CAMBODIA AND THE PRC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 16, 1973
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
IN ~ Lt - -- Ir
DOS, NSS, Review
Completed.
T" ffieRBT~SENSITIVE ACTION
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY July 16, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
L. S G EBURGER
Cambodia and the PRC
Having become -- almost overnight -- one of the world's preeminent
Asia experts, I offer the following thoughts on the Cambodian aspects
of your Peking trip.
In the light of Sihanouk's latest blast (you will have seen the Reuter
report -- Tab A) the immediate question for us becomes whether to
remain silent in the face of such statements, or to say something soon
to Peking. Should we remain silent Sihanouk may dig himself further
into a position from which compromise would be difficult (although
nothing is impossible for him); the danger of saying much more to
Peking is that we will reveal a certain degree of anxiety.
I recommend that we say nothing until the Chinese- respond on specific
dates for your visit. If, at that time, they indicate reasonably positive
expectations that you would not come home empty-handed, no additional
push from you will be necessary. If, as seems more likely, they merely
welcome you to Peking at a date of your choosing without mentioning
the potential for a Cambodian solution, you will have two courses:
-- to go ahead with your visit, but eliminate any public expectation
of obtaining much on Cambodia;
-- to propose postponement of your visit, probably until September.
The former course (which I do not recommend) would necessitate a public
statement at a fairly early date to the effect that Cambodia will not be
negotiated in Peking. The latter course (which I do recommend) could,
through careful structuring of your message, cause some nervousness
in Peking, and perhaps give Sihanouk pause. The desired result is to en-
courage Chinese pressure on Sihanouk, and to impress Sihanouk himself
with the uncertainties of delay.
SITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY . ? !4
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
The draft at Tab B is a suggestion as to the line you might take with
Han Hsu should the Chinese communication on visit dates be disappointing.
The Case Against
There is of course some danger that the Chinese will accommodate your
postponement request. Given the almost certain continuation of Congressional
opposition to U. S. air support after August 15, and the doubt about the
present Cambodian government's ability to carry on thereafter, your
bargaining position could well deteriorate. The costs of postponement
would, in that case, be compounded by the diminished chance of satisfactory
resolution of the Cambodian problem.
The Case For
It may well be, however, that the Chinese will elect to do what they
can to bring Sihanouk or one of his people to the table in early August
rather than suffer postponement of discussion of the other issues at
hand. The time element is probably particularly important to Peking
because of their desire to discuss, at first hand, the Brezhnev visit --
particularly certain aspects which you first broached with Huang Chen in
San Clemente.
Regarding Sihanouk himself, it is difficult to see how a postponement
proposal could worsen our position with him. On the surface his state -
ments reflect patience and optimism over his standing in the event of a
collapse of the present government following the bombing halt. That may
well be an accurate reflection of his present thinking. But, he also has
some reason to be apprehensive about his future with the Khmer Rouge.
Thus, we might gently play on this concern if it exists, or seek to create
it if it does not.
Given either interpretation of Sihanouk's current thinking, an indication
of patience by you might make early August talks more attractive to him
than they are now. Increased doubt in Sihanouk's mind about U. S. actions
and options after August 15 might prove decisive if accompanied by the
Chinese pressure we hope to evoke.
The draft at Tab B attempts to stimulate both these developments.
It is an admittedly somewhat chancy course, since postponement carries
greater risks than the alternative of accepting the omission of Cambodian
negotiations in an early August visit -- an omission for which the public
can be prepared in advance. To propose postponement does, however,
offer the only-ehr be for exercising leverage over Sihanouk, -Tirectly and
through the Chinese. I present it to you as a course worth considering.
TOP SECRE`1'(~,SENS,ITIVE
%rf-T TTCT\TL'T L'V C (1TTTV
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
A
1 G1K, SCOWCROFT & LL : S II LANOUK STATES NE IT1 iER 11E NOR ANY MII IBER OF HIS
EXILED GOVER\''MEN T WILL BE IN CONTACT WI TI 1 T1 1E
KISSINGER PAN IY DURING IL\K' S VISIT; SIIIANOUK DOUBTS
THAT U.S. BOMBING WILL CEASE ON AUGUST 15.
#ZZ
R NR 67
SIHANOUK:
BY JAMES PRINGLE
PEKING, JULY 13, REUTER -- PRINCE NORODOM
SIHANOUK THE DEPOSED CAMBODIAN HEAD OF STATE, SAID TODAY HE
WOULD LEAVE NEXT WEEK FOR A THREE-WEEK VISIT TO NORTH KOREA
AND WOULD NOT MEET U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER DR HENRY KISSINGER
WHEN HE COMES TO PEKING NEXT MONTH.
KISSINGER IS DUE HERE EARLY IN AUGUST FOR TALKS
WITH CHINESE LEADERS. THE PRINCE LEAVES PEKING NEXT FRIDAY.
THE PRINCE SAID THAT EVEN IF HE WAS IN PEKING WHEN
DR KISSINGER ARRIVED, HE WOULD REFUSE TO MEET HIM AND NO MEMBER
OF HIS EXILED GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN CONTACT WITH THE
AMERICAN OFFICIAL.
SIHANOUK, WHO RETURNED TO PEKING LAST WEEK FROM
A TWO-MONTH TOUR OF SOME AFRICAN AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES,
EXPRESSED PESSIMISM OVER THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA
AND SAID HE HAD NO CONFIDENCE THAT U.S. BOMBING THERE WOULD
END ON AUGUST 15.
THIS IS THE DATE AGREED BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND CONGRESS
AS A COMPROMISE FOR ENDING U.S. AIR FORCE ATTACKS IN CAMBODIA.
MORE PJS/MIT 0916
#Z Z
R NR 68
SIHANOUK 2 PEKING
THE PRINCES STATEMENT APPEARED TO HAVE FINALLY SLAMMED
THE DOOR ON ANY POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT CONTACT DURING
KISSINGERS VISIT.
HE SAID ANY MEETING WITH KISSINGER WOULD OFFER PRESIDENT NIXON
AN EXCUSE TO TELL CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT NEGOTIATIONS
WERE GOING ON.
THIS WOULD GIVE NIXON LEVERAGE WITH CONGRESS FOR A
CONTINUATION OF THE BOMBING AFTER THE AUGUST 15 DEADLINE IN THE
HOPE THAT THE ATTACKS WOULD FORCE SIHANOUKS
SUPPORTERS TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE,
.HE ADDED.
"BUT WE WILL NOT GIVE NIXON THAT SATISFACTION," THE
PRINCE TOLD REPORTERS. "THERE WILL BE NO CONTACTS AND WE WILL
CONTINUE TO FIGHT, FIGHT AND FIGHT UNTIL FINAL VICTORY EVEN
IF THIS TAKES 1a YEARS OR MORE."
MORE PJS/MIT 091.18
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
#zz
R NR b9
SIHANOUK 3 PEKING
THE PRINCE SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE WATERGATE SCANDAL WOULD
STOP NIXON "IN HIS DETERMINATION TO GO ON BOMBING US.
"THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT CONGRESS HAS
ABDICATED ITS EXECUTIVE POWERS, VIS-A-VIS NIXON," HE ADDED.
THE CAMBODIAN LEADER AGAIN VEHEMENTLY DENIED THAT ANY
"DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS" WERE UNDER WAY AS SUGGESTED BY THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT,
HE REITERATED THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY COME ABOUT
THROUGH COMPLETE CESSATION OF AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS AND THE
ELIMINATION OF THE "TRAITOROUS" PHNOM PENH GOVERNMENT OF
PRESIDENT LON NOL.
ASKED ABOUT THE REPORTED RETURN TO PEKING OF HUANG
CHE,N, HEAD OF CHINAS LIAISON OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES
WHO HAD A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON IN SAN CLEMENTE LAST WEEK,
THE PRINCE SAID HE HAD "NO NEW INFORMATION ON THIS."
INFORMED SOURCES IN WASHINGTON HAD SAID HUANG HAD
RETURNED TO THE CHINESE CAPITAL FOR CONSULTATIONS ON CAMBODIA
AND OTHER ISSUES.
SIHANOUK SAID, HOWEVER, THAT CHINESE PREMIER CHOU
EN"LAI WOULD NEVER INTERFERE I N THE AFFAIRS OF HIS EXILED
CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT OR GIVE ANY HOPE TO THE AMERICANS AS FAR
AS A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT WAS CONCERNED.
MORE. PJS/MIT 0921
4zz
RNR70
SIHANOUK 4 PEKING
SIHANOUK RENEWED HIS APPEAL MADE AT A STATE
BANQUET IN PEKING LAST WEEK FOR ARMS AND AMMUNITION.
HE SAID TODAY THAT HIS FORCES IN CAMBODIA COULD FIGHT
FOR 20 YEARS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WITH EQUIPMENT CAPTURED FROM
THE TROOPS OF THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT. "BUT IF WE
ARE TO TAKE PHNOM PENH, WE NEED MORE AMMUNITION."
HE SAID HE HAD REQUESTED CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM, WHICH
HAD STOPPED SUPPLYING ARMS TO HIS FORCES I N CAMBODIA FOLLOWING
THE SIGNING OF THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT ON INDOCHINA, TO
RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION IV VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NIXON
HAD "WIPED OUT" ARTICLE 20 OF THE AGREEMENT.
ARTICLE 20 OF THE PARIS ACCORD SAYS, AMONG OTHER THINGS,
THAT FOREIGN COUNTRIES SHALL PUT AN END TO ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS, TOTALLY WITHDRAW AND REFRAIN FROM REINTRODUCING
INTO THE TWO COUNTRIES TROOPS, MILITARY ADVISERS AND MILITARY
PERSONNEL, ARMAMENTS, MUNNITIONS AND WAR MATERIAL.
NORTH KOREA, WHOSE PREMIER KIM IL-SUMG HAD INVITED THE
PRINCE TO PAY A FRIENDLY VISIT BEGINNING NEXT
FRIDAY, HAD OFFERED . H EVERY ASSISTANCE I N THIS RESPECT,
THE EXILED CAMBODIAN+ MADER ADDED.
REUTER PJS-DO927
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
IV
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY TAB B
The U. S. side has taken note of the Chinese side's proposal that
Dr. Kissinger visit Peking on August and is grateful for the invitation.
The U. S. side would like to suggest, however, that Dr. Kissinger's
visit to Peking be delayed until some mutually satisfactory later date,
perhaps during the month of September.
Prince Sihanouk's statements to the effect that neither he nor members
of his entourage will be prepared to meet with Dr. Kissinger during his
visit to Peking eliminates one of the principal purposes for the visit.
The U. S. side deeply regrets this fact since, as Dr. Kissinger has on
several occasions explained, the U. S. side was prepared to initiate dis-
cussions with Prince Sihanouk looking toward the creation of a situation
in Cambodia which would bring peace to the people of that country.
The U. S. further regrets the necessity to postpone Dr. Kissinger's
visit because we had firmly hoped that the process of developing a better
understanding between Prince Sihanouk and Dr. Kissinger would have
encouraged an even more rapid improvement in relations between the U. S.
and the PRC -- relations that have matured so well to this point because
of the developing community of interests that exists between our two countries.
In the absence of any indication of a willingness on Prince Sihanouk's
part to engage in conversations with Dr. Kissinger, it will be necessary
for the U. S. to do what it can through other means to strengthen the posi-
tion of the present government.
It may well be that both Prince Sihanouk and Dr. Kissinger will be
in a better position to discuss their respective points of view in a mean-
ingful way at a mutually acceptable later date. Further conversations
between Dr. Kissinger and representatives of the PRC on the range of
issues that have already been partially discussed with Ambassador Huang
Chen could, of course, be discussed at that time as well.
The U. S. would be interested in the views of the Chinese side.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY- ES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9
W
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 2
Henry: The above would be handed over to Han Hsu. You might accom-
pany it with the following remarks:
-- I particularly regret that I am forced to suggest a delay because
we are receiving an increasing number of reports of developing Soviet
interest in (and perhaps involvement in) the Cambodian situation.
-- The Soviet Charge in Phnom Penh, for example, has recently
been in contact with senior officials of the Cambodian government
about how the USSR might be helpful in negotiations between the two
Cambodian sides. During those conversations, according to our reports,
the Charge rejected the idea of any dialogue with Sihanouk, whom he des -
cribed as unacceptable to the Khmer Rouge, and as outmoded.
-- We are extremely doubtful that Soviet involvement will be beneficial
to the interests of either of us.
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/18: LOC-HAK-462-7-2-9