MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN, HEAD OF THE PRC LIAISON OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, JULY 6, 1973, 11:30 A. M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
SANITIZED
COPY
FOLLOWS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
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TOP SECRET f? r'Z
' '''' , THE
r.tOMi
S 'EC
` wft , aA4oz H Chen, ;fie
of .'the
tors, Friday,
PRC ; ` + hing
Suly, 6, 1 7% 11: 0 a. m,
PLAC W The '?resiaent's Office
PA .TICl TSi
The House
Ambassador ;,,C
Dr. Henry l 's er, Assistant to thoPresident
for National Security Affairs
Chi ?Chl a*- hu (Interpreter)
The P"sWoo
13wip 'd welcomed Ambassador ,Ran Western. White House.
He told the aador that expected the OU040 be ret 'vniang in the
afternnoon. Amhwaft ua a C th aardced the ., P e ident . a d expressed
his es's M ten
NIA House to his respects. The
ado r
rye i $t told the Ambassador c drive the Amb s r
there e:P ee dent's ha "., : haste noted that looking
aacr' 's.:th . aot1jo1 realize C`b6ma is, t t ;other side,
The r pointed out that its 3. ere in ;'uly 1971 that be had
annot:ed' 's t,,te :Chita,
The Presijnt then said that he to reaffirm the matters that Dr.
KKissinger had d .scussed with the Ambassador. These assurances all had
the President's complete support :> i es one may wonder which
sass 3e thd::. resident. But. Dr.. ser tee.; r spoke-for
hi re: ne He?::al*ays reflect &: .,Pry own views.
At 's '' n ',,, conversation there? s arc, reak for picture-taking
T 0P R ' /S ITI E
EXC L Y ON
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
 @ELAS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1
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The s e ~,, ~ ed nhy sayxnga' ha e.a,wanted toe s3 '. l i e the
pos l ? s utwr~, to Premier Chou E -lai teeing the Preste
+ s wig F rs ~r. The Ambassador and the ~P er, would recall
tb*lPees e3* ?r a .me et n with Buo . , tn whey. the,,President
saad' that nr d done e n of:,.our relations;
PR C "~E rboth the sp r t this commitment,
the ;k 0
Any interpretation lbat this nuclear agreement set up
a coot o,inbited, off, doing what it required
if there attack, , user or otherwise, on third countries was inaccurate.
When , Dp Kissinger had had his press briefing o the nuclear agreement,
the President ? as a,y, an attack onthe PR C would endanger
interna a pea a mac ,. ',he President wanted this point madenot
because we Yf 3? or because -we have good, relations with the PRC
but because we had"Aeftriiiiai6d on the ':: asis ot the security inter sts of the
United States that the ,PRC should be free? indep e t ;and secure. One
could have tried to out it on the basis 4a p a 1, l ,tion p, but this was
a la, l' tens t. Vach nubts y'`had-an interest in the survival of
the other. We could sign a, piece of paper with, great fanfare and clinking
of glas sw~s.,, p' Buti a kU6 ` fro ,' istorp that "every war has started with the
breadng of a, treaty.
Ou* lnt r ts,t y n d`ahd would continue to coincide for many years
tc e, i' ctted. Theei personal discussions with the
sa~dr, le,,Y ~d ? a fornal agreement, ? represented the
policy of the United $Uteo, which ,would be Implemented without question in the years to come. We did not say things privately to the PRC and
another thing publicly to the Russians. Our interests required us to meet
withthe-Soviet leaders and find ways to agree. But we totally rejected a
condominium of the two superpowers. And we totally rejected the idea of
giving the Soviets a free hand to move against their neighbors. So the
United State s sr?o IA work hard for continuing to develop its relations with
the PRC, having mind the personal warmth which characterized this
relationship but also that our interests required that we be inseparable
on security matters.
Ambassador Haan wanted again to e p ess: his ? ppin ss to comae to the
Western White Rouses. e wpd surely report is ?Chaixman Mao and Premier
Chou En-1ai what President had. said. He would be returning to China
but he will see Dr. Kissinger again in August in Peking. The President
pointed out tbe importance we attached to taking care of our confidential
channel. ' " assador repeated ' t b ould report all this to Premier
Chou En-lai.
TOP &l Cli=/S9(=1 Z
EXCLUSIVELY EYE ONLY
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Authority '& S
t3y YAVA Date Z
E'CR?.. SITwE
AC .,U I" LY ' 1YE ONLY
The Pry n? Cambodia, .M
tbo
e se at time it was our
judgment,
VMoo,se Government held the key, through the
i sflwence e~ ~ o S no k The situation was urgent, because
if it continued to deteriorate the possibility of the conflict spreading was
real. The wax ,in South Vietnam was over, and in Laos. They were
continuing t p iz typically, tut in Cambodia the
,W 0 war was,: and the Pra.s ldent ' e y, strongly that it did not
serve our n :interes t to,,:, dr gged `into differences and even a
confrontation about Cambodia. The United States, had desire to retain
a ,special position of inluence,,c r to.,retain any , tary forces there.
Our desire was to have a government in Phnom, P "h to brig peace.
If our two countries could work i together it would,, ve a good effect not
y rMations, of our two countries but also on world opinion.
`he were many danger spots,, like the Middle Est, . The small country
of Cambodia was the only one w, ,war was going on. We therefore
felt a way must be found to settle it. The United States had no unilateral
solution, :-but.. athe.r it took the infl enc, of all interested parties.
The President then said he was not a king. fmr, an immediate comment from
the Ambassador. But the President hoped the Ambassador would convey
these ideas to Premier Chou En?li so that the US and PRC could discuss
it if it was not settled by the time Dr. Kissinger got to Peking. Axnbassado:
Huang responded that he would carefully convey the President's words to
the Premier. Fje add.,t china, too, wished for an early en, d to the
war.
TOPS +C'' ,, , " 5ENSV"I'.1;Y;F4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-10-1