MONITORING SOVIET EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE U. S. ELITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET
Outside System
NATIONAL SECF ITY COUNCIL 8353X
ACTION
December 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A' LSSINGER
FROM: A. W. MARSHALL ft?144
SUBJECT: Monitoring Soviet Efforts to Influence
U.S. Elites
I agree that to put out a memorandum 3::,irector of the
FBI could cause problems. As an alternative, one that I would prefer
in any case, you should have a meeting with them to discuss a joint
effort on their part to monitor relevant Soviet activities and periodically
report to the President.
I will supply talking points, if you want them, for such a meeting when
it is scheduled.
? I recommend that you schedule the meeting early next year after the
inauguration.
Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs.
NSS, FBI Reviews Completed
TOP SECRET (XGDS) - 5B 2, 3
DECLAS - Date impossible to determine
BYAUTH - Approval of A. Haig
044:4-1iA
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07.: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM
FROM:
SUBJECT:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUN IL
FOR HENRY A. KISSI ER
A. W. MARSHA
74 67
ACTION
November 16, 1972
Monitoring Soviet Effo to Influence
U.S. Elites
,e2
In a recent memorandum I suggested that you initia an effort to monitor
more closely the processes by which the Soviets try o influence U.S.
officials and opinion leaders. You indicated
for a copy of my initial memorandum
agreeme
to you.
t.
See TAB B
Attached is a memorandum from you
Gray
sking them to:
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-- Work out appropriate arrangements for such onitoring.
-- Report. to you at regular intervals.
Focus their efforts on:
The extent and nature of the Soviet efforts.
. The objectives of Soviet efforts.
I recommend you sign the memorandum at TAB A.
Hal Sonnenf
concurs.
TOP SECRET (XGDS)
DECLAS - Date impossible tca'etezzpine.
BYAUTH - Approval of A. Haig
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
? S c IP
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
Acting Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation
SUBJECT: Reporting on Soviet Efforts to Influence U.S.
Officials and Opinion Leaders
The growing network of U.S. and Soviet contacts may lead to Soviet
attempts to influence U.S. officials and opinion leaders, and thereby
U.S. policy and behavior. An effort to monitor the processes by
which the Soviets try to exert influence should be initiated. Appropri-
ate arrangements should be worked out
to carry out this effort.
Summary reports on the results of the monitoring should be submitted
? quarterly to the President.
The focus on this effort should be to assess the:
-- extent of the Soviet effort;
????i
??? WIN
target groups in the U.S. ;
objectives as a function of the target group and aspect of
U.S. policy;
important trends or changes in level of effort, targets, or
objectives.
Henry A. Kissinger
TOP SECRET (XGDS) - 5B 2, 3
DECLAS - Date impossible to determine
BYAUTH - Approval of A. Haig
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-4-52-4-1-4
MEMORANDUM
SECRET
'e
Tti
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
- ?
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
/
A. W. MARSHALL,'
FROM:
p'? et, is,
1,4?Iffyt-Tertrti4,541
October 16, 1972
SUBJECT: Implications of Increasing U.S. - Soviet Contacts
I want to call your attention to the following:
probably ask you about your willingness to dis-
cuss your observations of Soviet leaders, Soviet policy, etc., with a
small group of people from'
response to a growing complaint" "that
there is no feedback from your unprecedented contacts. Various
limitations and inhibitions in the preparation of future
is alleged. The Soviet area, of course, is not the only point
of interest.
? The growing net work of U.S. and Soviet relations create
.a major new opportunity for us to understand the o.caration of the Soviet
governmental process, its bureaucratic politics, etc. In the future it
will probably also create, a competition as to which government,
bureaucracy, or society will most influence the behaVior of the other
in the emerging relationship.
This suggests the following:
Some more systematic effort should be made to collect
and analyze the insights obtained by the growing number of U.S.
officials and U.S. businessmen, who will be personally involved in
conducting negotiations, arranging joint projects, etc.
-- The insights may add significantly to our knowledge of the
working of the Soviet government. A friend of mine who directs the
SECRET
?
Cf.SSTFIFT)
DITI-AssivicATioN
6:: i..)111)ER 1162
CA'1.I.C.;:1)!.,V. 513(3)
ON l3yAuth o AT Haig
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U.
SECRET -2-
NSF Polar Research Program is coached by his Soviet counterparts
as to the best sort of letters to write so that they can solve their in-
ternal bureaucratic problems, which are described to at least a
limited extent, in moving forward on projects of joint interest.
-- It may be best to organize the effort separately from the
A White House directed effort may be
nee e
-- Such an effort, if successful, should gradually allow us
to better assess the impact the net work of relationships are having
in the Soviet Union. '
-- A complementary effort is needed to monitor more closely
the processes by which the Soviets try to influence U.S. officials and
other elites with important roles in influencing U.S. policy and action.
At the moment there does not appear to be any effort to put together
a picture of Soviet efforts to influence relevant U.S. elites. While
information is gathered on Soviet contacts with some U.S. individuals,
there is no effort to look for patterns, or shifts of line, etc. Perhaps
a more systematic effort is needed.
Would you like to take some initiative in these areas:
? With regard to an effort to collect and analyze the insights
of U. S. personnel in contact with the Soviets?
?
SECRET
YES . NO
/;/1./VVi-i)1.,
-- With regard to Soviet efforts to influence U.S. elite groups?
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YES
NO
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-452-4-1-4