DRV NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-6-4-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 4, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
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State Dept. review completed
INFORMATION
August 4, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN NEGROPONTE
1
1"
SUBJECT:
DRV Negotiating Proposal and Where
We Go from Here
Attached at Tab A is a brief analysis of what I believe to be some of the
salient elements of their August I proposal.
I am particularly intrigued by their procedural document which states
that the two parties will "discuss and resolve issues one by one. " I
was also struck by Tho's invitation to discuss the modalities of troop
withdrawals and prisoner releases if we agreed to the military principles
he enunciated.
My own calculation is that they continue to expect us to stonewall them
on the political issue. If they feel an overriding compulsion to settle
they will agree on military issues alone but, as can be seen from point
2 of their negotiating document, they have thrown in an end to our
military aid to the Saigon Administration for good measure and this
would be a sticking point.
The procedural document's invitation to "discuss and resolve issues
one by one" provides us a good opening for our next meeting to propose
a concrete agenda. One way to structure the meeting might be as follows:
A. Begin with a set of general remarks about their proposal, laying
out in broad terms areas of agreement and disagreement.
B. Propose an agenda of issues for that and following meetings.
For example:
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-- Modalities of troop withdrawals
(At the August I meeting Tho himself proposed our withdrawals,
followed by the question of aid to Saigon, followed by the timing of
ceasefire as issues for first and "immediate" discussion. )
- Modalities of prisoner releases
-- Modalities of a ceasefire
- - The political question.
C. If they agreed we might even get into the POW or withdrawal question
ii, somewhat more detail; or perhaps ceasefire modalities.
D. On the political question you could explain that you are not in any
position to negotiate in detail because you must first consult President
Thieu. This could have the doubly-beneficial effect of demonstrating that
we won't go behind the GVN's back and, the .fact itself that you are consulting
Thieu would discourage them from expecting any major breakthrough on the
political front. It may also have the beneficial effect of prompting them to
consider showing even more of their hand at the following meeting or two.
One brief comment on the current situation on the ground as it affects our
talks. I think Hanoi is engaged in a final supreme effort; their manpower
priorities are stretched to the utmost.; and everything is now keyed to
November 7. I find it inconceivable that Hanoi will do anything but revert
back to protracted warfare after that. Meanwhile we will be in for some
rocky times in Quang Tri/Thua Thien and parts of the Delta where their
strategy is to disrupt lines of communication, hurt the economy and generally
make inroads into the population. They may enjoy some temporary successes
but if we hold to the broad lines of our current negotiating position for the
next 90 days, I think we stand a good chance of seeing the talks break our
way just before the election or, in my view more likely, a reversion to
protracted warfare after the election which is likely to prove within the
GVN's capability to contain with minimal direct U. S. military involvement- -
and, assuming the few necessary structural improvements in RVNAF,
no direct military role on our part within a couple of years.
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The co nmunist Proposal of August 1, 1972
). Withdrawals No Longer the First Point:
This first point no longer pertains to withdrawals. It contains a pre-
ambulatory set. of. principles which we must respect including an end to
"all U. S. involvement in Vietnam" and then a specific set of steps which
in earlier formulations had simply been referred to as the "air war" but
which they now define as refraining from using our ground, air and naval
forces "no matter where they come from. " Thus our activities originating
from Thailand and the 7th fleet have now been explicitly drawn into their
negotiating position.
The first point also includes a statement that we will stop the bombing
and mining of the North. i
2. Withdrawals One Month After Agreement:
Wording of the withdrawal provision remains essentially unchanged
with the exception of timing which now is a one month period tied to
the completion of an overall agreement.
A curious addition to the withdrawal section is the provision that U. S.
aid to the Saigon Administration will end when the ceasefire comes into
force in South Vietnam.
This is the first explicit mention of U. S. aid in their negotiating position;
but the provision more logically would have said that our aid will stop
when a government of National Concord is formed.
The present formulation suggests that if they ever agreed to settle the
military issues separately, cessation of our aid to the GVN would be a
quid pro quo.
3. Exchange of Prison ~r Lists:
y..
This is the first mention of an exchange of prisoner lists, which is to be
done on the day of the signing of the agreement. An important detail,
though not a concession.
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4. Thieu's Resignation No Longer a Precondition for Talks:
Tl,e political provisions drop their insistence that Thieu resign immediately
to pave the way for PRG-Saigon Administration talks on the formation of a
Government of National Concord. In the new plan, Thieu is to resign
immediately after the signing of the overall agreement. However, the
otli,sr part of their conditions for these talks--namely, that the Saigon
Administration should change its policy, ensuring democratic liberties,
releasing political prisoners, etc. -- remains stated in the procedural
segment of the plan (paragraph 2 a), along with a new demand that the
GVN make its Paris Talks delegation "more representative". The relega-
tion of these demands to the procedural section hints at considerable
possibility for flexible interpretation. Moreover, compared to the two-
point elaboration, the necessary changes in Saigon Administration policy
have been somewhat toned down--for example, there is no longer an
explicit demand for a halt to pacification or disbanding of "concentration
.camps. "
A precondition for PRG-Saigon talks, however, is that we agree.with
the' DRV to the "principles and main contents" of the political question
first.
5. Government of National Concord Concept Elaborated:
A number of details are stated for the first time: a.) that the three
segments of the Government are to be evenly matched; and b.) that the
third segment will be appointed in common agreement by the PRG and
Saigon Administration. These provisions together would ensure a 50 -50
representation for the PRG.
6. Question of Vietnamese Armed Forces:
The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam is to be
settled between the PRG and the Saigon Administration after the ceasefire.
Formerly all that was said was that this was a question to be settled
between the "Vietnamese parties".
7. New Emphasis on International Control and Supervision:
Where previous proposals have just referred vaguely to the necessity
for international "supervision", this plan for the first time refers both
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to international "supervision" and "control", and says that an international
control and supervision cornEni ssiorl will be established. The organization
of this commission as well a5 the subjects under its purview would be
agreed upon by the parties. However, the standstill ceasefire is specif-
ically put under control and supervision. This new emphasis could be
interpreted` to reflect a defensive position.
8. Procedural Questions:
talks, again of effort
The procedural aspects of tohsket h out an agenda represent a greater
course
than; at a y yf, OU S time
with-the- precon4ition that the main lines of an agreement between us and
the DRV be reached beforehand.
(a) Possible se aration of militar and political issues.
"The two parties will discuss and resolve the questions one
by one,.": This leaves wide flexibility for
the modalities fd
be interpreted as an invitation to move into
any particular issue of our choosing. Separability of issues
is precluded textually by the caveat that the principles agreed
upon "will be recorded for the subsequent discussion of the de-
tails" and that only after an overall agreement is reached will
its provisions come into force.
However, the procedural document draws an interesting dis-
tinction between military "questions" and the "principles and
main contents" of political questions which suggests some
grading of the issues. Moreover, at the August 1 meeting,, Le
Duc Tho said that if we agreed to the military principles he .
enunciated "then we shall go into the discussion of the modalities
of withdrawal of troops and the modalities for the release of
captured military men and civilians. "
The questidh arises as to why the DRV would leave open the
sequence of agenda items for discussion and settlement. They
know we want to settle the military questions first and, if they
continue to insist on inseparability, the procedure they have
prescribed could be taken as a prescription for stalemate.
The alternate hypothesis is that they would be prepared to agree
on military issues in principle and then after a brief period.of
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stalemate on political questions agree to implement the military
principles already agreed upon.
(b) The PRG and GVN forum will "discuss and resolve in detail the
political and military questions that the forum between the DRV
and U. S: as not resolved" (Emphasis added).
Here again is an opening which suggests that the DRV may indeed
be contemplating that important political questions (not details) will
be unresolved between us and them.
(c) A tripartEe forum between the DRV PRG and Saigon for the-
g Two
"continued" Settlement of Specific Questions concernin th
Zones.
This is an intriguing proposal. It is difficult to envisage why they
have suggested such a forum. Unless they have in mind settling
some questions relating to relations between the North and South
before a definitive government is established in the South we are
uncertain what they have in mind.
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