MY NOVEMBER 23 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HUANG HUA, PERMANENT PRC REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-9-16-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 26, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
INFORMATION
November 26, 197).
SUBJECT; My November 23 Meeting with Ambassador Huang
I ua, Permanent PRC Representative to the LIN
I met secretly with Ambassador Huang Hua, Peking's Permanent Re,presenta-
tive to the United Nations, for two hours in New York on Tuesday night,
November 23. He was accompanied by their Deputy Permanent Repre..esenta.
tive, Chen Chlu, who is also the Director of the In" o'. -cation Departnient
in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and an - ferpr eter. On our side
were Ambassador Bush, General .Hail. and Winston 7".r>??cl,
The meeting served to establish this new channel for U:'rna.t:ters as agreed.
to by both governments through our regular channel, to make arrangements
for future communication, and to begin discussions on such UN issues as
South Asia, a new Secretary-General, and the Middle East. The An al:~ .:; sa.-
d.or, whom I had met in. Peking i i July and has since been the PRC
Ambassador in Ottawa, was affable but cautious. He generally cited his
government's public statements as the approach they would take in New
York. It was abundantly clear from IHTuang's performance that the PRC
was surprised to gain admission to the UN this year, that it was not parti-
cularly enthusiastic about its entrance, and that its delegation is feeling,
its way in an unfamiliar environment.
Following are the highlights of the session
The Private Channel and Public Perforrna.nce
We confirmed our agreement with the Chinese that Huang Hua and I f--f cretly exchange views 01) relevant -major questions of principle Nvii'h-i1r
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State Dept. review completed
NLC Review
Completed.
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the scope of the work of the United. I~Taticar~s. " -"V(- will corn.:rnun:icate only
on subjects of, major importance, such, as South Asia, art. least until your
visit, when various issues may become clearer. When con nl.tatians are
necessary, we will decide on an ad tioc basis ho ww e,-Ch issue :Should be
handled between us, and e st: blisir t~nderstaric':ix~t,s which could then f::be
implemented by Ambassador Bush i.n New York. I pointed out that it was
in our rn.utual interest that we don't appear to be cooperating visil...ly, acrd
I made clear that we did not seek a groat deal of contact.
After complimenting the Ambassador on how the PRC had turned aside
requests from Democratic candidates to visit China, I emphasized the
need for restraint in public statements between, now and your visit. I said
our side would avoid. polemics, and pointed to their opc n.ing UN speech
on November 15 as fodder for domestic opponents of your China policy.
Many parties would like to derail your initiative; therefore while both
sides would clearly stand by their convictions, we both had to be alert
to this probler4a. I said that Vietnam was a particularly sensitive
subject, a pointed reference to statements corning ou.t of Peking during
North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan. Van Dong's current visit tlr x ,
South Asia.
This took up the bulk of our time. I explained our approach both gen. era.i.ly
and in the United Nations; Ambassador. Huang Hru~a, referred to their public
statements and reaffirmed PRC support for Pakistan.
I said that we knew what the Indians were up to, and I repeated our intention
to cut off assistance if they clearly launched aggression. We were aIievia.-
ting the suffering and economic dislocation of the refugees, having given
more to this effort than the rest of the world put together; we bad car zmx.rked
$250 million for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan; and we favore az
political solution of the pr?oblern and had taken many steps in this dir. ec. tion.
R.eernphasizing that we would not accept military aggression by Jndita., I
outlined w bat we were currently doing to prevent hostilities, including our
approaches to New Delhi, Moscow, and Islanlahacl, our consideration of
UN action, and our approaches to the .British and Ge. rmans.
Ambassador Huang llua, pointed to Chows statements to met, their :note-; in
the other channel, their Fore cgn tviiinister's speech during
in Peking, and their recent speech in the I)-IN as reprt ,ear,rting .l k l::ir.rf s
basic position. This ad.dr up io strong backing; of F.'akistaln, i.nclu:.rl41
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military but falls short of a commitment to send troops in
the event; of hostilities.
I outlined the type of resolution we were considering, and he said that
they would have to study it. He inquired, and I confirmed, that we would
probably at propose a Resolution but would work toward one that might
:
have a re straining; impact. He indicated the PRC's unenthusiastic resi.g-
n;_a.tio7:'n tip the prospect of Security Council. action, saying it was out of
their hands. I pointed out that it wa.s in our mutual interest not to appear
to have positions too close on this issue, thus establishing the fact that
we will have to be more evenhanded than they.
I assured hire. that we would not force the pace on this issue and would
give them, advance. information on anything tl.iat we know would occur.
My efforts to elicit more precise positions on their part were fruitless,
as he clearly was restricting himself to their public statements and to
assessing the situation as. it evolves,
Ambassador Huang asked for our assessraant of the military situation an:-id
I gave hi-in the rundown of our latest intelligence estimates.
Successor to U Thant
I said that we would take into account their views on U Thant's succE w. o ,
making it clear that I di.c:? -a of expect an answer at this time. He asked
our views, and I said that we had not made any final judgment but hat:
slight leaning toward Jacobson at this point. The only candidate we i1 =: c'.
ruled out was Herrera.
He stated that they were unfamiliar with all the candidates and were still
studying the situation. He pointed out that our official rejection of IT.. z er .
had pat them in an awkward position when they were asked about his
candidacy. I said that we would give there advance warning of any new
official positions on the various candidates that we r tight take. Ile
wondered whether there was any-thing to the suggestions that U Thant
rni.ght stay on for a, brief interim period while a successor was chosern
Ambassador Bush and I knocked clown this possibility, saying that a
decision was needed by January 1.
He raised this subject, asking in particular how it slight be treated ';bc
United Nations. I briefly 1 e ~:c?a:;.nt c?r.'1 the ;neet otiaat a;g history -- the
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bilaterals with the Soviet Union, the Four Power talks in the UN, and our
recent intermediary role. Ambassador Bush and I pointed out that no
serious discussion had really been held among the Four Powers. I
mentioned in low key that we would not be opposed to their participation
in this forum, and he emphasized that the PRC was not interested in
joining these talks.
I said. that we had hoped that negotiations would move away from discussions
of theoretical. formulations toward concrete progress, and I pointed out the
difficulties which had arisen over an interim settlement which we had
thought was important to show movement. Our immediate efforts in the
UN debate would be to prevent exacerbation of feeling on both sides, as
well as rn.ore rigid commitment by the Israelis to existing lines. I
explained, that making too absolute demands on Is rael. had the practical
tendency of making it easier for it to dig in.
Taiwan Independence Demonstrations
I preempted this subject, knowing their sensitivities and the fact that he e
had been some recent dcenironstrations around their hotel. I reaffirmed
that there was no US official involvement in these demonstrations. We
could and would not interfere in demonstrations so long as they were
legal and orderly. I pointed out that you had been the target of larger
demonstrations than. they. Ambassador Huang did not press the issue,
but pointed out that there had been increasing Taiwan independence activitic
recently in the US and in other places, such as Japan. I repeated. is?i t
I had told Chou En-.lai, namely that we would not encourage or participate
in such movements.
The meeting ended with agreement on future contacts and add3.tional
pleasantries . I repeated that we would do anything that we could. to m .J.,e
their stay in New York more comfortable.
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