CAMBODIA AND THE CHINESE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 20, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

? ,-gvvc iho atiAl '71'4 3 ACTION
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i OP SEGRET/SENFTWE lip July 20, 1973
EXCLUSIVELY, vrtS ONLY DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR: HAK
FROM: LSE
SUBJECT: Cambodia and the Chinese
I recommend that our replies k -A 11101111.10100to the recent
Chinese notes on Cambodia and the Peking trip be presented together
by Brent Scowcroft, and that he make the following points orally at
that time:
-- The ixiese side for Dr. Kissinger to visit
6 A& 1:NOCer****410446.4/ avot#
Peking olipAtigaaws4r4oireergsvet?gre.serietelisol. I hope the Chinese side will
be able to accommodate our suggestion that alternative dates be proposed.
-- An early reply regarding visit dates would be helpful in arrang-
ing Dr. Kis singer' s schedule.
-- The Chinese statement on Cambodia presented by Han Hsu
has come as a shock to my Government. We particularly regret its
tone, which is reminiscent of a period in our relationship that we
thought had been put behind us.
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DOS, NSS, Review
Completed.
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The US side regrets that the August 16 date proposed by the
Chinese for Dr. Kissinger's arrival in Peking is inconvenient.
It is suggested instead that the Chinese side propose two
alternative three-day periods for a visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking:
one falling within the dates September 1 to 15 and one beginning after
September 28. In view of the large number of schedule commitments
which are now pending, a reply at the earliest convenience of the Chinese
side would be appreciated.
In view of press reports both in the United States and China
speculating on the possibility of an early August visit by Dr. Kissinger
to Peking the US side believes it necessary that both sides be pre-
pared to respond to press inquiries-relating to plans for the visit.
The US side would be interested in the views of the Chinese side on
responding to such inquiries.
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i. J. v u J. V 1t.J. I i I J L Y
aollism?
S
At a time when the Communist ,side is making a rs.new,-.4 and
intensified effort to determine Cambodia's political futuKe by force, the
Chinese side's complaints about American military action are disingenuous.
The US side and the Cambodian Government have consistently sought a
ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris
Agreement, and indeed since October 1970. The Communist side has
continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and cynically responded to
the Cambodian Government's unilateral ceasefire and cessation of US air
actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive.
In the face of this brutal military response to a genuine and concrete step to
end hostilities in Cambodia, the comments of the Chinese side about US
bombing ring very hollow.
The Chinese side solemnly declared to the US side in its message
of June 4 tharit could communicate the US peace propos.al to Prince
Sihanouk. It was stated in the June 4 message, and reiterated on June 13
by Foreign Minister Chi Pieng-fei and again in the Chinese message of
July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels.
On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would
convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.
After a further delay of nearly two weeks, the Chinese message
of July 18 is therefore most difficult to comprehend. There has been no
change in US policy and no change in the situation to warrant this reversal
of the Chinese position. In light of these earlier assurances, and the
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVP. / MCCT.TMTAT
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principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communique, it is impossible to
understandswhy the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American
peace proposal to its Cambodian allies. (Prince Sihanouk's suggestion
that the US communicate with him through Mauritania is particularly
incomprehensible, since he is residing in Peking and since the Chinese
side itself asserted in prior messages the inconvenience of communicating
with Prince Sihanouk through similar channels while he was traveling.)
The US side notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the
development of our new relationship that the Chinese side has not honored
a commitment it has made to the US side.
As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese
side is proposing that the US side give its formai assent to a plan of total
surrender in Cambodia. The US side cannot accept a "solution'l
imperiously dictated to us. It is beyond the bounds of logic to negotiate
on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no
room for negotiations.
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Central Intelligence Agency
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PEKING 022
July 20, 1973
TO:
FROM:
HENRY KISSINGER
JENKINS/HOLDRIDGE
REF: Washington 19, Peking 021.
1. On careful reflection we resubscribe
with only following to add:
2. Representatives of friendly governmen
warned us not to expect that our startlin
would last forever. They say in effect:
uniquely disarming and personable, but al
They are wary, with historical reason, of
even while leading one to believe that su
They are serious when they extol self-suf
to degree possible. They need the U.S.,
relationship will be firm so long as you
their sense of pride. If you do that, th
at great danger to themselves, for nation
recently regained and viewed as the indis
extremely difficult-to-organize society (
the Chinese people as a pile of sand.) S
are that the U.S. has honored that concep
Don't flub it, for what you do in this re
deal to the rest of us."
to previous message
s here have repeatedly
honeymoon period
'the Chinese are
o coldly practical.
close relationships,
h are established.
iciency and in dependence,
owever, and your
o not seriously offend
y will drop you even
I pride is too
ensible cement of their
un Yat-sen spoke of
far, all indications
with great skill.
ard matters a great
3. We have not flubbed it. We can weath r the present Chinese
anger and doubt, to the degree they may e ist. Chinese
perplexity seems to stem from what they o ce told us in the
context of Cambodia: "You risk sacrificin big things for
small place."
4. No one here doubts U.S. power. As for U.S. fidelity,
they tend to consider it as having been if anything already
excessively proved. But we find no one here who believes U.S.
power can be applied through Lon Nol or any Asian leader who will
not even pay his troops, much less win the civilian population.
5. We estimate that: (1) The Chinese ar at least temporarily
peeved, partly for reasons unrelated to Cambodia; (2) They
believe we have our priorities out of kilt r to a degree which
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endangers their interests as well as (in their view) ours;
but(3) They are by no means trying to scuttle us in Cambodia
or elsewhere. It may or may not look di ferent from
Washington, but seems clearly that way h re.
6. The Chinese may well reason that the can better afford to show
pique now if they feel it, at least with regard to a limited
segment of our spectrum of relationships. For they no longer
believe a Soviet attack to be at all likely, or at least
imminent, though the hatred and mistrust thrive thumpingly.
We can no longer bank so much on the negative factors which
threw us together originally, but must rely more on the positive,
which is harder work. Fortunately, you have built on the latter
well, and we are convinced that those positive factors look
better and better to the Chinese. That iS one reason they want
the negative ones out of the way.
7. The Chinese also have a series of psy
be at an out of sorts with us. Our airli
for which was a special courtesy, overfle
of theirs, against clear routing instruct
uniforms and side arms against local oust
thought was a firm understanding. Our Co
displayed unbelievable insensitivity and
were at times short-sightedly presumptiou
Chinese are acutely embarrassed by the co
missions that we have received all sorts
in setting up the office and in favored 1
The Chinese probably have to prove to oth
some of their own gallery, that they are
hological reasons to
t plane, permission
a sensitive island
ons. The Marines wore
m and what the Chinese
gressional group
he accompanying newsmen
. Furthermore, the
plaints of their
f special treatment
ving accommodations.
rs, and even more to
ot in our pocket.
8. We interpret the Chinese message to u to be designed as
much for Cambodian consumption as for our-, and perhaps even
more so. If the Chinese are urging some concessions on the part
of Sihanouk, which we believe likely, it is all the more
important that they appear to the Cambodians to be adequately
firm with us.
9. In sum, we believe we will win more by playing it cool,
as a power so sure of itself that we are not likely to miss
the big picture. The Chinese are wringing their hands lest in
their view we do the latter in Cambodia.
10. In this situation, we have a few speculative thoughts on
Sihanouks and Chinese roles in Cambodia which may be of some
help to you:
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11. -- It appears very likely that Siha ouk has little or
no influence with the Khmer insurgents ((I), and that he is
accepted by them essentially in the capa ty of .a figurehead
and as someone who can gain internationa standing for the KI
cause. Sihanouk has said as much in press interviews, most
recent being that given AFP correspondent Romensky on July 10,
wherein he declared that his post-victor role would be that
of Queen Elizabeth and that if "after a ew weeks there is any
incompability between me and the red Khm rs, I will hang up my
hat and retire."
12. -- If such is the case, Sihanouks u willingness to meet
with you may be due in part to his inabi ity to speak with any
degree of authority on behalf of KI. Personal pique probably
figures in as well, but the prince could be more concerned with
avoiding the embarrassment which would arise if it became
generally known that he could not really represent the KI in
negotiations.
13. -- Accordingly, Sihanouks recent insistence on our dealing
directly with the KI, or "red Khmers", could be an admission
that there is no alternative, either for him or for us.
14. Sihanouk continues to imply a deg ee of Chinese influence
on the scene, however. In the Romensky ? terview, he acknowledged
that they as well as North Vietnamese had indeed halted arms
shipments since signing of Paris Agreement. (He has subsequently
said he has asked Chinese to resume shipments and that they are
prepared to do so once transportation through North Vietnam can
be arranged). Sihanouk has also indicated that we could use
Chou En-lai as an intermediary to put forWard proposals for
negotiations with KI, thus "leaving open tiny door." Although
he has since backed away from this by dec aring that we should
go through Mauritanian Chief of State, we doubt that this
Chinese channel has entirely dried up.
15. -- If Chinese have now suspended arm8 and ammunition
shipments to KI, this could be a sign that they are indeed trying
to use what leverage they possess to help bring about a
settlement. But if they are trying to be helpful, it will be
in their own way. They will not tell us about it, and they will
be operating within the limits imposed by their need to sustain
Sihanouk and by what we judge in lack of direct PRC political
control over the KI. They also may be up against a time factor,
i.e., the pressures on them to resume arm shipments to the KI
may be mounting as our bombing in Cambodi continues.
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16. We have weighed the advantage of pho
suggest he may wish to return early. We
two messages are not consonant with his t
know we have no reason to believe he woul
if at all) it would be better for you to
a bit later rather than alert the Chinese
to what they would interpret as extra ord
Bruce plans return early evening Monday.
to request change.
17. Warm Regards. END OF MESSAGE.
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4
ing Mr. Bruce to
oncluded that if our
inking (from what we
differ significantly
eceive his comments
by open telephone call
nary concern. Mr.
Advise if you wish
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