MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
December 8, 2010
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 19, 1973
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4.pdf1.78 MB
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 SANITIZED COPY FOLLOWS ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY DOS Review Completed. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 ? --7(T 4,11111F tt71: It is believed.that..the.U.S. side is. aware of the recent developments in the situation in Cambodia. Of late, ?Samdech Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and.the??National United. Front and the. Royal Government of National Union led by him. have repeatedly enunciated their position in public, reiteratins the Five?loint Declaration of Larch 23, 1970, and demanding. that the United states immediately end its bombing of Cambodia, stop its military aids to the Lon Nol clique and withdraw all . military personnel dispatched by .-"e United States and its allies. In confor?ity with its consistent position stated to the U.S. side on nany occasicns, the Chinese Side fully supports the above Cambodian demands. Nevertheless, the U.S. side is still obdurately continuing its bombing of Cambodia, intensifying its support to the Ion Nol clique and ruttingpressure on Samdech Sihanouk and the Royal Government of :Tational Union :in other respects. This has all the more enraged Samdech ?Sihanouk, the Royal Government of National ?Union and the Canbodian people. Under these circumstancesL the Chinese Side holds that it is -obviously inappropriate to commUnicate to Samdech Sihanouk the tentative thinking on the settlement .of the Cambodian ousstion as set forth by the U.S. side in late .The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of this with Iranlmess. The origin of the Cambodian questien is clear to the U.S. side. "It is up to the doer to undo the knot." The key to the settlement of the questien is held by the United .:tatee, and not by others. If the United States "truly desires to settle t'ae Cc-mbodian question, the above reasonable demands raised by the Cambodian side should be ;aaceptable to it. It is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious consideration to this and translate it into action. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 et) No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 I NJ . ?L.., v73 1. The Chinese side has noted the proposal put to the Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office Huang Chen that Dr. Kissinger visit China on August 6. As the first half of August is inconvenient to the Chinese side, we would welcome Dr. Kissinger to visit China on August 16. 2. The Chinese side suggests that the two sides simultaneously publish the news of Dr. Hissinger's visit to China on August 6 or 9. The contents of the news to be published may be decided upon later through consultations. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 "????=-^--- ii i r f r No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 411 - I/ I / 1. The Chinese side has noted the proposal put to the Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office Huang Chen that Dr. Kissinger visit China on August 6. As the first half of August is inconvenient to the Chinese side, we would welcome Dr. Kissinger to visit China on August 16. 2. The Chinese side suggests that the two sides simultaneously publish the news Of Dr. Kissingerrs visit to China on August 6 or 2- The contents, of the news to be published may be decided upon later through consultations. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 DECLASSIFIED Authority 2(:)/(;16, HITE HOUSE niNGTON TOP stic EXCLUSIVE TIVE $ ONLY PANT OF 0 VERSATION 141enry A. CeneratEr*n , Lawrence tag inoiton Lord than T. Ho rd Solcirn W. Rodm DATE AND TX Thursday, 1:00 - 11:46 a. Dr. Kissinger The White Hous ice er convened meeting om e PRC the previous evening (Tab A to Cambodia, his prospective trip to Pext relations; and how the U. S. should respo o discuss he note received s implications with respect and the course of Sino-tl. S. back pointing out that e of the U. S. -Chin several months.. This note was clearly Int ponemeOt of the Kissinger trip and an opti involvement in negotiations for a, Cambodi plete reversal a the Chinese position on b . . ach and every previous Kissinger tri he meet with Sihanouk. Sihanouk that we should negotiate with the Khmer interjected. That is true, Mr. Kissin trip, especially in February 1973, Combo At the end of May we had made a proposal convey it to Sihanouk once he returned fro June 4 went to the extraordinary length 0 d agai se relationship over the past tided as a cancellation or po g-out by the Chinese of any n settlement. This was a corn th counts., to ue thddetubde: eB'hiniunntde:?ssnsec TheirPeueblescdehehds arn?e;detrsjtes'hunalesslIgylo.evilw?0e?1m:fY4:1411 andse n.t atohtewCihthinheimt eplie travels. badekptroapuossed his eciting a porposa_ - previous No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 ? DECLASSIFIED Authority i Bye2t6) NARAflat XCL NS1T1VE rs ONI,J4ir -2- any other sttbject. Ther orethistote represented a reneging on a. clear i).ssurartce. t hadltappehed in the interim? Mr. Kissinger asked. The Congressional vote to cut off the bombing had destroyed the balance in Cambodia. It was utegite the Chinese.couldnIt deliver, bOmbint cutthoff had fundamentally c 4 the situation in Cambodia. Formerly, Sihanouk's utility to the Tanner Rouge had been that he gave them ,tnacy Which they had not had. I.6W they 'didn't need legitimacy; they saw theY c mild . Utility to the Chit:1*Se had been that he gave them influence over tlie ithrrier Reugeittend c?esist ,,other outside influences. The utility of the ChineSe'lt0 OS Was that they had Some control over Sihanouk. Sihanouk 's utiltty to WI Was that, once he returned to Cambodia, be might be able to keep things balaed.v Ironically the Chinese needed the Lou Nol group--this was ao restraint on Sihanouk and on the Khmer Rouge. The Con- 4reescaen had totally misjudged'the bituation. Now this was an lost. Siha- noulecouldnIt .deliverthe Khmer Rouge and the Chinese couldn't deliver With respect to the trip, the Chinese had virtually agreed in June that it we4414 take plane in early August. They had invited us to choose any date we wanted We had then proposed August 6. They had spread the word around that4twould be early August and had even leaked the date of August 6th to the press in Peking. But then Huang Chen was called back the beginning of this rnetiliz, and we received the note that they couldn't reply on a date until he Sot to Peking. We had yet to receive a reply to our proposed dates for the trip and for the announcement. We had first proposed 3uly 16 for the announcement. But July 16 had come aud. gone, The Chinese had to know that this delay in repl.ying,and the turn-around on Cambodia, meant a post- poustuent. This Was a conscious decision, Mr. Kissinger concluded. The question was whether it reflected only the Cambodian issue or something more fundamental that was happening to the relationship. Brent had told Han Hsu that Dr. Kis singer's authority would be undermined if he came back empty-handed on Cambodia and that he and the E'residentvere the key men who embodied Amer- ican support for China for the right reasons. All this talk about 25 years of mutual eStrangerttent was crap. What the Chinese wanted Was support in a railitary contingency. We might not be able to pull it off, but at-least he and the President understood this. Alex Eckstein and other chowder-headed liberals loved China but if you asked them about military actions in a con- tingency they'd have 600 heart attache. Liberals kept talking about how is ala- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 tion was so psychologically disturbing to the Chinese. It might have been ally disturbing to us, but..it.'wasnit to the Chinese. For 344000 t bother them to be isolated They've been self-contained more ontact with the rest of the world, and they have the ndle it quite well. was ter yen 6 ajo them. To assessquestion--this wa r. Kissinger had cafled together P. It had to be a the real reason ointedz out the disastrous u tion with Chou En- lai. Chou bad been visibly angered by 1 s attempt to engage him with the.Congreso,Againet the F'residerkkp,Magnuson had talked for 45 minutes about Cambodia in spite of everyone else's efforts to get off the subject. While Chou attacked the'USI.Soviet nuclear agreement, and uttered some harsh words about the Cambodian bombing, Magnuson t d the role of Congress in cutting off the bombing and repeatedly urged Chouto 'Be patient. It'll.lse over soon." Jenkins and Haldridge Mr. Solomon noted, thought that the tone of the note may have reflected their irritation at g aeon's per- formance. Mr. l(issinger said he had thought that was a stupid point. There was something more fundamental underlying this. He suggested that from a coldly calculated Chinese point of view they now saw a paralyzed President un*-41P to provide firm support immatters'.affecting their security. This may have made them now question.the value of our relationship. General Scowcroft mphasized that the Chinese wanted firm action from the U.S. Solomon turned again to the Cambodian aspect. Sihanouk had displayed n powerlessness and admitted he could be only a figurehead in asserting hould now talk to the Khmer Rouge, This was probably true. In ion, the Chinese might not want biante,, expose his weakness in negotia with us, as they probably hoped to use him as a point of influence' in Cambodia in the future. NOT, ,would the Chinese,leader ship want to expose themselves to criticism from domestic or foreign sources for pressuring an evidently successful "people's war" into compromising negotiations on the eve of an apparent victory. Certainly not before a Party Congress. Mr. leburger + suggested that the unfortunate Juxtaposition of press leaks here ab"delicate negotiations inprogress" and the Kissinger trip to Peking may have provoked a change in the Chinese attitude. He asked if some members of the Chinese leadership might not be saying that China had, y or unwittingly, been used by the Americans to obtain a 45-day on of the bombing. Missinger responded that the bombing cutoff as the decisive thing, not No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 the b May. Con re kinger 134ore, he Klub** Chi br bad been bombing theliejeans?out of them &too sincect been no intensification of the bombing the , General .ScoWer..o.ft. confirmed thiS,.. Next to. hurt..br.,thabortibing cutoff were the ? , . ? gave them and Sthanouk, something they could deliver to Now If the et. 13.0,, worked Qiit. 41; t their influence for '?it T':o.Mea across as a ely a ,? e between us and them. c o OT Would make This time, the reply at all to di was Chei standard been relatively abusiv public statements. Mr. Kissinesaid he was bombing. But this was nevertheless in marked previous exchanges with us OA the subject and with the d with them, on Vietnam. On Vietnam when they had say in a message, they would always have other things to clear in other ways that this did not hurt our relationship. failure to reiterate the invitation, and indeed the failure to our date proposal, was a major step, and very puzzling ed that we had established Cambodia and the trip. They were on the spot a By commenting only on Cambodia they may have been trYingt break and separate t146 two issues. They wanted to make a between move- ouldn't deliver. make a clean cipled stand. " ne of the previous few months had been. Mr. Kis- omo,, sked how they bad taken the Brezhnev visit. They tride, Mr. Kissinger replied. They didn't like the nuclear said so in very restrained fashion. General Scowcroft . ively..we..had.?cons.alted.with tti..,.p141.....9n that, that there was no other evidence of a basic shift in the ard the U. S. On the contrary, three days before, Mao himself had e unusual step of receiving a Chinese-American nuclear physicist, and then Chou had had a banquet for him. This was an unmistakable signal Chinese people and overseas Chinese that the Sino-U. S. relationship w n. And, Madame Mao's appearance with Ambassador Bruce at the ketball game a few weeks before showed that the very people whq might e been cbailenging the rapprochement with the U. S. were now solidly d up wit: No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 DECLASS Authority '1'.(21,t;r3 By.eit4) NARA 4 that this was all people-to. I line. and did not he issue of the Chinese seeing a paralyzed Pr to provide themselves with a little more flexibility, ct to the Russians. There Was no question about the off a Kissinger trip, particularly after the Brezhnev n pointed out that the Chinese message was a response to a stion we bad put, namely, what could we expect on Cambodia? They Lying us an honest answer. We bad I the trip with Cambodia. It being left to us how to respond. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that the sponse Wa,..S unmistakably a postponement of the trip. They could done any one of a number of things to take the edge off the Cambodian ponding in any way to our proposed date would have done this. could have said, 'We can't do anything for you on Cambodia but we are o have you on August 6.-or some other date.n Mr. Rodman suggested hey might not want to propose August 6 knowing itwas now impossible us to come. General Scovocroft stated that there were a hundred other they could have played it. Mr, Ea.gleburger.concluded that we were simply not going to be able to Mr.Xissingeris question as to why the Chinese had behaved in this way. The discussion then turned to how to respond. It was agreed that we should answer the Cambodian note in strong terms and also postpone the trip. Mr. Kissinger said that we should have Bruce deliver a tough note on Cambodia which would express regret that for the first time in our relationship the Chinese word had not counted. We should just list all the things they had said before--their assurances that they would convey our proposal to Sihanouk. There had been no change in the situation. The idea that we had to communicate with Sihanouk through Mauritania was absurd. Sihanouk was in Peking. And the Chinese themselves had said they couldn't contact Sihanouk when he was abroad because it wasn't secure. wer We should try to find out what their message means about our relationship. We should have Bruce go in and sound out ChTiao Kuan-hua about the status of our relations generally. We should say we are asking Bruce to have a general review of Sino-American relations. If they answer, we '11 find out. Even if they give us no answers, that in itself is an answer. Either way, we learn something. We should have Bruce deliver a stern message on Cambodia and then raise the other questions orally. We should do that next week, on the 24th or 25th. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4 DECLASSfl had no choice but to postpone the trip with a cool note. ould give a note to Han Hsu here doing this, Mr. Kissinger or propose discussion 'some s. e aboutr,itci7e m d. t,h,e T whethercold."t fth7e li o second should s question ? propose The Oant weaadate o The note should o hould propose the text heavy ofTaje joint sAnouncernont,or ask them for al on an announcement. would put them on the spot. A impact. But we had to have SOMe , t "Min:. nt would havest Kissinger said, , or at leaSt some answer to give to press aCase as August went by there of uldsureiybe, a flood of press 0 We could just ,. say that because scheduling difficulties the two to postpone until September. At5:00 p.m. OA July 19, Han Hsu delivered a second Chinese note (r a b B) proposing that Mr. Kissinger come on August 16. By the end was tentatively decided to respond to the two Chinese notes in they had done--replying to Cambodia on one day arid proposing ip on the second day. It would be done here, on paper, with as now no need for Bruce to raise "fundamental questions" of the day quence, epternbe Han Hsu. The Ch' Lao. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/08: LOC-HAK-462-7-7-4