MY VISIT TO CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-9-16-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 19, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
T-OP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY.EYES` ONLY November 19, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
My Visit to China
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Overview
The four-day visit to the People's Republic of China was a positive
success on all planes. The two and three-quarter hour session with
Chairman Mao (the fact that it was the longest session with a foreign
official in recent years is of itself very significant); fourteen hours of
private meetings and several more of informal conversation with Prime
Minister Chou; additional talks with Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on
sightseeing tours;.and six hours of counterpart meetings on technical
bilateral issues added up to the following:
-- Confirmation and deepening of the close identity between you
and the Chinese leaders' strategic perspectives on the international
situation. As I pointed out after my February 1973 trip, we have become
tacit allies. We share essentially the same views about the Soviet strategy
(though the Chinese are firmly convinced of Soviet hegemonial ambitions
while we still hold out the possibility that our combination of firmness and
negotiation. can steer Moscow on a constructive course); the necessity of
a strong American- world role and defense capability; and the strategic
importance of Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and the Near East-South
Asia axis.
-- A positive. joint communique that expands our existing bilateral
relationship and establishes the framework for further forward movement.
The key element in the document- -indeed the most significant development
of the visit--is the breakthrough proposed by Chou on Taiwan that requires
only that the "principle" of one China be respected as we normalize rela-
tions. We now have to explore how to give concrete expression to this
concept which could provide an opening for maintaining a substantial bilateral
tie with Taiwan as and when we establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.
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-- Clear statements on Mao and Chou of support for your firm
cli` lomac and their strong hope that you will surmount domestic
difficulties. They were scathing in their criticism both of the neoisola-
tionists in the United States and those whom they consider are exaggerating
? and exploiting Watergate to attack you.
-- Recognition by the Chinese of your position that a militar
flareu in Indochina will have adverse effects on our mutual interests.
Chou strongly suggested that they have throttled way down their assistance
to North Vietnam and Cambodia. He stated that there would be no major
offensive in South Vietnam in the near term. On Cambodia, the Chinese
seemed content to let the parties further exhaust themselves on the battle-
field to get into a negotiating mood; he did not pick up my offer to listen
to their (or Sihanouk's) ideas on a settlement.
-- A continuing warm reception for our party, , including trul major
coverage of our activities in the Chinese press.
Progress with Some Caveats
These elements constitute substantial forward progress. The driving
force on the Chinese side remains their preoccupation with the Soviet
Union which infuses their discussion of every major international issue.
heir crucial-calculation is the steadiness and strength of America as a
courweight. In this regard your strong handling of the Middle East,
particularly the alert, - Chou called you more courageous than President
ennedy as a leader - was an ideal prelude to my visit. It served the
same purpose that your policy during the 1971 Indian subcontinent did
in the period between my first trip and your summit conversations.
Your strong policies, the Chinese concerns about encirclement, our
developing mutual trust and reliability the past few years, our profound
exchanges at the highest levels have all combined to move us forward
at a steady pace. In addition, the two major obstacles to improvement
in relations have been eased: last January's Vietnam settlement all but
removed Indochina as an impediment, though Cambodia is a lingering
problem; and the Chinese continue to show patience on Taiwan and may
have supplied us with a breakthrough on this trip with their one China
principle formula in the communique.
We cannot by any means be complacent about our relationship, however.
The following caveats are in order:
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The Sino-Soviet Split. We have been in probably the ideal situa-
tion with regard to the two communist giants: they both want and need to
deal with us because they cannot deal with one another. We are walking a
delicate tightrope of public detente with Moscow and tacit alliance with
Peking. This will continue to require the most careful handling. The
meticulous care and feeding of the Chinese on our Soviet policy has paid
off, but Peking sees our detente pursuit as .at least objectively threatening
its security, whatever our motives. And even if we don't make mistakes,
events beyond our control could turn one or the other against us or propel
them toward each other.
The U. S. Domestic Scene. Our domestic situation clearly
troubles the Chinese. For the short term they are worried about the
attacks on you and hope you will overcome them. More fundamentally,
they are wary of our domestic and Congressional mood which they see
potentially leading to American disengagement from the world. Once they
become convinced that we cannot or will not act as a major force on a
global scale, we will lose our principal value to them. In this case,
Taiwan and other bilateral pursuits notwithstanding, they would be likely to
explore other alternatives.
__ The Chinese Leadership Succession. Mao and Chou both looked
well and demonstrated their usual mental prowess (Mao more than ever).
But they are old, and there appears in any event to be some domestic
challenge to them, though probably mostly on domestic issues. We just
don't know much about their politics -- nor does any other outside country.
We have no idea who will succeed the present leadership or what their foreign
policy tendencies will be. The one element we can be certain of is that
they will not be as far-sighted or as sophisticated as Mao and Chou, who
may well be the most impressive twosome in history. A worrisorrie aspect
is the fact that on all our trips we have dealt with a restricted circle of
Chou and his lieutenants. We have had virtually no contact with other
elements of the political leadership, such as the Shanghai radicals. Since
a reasonable case can be made for accommodation with Moscow or some
other option than their present course, we have no assurance that the PRC
will continue its policy toward us when Mao and Chou depart. This puts a
premium on solidifying our relationship while the current leadership is
directing their policy.
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p
orl the basis of confa.rming t e pr
we might be able to continue a substantial relaltcatlshilr wtiith 1'.6w.411 when
Lion of relations between %alixlia -~,~ -- - Thiw raartt~;e$trc that
le of one Ghina.
h inci
-_ We have agreed to expand the scope of the functicnri of the
Liaison Offices". This will result in larger missions perfori-ainl; wider
tasks. They are becoming embassies in all but name
We will work for the further development of tr:ule. "Tits h.19
already reached the level of some $900 million in exhorts to the 1111C. (and
less than $100 million Chinese export to us). We made major progress
on the principal technical issues which should expand trade farther.
_. We have arranged "a number of new exchatw.eti for the coit,ing
year." This program is important both substantvt?ly in ltronaoti--t; rri,-tual
knowledge and awareness, and symbolically in highlighting the progrt?8s of
our relations.
In addition, Chou tabled language that provides the framework ftir Harr:-lida-
central bilateral problem in the coming period, T;6wv crt; `~. .
TT_:,.,"1 csCItI?M can hr rc?.alt>tcrl only
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The Joint Communique
As I have already reported, the communique we issued is a pcaetitive.
document and contains a possible breakthrough on the funclanient ti
question of Taiwan.
The Shanghai Communique established a framework and principle mm for Our
relationship. Since your trip we have given these concrete exprrrarsiuns.
This communique further accelerates momentum in these- areas:
__ It expands the principle of opposing hegemony from the Asia-
Pacific region to "any other part of the world." This reflects our
parallel strategic interests and sends some clear, though stufttciently
muted signals to Moscow.
We have extended the process of consultation "to ni.tint.-in
frequent contact at authoritative levels" and "to engage in concrete
consultations". In addition to suggesting closer coll,abor.ation in general,
it balances off somewhat our consultation procedures with the Ru:etci;"ans
under the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War.
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we establish diplomatic relations with Peking so long as we maintain the
"principle" of one China. They may be willing to settle for considerable
autonomy for Taiwan and continuing U. S. ties so long as the nominal
juridical framework reflects the one China approach. Our task now is
to come up with some formulas that can begin to move toward this goal.
--They are clearly ready to hear from us,_I said that we would get back to
them within a few weeks.
Thus once again the Chinese have demonstrated their patience and
shrewdness with respect to this delicate issue. Just as the Shanghai
Communique formula allowed us to launch our bilateral relationship so
may this one allow us to proceed eventually to diplomatic relations while
continuing close ties (as yet undefined) with Taiwan.
More generally, this communique follows the pattern of previous ones by
fleshing out the framework already established and shaping a fresh frame-
work for the next stage.
The Meeting with Mao
I have already sent you the highlights of this extraordinary session. The
Chairman looked much. healthier and thinner than last February when in
turn he looked much better than during your trip. (It is now clear in
retrospect that he was quite ill when you saw him.) He moved and walked
unaided and used his hands continuously and expressively as he talked in
his slow, low, gravelly tones.
Mentally he was extremely impressive, improving his previous performances.
He led the conversation, covered all major international issues with
subtlety and incisiveness and an unerring knack at striking the essential
c].ords in a seemingly casual way. By the time he was finished he had
sketched their strategic vision comprehensively and laid down the essen-
tial elements of their policies region by region. He went from issue to
issue in an ostensibly random, but always purposeful, manner. And all
of this was done without a single note of his own or prompting by Chou, who
once again was clearly deferential in his presence.
Throughout he employed his
The Chairman obviously enjoyed himself.
earthy phrasing and bawdy humor to illustrate a point or color a tone; the
females present laughed easily, almost coquettishly and were again at
ease in his presence. After the conversation had gone beyond one and
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three quarters hours, several on the Chinese side looked at their watches
and made tentative moves to close out the meeting, but Mao prolonged
the talk and toward the end engaged in exchanges on philosophy.
Indeed one of the striking aspects of the visit was the fact that this time
_Mao presented the bulk of the Chinese positions while Chou generally
stuck to details and asking questions and making comments on our posi-
tions. Before, Chou had taken his cue from Mao but made extensive
substantive presentations of his own.
The Chairman was virogously supportive of you, as I have reported. He
praised your strong policies, singling out the recent alert and Middle East
policy generally. He found your actions much firmer and steadier than
the Cuban missile crisis scenario.
He discussed the Watergate events in bawdy fashion, calling g it no more
than a breaking of wind the ' -eter had amusing dif_ficulty e con-
sidered the incident meagre, yet much chaos was being made of it and
"we are not happy about it." He pointed out that other domestic policies,
especially economic, were going well. I assured him you would surmount
your current troubles and explained the domestic political tides.
Mao was also concerned in general about trends in America toward dis-
engagement. He asked me if we would revert to isolationism if the
Democrats took office. I said that many (not all) of them would want to
move in that direction but objective reality would prevent them at some
point; the problem was how much damage would already have taken place
before they checked this trend. On the whole I thought that future Admin-
istrations would have to pursue the same general course, though perhaps
in less complex fashion than your tactics. I emphasized that in any event
these concerns pointed up the need to solidify U. S.-Chinese relations now
so there would be no alternative for successors.
The world wide preoccupation with the Soviet Union once again dominated
his conversation. Almost every subject was linked to this theme. He
painted the global Soviet threat and recounted how he had contempuously
rejected their offers, direct and through emissaries, for improved rela-
tions. I rehearsed our own, less direct policy with Moscow. The Chinese
still remain somewhat suspicious of our approach, especially of the
objective dangers of false detente; the Chairman compared our policy to
shadow-boxing in contrast to their more straightforward opposition. I also
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d that the Soviet threat to China seemed to shave aandcthe d
air ,0 acknowledge osition to these pres
since my last visit` I repeated our opP
dangers we saw in a Soviet attack. He made clear that they didn't want a
g
war but were prepared if necessarye
et Union
Mao seemed basically optimistic about containing the Sovi,
Indeed, -n, th~~ allie
Chin citing his familiar axis of potential
East-. Asia axis a, He a~l;:.xin
United States, Europe and the
stressed the importance of our working nl elymilita these ou `t(riin _
maintaining close ties with Japan, keeping our Middle Europe; and countering Soviet influence Pershan Gulf an athc clnClraT1 ocean.
now doing), Pakistan, Ixaxl, India,
outlined our efforts to support these various countries; offset Soviet
I
influence; maintain a strong national defense; keep forces in .,urcype:
anchor Japan securely, etc.
He was very worried ;~boLtt
We discussed several specific countries. e .~' utltrcled Ira Soviet influence in the radical Arab in theeregion 11yfle cqr ticiz d ltbvir
fluence
Cur efforts to increase our in
Chief of their Liaison Office in Washington their standard pro Arab tline.t()7'lYe for his recent
sed
h
ear
on the Middle East which re
made clear that Ambassador Huang o of the regian~.lr
t conflict.
Chairman o
the more important U. S. -Soviet strategic aspect
Mao was both patient and somewhat ~ an irnportan
relations. He said that the Taiwan issue "is not the Soviet Union) is an
issue of the overall international situation (i.e. ' Ltcstion or tbat of
The PRC would not rush us on this q
important one a he stated. After all, their relations with -ls were
tic relations, with .~? 10111 they
R nci India,
diploma
httu also ni icle
better than those with countries like the USS a
diplomatic ties; the Liaison offices "could rdo." the S
llowuT us to ties 111,1t move with l-rthr'1pid age
have (.rvi(*t (includin some elusive references d flex bility to
a
Baltic states) that sugges and we emerged with
followed up for clarification with Chou,
in the Communique.
suggested that they would not use force It,. (li,lrr't bc li(ve in
he ng. aint
ong pointing to their reSwith the counter-revol tionaries, Vitt 1'('kirt~;
Ou
peaceful transition
wait 600 years should be island. In Iny event ' b%i the yu.>nt of the small from this issue and., 11milLi" take
relations with us s shoo
so long.
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I will shortly send you the full transcript of this remarkable conversation.
Meetings with .Ch.ou
I have already given you the highlights of my conversation with Chou.
They were stimulating, and he was impressive as always, but his role
was considerably more subordinate to Mao's this trip. As I have indicated
in earlier reports, our first meeting was taken up largely by my presen-
tation of our position on major international issues, with Chou commenting
and probing. The second session was largely a holding action of ques-
tions from him while they prepared for my meeting with the Chairman.
And the meetings on the final day largely consisted of his elaborations of
Mao's basic lines; sensitive exchanges about the strategic international
scene; discussion of bilateral matters, including trade; and negotiation of
the communique.
Following are the major points that emerged from these sessions:
_.> He strongly praised your Middle East policy and our growing
dialogue with the Arabs. He indicated he had been helpful with Egypt.
He suggested we talk directly to Syria; was suspicious of Iraq; urged
inclusion of the Palestinians in the negotiations; and shared our positive
view of the Shah. On the alert he compared you favorably with President
Kennedy and suggested the incident gave us a chance to increase our
defense budget.
On Vietnam, Chou said that the North Vietnamese leaders have
assured him they have no desire of launching a major offensive. lie claimed
the material moving south was for rebuilding roads and building tip produc-
tion. From what the Chinese know, Hanoi has no intention of launching a
major attack. He alluded to the gradual political evolu the d' t eI had told
th I underlined
i
d l
.
ive w
him on previous visits we coul
North Vietnamese offensive.
_ Chou declared that their friends in Cam a were complaining
about lack of military support from Hanoi which according to hin, is
"extremely meagre." He didn't foresee major fighting in Cambodia;
favored a political settlement; and thought the area should be peaceful and
neutral. He also indicated opposition to Sihanouk's return and it Soviet
desire to have their "hand in the pile."
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Chou pointed to vigorous efforts by Moscow to the sou of
China. He urged support of Pakistan and approved our building a port
there. I reaffirmed our policies and said that we were also trying
gradually to improve relations with New Delhi to counter Soviet influence
ther e.
Discussion on Korea was restricted to the ongoing discussions
in the United Nations. The Chinese had just given us a satisfactory
as they allies.
compromise solution in New York anwa.th needed time to line them on timing uplontheir
I agreed that we would work closely
stuck by their substantive position.
He thought we should come closer to 12 pan on defense matters
hat_,'t
1- ?mbrella) and indicated he agreed L
alone. I emphasized the importance oi
and not subjected to too many pressures.
-- Chou criticized Allende's rashness in Chile and Che Quevara's
he in effect said that the
adventurism. In response to my comments,
PRC would not cause trouble in Latin America.
I went over our Soviet strategy in some detail, including our
rationale for the agreement which you had used during the Middle East
alert. He continually sounded their by now familiar preoccupations.
__ Chou strongly supported NATO and our troop presence in
Eura e. He said he would continue to educate European leaders, beginning
with Heath who will visit Peking soon.
- I reaffirmed our intentions on Taiwan in' political terms and out-
fined our plans concerning our military presence.
At his own initiative, Chou said he would not attend the United
Nations session next fall.
I described to Chou, as I did later to Mao, our domestic mood
and its impact on foreign policy.
Bilateral Technical Issues
Counterpart negotiations conducted on our side by Acting Assistant
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Secretary Hummel focused on trade and exchange matters.
We presented to the Chinese our view of the importance to the evolution
of normal economic relations of concluding the private claims /blocked
assets problem -- agreed to in principle during my visit last February.
In the only harsh aspect of all our discussions (apparently reflecting the
acerbic personality of negotiator Lin Ping, formerly Ambassador to
Chile during the Allende period and now Director of the Foreign Ministry's
Bureau of American and Oceanic Affairs) the Chinese side attacked our
proposed technical language defining the source of their blocked assets
as being an unwarranted reference to the former "hostile" attitude of
the U. S. toward the PRC. More substantively, they demanded that we
exclude from the settlement $17 million blocked in third-country banks,
some of which has been repaid indirectly to the PRC despite our warnings
to the banks of the illegality of such action. Our side indicated that these
positions were unacceptable, primarily because exclusion of the third-
country blocked assets from a settlement would reduce the suns of the total
available for repaying our domestic claimants to a level unacceptable to
the Congress, but as well because of the disastrous precedent for our
international banking relations of such actions.
In my final session with the Premier, we made some progress on this
matter. I reiterated the desirability of resolving the claims/assets
problem, but the unacceptability of the Chinese position on the third-
country bank question. We concluded by agreeing to further exchanges on
the technical issues in the coming weeks in an effort to reach a final
resolution of this matter in about a month.
The Chinese were relaxed about the most favored nation issue. Chou
probed about the relationship between the present Congressional obstruc-
tion of this aspect of the trade bill because of the Soviet internal scene
and extension of MFN to Peking. They do not mind delay. Their only
concern is to keep the Soviet and Chinese aspects separate in congressional
and public discussion.
Scientific, cultural, and public affairs exchanges were discussed. with
agreement reached on twenty specific programs which will be implemented
in 1974. Included in this total is a visit to the U. S. by a delegation of
Chinese mayors, and acceptance by the PRC of our proposal that a group
of American state governors tour China. As well, the 1'RC proposed
another Congressional delegation visit in the summer of next year by a
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a
bipartisan group of fifteen. We will be presenting suggestions to you
shortly on which Representatives and Senators night most uisr.. fully be
included in this group. (We suggest this trip not be mentioned to members
of Congress at this time, as it will generate a flood of requests, making it
difficult to organize purposefully a group which will most effectively
support your programs).
We also proposed longer-term cooperative programs with the 1'1tC in the
areas of agricultural research, earth resource surveying, and lange-,ege
study. They indicated only that they would consider theie,. iuras.
We also requested agreement from the Chinese side to our making a public
statement regarding American servicemen missing in action in the vicinity
of the PRC as a result of the Indochina' hostilities or our pa st military
activities in the Taiwan area. Premier Chou indicated to we that hi:a
officials were making a detailed search for information regarding a number
of MIAs. He also agreed to our publicly stating that we have di?Icu;svd the
problem of MIAs, that the PRC has been conducting searchers. that no new
information has been turned up, that they are continuing to 'nve:etig:ate,
a d that they will provide us any new information which conies up. We
can release this statement at an early press conference. This taliouuld
clear the air on a lingering problem of concern to MIA families and their
Congressmen.
TT C
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t ./ 1 raisea wiuti r 1 --A ?,???? - - - `
be*-,,4 tion in Peking. He replied that they saw no problem with our ne?wN romef in
'r capital; but there is concern with possible awkward confrontations in
orters of Taiw:en'r; offie'i:t1
.,
re
n
p
' W a.sningw" sic -wc.-- . --~ -
?q Central News Agency. We will look into ways that this latter iar