DISCUSSIONS WITH MISS WANG HAI-JUNG AND MISS T'ANG WEN-SHENG DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 3-4, 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
W
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: JONATHAN T. HOWE
SUBJECT: Discussions with Miss Wang Hai-jung and
Miss T'ang Wen-sheng during the period
December 3-4, 1971
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The following is an account of two meetings and a number of telephone
conversations with representatives of the PRC conducted over the
period December 3-4, 1971 in New York City.
First Meeting - 10:30 a.m., December 3, 1971, Roosevelt Hotel
~f3X111YY'a 1 y Ii v cc a i vvu about 15 min ites ari:ei" the ox'iginallyr
appointed hour due to cancellation of the flight on which he had
reservations. (Mr. Lord was unable to reach the Chinese side to
inform them of the delay.) He was met by Miss Wang and Miss Tang
who asked if he had run into trouble and indicated they were beginning
to think he might not be coming. They escorted him to the same room
he had been in on his previous visit, down the corridor to the left from
the elevator and almost at the end of the hall.
Miss Wang explained that the Ambassador was at a reception and
probably would not be back until late and therefore they would be glad
to receive the message and convey it to him on his return. After they
had read the message (Tab A) a discussion ensued as to how contact
might best be made the following morning. It was agreed that
Commander Howe would call the hotel room which the two women
shared (ext. 1422) at 10,00 a. m. and that Miss T`a.ng would answer
and indicate whether it was desired that Commander Howe come to
the Roosevelt Hotel. Commander Howe politely indicated that he would
be available at an earlier hour but the Chinese were adamant that
10:00 a. m. was the best time for telephoning.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
TOP SECRET /SENSSITIVE/EYES ONLY
After a relaxed conversation over tea on inconsequential subjects,
Commander Howe took leave of his hosts. Both women escorted him
to the elevator and got in saying they would go down with him. During
the ride, Commander Howe indicated that it might be best if the group
were not seen together in the lobby, and the women agreed and left
the elevator at the second floor.
II. Telephone Calls between 10:00 a. m. and 10:45 a. in. December 4, 1971
Before 10:00 a. m. Commander Howe had received a call from
Dr. Kissinger indicating that he should convey to the Chinese Ambassador
that Dr. Kissinger was under great pressure to go to the UN and had been
trying to hold off the bureaucracy. Commander Howe was to phone by
10:30 a. m. with the Chinese reaction on the UN question. A WSAG meeting
was scheduled to commence at 11:00 a. m. Subsequently, General Haig
called to say that Commander Howe should convey that the US side had
heard from the Pakistanis and the Pakistanis left to the judgment of the
United States whether to go to the Security Council. In view of this the
US felt it should proceed unless there were strong feelings to the contrary.
No one answered at 10:00 a. m. when Commander Howe called
Miss Tang; however, ' when the call was replaced a few minutes later she
was there. Miss Tang reported it was the view of the Ambassador that
the meeting on the 10th was "unnecessary at the present time. " She
indicated that there was nothing else to report so Commander Howe said
he had additional information to convey to them concerning the first topic
in the note. Miss T'ang responded that she would have to check on this and
asked if he would call back in 10 minutes.
In the intervening period Commander Howe and Dr. Kissinger agreed
that the Chinese side was saying, in so many words, that it had no reply.
He instructed Commander Howe to tell them, either in a meeting or over
the phone, if necessary, that the U. S. had heard from the Pakistanis and
they were leaving it up to American judgment as to whether to call a
Security Council meeting. Therefore, the U. S. felt it should proceed.
After several attempts to reach Miss Tang, Commander Howe again
made contact and she indicated that if he had anything written to pass on
they would accept it; however, "if it was verbal, or if he only had an
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
oral message, perhaps this could be done some other time.'' Commander
Howe said he would call back shortly. She asked if the information was
urgent and he reiterated that it concerned further developments related to the
first subject of the note and was something they would want to know. He said
he did not want to inconvenience them in any way, and offered to pass the
information over the phone if that would be easier.
Commander Howe then reported to General Haig and began putting the
oral message on paper. General Haig called back shortly, agreeing to
the text (Tab B) with the addition of the phrase "in coordination with
other powers" which lowered the U. S. profile somewhat.
Commander Howe then called Miss Tang to say that he had a written
message to deliver. She seemed surprised and asked if he would call
back in ten minutes. In assenting, he indicated that there would be no
need for a special meeting or direct reply.
At 10:45 a. m. Commander Howe called Miss T'ang again and she
said, "if you deem it necessary you can come with a message in written
form_." Commander Howe reiterated that he wished to deliver a written
message and could be there in ten minutes if that was convenient. She
asked for a call in five minutes. At 10:50 a. m. , Miss Tang said that they
would be glad to receive the written message in the usual way.
When Commander Howe called to indicate that he finally had an
appointment, Dr. Kissinger instructed him to tell them that the U. S.
side was going to call a Security Council meeting.
III. Meeting at .11:00 a .m.
Commander Howe arrived at the Roosevelt Hotel at 11:00 a. m. and
was greeted by Miss Wang and Miss Tang who escorted him to the usual.
meeting room. After they had read the hand-printed note (Tab B) and
discussed it briefly, Commander Howe added orally that the U.S. intended
to move toward a Security Council meeting. The ladies promised they would
convey the message to the Ambassador and stated they had nothing to say
at the present time. They added that if there were anything to convey they
would contact the U. S. side through the previously agreed arrangement.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
A very genial discussion then ensued, including comments on
various Eastern cities and the spreading megalopolis along the Eastern
seaboard and the President's forthcoming trip to China. Miss Wang
asked who would accompany Mrs. Nixon and Commander Howe cautioned
that anything he said on that subject would have to be totally off the record
and unofficial, but that he did not believe anything final had been decided.
He speculated, however, that there would probably not be any women
accompanying Mrs. Nixon other than the President's secretary, Miss
Woods, who had been listed in the book given to the PRC in October.
(This in fact is the current plan.) He added that there might be a few
additional security personnel. They agreed that the discussion would
be a non conversation and asked whether any of the White House security
personnel were women. With a passing reference to the Woman's
Liberation Movement in the U.S., Commander Howe indicated that in the
past couple of years a few women have been brought into the White House
security organization.
They also inquired about people on Dr. Kissinger's staff, including.
the secretaries, who would be on the President's trip. Commander. Howe
indicated that plans were not final but that it was a much sought after
assignment. In response to his inquiry, they said they thought they would
be in Peking when the President arrived. They noted that the woman who
had served as the interpreter for the technical discussions was also at
the UN and would return to Peking for the visit. Commander Howe remarked
that he thought he had seen her on the CBS television coverage of the PRC
delegation's flight from Paris to New York.
One noteworthy point developed during the discussion of New York
City. They indicated they had done some exploring and visited a number
of department stores and book stores, and also mentioned the restriction
on their movement beyond the city which required prior notification, comment-
ing that they assumed this was true in other countries as well. (Note:
Commander Howe treated this subject delicately but at some point in the
future there might be a propitious moment for Dr. Kissinger to inform them
that if they desire to travel it would be handled routinely and quietly. )
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
V
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Toward the end of the discussion, they raised the question of the
timing of the U. S. side going to the Security Council. They indicated
they assumed it might be after the weekend. Commander Howe
responded that he was unaware of the precise timing, but it was his
impression that it would be very soon. He noted casually that there
had been strong sentiment in the U. S. Government to move to the UN
immediately but that Dr. Kissinger had been holding things down. Now,
Dr. Kissinger felt the U.S. should proceed. They then confirmed that
Commander Howe had received the additional information concerning the
UN subsequent to the previous evening's meeting, and that the point
made orally about the U. S. intention to seek a meeting had been received
after the note had been written.
As Commander Howe was departing they asked him to extend their
personal regards to their friends Miss Matthews and Miss Pineau and
he reciprocated. They then dumped the candy bowl into napkins, and
presented the candy to Commander Howe for Dr. Kissinger's two
secretaries. They had earlier noted that they sometimes received
Chinese candies from their friend's in Canada. After a mild protest,
Commander Howe expressed'appreciation for this gesture. They then
escorted him to the elevator and this time did not get in.
Both Miss Wang and Miss Tang were relaxed and gracious and the
conversation was lively and extremely friendly. From this series of
encounters it appears that the Ambassador has very little leverage.
Although he obviously had not received any guidance from Peking on the
note presented the previous evening, the rejection of the December 10
invitation combined with emphasis on written communication may indicate
that Peking is having second thoughts about using this arrangement for
tete-a-tetes on UN issues.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
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pry x ,,~,~ ~~P% W (a W
1. The U. S. side wanted the Chinese side to be aware of the folio
developments. In light of the deteriorating situation in South Asia, the
United States has told Pakistan that it is prepared to take this issue to the
U. N. Security Council. Assuming the Pakistani Government favors this step,
the U. S. would plan to work toward a Security Council resolution along the
lines of the current tentative draft attached. Based on consultations with the
Pakistani Government, this draft is strengthened over the U. S. draft discussed
on November 23.
In view of the urgency of this situation, the U. S. wishes to inform the
Chinese through this channel of the measures it is currently taking. The,
State Department announced today, December 3, the U. S. decision of
December 2"to cancel all remai.nIn'g valid licenses for equipment for
India. This is in addition to the December 1 announcement that all such
future licenses for India were suspended, existing licenses would not be
renewed, and some current licenses relating to arnzz unition were canceled.
The U.S. is now reviewing all economic assistance programs to South Asia
to determine what further measures might be appropriate. It is in the
meantime holding up new disbursements.
The U. S. side proposes that as the situation in the United Nations
evolves, the U. S. and Chinese sides maintain contact through Pakistani
diploxnats. If the Chinese side. wishes to contact the U. S. side directly, the
U. S. side suggests that it first call Washington, using the procedure agreed
upon on November 23. If any American official, no r natter wh rt level, seeks
to arran e a meeting With the Chinese side, this ]:tc"tt lei not be considered
official unless it has been pre\6,ouslyco.ti.firi-ned. in Ills cli r.nn l..
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
2. In light of the pressure building up on the issue of a successor
to Secretary General U Thant, the question arises as to how the People's
Republic of China wishes to proceed. For example, there have been
informal discussions in New York looking toward a possible informal
meeting of the five permanent members of the Secretary Council.
Dr. Kissinger plans to be in New York on other business Friday,
December 10, 1971 and could arrange to see Ambassador Huang Hua
secretly if the Chinese side would like to discuss this matter as well
as any other pertinent U. N. topics, including the South Asian situation.
If the Chinese side considers an earlier meeting desirable, Dr. Kissinger
is prepared to rearrange his schedule.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
The Security Council,
Noting the memoranda of the Secretary General dated July 10,
1971 and October 20, 1971 to the President of the Security Council;
Havi.n, heard the statements of-the representatives of India
and Pakistan,
Deeply concerned that hostilities along the India--Pakistan
border could constitute an immediate threat to international peace
and security',
1) Calls upon the Governments of India and'Pakistan to take
all steps required fur an immediate cessation of hostilities;
2) Calls for an immediate withdrawal of any foreign forces
on, the territory of the other tco, their own sides of the India-Pakistan
3) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others
concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation of a political
climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;
4) Calls upon. all states to refrain from any action that would
endanger the peace in the area;
5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to respond
affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General. offering good
offices looking towards a peaceful resolution of the situation. in the area;
6) Rec ue. is the Secretary General to report to the Security
Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
~ 'y J
1. The U. S. side wanted the Chinese sick; to be aware of the following
developments. In light of the deteriorating situation in South Asia, the
United States has told Pakistan that it is prepared to take this issue to the
U. N. Security Council. Assuming the Pakistani Government favors this step,
the U. S. would plan to Work toward a Security Council resolution along the
lines of the current tentative draft. attached. Based on consultations with the
India. This is in addition to the December 1 announcement that all such
Dec~"rhr~r"7 rn all.r'c-'mai:nc-ring valid licenses for milita:L.y equipment for
Pakistani Government, this draft is strengthened over the U. S. draft discussed
on November 23.
In view of the urgency of this situation, the U.S. wishes to inform the
Chinese through this chanlnel of the measures it is currently taking. The
State Department announced today, December 3, the U. S. decision of
future licenses for India were suspended, existing licenses would not be
renewed, and some current licenses relating to ammunition were canceled.
The Ll. S. is now reviewing all economic assistance programs to South Asia
to determine what further measures might be appropriate. It is in the
meantime holding up new disbursements.
The U. S. side proposes that as the situation in the United Nations
upon on November 23. If ai,)y American official., no matter what Level., seeks
U.S. side suggests that it first call Washington, using the pr9cedu.re ar rced
diplomats. If the Chinese side wishes to contact the U.S. side directly, the
evolves, the U. S. and Chinese sides maintain contact through Pakistani
to arrange a meeting with the Chinese side, tld
should not be considered.
official unless it has been previously confirmed in t:itis clhantnel.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
In light of the pressure building; up on the issue of a successor
to Secretary General U Thant, the question arises as to how the People's
Republic of China wishes to proceed. For example, there have been
informal discussions in New York looking toward a possible informal
meeting of the five permanent members of the Secretary Council.
Dr, Kissinger plans to be in New York on other business Friday,
December 10, 1971 and could arrange to see Ambassador Huang Hua
secretly if the Chinese side would like to discuss this matter as well
as any other pertinent U. N. topics, including the South Asian situation.
If the Chinese side considers an earlier meeting desirable, Dr. Kissinger
is prepared to rearrange his schedule.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9
7
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
The Security Council,
Notin the memoranda of the Secretary General dated July 1.0,
.1971 and October Z0, 1971 to the President of the Security Council;
I?javiri heard the statements of the representatives of India
and Pakistan,
Deeply concerned that hostilities along the India--Pakistan
border could constitute an immediate threat to international peace
and security,
1) Calls upon the Governments of. India and Pakistan to take
all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;
Z) Calls for an immediate withdrawal of any foreign forces
on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan
3) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others
concerned to exert their best efforts towaxd the creation of a political
climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;
4) Calls upon all states to refrain from any action that would
endanger the peace in the area;
5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to respond
affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General offering good
offices looking towards a peaceful resolution of the situation in the area;
6) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security
Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/01 : LOC-HAK-460-9-20-9