JAPAN AND PRC APPEAR TO REVERSE ROLES IN PURSUING NORMALIZING RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-5-26-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: July 29, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/16: LOC-HAK-451-5-26-7
MEMORANDUM
F/Lc-~
TOP SECRET/NODIS
July 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT:
INFORMATION
Japan and PRC Appear to Reverse Roles
in Pursuing Normalizing Relations
(5866)
Vice Foreign Minister Bogen has given a description to Ambassador
Ingersoll July 27 of Foreign Minister Ohira's meeting with PRC repre-
spnta.tives on July 22 (see cable from Tokyo at Tab A.). This meeting
has provided the clearest indication yet that Peking is now taking a
decidedly active interest in getting normalization talks with Japan
underway at the earliest possible date. Hogen's explanation of Japan's
strategy for the talks also clarifies Japan's intentions, particularly
as regards its obligations under the Mutual Security Treaty, as well
as ou China policy generally.
PRC Position on Normalization Talks
Bogen said that the PRC representatives, Deputy Secretary-General of
the China-Japan Friendship Association SUN Ping-hua and Chief
Representative of the Chinese Trade Office in Tokyo HSIAO Hsiang-cI
had made the following points to Ohira:
DOS Review
Completed
The PRC would welcome Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign
Meeting and of Japan's position squares with that of bl.ogen - - please
that they are put in no embarrassing positions. (Ambassador Ushiba
told Under Secretary of State Johnson on July 26 that Ohira had committed
:self to respond to the PRC invitation by August 12, but told Sun that
to Government first wanted to clear with the Liberal Democratic Party
and check with Japan's allies. Ushiba's account of the Ohira-Sun-Hsiao
~nister Ohira's visiting Peking for normalization talks, and will insure
be Tab B. )
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TOP SECRET/NWS a 2
-- The PRC will not insist on the "three principles" as prerequisites
to normalizing relations between the two countries, but sees them as
basic elements that should "ultimately" be incorporated into the
relationship.
-- Chou En-lai believes that discussions with Tanaka and Ohira can
pave the way for the solution of difficult problems in the relationship.
The PRC will not let formalities obstruct progress in the talks, does
not believe that a Japanese apology for World War II is necessary, and
welcomes Japan's broaching any "difficult situations or problems"
for the PRC's consideration. -
Japan's Strategy on Normalization
As regards Japan's strategy, Hogen,., n the course of Ambassador
Ingersoll's presentation of our response to Tokyo's earlier inquiry
regarding our position on the basic problem, set out his government's
approach:
-- Although the U. S. has been able to open a dialogue with the PRC
without establishing diplomatic relations, Japan, lacking the power of
the Ti. S. , will have to establish diplomatic relations in the early stages
of normalizing relations. (Ambassador Ingersoll interjected that Japan
should test the PRC on this point, rather than accept it as a foregone
conclusion. )
- - Japan must pursue the twin objectives - - which are not incompatible of establishing a dialogue with Peking and of avoiding any change in its
relationship with the U. S.
-- Specifically, the Japanese Government is determined to uphold and
respect the U. S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty relationship, and therefore
wdrke no action which might weaken the U. S. position vis-a-vis the
Republic of China.
-- Japan agrees that its problem in normalizing relations is not so much
legal as political.
,.. Japan will resist any PRC attempt to drive wedges between itself
and' the U. S.
Ue iba!s account of Ohira's views was more explicit as regards the three
principles:
-- Japan is willing to recognize the PRC as the only legitimate govern-
ment of China.
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.L yr .1. / INV 49
-- Regarding the relationship of Taiwan to China, Japan will go no
further than saying that it "understands and respects" Peking's view.
Japan will never overtly and explicitly accept the PRC position.
-- Japan's Peace Treaty with the ROC will expire at the time of
normalization, but Japan will not accept the PRC assertion that it has
been null and void from the outset.
Ushiba said Ohira believes that if Peking accepts the Japanese position,
Tanaka's visit would follow fairly rapidly, and that a declaration would
result announcing the'normalizing of relations and perhaps stating that
Japan had withdrawn recognition from the ROC. Subsequent detailed
negotiations would take up the problem of a peace treaty, the main
objective having already been accomplished. If Peking could not accept
Japan's position, Ohira will not recommend a Tanaka visit, negotiations
will be protracted, and normalization delayed indefinitely.
With respect to post-normalization relations between Japan and Taiwan,
Ushiba said Ohfra wants to preserve the long-standing commercial and
cultural relations, and to support continued stability on the Island. Dilrect
Government loans to Taiwan would cease, but Exim Bank loans to Japanese
firms trading with Taiwan and Japan will continue and Japan will support
the ROC position in the IFI's.
Hogen and Ushiba's description of Japan's approach thus reinforces other
recent indications that the Japanese Government has come to a better
appreciation of its leverage vis-a-vis Peking, and that the Tanaka Govern-
ment is proceeding with caution and reasonable deliberation although
events are still moving quite rapidly. 'Tanaka is refusing to be stampeded
into a hasty visit to Peking.
Reversal of Peking and Tokyo's Roles
Japan and the PRC have almost reversed their pre-Tanaka roles on the
question of normalizing their relations. Peking now seems to be cast as
the pursuer and Tokyo the pursued. The s'fiift seems trrhave been con-
siderably more on the Chinese than on the Japanese side -- the PRC's
dropping the "three principles" as pre-conditions for commencing the
talks, for instance, represents a major concession on Peking's part.
Lacking much evidence as to the reasons why, we can at this point only
suggest the following speculative explanation for the change:
-- The mistrusted Sato being out of the way, Peking now perceives
Tanaka as a strong, popular leader with whom they are likely to have to
deal with for some time. In addition, Peking is now probably better
TOP SECRET/NODIS
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/16: LOC-HAK-451-5-26-7
a
aware of the limitations of its influence on Japan's China policy than
it was last fall, when its strong pressure failed to tip the scales against
Sato.
-- Peking may believe its advantage lies in getting to Tanaka earlY25X1
before he becomes too well steeped in the problem, while his China
policy is in its formative stage, and before the liberal Miki's influence
on him may decline
-- Peking probably wants to get normalization talks underway before
the peace treaty negotiations with the Soviets, scheduled to begin in
September, get too far along.
-- Mao, Chou, and other PRC leaders may be facing certain internal
political problems that would make the early commencement of the talks,
particularly useful to them.
-- Ushiba told Alex Johnson that Tokyo thought that a major reason
for Peking's haste was its immediate need for Japan's technology and
capital. The longer-range nature of this aspect of the problem would
make this seem doubtful.
The movement in Japan's position, on the other hand, has since Tanaka
took office been limited to Tanaka's expression of determination to move
ahead expeditiously to get the talks underway. His tactics, however,
have been marked by caution and calculation and, as Hogen made clear,
Tanaka is keeping the balance of Japan's basic interests well in mind.
On the substance of Japan's position, Tanaka has gone no further on the
critical "three principles" than had Sato before him -- and now has no
need to go further in order to begin the talks. At the same time, however,
Tanaka has sweetened the?pot somewhat by allowing Nakasone, as Minister
of International Trade and Industry, to announce Japan's tinilateral
movement on an important specific -- the intention to extend long-term
Exim Bank credits for the export of a vinylon plant to the PRC.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
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