition to 45, 000
NVA logistics and . 5, 000 anti-aircraft forces raise a basic interdiction
issue: the relative effectiveness of ground versus air interdiction. By
.comparing the annual cost of a 10 percent reduction in air sorties
and support with its equivalent in the
cost side of this,; trade -off can be illustrated:
1. 10 percent air sortie and support reductions -"$132 million 25X1
The possibility of increased ground interdiction in South Laos in
1972 to obtain the force diversion and logistics benefits obtained
from Lam Son will have an important
bearing on the enemy's 1972 options.
.In the case. of .additional deployments a country 25X1
mobilized at a very. small proportion of its manpower capacity, the
financial costs of additional deployments, a possible diminution
in. the counter -insurgency effort, or political opposition from 25X1
within are the principal constraints on additional deployments.
For Vietnam at issue is the fundamental trade-off between the benefits 25X1
to pacification of leaving main forces within South Vietnam versus
the gains from operations against South Laos. Alternatively, if one
considers expanding RVNAF to give it an additional capability to
operate in South Laos, the manpower and economic feasibility of
such an expansion would have to be weighed (see separate RVNAF
section below).
-- Whether .or not the.GVINY achieves decisive -control results
in the MRs in 1971. If *the GVN achieves decisive- control gains
in MRs 3 and 4 in 1971, the enemy's main force options will be all
but eliminated in these areas, except for costly conventional-style
attacks. Similar (but not expected) control results in MR 2 and
MR 1 would likewise force the enemy to fight as a conventional
army. From. the point of view of the support his main forces can
obtain from local forces,the enemy would prefer to mount a 1972
main force attack in northern MR 2 and southern MR 1.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
TOP SECRET/S SITIVE
adding two ARVN divisions.
FY 1972
($ million)
FY 73-75
Annual Average
U. S. Direct Costs in Support oft /
ROK Forces (2 1/3 divisions) ...
245
245
0
MASF and GVN Budget Costs of
Two Additional ARVN Divisions
348.x/
263
Whether ROK forces stay in South Vietnam the MR-2 main
force balance and the control situation over the next year will be
significantly affected by the possible ROK redeployments. The
performance of ROK forces has fallen. well below their capabilities
ana it is costly to the U. S. to retain them in South Vietnam. On the
other hand the FY 72 cost of retaining the current 2 1/3 division
ROK force in South Vietnam compares favorably with the cost of
/ Does'not include quid pro _quo MAP or AID funds provided
directly to Korea which, in any case, are now "sunk costs. "
2/ Includes. investment costs of, $72: million.
Given the possible infeasibility of adding two ARVN divisions in 1972,
or if they can be added given: (a) that their likely combat capabilities
would be less than that of ROK forces and (b) the desirability of using
them in NM .1 and as a reserve force for MR 2, the continued
presence of ROK forces might be desirable on cost-effectiveness
grounds.
Of course, efforts should be undertaken to enhance the ROK contri-
bution by deploying ROK forces away from the population where they
operate more effectively. .
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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 TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 23
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
RVNAF FORCE VARIANTS
Reviewed briefly below and described in more detail in the appendices
to this paper. are. possible measures that might be taken to strengthen
RVNAF.
Add Two Divisions to RVNAF
The following table. summarizes the force structure and costs of
the currently programmed RVNAF force of 1. 1 million and an
expanded force of 1. 2 million.
RVNAF Force Structures
1,100, 000 1,200,000
Programmed Force Changes
Fld Arty BNS (155)
RF Companies
RF Platoons
Infantry BNS
Armored Car Sqdns
Fld Arty -B NS- (10 5)
Personnel
ARVN
VNN
RF/PF
TOTAL
1/
Costs
477,456 514,988 + 37,530
39,611 .43,251 + 3,640
552,473 582,561 + 30,088
1,100, 000 1,201,260 +101,260
2/
$3.4 billion $3. 6 billion $+205 rr.
J/ FY 72 GVN. Budget (Approximately $1. 3B) is divided by DOLT Apprc?
Cost Agency based upon data gathered in Vietnam in Nov-D'
that the "Programmed" cost shown above of $3400M, ay
per year ph s or minus to the DOD Appro ?ed Base Case.
Cost estimating relationships developed by the US Army Fief.
factor of approximately $1200 per man. $1200 x 100, 000 equals '
by $ZOOM.
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12 14 + 2
.133 ? ? 157 + 24
17 18 + 1
40 46 + 6
15 17 + 2
1,679 1,872 + 200
7,479 7,479 0
__FY 72.RV,NAF Manpower (1, 100, 000) to yield an incremental plan-
 TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE. 24
The force mix described in.the above table is illustrative. A key
consideration in deciding the final mix if a-decision were made to
expand RVNAF is the relative cost of the various type forces. The
following table shows these costs on a per division strength basis.
That is the co.-:t of a 12, 700 man division is compared with the costs
of the size of RF and PF forces that could'be manned with the same
number of personnel.
Costs (Millions)
Strength
Initial
Investment
Annual
Recurring
Total
1 ARVN Division
12, 700
39.5
45. 8
85. 3
397 PF PLT @ .32 men
12-,704
12.7
11.5
24.2
103 RF Cos @ 123 men-
12, 669
14.9
17.2
32. 1
Before the selection of. any option that expands RVNAF beyond the
currently planned 1, 100, 000 man force, the serious issue of whether
such forces could be manned should be addressed. The following table,
developed by CINCPAC on the basis of admittedly poor RVN census data
is the best current estimate -of ranpower requirements and resources.
As can be noted in the preceding table, the currently available manpower
estimate shows a surplus of (a) 57, 000 to (b) 137, 503 to meet unprogrammed
military requirements in FY 72 depending on whether the economic
requirement is met from (a) internal or (b) additional external resources.
It is doubtful that a decline in casualties can be forecast in any situation
which would require an increase in the size of RVNAF. However, there
are programs to facilitate identification and return of deserters to duty
:which may reduce desertions over time below the figure assumed for
1972. In any event, the majority of the deserters not returned to duty
may actually be injections into the economy since few go over to the
enemy. A more important consideration is that, as GVN control of its
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Current
Strength
as of
30 Nov 70
0
FY 71
25
RVNAF (includes 1,042,676 1,078,345. 1,092,087,
a. Authorized
-Military
Requirement
RF & PF)
Paramilitary
(less PSDF)
SUBTOTAL
b. Estimate:
Requirement
to'Sustain
Authorized Force
RVNAF Casualties
(Not returned to
152,646 165,285.
,195,322 1,243,630
163,285
1,255,37f
duty)
33,000
33,500
RVNAF Desertions (Not
86#,500
6.2, 800
Returned to Duty)
RVNAF Dischartes (Less
.8,900
..
9,000
Physical. Discharges)
National Police Casualties
680
.690
(Not Returned to Duty)
National- Police Desertions
1,130
.570.
(Not Returned to Duty)
National' Police (Dismissed,
2,000
2,040
Resigned,' Retired)
SUBTOTAL:
132,210
108,600
c. Estimated Sources of
Manpower
Incoming 18 yrs age group
194,000 -
199-,000
Hoi Chanh
.50,000
55,000
Deserters
77 850
56,520
- - SUBTOTAL:
,$ 0
0,5 0
d. Total Estimated Requirements
to Sustain Force
132,210
.108,600
Minimal Increase in Economy/
80,000
80,000
Employment
Force Increase
48 30$.
11,742
"
SUBTOTAL:
260,518
90,342
1
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 26
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
e.
Surplus Available to Meet
Unprogrammed Military and
Economic Requirements: (a)
643 32
+120, 178
-- Excluding Economic Requirement1 (b)
+141, 322
+200, 178
Surplus Available to Meet Unprogrammed
Military Requirements: (a)
+ 24,173
+ 57, 503
Excluding Economic Requirement:' (b)
+104, 173
+137,503
1 The economic requirement could be met by increasing the level
of U. S. Imports in support of the GVN economy above the current
$750 million level.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1 " 27
R
population has increased over the past several years, the manpower
available to GVN has also increased and eaci. periodic estimate by
U. S. Agencies of the maximum total supportable force has proven to
be conservative. Moreover, RVNAF recruitment in 1970 was
measurably mere successful than in earlier years. The possibility
of an increase in GVN force levels cannot be ruled out solely on the
basis of manpower requirements versus manpower resources.
A second important factor is the likelihood that some of the available
manpower will be needed for increases in civilian employment related
to economic development. If the United States absorbs the cost and if
economic development is deferred, these personnel could be diverted
to the Armed forces. It is reasonable to expect that, under appropriate
circumstances, further increases in GVN force strengths could be
achieved and supported.
Another factor which impacts on changes in the RVNAF is that any
increase in force levels is highly time sensitive. Lead time in
developing effective members of the RVNAF may vary from as little
as three months in the case of replacements to two years as in the
case of fielding a major unit. This includes the time. for procurement,
induction of personnel, individual and advanced training, and specialist,
and unit training. An interrelated factor is the equipment variable.
Once the type unit and its activation schedule is determined, the procure-
ment of equipment may be the critical issue involved. Whether the
equipment is available in-country, available from U. S. stocks, or
requires production and delivery to the RVN will determine the time
required for unit organization and readiness. Decisions, therefore, to
increase the RVNAF in a major degree must take into account the time
required to provide the properly trained personnel with the necessary
equipment and to train further the unit before it can be considered
effectively a part of the overall force structure.
Variants That Reallocate Forces Within the" Currently Planned Force
Level
Three variants.were examined which reallocate RVNAF manpower
within the currently planned FY 72 force ceiling of 1, 100, 000 men.
These variants could be implemented singularly or in combination.
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W
28
-- (1) RVNAF forces in MRs I and II could be strengthened by
RVNAF zeroing out units in MRs III and IV and activating them in
the former M .s. Possibilities for such an action would be deactivating
RF/FF units in areas in which the PSDF are firmly in control and/or
reducing ARVIN' regiments in MRs III and IV from four to three battalion
units.
The GVN is currently planning changes in RVNAF force structure
along these'lines. Proposals under consideration provide for eliminating
the 4th battalion in each ARVN regiment and adding the deactivated
battalion's rifle companies to the remaining battalions in the regiment
(providing four rifle companies per battalion vice the current three rifle,
companies per battalion). In addition, GVN proposes to reduce the
strength of each PF platoon from 35 to 32 men. These space savings
will be used to add one Armed Cavalry Regiment, 10 Military Police
Companies, 17 RF battalion headquarters, and 219 PF platoons. to their
force structure. Other variants could be considered.
-- (2) The present 1 st ARVN Division could be modified to form
a two-division?force to provide security in northern MR I. Logistic
support would then continue to be provided by .the existing MR I Corps
System. Two ARVN divisions would be formed by reducing the
1st Division to standard configuration and using the excess plus additional
resources to form a new division. Assets available in the l st ARVN
Division, additional resources required, and the proposed reorganization
are shown below:
PROPOSED REORGANIZATION
1st ARVN Division
New.ARVN Division
Old Regt'
Old Regt
New Regt
9 Old Bns
3 New Bn Hqs
1 A/C Sqdn
~. Engr Bn N
3 105 How Bn
1 155 now En
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Old Regt
Old Regt
New Regt
8 Old Bns
4 New Bn Hqs
-1 A/C Sgdn
1 Engr Bn
3 105 How Bn
1 155 How Bn
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
COST OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
TYPE STRUCTURE
1 Division Base (-90 spaces)
2Regimental Bases
7 Infantry Battalion Headquarters
23 Infantry Companies
1 105 How Battalion
2 155 How Batteries
1 155 How Bn Hq
TOTAL COSTS
29
INVESTMENT' ANNUAL RECURRING
$12.2M
.2,0
.7
9.6
2.6 6.4
2.0 2.5
.5.
.$29.6M
$27.9M
TOTAL $57.5M
-- (3) Another possibility to strengthen ARVN force posture
would-be to combine forces in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces into a
force tailored along the lines of an ARVN division. The proposed
force structure would be developed to include those assets in terms
of maneuver battalions, staff organization /manning and combat and
combat service support elements that would enable it to function
independently in sustained combat with NVA forces. As a minimum,
it would be organized with two infantry regiments and would possess
a division base (standard ARVN configuration) capable of accepting
and sustaining under its OPCON the equivalent of a third infantry
regiment. Logistic support would continue to be provided by the
existing MR II Corps system. The necessary staff, combat and
combat service support augmentation could be realized essentially
from MR II Corps nondivisional assets. The proposed reorganization
and additional resources required are shown below:.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
TOP SECRET /SWSITIVE 30
PROPOSED REORGANIZATION
Headquarters, (ARVN Div equivalent)
42d Infantry Regiment or other.numbered regiments as desired
47th Infantry Regiment]
Third Infantry Regiment (or equivalent) upon augmentation
ARVN Division combat and combat support elements to include:
2 -- Direct Support (DS) Artillery Battalions
(Third DS Battalion upon augmentation)
1 -- General Support Artillery Battalion
3 -- Armored Cavalry Squadron
C
Scout Companies
Signal Battalion
-- Medical Company
-- Ranger Battalions
?ADDITIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED
STRUCTURE
INVESTMENT
ANNUAL RECURRING
1 Direct Sunvort Artillery Bn
$2.7M
$6.4M
1 General Support Artillery Bn
3.2.
7.6
1 ? Signal Battalion (-) and elements
3.3
1.0
of Logistic Battalion, Infantry
Division
TOTAL COSTS
$9.2M
$15.0M
TOTAL
$24.2M
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
Augmentation of RVNAF Logistics Capabilities
31
Although the. Vietnamization Program.has made improvements in the
overall RVNAF logistical posture, internal management capabilities
in the logistic area are marginal. The RVNAF capability to provide
responsive logistic support to tactical operations is constrained by
the shortage of logistic managers, lack of fully trained logistic units,
and the inability of GVN to fill essential civilian logistic positions.
Moreover, the RVNAF command structure, organized on an MR basis,
hampers centralized control and direction for logistic matters.
With the expansion of logistic forces as part of the Consolidated RVNAF
Improvement and Modernization Program, the RVNAF Logistic
System should attain the planned level of limited self-sufficiency by
the time, under the present planned program, that the last U. S.
logistical .support units redeploy in, FY 73. Should U. S. withdrawals
be accelerated, with U. S. forces being reduced to a MAAG by end
FY 72, major modification of the current logistic Vietnamization Plan
would be required. On-going programs with completion dates
scheduled during FY 73 would have to be accelerated, ' or alternative
means developed for their accomplishment.
Movement of RVNAF Units from MRs III and IV
The movement of units fro m MRs III and IV is a possibility, if and
when the threat to these two important regions permits. The most
likely type of redeployment would be on a temporary basis, for example
MR 3 units could be temporarily moved to Binh Dinh during the wet
season. Such moves have been made in the past, particularly by the
JGS reserve forces (VNMC and airborne units). As the threat to MRs
III and IV lessens, this deployment could be made more frequently.
Movement of combat units from one MR to another on a permanent
basis is much more difficult. The attendant morale, dependent housing,
and other associated problems which occurred in 1964 after movement
of the ARVN 25th Division from MR II to MR III exemplify the problems
associated with such moves. GVN decisions- on whether to agree to
either a temporary or permanent move will depend on such factors as
seasonal weath3r, the effectiveness of FAN', and the results of friendly
operations in NE Cambodia and southern Laos to cut the enemy's LOC
to MRs III and IV.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
TOP SECRET/SWITIVE W 32
Quality 1 rovement Variants
Across-the-board improvement in armament, communications,
supporting equipment, improved operational capability within the
constraints of existing organization and equipment, and improvements
in general morale would enhance RVNAF force effectiveness.
The Improvement and Modernization (I&M) Program is providing
equipment to the RVNAF ground forces in accordance with a
schedule agreed to by MACV and JGS and based upon the RVNAF
ability to use and maintain the equipment. Ground forces are being
issued U. S. Army standard equipment. Although improvements in
units not yet modernized are to be expected, major changes in the
program for the regular ground forces would be difficult if not
impossible to accelerate since it is based on the capability of the
indigenous forces. Although material improvement could be made in
the People's Self-Defense Force {PSDF), mainly by arming the PSDF
with M-16 rifles, the PSDF's adverse weapons lost to weapons
captured ratio (.43:1) coupled with the innate GVN reluctance to
Arming the PSDF would seem to militate against this course of action.
Other specific equipment augmentation variants have not been
considered.
Qualitative improvement might be stimulated by further improvement
in leadership and personnel policies. In spite of notable improvement
in effectiveness achieved in some divisions by new and more aggressive
leadership, net desertion rates remain amazingly constant, although
currently at the low side of their standard range of variation. Further
improvement in leadership especially at the junior officer and NCO level
pia needed and being sought through training programs and improved
promotion policies.
Some further improv=~ment might also be achieved by revision of
personnel policies and pay. A 10 percent pay raise' would
cost $130 million. Considering the rate of inflation, such a raise
would seem warranted. ?However, it would not be likely to influence
desertion rates. In part, the desertion problem is technical -- caused
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1
TOP SECRET/MSITIVE 33:
by the 15 day absence rule, the reluctance of many commanders to
grant extended leaves, and the difficulty of traveling (especially
on schedule). Some further efforts might help in lowering the
desertion rate such as the dependent shelter and food supplement
program which are already underway.
Other special personnel measures could be considered such as a
dislocation allowance for combat troops operating an extended distance
from home bases, since there is evidence that such absences may be
related to the cause or rate of desertions. Dislocation pay of this
type could enhance performance and would ease the burden on the
individual soldier operating in Laos, Cambodia, or in isolated areas
of South Vietnam. While it might not measurably decrease desertions,
it could still have a positive effect on performance. Dislocation pay
would also be much more manageable in terms of its consequences for
the general economy because it would be provided to a small fraction.
of the total RVNAF force.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-451-2-16-1