TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 16, 1971
• Content Type: MISC

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Introduction
TALKING POINTS
DOS, OSD Reviews
Completed.
- - It is good to see you again. I have a few matters, some of which
are technical, that I wish to discuss with you for transmittal to
Peking.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union
-- Prime Minister Chou En-lai will recall our discussions on this
subject.
-- In the last few weeks we have made good progress in two
negotiations:
Measures to lessen the chance of accidental nuclear war,
which is a rather technical area that has been discussed in
the SALT talks.
Berlin, which involves the British and French as well as
the Russians,
Accidental War
-- The main provisions of the agreement which we are close to
concluding with the Russians are as follows:
Each side will improve its organizational and technical arrange-
ments to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons under its control.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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The parties will notif each other immediately in the event
of an accidental or unauthorized incident involving possible
detonation of a nuclear weapon which could risk the outbreak
of nuclear war. CThe party whose nuclear weapon is involved
will seek to neutralize it without its causing darnage.7
? The parties will notify each other immediately in the event of
detecting unidentified.objects for interference, with warning.
war between the two countries;,.ate Peach party will noti# the
systernslif such occurrences could create the risk of nuclear
other in advance of any missile launches which will extend
beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party.
? Each party in other situations involving unexplained nuclear
incidents will act so as to lessen the chance of misinterpretation
by the other party.
These are the principal provisions (full text at Tab A).
-- For the information of the PRC, and as I told the Prime Minister,
we have been scrupulous in keeping out of this agreement.any
phrases that refer to third countries. Specifically:
? we have rejected the idea of an accession clause or any reference
to third country accession; and
` we changed language which the other side proposed that would
have suggested reporting to each other on the nuclear activities
of third countries.
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-- We have taken these positions because we do not wish to have
it appear that we and the Russians are making joint moves with
respect to others. We believe the agreement as now drafted
will in fact reduce the risks of accidental nuclear war and is
carefully phrased so that it cannot be construed as being directed
against third countries.
As I made clear, in .'eking,. we are p,pared to sign the same type
rrv'~ n
- of agreement with the PRC if it is interested.
v
Ion Berlin
/yt "
--- (Give rundown of these negotiations. j
Meeting with. Soviet Leaders
-- When I was in Peking I explained the prospects for a meeting
between the President and Soviet leaders.
-- Assuming we reach final agreement in the accidental war and
Berlin areas in the near future, we shall move to make a public
announcement about a Presidential visit to the Soviet Union.
Such an announcement could come as early as within a few weeks'
but as we have made clear consistently, the meeting itself would
take place after the President's visit to China.
-- We will continue to keep the PRC informed of any developm, exits
on this subject, and specifically, will give you advance warning
of the public announcement.
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-- Naturally, the President when he is in Peking, and I during
my advance visit, will be prepared to discuss fully all issues
relating to a possible meeting with the Soviet leaders.
'isitors to the U.S.
-- The President has agreed to meet briefly with the Emperor
of Japan when he stops over in Anchorage, Alaska on
Several months ago, prior to my visit to Peking, we extended
an invitation to Prime Minister Gandhi of India to visit the
United States. This invitation i~s" still outstaiiding',' but if she
accepts, the visit will take place around November 9, 1971.
September 2k on his way to Europe. This was preferred to
a more extensive official visit. This meeting is still closely
held, but we expect that it will be announced later this week.
South Asia
-- As I said in my communication to you last week, we thought it
would be useful to explain how we see the situation in the South
Asian subcontinent and how we are approaching it.
-- First of all, as I emphasized to the Prime Minister, we are
making it emphatically clear to the parties concerned that we
are strongly opposed to military actions. We are using our
influence with both sides to keep hostilities from breaking out.
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I f C ' Because of humanitarian concerns and other factors in the
- If either side were to launch an attack, we would almost certainly
cut off our aid to it.
In addition to our trying to help prevent a war, our other major
concern is humanitarian. We are making substantial efforts to
help relieve the misery of the people both in East Pakistan and
India.
n. pursuing t1 is objective, -we are trying to separate the humani- .
tarian and relief aspects on the one hand from the arms supply
and political issues on the other.
IAT
I
-
-,
political. affairs, and will instead focus our energies on helpii.;
to create conditions that will reduce tensions and alleviate
suffering.
If these objectives are to be met, clearly both India and Pakistan
will have to make some difficult moves.
W -
TlIT, f'c ri c' T] T~ "T'" / 0 TT TTC T T` T'C T T. / T'T TT C IT`G T "Z7 T:'t7 T`C l1 TT T YT
L~ domestic pressures on the arms supply question and other
issues.
LI I ^n . influence with India, a country which has received more economic
(, -- In addition to our close ties with Pakistan, we still retain some
N~
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rv6. aid from us than any other.
v anr~~tivb? -7vK
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
- - In this volatile situation, we believe it is important for us to try
and maintain communications and influence with both sides.
We would be interested in the Chinese views on this situation and,
if they care to comment, on the implications of the Soviet-Indian
Treaty of Friendship.
The President's Trip to Pekin
would like to set a date for the President's visit, and would
welcome the views of the PRC on this matter.
-- The most convenient time from our standpoint would be for the
President to arrive in Peking on February 21, 1972. Our
ct"
second preference would be March 15, 1972.
- - We believe that the visit should be up to seven days.
Kissinger Trip to Peking
-- The PRC has suggested the latter part of October. I would like
to go to Peking as close to October 15 as is convenient for the
PL I PRC, because President Tito of Yugoslavia is visiting the U.S.
vv on October 28. We would appreciate your Government's views.
V
t--- I am planning to stop overnight in Hawaii and come to China via
Guam. I will be using a Presidential airplane which I assume
will be going on to Peking after first landing in Shanghai
(presumably to take on a Chinese navigator).
,Y" / u Jf/ r' ~~ r Il
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OW
PRC Public Statements.
GSV ML
I think that we would need perhaps up to four days to continue
our policy discussions and prepare for the subsequent visit by
the President.
We have been carefully restraining official speculation and
substantive comment on the forthcoming Presidential visit to
_Feki.ng.
-- We have understood the reasons for some Chinese commentaries,
but we believe that now we have passed through the initial period,
it would be helpful if such commentaries could subside somewhat.
- We think this would. he in our rni.itua.l interest. To take just
one example, we shall, of course, stick to the understandings
on the Taiwan Independence Movement that I outlined to the
Prime Minister. But if too much attention is focussed on
this question, it could develop into a major public issue when
it. need not be one.
Ambassador Huang Hua
-- I have a brief note to Ambassador Huang Hua welcoming him to
the North American Continent which I would appreciate your
forwarding to him. My letter to him is merely a courtesy and
indicates how I could be reached if necessary (Tab B).
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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- You, of course, will remain the sole official channel to your
Government, and that is why I am sending this letter through you.
-- In case of unforeseen circumstances requiring emergency
communication, it might be useful for the PRC to designate
someone we could contact quickly in case we could not get through
to you right away.
? 'Becaus,e Qf; aas pro2ini-ity.;'~ A, b .s6ado'i,,Huang 3-Jud,'s eiiied a
logical choice, but we will of course abide by the preference of
the PRC on this matter.
Lend Lease
_- While in Peking I promised to provide the Prime Minister with the
amount of our Lend Lease aid during the 1940's. We have
checked the figures - our assistance totaled $48.4 billion through
March 31, 1948 when the program ended. (About 1. /4 of this
went to the Soviet Union. )
- I would appreciate your forwarding this information to the
Prime Minister.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22 : LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22: LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
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 MEMORANDUM
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W1NA11U1NA1~ bnUULC.11 Y lIUU1NLW
SECRET
For Mr. Kissinger
The Soviets raised accession clause last April, and were,told not to make
a formal proposal. They have not returned to it. If they do our delegation
is instructed to reject it (Tab B).
Full text as now agreed (Tab A).
Original proposition from the Soviets was as follows:
or request information when, in its view, this is warranted by the interests
of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. "
weapons in, such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being
misinterpreted by the other side. Each Party may inforn-i the other side
"Each Party undertakes to act in all other situa.tl'ons inv-olvix'ng nuclear
More relevant to China problem..is Soviet proposal of July 1.970 for agree-
it
i -I.ent for ]o7. ;.t c7 coon against third countries in c ~.so of "provocative attack'.
We. rejected this completely.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22: LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
 R E E_ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22 : LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9 -I r,; U C L E: n r~
EAR h0k'EE:THE UN~ ('D ST AT S OF AME H I CA ANDWHE U N I ON OF SOV I (, T
t ~. 4 SOCIALIST RE?.PUSL I CS
(I : -(I-IF- UNNITEED STATE, OF AME,Fc._ICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST'
TAKING INTQ i~CCOU, ' THE tiETING CONSEQUENCES THAT NUCLEAR
WmR WOULD HAVE ALL "1 r :d:/, I: D, AND (=dECDG.N I Z I vG THE IEC1) TO
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WEAPONS UN )E R ITS CONTROL_*
EACH (r, t ' RTY J(JDFRTAI;ES TO `IA ? >NTA
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ARTICLE 3
TRE: PARTIES UI\.DERTAVF? TO '!L)TIFY EACH OTHER I1.11EDIATELY IN THE
EVENT OF DDTE-CTION :?Y MISSSIL,c: 'r1ARNIt4:, SYSTEMS OF UNIDENTIE It i)
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22: LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22: LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/03/22 : LOC-HAK-460-8-12-9
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