MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 19, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
SANITIZED
COPY
FOLLOWS
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
DOS Review Completed.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
? --7(T 4,11111F tt71:
It is believed.that..the.U.S. side is. aware of the recent
developments in the situation in Cambodia. Of late, ?Samdech
Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and.the??National United.
Front and the. Royal Government of National Union led by him.
have repeatedly enunciated their position in public, reiteratins
the Five?loint Declaration of Larch 23, 1970, and demanding.
that the United states immediately end its bombing of Cambodia,
stop its military aids to the Lon Nol clique and withdraw all .
military personnel dispatched by .-"e United States and its
allies. In confor?ity with its consistent position stated to
the U.S. side on nany occasicns, the Chinese Side fully supports
the above Cambodian demands. Nevertheless, the U.S. side is
still obdurately continuing its bombing of Cambodia, intensifying
its support to the Ion Nol clique and ruttingpressure on
Samdech Sihanouk and the Royal Government of :Tational Union
:in other respects. This has all the more enraged Samdech
?Sihanouk, the Royal Government of National ?Union and the
Canbodian people. Under these circumstancesL the Chinese
Side holds that it is -obviously inappropriate to commUnicate
to Samdech Sihanouk the tentative thinking on the settlement
.of the Cambodian ousstion as set forth by the U.S. side in
late .The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of
this with Iranlmess.
The origin of the Cambodian questien is clear to the
U.S. side. "It is up to the doer to undo the knot." The key
to the settlement of the questien is held by the United .:tatee,
and not by others. If the United States "truly desires to
settle t'ae Cc-mbodian question, the above reasonable demands
raised by the Cambodian side should be ;aaceptable to it. It
is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious consideration
to this and translate it into action.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
et)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
I NJ . ?L..,
v73
1. The Chinese side has noted the proposal put
to the Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office Huang Chen
that Dr. Kissinger visit China on August 6. As the
first half of August is inconvenient to the Chinese
side, we would welcome Dr. Kissinger to visit China
on August 16.
2. The Chinese side suggests that the two sides
simultaneously publish the news of Dr. Hissinger's
visit to China on August 6 or 9. The contents of the
news to be published may be decided upon later through
consultations.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
"????=-^---
ii i r f r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
411 -
I/
I /
1. The Chinese side has noted the proposal put
to the Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office Huang Chen
that Dr. Kissinger visit China on August 6. As the
first half of August is inconvenient to the Chinese
side, we would welcome Dr. Kissinger to visit China
on August 16.
2. The Chinese side suggests that the two sides
simultaneously publish the news Of Dr. Kissingerrs
visit to China on August 6 or 2- The contents, of the
news to be published may be decided upon later through
consultations.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
DECLASSIFIED
Authority 2(:)/(;16,
HITE HOUSE
niNGTON
TOP stic
EXCLUSIVE
TIVE
$ ONLY
PANT
OF 0 VERSATION
141enry A.
CeneratEr*n
,
Lawrence tag
inoiton Lord
than T. Ho
rd Solcirn
W. Rodm
DATE AND TX
Thursday,
1:00 - 11:46 a.
Dr. Kissinger
The White Hous
ice
er convened meeting
om e PRC the previous evening (Tab A
to Cambodia, his prospective trip to Pext
relations; and how the U. S. should respo
o discuss he note received
s implications with respect
and the course of Sino-tl. S.
back
pointing out that
e of the U. S. -Chin
several months.. This note was clearly Int
ponemeOt of the Kissinger trip and an opti
involvement in negotiations for a, Cambodi
plete reversal a the Chinese position on b
. .
ach and every previous Kissinger tri
he meet with Sihanouk. Sihanouk
that we should negotiate with the Khmer
interjected. That is true, Mr. Kissin
trip, especially in February 1973, Combo
At the end of May we had made a proposal
convey it to Sihanouk once he returned fro
June 4 went to the extraordinary length 0
d agai
se relationship over the past
tided as a cancellation or po
g-out by the Chinese of any
n settlement. This was a corn
th counts.,
to ue
thddetubde: eB'hiniunntde:?ssnsec TheirPeueblescdehehds arn?e;detrsjtes'hunalesslIgylo.evilw?0e?1m:fY4:1411
andse
n.t atohtewCihthinheimt
eplie
travels.
badekptroapuossed
his
eciting a porposa_
- previous
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
? DECLASSIFIED
Authority i
Bye2t6) NARAflat
XCL
NS1T1VE
rs ONI,J4ir
-2-
any other sttbject. Ther orethistote represented a reneging on a. clear
i).ssurartce.
t hadltappehed in the interim? Mr. Kissinger asked. The Congressional
vote to cut off the bombing had destroyed the balance in Cambodia. It was
utegite the Chinese.couldnIt deliver,
bOmbint cutthoff had fundamentally c 4 the situation in Cambodia.
Formerly, Sihanouk's utility to the Tanner Rouge had been that he gave them
,tnacy Which they had not had. I.6W they 'didn't need legitimacy; they
saw theY c mild . Utility to the Chit:1*Se had been that he gave
them influence over tlie ithrrier Reugeittend c?esist ,,other outside influences.
The utility of the ChineSe'lt0 OS Was that they had Some control over Sihanouk.
Sihanouk 's utiltty to WI Was that, once he returned to Cambodia, be might
be able to keep things balaed.v Ironically the Chinese needed the Lou Nol
group--this was ao restraint on Sihanouk and on the Khmer Rouge. The Con-
4reescaen had totally misjudged'the bituation. Now this was an lost. Siha-
noulecouldnIt .deliverthe Khmer Rouge and the Chinese couldn't deliver
With respect to the trip, the Chinese had virtually agreed in June that it
we4414 take plane in early August. They had invited us to choose any date we
wanted We had then proposed August 6. They had spread the word around
that4twould be early August and had even leaked the date of August 6th to
the press in Peking. But then Huang Chen was called back the beginning of
this rnetiliz, and we received the note that they couldn't reply on a date until
he Sot to Peking. We had yet to receive a reply to our proposed dates for
the trip and for the announcement. We had first proposed 3uly 16 for the
announcement. But July 16 had come aud. gone, The Chinese had to know
that this delay in repl.ying,and the turn-around on Cambodia, meant a post-
poustuent.
This Was a conscious decision, Mr. Kissinger concluded. The question was
whether it reflected only the Cambodian issue or something more fundamental
that was happening to the relationship. Brent had told Han Hsu that Dr. Kis
singer's authority would be undermined if he came back empty-handed on
Cambodia and that he and the E'residentvere the key men who embodied Amer-
ican support for China for the right reasons. All this talk about 25 years of
mutual eStrangerttent was crap. What the Chinese wanted Was support in a
railitary contingency. We might not be able to pull it off, but at-least he and
the President understood this. Alex Eckstein and other chowder-headed
liberals loved China but if you asked them about military actions in a con-
tingency they'd have 600 heart attache. Liberals kept talking about how is ala-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
tion was so psychologically disturbing to the Chinese. It might have been
ally disturbing to us, but..it.'wasnit to the Chinese. For 344000
t bother them to be isolated They've been self-contained more
ontact with the rest of the world, and they have the
ndle it quite well.
was ter yen
6
ajo them. To assessquestion--this wa
r. Kissinger had cafled together P.
It had to be a
the real reason
ointedz out the disastrous u tion with Chou En-
lai. Chou bad been visibly angered by 1 s attempt to engage him with
the.Congreso,Againet the F'residerkkp,Magnuson had talked for 45 minutes
about Cambodia in spite of everyone else's efforts to get off the subject.
While Chou attacked the'USI.Soviet nuclear agreement, and uttered some
harsh words about the Cambodian bombing, Magnuson t d the role of
Congress in cutting off the bombing and repeatedly urged Chouto 'Be patient.
It'll.lse over soon." Jenkins and Haldridge Mr. Solomon noted, thought
that the tone of the note may have reflected their irritation at g aeon's per-
formance. Mr. l(issinger said he had thought that was a stupid point. There
was something more fundamental underlying this. He suggested that from a
coldly calculated Chinese point of view they now saw a paralyzed President
un*-41P to provide firm support immatters'.affecting their security. This may
have made them now question.the value of our relationship. General Scowcroft
mphasized that the Chinese wanted firm action from the U.S.
Solomon turned again to the Cambodian aspect. Sihanouk had displayed
n powerlessness and admitted he could be only a figurehead in asserting
hould now talk to the Khmer Rouge, This was probably true. In
ion, the Chinese might not want biante,, expose his weakness in negotia
with us, as they probably hoped to use him as a point of influence' in
Cambodia in the future. NOT, ,would the Chinese,leader ship want to expose
themselves to criticism from domestic or foreign sources for pressuring an
evidently successful "people's war" into compromising negotiations on the
eve of an apparent victory. Certainly not before a Party Congress.
Mr. leburger
+ suggested that the unfortunate Juxtaposition of press leaks
here ab"delicate negotiations inprogress" and the Kissinger trip to
Peking may have provoked a change in the Chinese attitude. He asked if
some members of the Chinese leadership might not be saying that China had,
y or unwittingly, been used by the Americans to obtain a 45-day
on of the bombing.
Missinger responded that the bombing cutoff as the decisive thing, not
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
the b
May.
Con re
kinger
134ore,
he Klub**
Chi
br
bad been bombing theliejeans?out of them &too
sincect been no intensification of the bombing the
,
General .ScoWer..o.ft. confirmed thiS,.. Next to.
hurt..br.,thabortibing cutoff were the
? , . ?
gave them and Sthanouk, something they could deliver to
Now
If the
et. 13.0,,
worked Qiit. 41; t
their influence for '?it T':o.Mea across as a
ely a ,?
e
between us and them.
c o
OT Would make
This time, the
reply at all to
di
was Chei standard
been relatively abusiv
public statements. Mr. Kissinesaid he was
bombing. But this was nevertheless in marked
previous exchanges with us OA the subject and with the
d with them, on Vietnam. On Vietnam when they had
say in a message, they would always have other things to
clear in other ways that this did not hurt our relationship.
failure to reiterate the invitation, and indeed the failure to
our date proposal, was a major step, and very puzzling
ed that we had established
Cambodia and the trip. They were on the spot a
By commenting only on Cambodia they may have been trYingt
break and separate t146 two issues. They wanted to make a
between move-
ouldn't deliver.
make a clean
cipled stand. "
ne of the previous few months had been. Mr. Kis-
omo,,
sked how they bad taken the Brezhnev visit. They
tride, Mr. Kissinger replied. They didn't like the nuclear
said so in very restrained fashion. General Scowcroft .
ively..we..had.?cons.alted.with tti..,.p141.....9n that,
that there was no other evidence of a basic shift in the
ard the U. S. On the contrary, three days before, Mao himself had
e unusual step of receiving a Chinese-American nuclear physicist,
and then Chou had had a banquet for him. This was an unmistakable signal
Chinese people and overseas Chinese that the Sino-U. S. relationship w
n. And, Madame Mao's appearance with Ambassador Bruce at the
ketball game a few weeks before showed that the very people whq might
e been cbailenging the rapprochement with the U. S. were now solidly
d up wit:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
DECLASS
Authority '1'.(21,t;r3
By.eit4) NARA
4 that this was all people-to.
I line.
and did not
he issue of the Chinese seeing a paralyzed Pr
to provide themselves with a little more flexibility,
ct to the Russians. There Was no question about the
off a Kissinger trip, particularly after the Brezhnev
n pointed out that the Chinese message was a response
to a stion we bad put, namely, what could we expect on Cambodia? They
Lying us an honest answer. We bad I the trip with Cambodia. It
being left to us how to respond. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that the
sponse Wa,..S unmistakably a postponement of the trip. They could
done any one of a number of things to take the edge off the Cambodian
ponding in any way to our proposed date would have done this.
could have said, 'We can't do anything for you on Cambodia but we are
o have you on August 6.-or some other date.n Mr. Rodman suggested
hey might not want to propose August 6 knowing itwas now impossible
us to come. General Scovocroft stated that there were a hundred other
they could have played it.
Mr, Ea.gleburger.concluded that we were simply not going to be able to
Mr.Xissingeris question as to why the Chinese had behaved in this way.
The discussion then turned to how to respond. It was agreed that we should
answer the Cambodian note in strong terms and also postpone the trip. Mr.
Kissinger said that we should have Bruce deliver a tough note on Cambodia
which would express regret that for the first time in our relationship the
Chinese word had not counted. We should just list all the things they had
said before--their assurances that they would convey our proposal to Sihanouk.
There had been no change in the situation. The idea that we had to communicate
with Sihanouk through Mauritania was absurd. Sihanouk was in Peking. And
the Chinese themselves had said they couldn't contact Sihanouk when he was
abroad because it wasn't secure.
wer
We should try to find out what their message means about our relationship.
We should have Bruce go in and sound out ChTiao Kuan-hua about the status
of our relations generally. We should say we are asking Bruce to have a
general review of Sino-American relations. If they answer, we '11 find out.
Even if they give us no answers, that in itself is an answer. Either way, we
learn something. We should have Bruce deliver a stern message on Cambodia
and then raise the other questions orally. We should do that next week, on the
24th or 25th.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
DECLASSfl
had no choice but to postpone the trip with a cool note.
ould give a note to Han Hsu here doing this, Mr. Kissinger
or propose discussion 'some
s. e aboutr,itci7e m d. t,h,e T
whethercold."t fth7e li o second
should
s question
? propose
The
Oant weaadate
o
The note should o
hould propose the text heavy ofTaje
joint sAnouncernont,or ask them for
al on an announcement. would put them on the spot. A
impact. But we had to have SOMe
,
t "Min:. nt would havest Kissinger said, , or at leaSt some answer to give to press
aCase as August went by there of
uldsureiybe, a flood of press 0
We could just
,. say that because scheduling difficulties the two
to postpone until September.
At5:00 p.m. OA July 19, Han Hsu delivered a second Chinese
note (r a b B) proposing that Mr. Kissinger come on August 16. By the end
was tentatively decided to respond to the two Chinese notes in
they had done--replying to Cambodia on one day arid proposing
ip on the second day. It would be done here, on paper, with
as now no need for Bruce to raise "fundamental questions"
of the day
quence,
epternbe
Han Hsu. The
Ch' Lao.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4