YOUR VISIT TO PEKING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-6-18-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 11, 1973
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-6-18-3
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******* S E C R E T *4* ** S copy
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? CRZI48
DE RUEHCR #0510 1900940
0409302 JUL 73
Fs USLO PEKING
? TP SeCSTATE SHOC 389
?INFO AmEmBASSY BANGKOK 024
AmeMBASSY LONDON 004
? AmemBASSY MOSCOW 002
AmEMBASSY PARIS 011
AmemBASSY PHNOM PENH 002
AHEMBASSY TAIPEI 020.
? AmeNBASSY TOKYO 036 '
' MEMBASSY SAIGON 011.
,
A.MCONSOL 'HONG KONG 201
S.E R eit PEKING OB10
E.O. 11652: GDS IneLAs 12/31/79
TAGS: PfOR, CHCG
SUBJC CHOU ON CAMBODIA
' REF: HONG KONG 6045, OSLO PEKING A-8
. t, USLO AGREES WITH CONGEN HONG KONG ON RFSTRAING EXERciso ey
CHOU EN-LAI IN ,HIS BANQUET SPEECH WELCOMING SIHANNKIS RETuRN
TO PEKING (HONG KONG 1520). THIS RESTRAINT IS ALL THE MORE
NOTICEABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF SIHANOWS OWN REMARKS, WHICH R,.E
?A1.M0ST OBSESSIVE IN EXPRESSING HATRED OF THF "LON NOL CLIQU(0 AND
THE "U.S. ImPERIA1JSTS". GIVEN THE FACT THAT IN HIS mEETIN,'
WITH U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION JUST PRIOR TO THIS, RAN0uri
CHOU MENTIONED THAT'SIMANouK WOuLn BE "FIRING SOME CANNONS
.7TRAT EVENING, WE BELIEVE THAT CHOU MUST HAVE REEN INFORMED IN, ADVANCE
ABOUT WHAT SIHANOUK WAS GOING To SAY AND TEMPERED HIS REMAR,(S
' ACORDINpLY So AS TO MAINTAIN PRC FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT
To CAMBODIAN SITUATION,
.20, DESPITE THE BOMBAST OF SIHANQUKIS WORDS, WE CONSIDER T,40
'1.14ERE,,Is A MA0e0 ELEMENT OF APPEAL CONTAINED WITHIN THEM, IF
SIHANOUK, DOWNOT. FEEL THAT HIS OwN POSITION ANO THAT OF
FORM HE CLAIMS TO, LEAD ARE ALL THAT COMFORTABLE4
1:0R EXAmPLE, I$. PASSAGE OF SPEECH TEXT wE OBTAINED .
FROK GERMAN DIPLOMAT AND PRINTED IN "PEOPLels DAILym, BUT ,
* * * * * * * * * ?* *wHsR ComMENT * * * * * * * * * * *
IKENWEDY,I00,,STEARMANPSOLomON
RECALLED
$4012 PAGE 01. DR$10/14:46Z DIG:09093 2 JUL 73
,
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SECRET ** ****S CIIPV
.hi/NOT NeNA ENGLISH, HE. SAYS THAT U.S. WILL ONLY UNDERSTA,.0
THE LANGUAGE OF FORCE,: AND THAT Is wHY HE ASKS ALL HFRIENOly
,C4IMNOIES, ALL FRATERNAL COUNTRIES, AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST
OMRADES.-INA-ARmS OF THE KHMER PEOPLE TO GIVE, SEND AND ORIN4.-:
OVER AS Snow AS POSSIBLE ARMS AND PARTICULARLY AMMUNITION, Ac,AiN
AMMUNITION AND ALWAYS AMMUNITION,' TO HELP HIS :F(IRCES ?PREvET THE
EXTERMINATION OF THE KHMER COUNTRY AND PEOPLE AND HELP THEM
:AF.,6:AIN NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE". THIS RECALLS WHAT STHANOUk
TOLD CORRESPONDENT STANLEY KARNoW JUST PRIOR TO HIS DEpART110
,Fog HIS TRIP. ABROAD: ABOTH TN CHINESE AND THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE VAT) STOPPED SENDING MILITARY EQUIPMENT AFTEp
'JANUARY 27, THUSOBLIGING HIS FORCES TO RELY ON CAPTURED
WEAPONS FROM ON Not. (oSinis A-8).
^ AT ANOTHER POINT,: HE DEtLARFS THAT HIS FORCES WILL FIGH'r
I:0,INQP:!'EVEN IF THERE: ARE LEFT FOR THEM ONLY THE ARCHAIC APONS
OP
THEIR ANCESTORS IB0w$ AND ARROwS, CUTTERS, HAMmERS, AxEs,
SHOVELS, PICKS AND CUDGELS) TO 00 SP.?
WE ACCORDINGLY JUDGE THAT IF THE CHINESE, AT LEAST, HAv
'TURNED OFF THE ARMS PIPE-LINE To SIHANOUK, THEY HAVE
,NEVERTHELESS LET HIM *NON THAT THEY HAVE THEIR HANDS ON THr-
0/AVE. WE, ro,cOURSE, HAVE NO wAY OF KNOWING WHAT' HANOI'S
poSITIOW,Nlowt HE, BUT CERTAINLN ROTH HANOI AND PEKING WOlit'q
RE INCLUDED IN MANI:MIS APPEAL TO "FRATERNAL COUNTRIES" 'FfIft
/WO ASMONtTfON4
BRUCE )
ST''
TOR *1901 14146t
C B E IA*114* *S
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TOP SECRET/ T VE
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PEKING 016 (Section 1 of 2)
July 11 1973
TO: HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: DAVID BRUCE
SUBJECT: Your Visit to Ping
. Much appreclate opportunity to comment on subjects which
You might cover during Your August visit to Peking. Following
are my thoughts, which are subject to further refinement in
the period prior to your arrival as international developments
or other tactical considerations may dictate.
2. U.S. -PRC Bilateral Relations These have been progressing
very wellIvery well indeed slnce signing of Paris Agreement
despite the existence of Cambodia and Taiwan as important
issues still standing between us in the immediate sense.
The Chinese people are now becoming used to an official American
presence in Peking and to an increasing number of U.S. delegations
In China; the PRC is sending it own people to the U.S. in
growing numbers; the PRC authorities have been very responsive
to our needs in opening our Liaison Office; American businessmen
are engaging in a substantial level of trade with the PRC; and
all-in-all the Chinese leaders are making it plain that they
are Prepared to push ahead to the normalization of relations
providing we ourselves respond in kind "in 'the spirit of the
Shanghai Joint Communique. In following this course the PRC
leaders are unabashed by the contradictions it creates between
their ideological predeleotions on the one hand and the realities
of world Power balances on the other; e.g. the same issue of
the People's Daily which carried Sihanouk's banquet speech
strongly attacking the U.S. also printed an article and photo
covering Chou En -lai's reception of the Magnuson group. The
Chinese people Must accordingly now be realizing that rhetoric
is indeed just the firing of empty cannons and that what counts
is what the PRC does rather than what it says. You might wish
to open by commenting in positive terms on the favorable trend
in U.S.-FRC relations and reaffirm that we definitely intend
to follow through on our side toward the goals which have been
jointly set.
3. Cambodia -- This of course i the Most pressing problem
betweenth?US.and Peking give China's identificationwith
While there is some reason to believe the Chinese
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Wtik Da
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may be attempting behind the $ nes to bring iflu?e to bear
on Sihanouk (Peking .105101 they are acutely embarrassed by any
allegations that they are engaged with other great powers in
an exercise to settle Cambodia behind Sihanouk's back.
We will need to do what we can to hold down U.S. press
speculation to this effect, otherwise Chinese efforts to
be helpful may be compromised. In your. private Peking
conversations on Cambodia, I believe that the line you have
taken publicly is absolutely correct; that all major countries
which have a stake in peace in Indo-China should use their
influence in the direction of restraint. The position which
you have already handed the Chinese on Cambodia should also
serve as a basis for further discussion, and you will want to
know the reaction of Sihanouk, if any. In addition, I would
suggest these points:
Anti-Vietnam forces in the U.S are trying to seize
upon Cambodia to achieve what they were unable to get in
VIetnam; a serious defeat for administration policy. If this
effort is allowed to succeed, a new American isolationism may
develop which would disrupt existing power alignments no
only in the Far East but in Europe as well. Such a situ
would suit neither U.S. nor PRC interests.
-- As Prime Minister Chou En -lai undoubtedly discovered
in his conversations with Senator Magnuson, the Senator does
not have the world view shared by the administration and the
PRC. Regrettably there are many others like him in the U.S.
Senate, and these people exercise a great amount of influence.
Although their position on Cambodia may be similar to that of
the PRC? their ultimate objectives run counter to those of the
administration and also that what we believe are the PRC's
objectives. In all this, the Chinese may be more disposed to
listen than to indicate any particular line of action on their
part. They will of course express support for Sihanouk.
4. Nixon -Brezhpev Summit Talks and Joint Agreement -- In my
opinion your main purpose here will be to reiterate in person
to Chou En -lai the assurances we have already provided elsewhere
as to the U.S. philosophy regarding the USSR and the Joint
Agreement and as to the lack of U.S.-Soviet "collusion."
In this case, the Chinese will undoubtedly want to expand further
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on their area of greatest concern -- their fear that the
agreement with the USSR, which they say the Soviets will in
any case not honor, will lull people into a false sense o
security. (In this connection a reiteration of Sec Def
Schlesinger's line on the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe
may be helpful,) It is noteworthy, though, that the Chinese
have not commented publicly to this effect other than through
Senator Magnuson's unfortunate leak of his conversation
with Chou, and you may wish to express appreciation for the
absence of overt Chinese criticism, This has been very helpful
in gaining international acceptance of the Joint Agreement.
5. The Soviet Role World wide I think it likely that in
connection with pare 4 above, the Chinese will expatiate on
the topic of how the Soviets are stretching out their hands
in areas of strategic interests to China such as the Indian
Ocean) Southeast Asia, and Japan' You might deal with this
by repeating what the President said to Huang Chen about cur
wanting a strong and secure China, and by pointing out that
our efforts to retain adequate deterrent forces in various
parts of the world are both contributory to this end and
a reflection of our own awareness of basic Soviet pollcy.
You might also note that we will do what we can to oppose
Soviet moves toward an Asian Security Pact, (which incidenta
do not appear to be gaining much acceptance perhaps the
Chinese may wish to give their own appraisal).
End Section 1 of 2.
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PEKING 016 (Final Section of 2)
July 11, 1973
TO: HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: DAVID BRUCE
SUBJECT: Your Visit to Peking
6. Taiwan -- In the wake of Senator Magnuson's banquet remarks
about Taiwan independence it would be desirable for you Co
reaffirm strongly the direction of U.S. policy as discussed
previously with the Chinese and embodied in the Shanghai Joint
Communique.You could also take the opportunity to point out
that neither Senator Magnuson nor pro-Taiwan advertisements in
the New York Times and Washington Post are indicative of U.S.
policy. I have received no hint in Peking of any undue Chinese
concern over the U.S. military presence in Taiwan, and it is
possible that in the near term the Chinese may regard these
forces as contributory to the stability of the Asian-Pacific
Region. However, if there are any developments with respect to
U.S. troop withdrawals from Taiwan, I believe that You should
coMmunicate them.
7. 'Japan You are probably aware that Chou En -lai has been
telling visitors lately that Japan is at the crossroads,"
that is, it can either continue along a course which is reasonably
congenial to the Chinese, as at present, or one which could cut
across Chinese bows. I doubt that the Chinese presently believe
there is much possibility of a revival of Japanese militarism
(although they may claim that there is), but what does concern
them is the prospect of Soviet-Japanese collaboration in ways
which would be harmful to China. They appear particularly
apprehensive about bilateral Soviet-Japanese exploitation of
strategic Siberian resources. Judging by Chou En -lai's remarks
to me on June 25 they appear resigned to some form of Soviet-
Japanese exploitation of these resources but look to the U.S.
to join in so as to exercise some moderating influence over the
Japanese and to keep them from falling wholly under Soviet sway.
You should be prepared to address this issue and bring he
Chinese up to date in what is being done on the US. side with
respect to Siberian developments. Again, the question o
Soviet-inspired Asian Security Pact may come up in connecti
with Japan, and you may be called upon to talk to this issue.
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As it looks from here the Japanese do not appear much interested
in the security pact, although they may from time to time say
vaguely encouraging things about it in hopes of getting more out
of the Soviets than they have so far on the northern territories
issue.
8. Korea - The FRC has made a concerted effort lately to
identify itself with DPRK policies regarding relations between
North and South Korea, particularly Kim Il -sung's "new line and
five propositions for the independent and peaceful reunification
of Korea," and consequently may have lost some of its flexibility
on the Korean question. It would be a pity if such is the case,
since the result might be a return to the frozen situation of the
past if Kim Il -sung should decide that the South-North talks
are frUitless and break them off. We and the Chinese both need
to keep our options open on Korea so as to assure continuation
of the talks, and we for our part have done so with respect to
UNCURK and the UN Command in relation to this year's U.N.G.A.
session. A discussion of the Korean situation would appear
to be in order in which you could sound out the Chinese position
and urge that we both do what we can to encourage progress on
the South-North talks within the limitations of our mutual needs
to back up our respective Korean allies. And since we have
made certain concessions or adjustments it policy on our side/,
it would be desirable to see what adjustments, if any/ the
Chinese may have made on theirs. Policy adjustments should not
be all on one side.
9. Laos and South -Vietpam You are ,unquestionably far more
knowledgeable on theSe,sUbj.ects than I, and about all I can say
is that the Chinese appear anxious that the eeasefire hold in
South Vietnam and seem reasonably confident that the issues
between the sides in Laos will be cleared up so that a political
settlement will insue. About all that. I can suggest is that
you.review U.S. policies with respect to both countries, pointing
up the positive aspects and assuring the Chinese as before that
we are prepared to accept a "peaceful, neutral, and independent"
Indo-China, including Cambodia as well as Laos and South Vietnam.
10. Economic Issues The Chinese ar an:ious to wrap up the
Claim.Blocked Assets Agreement as a first step toward obtaining
MFN treatment, but are evidently having trouble over both the
wording and substantive contents of the draft agreement w
presented to them in Paris some three months ago. Chang Wen-chin
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has told us that despite agreement in principle the Chinese
were having difficulty working out language "suitable for
public consumption" and complain that the late introduction
of the question of Chinese railway bonds outside the framework
of the Claims-Blocked Assets Deal had complicated the matter.
The former question iS Probably relatively simple but the
latter is not. The Problem is that while the claims-blocked
assets arrangement is strictly governmental since it involves
Chinese assets sequestered under FAC regulations and Claims File
with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, we have taken
the poSition that pre l94:9. Chinese Railway Bonds held by
Americans are a private matter between the holders and the PRC.
Thus there is a Prospect that 011 law suits may :.:.be Placed
against the PRC by bond holders seeking redress, Chinese goods
shipped to the U.S. sequestered by the ports, and (b) complaint,
may be made to congress by bond holders, hence interfering with
MFN legislation. The Chinese may well raise this issue with
you at least at the Chang Wen-chin level, and may declare
they understand from your February discussions of this issue
that all American claims were to be included in the Claims-
Blocked Assets Deal. I think you should be prepared to go int
the matter in some detail, and I hope that some formula can be
found to be resPonsive to the Chinese needs.
11. Warm Regards.
END OF MESSAGE. End all sections.
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