TALKER FOR LUNCH WITH PFIAB THURSDAY, AUGUST 7, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 5, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
11P
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Outside the System
ACTION
August 5, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:? SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: Richard Ober izeb,
SUBJECT: Talker for Lunch with PFIAB
Thursday, August 7, 1975
You are scheduled to host a lunch for the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board 40441446gerztlimboiS p.m. on Thursday,
August 7, 1975, at the State Department. This lunch was originally
suggested by the Board to provide you an opportunity to meet with
it prior to its meeting with the President proposed for August 8, 1975 (144144-
It is suggested that, at this lunch meeting, you give the Board a status
report on its proposal to the President on cominunications security
and that you also brief the Board members on the President's European
trip.
BACKGROUND:
At your June 5, 1975, lunch with PFIAB you suggested that the
Board forward to the President its views on strategic estimates
and on the Soviet intercept problem. In response to your suggestion,
Admiral Anderson forwarded letters to the President on these subjects
and requested a meeting with the President on August 8, 1975 to brief
him on the Board's views on strategic threat assessment. Your memo-
randa to the President forwarding Admiral Anderson's letters are at
Tabs B an4 C.
TO NSITIVE/XGDS
NSS, OSD, NSA reviews completed
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
44,4101i
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Communications Security:
Since the Board's letter to the President, Dr. Baker has
been pressing for accelerated action; he will undoubtedly
wish to discuss his concerns on this problem with you at
the lunch. David Elliott has prepared a current status
report on actions taken, or underway, to solve the technical
aspects of this problem. This report, and copies of earlier
action memoranda, are at Tab D.
-- Admiral Anderson's letter to the President also suggested
a program to assess the intelligence losses to the Soviets
resulting from communications insecurities. A highly-
sensitive current NSA report on this subject and a staff
recommendation for consultation with Philip Buchen are
with General S cowcroft.
The Soviet intercept problem has received considerable
publicity since its disclosure in the Rockefeller Commission
Report (excerpt at Tab E and press item at Tab F).
The Rockefeller and Murphy Commission Reports were both
issued in June 1975. Proposals for implementing the recom-
mendations concerning the Intelligence Community in both
reports are currently being staffed for the President's consideration.
Both reports recommend an expanded and strengthened role for
PFIAB. These specific recommendations are described at Tab G.
The Board is unaware that the President is considering replacing
the Chairman and making changes in its membership.
All Board members, except Clare Boothe Luce, are expected to
attend the lunch. A list of current Board members is at Tab H.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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IP
TALKING POINTS:
? Communications Security
It is recommended that you make the following points in dis-
cussing the Board's letter to the President on communications
security:
-- the Board's proposals have been reviewed by the President,
an NSC Advisory Panel has been established with technical
consultants and participation by NSA, OTP and Dot),
funds are being made available for R & D on technical systems,
the delicate question of more detailed assessment of intelli-
gence losses is under study.
(FYI: We have urged Dr. Baker not to pursue the proposal to
make NSA the executive agent for implementing this program;
having the President give direct responsibility to a subordinate
organization in DoD would obviously create problems.)
Rockefeller and Murphy Commission Reports
It is recommended that you inform the Bbard that the
recommendations of both Commissions concerning intel-
ligence matters are in the final stages of White House Staff
review prior to presentation to the President.
The President's European Trip
It is recommended that you brief PFIAB with particular reference
to new developments on:
the future of U .S S. intelligence facilities
prospects for an agreement on Cyprus, and
progress on SALT and MBFR.
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25X1
25X1
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Attachments:
Tab A: Memorandum to Warren Rustand Concerning
Proposed Presidential Meeting with PFIAB (4422)
Tab B: Memorandum for the President Concerning PFIAB
Letter on Estimates of the Soviet Strategic Threat (4256X)
Tab C: Memorandum for the President on PFIAB Proposals
Concerning Communications Security (4257X)
Tab D: Status Report on Soviet Interception of U .5. Telephone
Communications and Staff Memoranda of 3 and 18 July 1975
(4257X)
Tab E: Excerpt from Rockefeller Commission Report Concerning
"Foreign Invasion of United States Privacy"
Tab F:? Washington Star Article, June 8, 1975
Tab G: Rockefeller and Murphy Commission Recommendations
Concerning PFIAB
Tab H: Current Membership of PFIAB
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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IIP
STATUS REPORT ON SOVIET INTERCEPTION OF U. S.
TELEPHONE C OlvIMUNICATIONS
Background
NSA has been keeping PFIAB (particularly Bill Baker) fully
informed about the extent of the Soviet telephone intercept problem
and our remedial plans and actions. (It also seems that NSA has
been bringing its complaints to Baker about lack of sufficient authority
and funds.)
The following actions have been taken:
-- In response to NSDM 266, certain sensitive government
telecommunications circuits have been switched from micro-
wave to cable in the Washington area, and the remainder will
be switched by the end of the year. (4,800 circuits to be
switched and 4,000 others now on cable to be tagged so that
they are not inadvertently later shifted to microwave.)
-- In order to avoid public disclosure of the intercept problem
(before the Rockefeller Commission Report gratuitiously ex-
posed it), GSA completed an earlier initiated acquisition of
some new microwave circuits from Washington to New York,
but will leave this capacity underused.
? A study on longer term solutions, including dealing with other
parts of the U.S. also under intercept surveillance, was prepared
by Don/NSA and submitted in January?leading to NSDM 296.
The key proposals were:
.. For the long term, the DoD recommends establishment of
Protected Communications Zone (PCZs) which would envelop
all Soviet/Bloc installations of concern in major cities and
within which all communications would be confined to cable
or encrypted microwave. The concept would minimize
opportunities for intercept of both government and major
private firm communications. While not of concern indivi-
dually, bulk communications by major defense, financial,
and legal firms, for example, could reveal information
damaging to US national security if collected and analyzed
In the aggregate. The concept would initially be implemented
In Washington, but eventually could be applied in other cities
of concern, e.g., New York, Chicago, San Francisco, etc.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Also?proposed is an Exedutive Secure Voice Network (ESVN)
program involving accelerated development and acquisition of
several hundred secure voice terminals which are operable
over standard telephone lines. By avoiding high circuit
leasing costs and installation delays associated with current
secure equipment, ESVN would permit rapid installation and
relocation of secure terminals so that high level government
officials (and key private consultants) could be readily equipped
with secure communications at any location.
The R & Don the technology to support the above proposal is
underway, and the implementation plan is being refined and
costed out. The plan is scheduled to be submitted to the
President in October. Brent has been leaning on DoD to accel-
erate the transfer of funds to NSA so that the work can quickly
proceed.
-- A small interagency oversight committee is being established in
the NSC to monitor the work on this problem and to be a coordi-
nating mechanism. NSA, DoD, and OTP will be represented,
and two or three of our technical consultants will participate.
(Some of them are meeting today-- August 7).
The proposed approach to this problem is reasonable and commen-
surate with the threat. As you requested, we have discussed the plans
and actions with Bill Baker to be sure that he is in basic agreement--
although we are somewhat limited in obtaining his approval in detail by
his AT&T affiliation (and possible conflict of interest).
PFIAB's Concerns
?
In June, Baker received an updated NSA briefing which considerably
Increased his concern that the intercept problem is potentially more severe
and widespread than-previously realized. Also, believes DoD is hampering
NSA's attack on the problem by bureaucratic and funding restrictions. As
a result, PFIAB wrote to the President recommending that (1) a White House
oversight committee be formed, (2) NSA (rather than the DoD) be given the
direct responsibility to tackle the problem, and (3) some $8 million be
immediately made available to NSA from DDR&E.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
We have acted on (l) by establishing an NSC advisory committee,
have made progress (but have not yet been fully successful) regarding
(3), and have urged Baker to defer pressing on (2) until there is a
chance to see if the other steps can solve NSA's problem. (Having the
President give direct responsibility to a subordinate organization in
Dot) has obvious problems connected with it.)
We are not sure if Baker is now satisfied (or mollified) or how
he will express himself at your lunch with PFIAB. ?The best approach
with him is to share his concerns regarding the problem, to note the
progress that has been made toward a solution, to indicate that the
Board's June proposals were reviewed by the President and certain
responses initiated, and to continue to value his and the Board's advice.
TOP SECRET/SENSITTVE
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Is4LNIORANDIJ Islip A lipuN - 457-X (Add-on In)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CTS*44M1' ISM
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE. July 18, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROb'T
'ROM: DAVID ELLIOTT(1.-.:-:-V-*
- -
RICHARD OBER
SUBJECT: Follow-up Actions Regarding
Secure Telephone Communications
We suggested in our earlier memorandum (Tab A) that there were
certain actions you might take that should satisfy many of PFIAB's
concerns regarding the telephone security problem, as stated in their
letter to the President (Tab B). Reviewing our recommendations, we
propose the following actions:
1. The most urgent matter is getting DOD to transfer $8 million to NSA
to begin the development work on certain technical systems required
under NSDM 296. We recommend that you call Wickham again and
request that Curry release the money withbut conditions. attached to it.
We have found that DOD still seems to be playing games. They are
proposing that NSA proceed to spend on the assumption that DOD will
transfer $8 million from its FY 76 budget. But they are also say-lag
.that if their R&D budget is cut by Congress, DOD may have to re-.
evaluate whether it can, in fact, make all of the funds available.
2. We continue to think it advisable to establish an NSC advisory panel,
using NSC consultants (possibly supplemented by one or two new ?
consultants relevant to this problem) and including NSA, OTP and DOD
as membersito provide a focal point in addressing the telephone
security problem.. The panel would be a forum for exchange of
information aid views, and the airing of differences. NSA could get
its future concerns on the table and hopefully resolved.
As you see from PFIA.B's letgerf they want the President to bypass DOD
and vest NSA with special authority to deal with the security problem.
This still seems like a bad idea to us and we hope to pull the teeth on
this idea by giving NSA a direct position in our advisory process.
3. We do, as before, think that the PFIAB idea of instituting a compre-
hensive program to assess the intelligence losses resulting from
communications insecurities is a difficult proposal to irnpleTnent. It
TOP SFCRET/SENSITIVIVXGDS
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4.
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TOP SECRE IliWNS IT IV E
would put NSA in a position of listening to telephone conversations
within the US in order to ascertain what the Soviets .e.re hearing.
Before approving such a surveillance and evaluation program, we
propose that you meet with General Allen, Philip Buchen and possibly
the Attorney General to consider the ramification of such action.
.?
..?--
. PFIAB also recommended that plans be developed to maintain a
?
sense of communications discipline within the Government in order to
reduce Soviet intelligence gains. As you know, maintaining vigilance
on a long run is difficult, but we can look at the question. There may be
some measures that are practicable and. have some promise of success.
In summary, we believe there are several actions that can be taken to
address the concerns and recommendations of PrIAB, and that they can be
implemented by you without further recourse to the President; although, the
ultimate decision to institute a program to evaluate what the Soviets are
learning from their intercept will require Presidential approval.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That, you call Wickharri and request that DDR&E transfer to NSA the
$8 million being sought without any qualifications or strings.
2. That you approve the establishment of an NSC advisory panel, using
our technical consultants (possibly augmented by one or two new
consultants) and with participation by NSA, OTP and DOD, to provide
a focal point in addressing the telephone security problem.
DISAPPROVE
hat if you feel the intelligence evaluation recommended by PFIAB
should be considered, that you meet with Philip Bucher/ and General
Allen to discuss the question.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE
Arrange such a meeting
V
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TOP alEcRrT/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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A cipbN 4257X add on
MEMORANDUM?
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE L12-3, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:. GENERAL SCOWCROFT
" FROM; DAVID ELLIOTT ?(4. .
? RICHARD OBER
SUBJECT: PFIAB's Letter to tlie President
Regarding Secure Telephone Communication
-414/47 7d
Admiral Anderson has communicated PFIAB's view to the President
regarding the implementation of NSDM 296 secure U.S. telephone
communications against Soviet-interception -- and you forwarded the
letter to the President (Tab A). PFIAB recorrunended that NSA be
given independent authority to attack this problem, that a small
industry/government oversight committee formed in the White House,
and that an assessment be made of what the Soviets are learning from
their intercepts and the implication of their choice of targets.
*
We have explored the nature of the concern behind PFIABIs letter and
believe it relates, by and large, to an NSA view that (.1) the problem is
greater than first thought and (2) the funding of the counter measures
directed by the NSDM is being held up by 13OD
.?
Bill Baker asks urgently that, through Wickham, you request Mal Curi-y
to release $8M without delay to NSA for development work, and that DOD
not make further funding a battle.
As far as hiving the President by-pass DOD and vest NSA with special autlaori
this seems questionable and irregular. This proposal is best overlooked,
-
at lest for the time being. ?
?
The idea of an oversight committee has merit and we have informally
contacted Ed David who has agreed to chair, a small group for the NSC.
Regarding the idea of assessing the implication of what the Soviets are ?
learning, such an effort has been proceeding cautiously in NSA with
periodic reporting to you. You are well aware of the dilemma we face
in developing a comprehensive program to evaluate in detail the subject
matter being obtained by the Soviets on American individuals and organi-
zations, both public and private. Recent publicity and the Senate Select
Committee investigation are added complications.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIV....,
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Before any formal program is undex:taken, we recommend that we consult
with General Allen and Philip Buchen to prepare recommendations for the
President's consideration.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you call Wickham and ask that Curry relea-se.SSM to NSA for
their work on telephone security.
2. That we arrange a meeting with General Allen, Phil Buchen; .and you
? to discuss the proposal for assessing intelligence losses.
Approve and I will call Wickham Visapprove, see me
.TOP SECRET iSENS/TiVE
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Report to the President lithe
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
Excerpt from Chapter 2 "The Need for Intelligence"
Foreign Invasions of United States Privacy
This Commission is devoted to analyzing the domestic activities of
the CIA in the interest of protecting the privacy and security rights
of American citizens. But we cannot ignore the invasion of the privacy
sad security rights of Americans by fors,ign countries or their agents.
This is the other side of the coin?and it merits attention here in the
interest of perspective. ?
Witnesses with responsibilities for cOunterintelligence have told the
COMMIS. Si= that the United States remains the principal intelligence
target of the c4mmunist bloc. ?
The communists invest large sums of money, personnel and sophis-
ticated technology in collecting information?within the United
'-States--on mir military capabilities, our weapons systems, our defense
structure andour social divisions. The communists seek to penetrate
our intelligence services, to compromise our law enforcement agen-
cies and to recruit as their agents United States citizens holding sensi-
tive government and industry jobs. In addition, it is a common prac-
. Ike in communist bloc countries to inspect and open mail coming from
'et going to the United States.
In an open society such as ours, the intelligence opportunities for
oar adversaries are immeasurably greater than they are for us in their
."closed societies. Our society must remain an open one, with our tradi-
tional freedoms unimpaired. But when the intelligence activities of
other countries are flourishing in the free environment we afford them,
ikt is all the more essential that the foreign intelligence activities of
Ahe CIA and our other intelligence agencies, as well as the domestic
counterintelligence activities of the FBI, be given the support neces-
sary to protect our national security and to shield the privacy and
rights of American citizens from foreign intrusion.
The Conunission has reeci?Ta ostititutes the. communist bloc intel-
ligence forces currently number well over 500,000 worldwide.
The number of communist government officials in the United States
Ms tripled since 1900, and is still increasing. Nearly 2,000 of them are
noir in this country?and a significant. ivrceutage of them have been
identified as members of intelligence or security agencies. Conserva-
tive estimates for the number of unidentified intelligence officers
among the remaining officials raise the level to over 40 percent. .
bl.addition to sending increasing numbers of their citizens to this
country openly, many of whom laa.i.e been trained in espionage, com-
munist bloc countries also place considerable emphasis on. the train-
ing. provision of false identification and dispatching of "illegal"
agents?that is, operatives for whom an alias identity has been sys-
tematically developed which enables them to live in the United States
as American citizens or resident aliens without our knowledge of their
true origins.
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While making large-scale use of human intelligence sources, the
communist countries also appear to have developed electronic collec-
tion of intelligence to an extram-dinstry degree of technology and
sophistication for. use in the United States and elsewhere throughout
the world, and we believe that these countries can monitor and record
thousands of private telephone conversations. Americans have a right
to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed at the real possibility that their
personal and business activities which they discuss freely over .the
telephone could be recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.
This raises the real specter that selected American users of telephones
are Potentially subject to blackmail that can seriously affect their
actions, or even lead in some cases to recruitment as espionage agents.
? r
?
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"""-- ma`r to II to kf y ALi I Ai Ma'
1 0 107 5
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(1.7'4111 fon 7-? Yr* t "f , B?
,1* WU.. .740 72 Za La- JION
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Hy lattles Deakin
speciai elowssiiiogion star
With space satellites or antennae
on top of the Soviet Embassy here,
Russian technicians are believed to
be monitoring thousands of long-dis-
tance telephone calls in the United
States each year.
U.S. intelligence agencies are be-
lieved to be daing the same thing in
Russia. especially in the field Of mili-
tary communications. But U.S.. obit-
ly to listen in on Russian telephone
James Deakin is a corresponucot of
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
traffic may be limited by the fact
that the Soviet telephone system is
less sophisticated.
In addition, a former State Depart-
ment official charges that the Na-
tional Security Agency is monitoring
the overseas telephone calls and
cables of many American citizens.
THESE ANO other aspects of
U.S.-Soviet telephone surveillance
were described this week after the
Rockefeller Commission lifted the lid
slightly on the secret world of &ice-
, tronic espionage in its report on the
CIA.
The Senate committee headed by
Sen. Frank Church. D-Idaho, plans
to qnestion officials of the CIA and
the FBI about the Soviet monitoring,
it was learned.
In its report on the CIA. the
commission headed by Vice Presi-
dent Nelson A. Rockefeller stated
that "Communist countries...appear
to have developed electronic collec-
tion of intelligence to an extraordi-
nary degree of technology and
sophistication for use in the United
States and elsewhere throughout the
World. ."
The commission said it believed
that "these countries can monitor
and record thousands of private tele-
phone conversations."
? Government sources said that
these statements in the Rockefeller
report referred to monitoring of
long-distanee telephone calls trans-
mitted within the United States by
,so-called microwave relays.
ALTHOUGH THE report referred
to "Communist countries," in the
plural, pvernment sources made it
clear that Russia was believed to be
the only Communist nation with the
ability to monitor such calls within
the United States.
"Only a highly industrialized,
computerized nation can do this." the
sources said. They drew attention to
what they said was a "concerted ef-
fort" by Russia to purchase Ameri-
can computer technology "and an
equally concerted effort by the U.S.
to prevent them from buying it."
As described by government offi-
cials, the monitoring of long-dis-
tance calls consists of picking up the
calls as they are transmitted be-
tween microwave stations. In the
United States, these stations are
about 20 to 25 miles apart.
About 70 percent of the
long-distance calls in the
United States are transmit-
ted by microwave relays, a
spokesman for the Ameri-
can Telephone and Tele-
graph Co. said. The
remainder are transmitted
by underground cables or
old-fashioned telephone
wires on poles.
TO PICK UP calls be-
etween microwave stations.-
the intercepting antenna
must be in the "line of
sight" between the stations,
government sources said.
Microwave signals can be
transmitted only in a "line
of sight." meaning that
there are no obstructions
such as mills or tall build-
ing in the way.
Government sources said
Russian agents could inter-
cept long-distance cable
calls with a high antenna on
the roof of the Soviet
embassy here. Computers
then would separate out the
bundles of calls in each mi-
crowave relay.
"Why do you think the
Russians are so anxious. to
build their new embassy on
the Mt. Alto site?" a gov-
ernment source said. "it is
a much higher elevation
than the site of the present
-embassy and would give
- them a much better line of
sight for intercepting mi-
crowaverelays.
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The Soviet gmernrnei
has been negotiating fc
several years to build a ne
embassy on the site of tt
old Mt. Alto Veterar
Hospital on Wisconsin Av
nue. This is one of the higl
est elevations in the Di
trict.
THE ROOF of Um
present Soviet Embassy. on
16th Street, is festoonei
with aerials. This has lei
U.S. intelligence agencie
to conclude tht the embassd
has the ability to monito
many types of communica
tions within this country
John D. Marks. a forme
State Department inteili
gence officer, said. ,
Marks, however, believe
that a high antenna on th
roof of the Soviet erribasv,
would have only a lirnite
capacity to intercep
microwave-relayed long
distaiice calls and that Rim
sia more likely is using on
or more fixed space sate
lites to do most of its rnoni
t"i"llifgYou just visualize tit
line of sight from one mi
crowave tower to anothei
at some point it goes int
outer space," Marks said
You just put your satellit
there, in a fixed positior
and pick up the relays." _
BECAUSE MOST 10c1!
telephone calls within a cit
or a metropolitan aea at
transmitted by 'Index
ground cables or teiephon
wires on poles, it is believe
that most of the Russia
monitoring involves long
distance calls. ?
The Russian civilian tek
phone system does not us
microwave relays to the ca
tent that the U.S. system
does, government source
said. As a result? they
the U.S. intelligence ager
VAX&
??? I. 1n./e
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"The New }sty Lane. . cont.
LATE EffrFrION
'
'Cies may not be able to
Intercept Russian long-dis-
tance calls to the same ex-
tent.
"But I can give you a
categorical assurance that
we are reading Soviet mi-
crowave communications,
especially military corn-
mtmications," Marks said.
_"But we are not necessarily
doing this from the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow. ?
Not only is the United
States doing the same thing
with Russian microwave
relays, but "I have personal
IrnOwledge from my own
. State Department career
' *that the National Security
- Agency has been monitor-
ing overseas telephone calls
? and cables by American
, citizens." Marks said.
MARKS DREW attention
to a paragraph in the
? Rockefeller Commission
eport That said that the
:CIA had "received rnateri-
as from an international
- Communications activity of
.another agency of the goy-
-, erntrient. ' as part of
:,,Operation Chaos.
Operation Chaos was a
secret CIA investigative
-/ and surveillaace program
? .that tried =successfully to
prove that anti-war and
civil rights groups in the
. United States were being
directed and financed by?
.. foreign elements.
The Rockefeller report
said that the CIA, as part of
Operation Chaos, "furnish-
ed a watch list of names to
the other agency and re-
cei3ed a total of aproxi-
mately 1,100 pages of
materials..."
Marks identified the
other agency as the NSA.
The material apparently
consisted of transcripts of
overseas telephone calls.
' cables and oter communi-
cations by U.S. citizens.
"The materials concern-
? ed for the most part anti-
war activities, travel to
international peace confer-
ences and movements of
members of various dissi-
dent groups," the Rockefel-
ler report said.
, ALTHOUGH THE report
said that the furnishing of
material to the CIA stopped
? when Operation Chaos was
terminated in March 1974, ?
Marks pointed out that the
report did not say that the
surveillance of overseas
communications by the
NSA had stopped.
Government sources said
. that the section of the
Rockefeller report dealing
with Soviet monitoring of
? calls in the United States
was written by. Rockefeller
himself. They said the vice
president wanted she
material included in the re-
port. apparently as a justi-
fication for similar CIA ac-
tivities.
"There was some intense
feeling within the commis-
sion that it (the material on
t Russsian monitoring) had
no place in the report, be-
cause it was felt that the
t commission's mandate was
, to look into the CIA and not
Into the KGB (the Soviet
? Intelligence Agency)." the
? r. sources said.
They said Rockefeller's
view prevailed, although
the. section was shortened
? because of opposition from
other members or staff per-
sonnel of the commission.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8
Rockefeller and Murphy Commission Recommendations Concerning PFIAB
A strengthened PFIAB is recommended by both the Rockefeller and
Murphy Commission Reports. Their specific recommendations, along
with summaries of the Executive department and agency responses,
are attached. The degree of change in, and the final responsibilities
of PFIAB are envisioned somewhat differently by the two Commissions.
The Rockefeller Commission Report, dated June 6, 1975, recommends
the expansion of PFIAB's functions to include oversight of CIA with
specific responsibility for monitoring CIA's compliance with statutory
authority, assessing the quality of CIA's management, organization
and foreign intelligence activities, and making recommendations as
a result of such oversight to the President and the DCI and, where
appropriate, to the Attorney General. This recommendation would
also authorize PFIAB to audit and investigate CIA expenditures and.
activities
activities at its own initiative. The Rockefeller Commission suggests
that the Board be headed by a full-time Chairman and have a full-time
staff appropriate in size to its increased role. The DCI concurs with
this recommendation. Treasury agrees in principal, but is against an
increase in staff size. State and Defense do not agree with expanding
PFIAB's role to the degree recommended.
The Murphy Commission Report, dated June 27, 1975, sees PFIAB in
two roles: the principal source of advice on intelligence to the President
independent a the DCI, and the external and independent oversight
body for the foreign intelligence community. In citing the latter role,
the report notes favorably the recommendations of the Rockefeller
Commission Report. The specific Murphy Commission recommendation
is more bland, calling for each Presid4nt to review and make necessary
changes in PFIAB's membership and to make himself directly available
to the PFIAB Chairman. The recommendation also suggests that the PFIAB
staff be increased in size and its members drawn, in part, from outside
the Intelligence Community. The DCI and Defense concur with the specific
points listed in the recommendation, while Treasury feels that the creation
of a large staff should be avoided.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8
11,
Rockefeller Commission
RECOMMENDATION (5)
a. The functions of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory.
Board should be expanded to include oversight of the CIA. This
expanded oversight board should be composed of distinguished citizens
with varying backgrounds and experience. It should be headed by a
full-time chairman and should have a full-time staff appropriate to its
role. Its functions related to the CIA should include:
I. Assessing compliance by the CIA with its statutory authority.
2. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence collection.
3. Assessing the quality of foreign intelligence activities.
4. Assessing the quality of the organization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the management of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with respect to the above sub-
jects to the President and the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, and, where appropriate, the Attorney General.
b. The Board should have access to all information in the CIA.
It should be authorized to audit and investigate CIA expenditures arid
activities on its own initiative.
c. The Inspector General of the CIA should be authorized to report
directly to the Board, after having notified he Director of Central
Intelligence, in cases he deems appropriate.
RESPONSE
The DCI concurs with this recommendation.
State wonders whether a part-time board, even with a full-time staff,
is capable of fulfilling all the recommended tasks listed in the Report.
The Board would inevitably become a large bureaucracy and, to some
degree, a substitute for the NSC Staff. Moreover, the Report leaves
unclear whether it will monitor activities currently performed by the
40 Committee of the NSCIC. In addition, there is a risk the PFIAB
would become an intermediary between the CIA Director and President.
There should be a more precise definition of the Board's responsibilities
andiunctions, lest the new function of oversight with respect to domestic
actiwides be subsumed in a variety of other tasks.
Defenneenotes this recommendation would place the PFIAB in direct
competition with the statutory members of the NSC, OMB and Congres-
sionatemersieit zommittees . The members of the NSC are in the best
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8
IIP
position to assess the quality of the intelligence collected and produced
by the CIA. The PFIAB should retain flexibility in its charter so that it
can be used by the President for ad hoc projects and oversight functions.
The President currently has sufficient authority to utilize the Board in
a broader oversight fashion if he so chooses.
Treasury concurs in the recommendation noting that an Advisory Board
consisting of distinguished citizens could help reassure the President,
public and Congress of the integrity and quality of our intelligence
operations. Secretary Simon recommends that George Shultz be appointed
Chairman of the Advisory Board. Because of its additional responsibilities
the Board would have to meet more frequently than it has in the past. The
reporting relation between the Inspector General and the Board should
be strengthened and formalized and an important working relationship should
? be developed between the FLAB and the CIA General Counsel. The Board
would continute to draw on the views of other departments and agencies con-
cerned with intelligence activities. The Board would also have access to
reports and recommendations made by the Joint Congressional Committee.
Thus, it would be unnecessarily duplicative to build up a large staff to
perform investigatory functions although a small permanent staff or secre-
tariat definitely would be essential.
No comment from Justice.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8
Murphy Commission
RECOMMENDATION (48)
In order to best utilize the PFIAB:
each incoming President should review and make such
changes in PFIAB's membership as may be required to
give him high personal confidence in that body's values
and judgement; that
he make himself directly available to the Chairman of
PFIAB upon the latter's request; and that
-- the PFIAB staff should be increased in size, and drawn
in part from sources outside the intelligence community.
RESPONSE
The DCI and Defense concur with this recommendation.
Treasury, while generally favoring this recommendation, feels that
the creation of .a large staff should be avoided.
No comments fro
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?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8 ?
E:WIMTE HOUSE. IP -?
WASPUNGTON
.?. ? .
T'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ANDERSON, GEORGE W. JR. 4.? Appointed by President Nixon ."
on May 1, 1970 to replace General Maxwell Taylor as PFIAB
Chairman; former Chief of Naval Operations; former U. S.
Ambassador to Portugal; presently director of several large
corporations.
BAKER, WILLIAM 0. -- Originally appointed to the Board by
President Eisenhower. and reappointed by each succeeding
President; currently President, Bell Telephone Laboratories,
incorporated; member of the National Academy of Sciences and
numerous other governmental and quasi-governmental boards
and commissions.
C E.RNE, LEO - Noted Economist; presently Executive Director
of the Research Institute of America, incorporated; member
of the United States Advisory Commission on International
Educational and Cultural Affairs; member of the Board of
Advisors of the Industrial College-of the Armed Forces, and
numerous other boards and commissions.
OSTER, JOHN S., JR. -- Physicist; presently Vice President for
Energy Research and Development, TRW, Incorporated; former
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of
Defense; and former Director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
'and Associate Director of Berkeley Laboratory.
GALVIN, RQBFRTW, Chief Executive Officer of
,Motorola, Incorporatedf-DirectDr of Harris Trust and Savings
Bank; Director and past President of the Electronic Industries
Association; and former member of the President's Commission
on International Trade and Investment.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8
No Objection to Decii'ssification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-456-4-3-8 ??:
111P IP
GRAY, GORDON ? Publisher; Director of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company and several other large corporations; former Secretary
of the Army, Special Assistant to the President (Eisenhower)
for National Security Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs), Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization; former Chancellor and President of the University
of North Carolina.
LAND, EDWIN H. -- Inventor of the Land Polaroid camera; presently
Board Chairman and President of Polaroid Corporation; member
of the National Academy of Sciences and numerous other similar
,groups.
"LUCE, CLARE BOOTHE -- Novelist and Playwright; former U. S.
Ambassador to Italy, and Congresswoman from Connecticut;
presently member of the White House Preservation Committee,
the Academy of Political Science, the American Institute for
Foreign Trade, and numerous other boards and commissions.
SHULTZ, GEORGE P. -- Former Secretary of the Treasury and
Assistant to the President (1972-74), Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (1970-72), ind Secretary of Labor
(1969-70); economist; educator; member American Economic
Association, National Academy of Arbitrators, Industrial
Relations Research Association; presently Executive-Vie*
President of Bechtel Corporation.
?
TELLER, EDWARD -- Physicist who played a major role in the
development of the first atomic bomb, and has made important
contributions in the fields of chemical physics, molecular physics,
nuclear,physics_axi.d guanturn theory. He has been associated
with th*17niversity OrCzaifarcria-446at- et..1435Z, where he currently
holds the position of University Professor of Physics and
Associate Director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.
BYERS, WHEATON B? ? Executive Secretary of the Board.
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