CAMBODIA AND THE CHINESE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
October 25, 2010
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 20, 1973
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8.pdf423.63 KB
Body: 
? ,-gvvc iho atiAl '71'4 3 ACTION No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 i OP SEGRET/SENFTWE lip July 20, 1973 EXCLUSIVELY, vrtS ONLY DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR: HAK FROM: LSE SUBJECT: Cambodia and the Chinese I recommend that our replies k -A 11101111.10100to the recent Chinese notes on Cambodia and the Peking trip be presented together by Brent Scowcroft, and that he make the following points orally at that time: -- The ixiese side for Dr. Kissinger to visit 6 A& 1:NOCer****410446.4/ avot# Peking olipAtigaaws4r4oireergsvet?gre.serietelisol. I hope the Chinese side will be able to accommodate our suggestion that alternative dates be proposed. -- An early reply regarding visit dates would be helpful in arrang- ing Dr. Kis singer' s schedule. -- The Chinese statement on Cambodia presented by Han Hsu has come as a shock to my Government. We particularly regret its tone, which is reminiscent of a period in our relationship that we thought had been put behind us. -1:45P-SeetteTIVETZITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY DOS, NSS, Review Completed. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 * No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 IP TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE TAB A EXCLU?IVELY_EYES ONLY The US side regrets that the August 16 date proposed by the Chinese for Dr. Kissinger's arrival in Peking is inconvenient. It is suggested instead that the Chinese side propose two alternative three-day periods for a visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking: one falling within the dates September 1 to 15 and one beginning after September 28. In view of the large number of schedule commitments which are now pending, a reply at the earliest convenience of the Chinese side would be appreciated. In view of press reports both in the United States and China speculating on the possibility of an early August visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking the US side believes it necessary that both sides be pre- pared to respond to press inquiries-relating to plans for the visit. The US side would be interested in the views of the Chinese side on responding to such inquiries. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 TC.No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 i. J. v u J. V 1t.J. I i I J L Y aollism? S At a time when the Communist ,side is making a rs.new,-.4 and intensified effort to determine Cambodia's political futuKe by force, the Chinese side's complaints about American military action are disingenuous. The US side and the Cambodian Government have consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement, and indeed since October 1970. The Communist side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and cynically responded to the Cambodian Government's unilateral ceasefire and cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive. In the face of this brutal military response to a genuine and concrete step to end hostilities in Cambodia, the comments of the Chinese side about US bombing ring very hollow. The Chinese side solemnly declared to the US side in its message of June 4 tharit could communicate the US peace propos.al to Prince Sihanouk. It was stated in the June 4 message, and reiterated on June 13 by Foreign Minister Chi Pieng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking. After a further delay of nearly two weeks, the Chinese message of July 18 is therefore most difficult to comprehend. There has been no change in US policy and no change in the situation to warrant this reversal of the Chinese position. In light of these earlier assurances, and the TOP SECRET / SENSITIVP. / MCCT.TMTAT _ V "G`V-C'C rVATT "Cr No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 .TO No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 -rht ?11. Page 2 principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communique, it is impossible to understandswhy the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to its Cambodian allies. (Prince Sihanouk's suggestion that the US communicate with him through Mauritania is particularly incomprehensible, since he is residing in Peking and since the Chinese side itself asserted in prior messages the inconvenience of communicating with Prince Sihanouk through similar channels while he was traveling.) The US side notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese side has not honored a commitment it has made to the US side. As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese side is proposing that the US side give its formai assent to a plan of total surrender in Cambodia. The US side cannot accept a "solution'l imperiously dictated to us. It is beyond the bounds of logic to negotiate on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no room for negotiations. TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE / EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 Document Separator Sheet Central Intelligence Agency CIA III NDCIA II No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 8-Z1,-Z-Z917->IVH-001 81-/170/ZI-OZ 4-led LI! uo!leoWsseloaCI 04 u0Peic10 ON SMOTIOA Ad03 aazwNvs 8-Z1,-Z-Z917->IVH-001 81-/170/ZI-OZ 4-led LI! uo!leoWsseloaCI 04 u0!400210 ON No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 c Gee 11 ? c 7/7 -- TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY PEKING 022 July 20, 1973 TO: FROM: HENRY KISSINGER JENKINS/HOLDRIDGE REF: Washington 19, Peking 021. 1. On careful reflection we resubscribe with only following to add: 2. Representatives of friendly governmen warned us not to expect that our startlin would last forever. They say in effect: uniquely disarming and personable, but al They are wary, with historical reason, of even while leading one to believe that su They are serious when they extol self-suf to degree possible. They need the U.S., relationship will be firm so long as you their sense of pride. If you do that, th at great danger to themselves, for nation recently regained and viewed as the indis extremely difficult-to-organize society ( the Chinese people as a pile of sand.) S are that the U.S. has honored that concep Don't flub it, for what you do in this re deal to the rest of us." to previous message s here have repeatedly honeymoon period 'the Chinese are o coldly practical. close relationships, h are established. iciency and in dependence, owever, and your o not seriously offend y will drop you even I pride is too ensible cement of their un Yat-sen spoke of far, all indications with great skill. ard matters a great 3. We have not flubbed it. We can weath r the present Chinese anger and doubt, to the degree they may e ist. Chinese perplexity seems to stem from what they o ce told us in the context of Cambodia: "You risk sacrificin big things for small place." 4. No one here doubts U.S. power. As for U.S. fidelity, they tend to consider it as having been if anything already excessively proved. But we find no one here who believes U.S. power can be applied through Lon Nol or any Asian leader who will not even pay his troops, much less win the civilian population. 5. We estimate that: (1) The Chinese ar at least temporarily peeved, partly for reasons unrelated to Cambodia; (2) They believe we have our priorities out of kilt r to a degree which TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18 : LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 1111 TOP SECRET/SENSIIIPE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY endangers their interests as well as (in their view) ours; but(3) They are by no means trying to scuttle us in Cambodia or elsewhere. It may or may not look di ferent from Washington, but seems clearly that way h re. 6. The Chinese may well reason that the can better afford to show pique now if they feel it, at least with regard to a limited segment of our spectrum of relationships. For they no longer believe a Soviet attack to be at all likely, or at least imminent, though the hatred and mistrust thrive thumpingly. We can no longer bank so much on the negative factors which threw us together originally, but must rely more on the positive, which is harder work. Fortunately, you have built on the latter well, and we are convinced that those positive factors look better and better to the Chinese. That iS one reason they want the negative ones out of the way. 7. The Chinese also have a series of psy be at an out of sorts with us. Our airli for which was a special courtesy, overfle of theirs, against clear routing instruct uniforms and side arms against local oust thought was a firm understanding. Our Co displayed unbelievable insensitivity and were at times short-sightedly presumptiou Chinese are acutely embarrassed by the co missions that we have received all sorts in setting up the office and in favored 1 The Chinese probably have to prove to oth some of their own gallery, that they are hological reasons to t plane, permission a sensitive island ons. The Marines wore m and what the Chinese gressional group he accompanying newsmen . Furthermore, the plaints of their f special treatment ving accommodations. rs, and even more to ot in our pocket. 8. We interpret the Chinese message to u to be designed as much for Cambodian consumption as for our-, and perhaps even more so. If the Chinese are urging some concessions on the part of Sihanouk, which we believe likely, it is all the more important that they appear to the Cambodians to be adequately firm with us. 9. In sum, we believe we will win more by playing it cool, as a power so sure of itself that we are not likely to miss the big picture. The Chinese are wringing their hands lest in their view we do the latter in Cambodia. 10. In this situation, we have a few speculative thoughts on Sihanouks and Chinese roles in Cambodia which may be of some help to you: TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 ' TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 11. -- It appears very likely that Siha ouk has little or no influence with the Khmer insurgents ((I), and that he is accepted by them essentially in the capa ty of .a figurehead and as someone who can gain internationa standing for the KI cause. Sihanouk has said as much in press interviews, most recent being that given AFP correspondent Romensky on July 10, wherein he declared that his post-victor role would be that of Queen Elizabeth and that if "after a ew weeks there is any incompability between me and the red Khm rs, I will hang up my hat and retire." 12. -- If such is the case, Sihanouks u willingness to meet with you may be due in part to his inabi ity to speak with any degree of authority on behalf of KI. Personal pique probably figures in as well, but the prince could be more concerned with avoiding the embarrassment which would arise if it became generally known that he could not really represent the KI in negotiations. 13. -- Accordingly, Sihanouks recent insistence on our dealing directly with the KI, or "red Khmers", could be an admission that there is no alternative, either for him or for us. 14. Sihanouk continues to imply a deg ee of Chinese influence on the scene, however. In the Romensky ? terview, he acknowledged that they as well as North Vietnamese had indeed halted arms shipments since signing of Paris Agreement. (He has subsequently said he has asked Chinese to resume shipments and that they are prepared to do so once transportation through North Vietnam can be arranged). Sihanouk has also indicated that we could use Chou En-lai as an intermediary to put forWard proposals for negotiations with KI, thus "leaving open tiny door." Although he has since backed away from this by dec aring that we should go through Mauritanian Chief of State, we doubt that this Chinese channel has entirely dried up. 15. -- If Chinese have now suspended arm8 and ammunition shipments to KI, this could be a sign that they are indeed trying to use what leverage they possess to help bring about a settlement. But if they are trying to be helpful, it will be in their own way. They will not tell us about it, and they will be operating within the limits imposed by their need to sustain Sihanouk and by what we judge in lack of direct PRC political control over the KI. They also may be up against a time factor, i.e., the pressures on them to resume arm shipments to the KI may be mounting as our bombing in Cambodi continues. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 ? TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 16. We have weighed the advantage of pho suggest he may wish to return early. We two messages are not consonant with his t know we have no reason to believe he woul if at all) it would be better for you to a bit later rather than alert the Chinese to what they would interpret as extra ord Bruce plans return early evening Monday. to request change. 17. Warm Regards. END OF MESSAGE. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 4 ing Mr. Bruce to oncluded that if our inking (from what we differ significantly eceive his comments by open telephone call nary concern. Mr. Advise if you wish No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18 : LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-12-8 25X1