YOU SHOULD SEEK AND APPOINTMENT WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1971
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
December 2, 2010
Sequence Number:
17
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 28, 1971
Content Type:
LETTER
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 28, 1971
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Dear Dick:
You should seek an appointment with the Chinese
Ambassador on Monday, November 29, 1971. At that meeting
you should hand over the enclosed note. In addition, I have
an oral message for you which I will be talking to you about.
Thanks again for your ~~nr; ,^ ~ Good work.
Sincerely,
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
Brigadier General U. S. Army
.Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Encl
Major General Vernon A. Walters
Sehxior Defense Attache
American Embassy ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Paris, France
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
1. The U. S. side would propose the following with regard
to the advance trip to make detailed arrangements for the President's visit:
-- Dates. It would be most convenient for the U. S. if the
trip could be conducted during the period from January 3 through
January 10, 1972. Alternate dates would be January 10 through 17 but
they are much less convenient.
- Locations. The group would like to visit Shanghai,
Hangchow and Peking to survey each site that the President would visit,
including residences, meeting rooms, and locations for various events.
It is estimated that the team would need about 1 1/2 days each in
Shanghai and Hange tow and Lour or live days in Peking. The best pro-
cedure might be to visit Peking first for two days, then go to Shanghai
and Hazigchow, returning to Peking to complete any unfinished business.
- Size oof 'arty. The U. S. would like to send a group of
about twenty persons in addition to the aircraft crew of some seventeen
persons. The names of these individuals in protocol order will be
forwarded to the People's Republic of China well in advance of the
agreed date for the trip. It is presently anticipated that the team
will be headed by Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., U. S.
Army, who is the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and who has Dr. Kissinger's complete confidence.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
2. As a related technical matter, there is a preliminary
action concerning the ground satellite terminal which it would be useful
to take prior to arrival of the advance party in January. The INTELSAT
Communications Satellite Committee which controls the satellites that
will relay signals from the ground satellite terminal is, meeting during
the week of December 8 and is not scheduled to meet again until
February 23. To preclude having to reconvene the group during the
intervening period, it is proposed that the Communications Satellite
Corporation (COMSAT), which manages INTELSAT, request authority
from the Committee at the December 8 meeting to approve an application
for use of satellite facilities if received at a subsequent date from the
People's Republic of China.
This action would not commit the People's Republic of
China to use these facilities, but would merely be a preliminary step to
ensure that arrangements can be made efficiently once the PRC has
determined that they are satisfactory. A formal application by the
People's Republic of China could be made after the January visit
when a detailed presentation of the facilities the U. S. recommends
and various leasing options will be made.
3. With regard to the November 20 Chinese note on the
India-Pakistan situation, President Nixon wanted Prime Minister
.;.a.,. No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3 3
Chou En-lai to be informed of the various steps that the U. S. Government
has taken in recent days, on this question.
On November 23, Dr. Kissinger, in his meeting with
Ambassador Huang Hua, exchanged views on this matter in the context
of United Nations business. This discussion included the possibility of a
UN Security Council resolution which might have .a restraining impact.
After consultation with the Pakistani government this resolution has
been strengthened. Enclosed is a copy of the kind of strengthened resolution
we are prepared to support.
On November 23, the U. S. Ambassador in New Delhi was
instructed to make a strong demarche to the Indian Government, inform-
ing it that the U. S. Government and pen-n1,- w,vo1,1r1 Mir ,,,,gip,-stand an
Indian decision to resort to war. On November 29, an even stronger
representation was made to Prime Minister Gandhi on the situation,
including our inquiry concerning India's failure to respond to the U. S.
proposal already agreed to by President Yahya that both sides pull back
their forces from the borders.
On November Z3, the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow was
instructed to urge the Soviet Government to exercise restraint on India.
On November 27, a letter from the President to Premier Kosygin
r`einfor'ced this request and warned of the consequences of continued
hostilities.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
4
On November 23, Dr. Kissinger talked to Chancellor Brandt
on behalf of the President.. Dr. Kissinger informed the Chancellor
of U. S. thinking on a possible UN Security Council resolution and
said that the U. S. would appreciate a demarche to the Indian Government
from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, urging an
end to military action.
On November 24, Dr. Kissinger informed the British
Ambassador of U. S. thinking on a 'possible UN Security Council resolution.
It was emphasized that the U. S. would leave to the Government of.
Pakistan the decision as to whether the issue should be referred to the
UN Security Council. The U. S. side asked the British to support
Pakistan in the UN or, if this proved impossible, to refrain from sup-
porting India.
On November 25, the President called Prime Minister
Heath to' express his concern over the India-Pakistan situation and the
Indian actions which have contributed to its deterioration. He told the
Prime Minister that while urging restraint in the subcontinent the U. S.
will favor Pakistan in its comments. He repeated Dr. Kissinger's
representation of the previous day.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
W.-
V
The U.. S. is now using, administrative techniques to delay
implementing economic assistance measures for India.
On November 30, the U. S. Director of the World Bank.
will warn the other directors of the adverse impact on Indian develop-
ment caused by the outbreak of war.
At the next Indian incursion, the U. S. will suspend the
shipment of arms to India (now at a very low level -- about $5 million
per year).
Other steps are under consideration, including actions
the U. S. might take if full hostilities erupt.
The U. S. is keeping the Government of Pakistan fully
informed of all steps it is taking with regard to this situation.
4. In line with the U. S. practice of informing the Prime
Minister of negotiations of possible interest, the U. S. Government
would like to inform the Government of the People's Republic of China
of the current state of our negotiations with the USSR on the subject of
incidents at sea. As a result of discussions in Moscow from October 12
to 22, 1971, both sides' delegations agreed to refer the following pro-
visions to their respective governments as the basis for an agreement:
;Both-sides will instruct commanding officers to observe
strictly the letter. and spirit of the international rules of the road.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
- Commanding officers will keep their ships far enough
apart to avoid risk of collision.
Ships engaged in surveillance operations will keep enough
distance to avoid risk of collision and to avoid endangering the ships
under surveillance.
Ships of both sides operating within sight of each, other
will show correct international signals (flag, sound and light).
Ships of both sides will not simulate attacks by aiming
their guns or other armament at a passing. ship, or by launching an
object in the direction of a passing ship.
Ships will not use their searchlights at night to 'blind'
the bridge personnel on passing ships.
-- Ships will show correct international signals when conducting
exercises with submerged submarines.
Ships will stay well clear of ships of the other side engaged
in such operations as aircraft carrier launch and recovery.
r'- .Pilots will be instructed to use the greatest prudence and
caution when approaching ships of the other side.
Pilots will be instructed to display correct navigation
lights.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
_ 7
Ships planning to conduct flight operations will be required
to give appropriate signals.
Pilots will be instructed not to make simulated attacks by
the simulated use of weapons against ships, and not to perform acrobatic
maneuvers over ships, including supersonic overflights.
- Arrangements for the mutual exchange of information
regarding collisions and other incidents at sea should be 'established.
The question of overflights should be thoroughly examined
during the next round of talks (expected to be in Washington early in
1972).
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
The Security Council,
Not in the memoranda of the Secretary General dated
July 10, 1971 and October 20, 1971 to the President of the
Security Council;
Having heard the statements of.the representatives o
India and Pakistan,
Deeply concerned that hostilities along the India-Pakistan
border could constitute an immediate threat to international
peace and security,
1) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to
take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;
Z) Calls for an immediate withdrawal of any foreign forces
present on the territory of the,other to their, own sides of the
India-Pakistan border;
.? .3) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and
others concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation
of a political climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees
to East Pakistani,.,._
4) Calls upon all states to refrain from any action that would
endanger the peace in the area;
5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to
respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General
offering good offices looking towards a peaceful resolution of the
situation in the area.
6) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security
oiincii as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-17-3