FOLLOWING IS A REPORT TO YOU FROM DR. KISSINGER REGARDING HIS SECOND MEETING WITH THE CHINESE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 10, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0
1 THE WHITE HOUSE 1P
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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DOS Review Completed.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
INFORMATION
November 10, 1973
THE PRESIDENT
BRENT' SCOWCROFT
Following is a.report to you from Dr. Kissinger regarding his second
meeting with the Chinese.
111. 1 had a 3 1/2 hour session with Chou En-Lai, the Foreign
Minister and Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua this afternoon which
covered most major,international issues which we will explore fur-
ther during this visit. There was a separate counterpart meeting
which began discussions on bilateral issues such as trade and
exchanges.
2. At Chou's invitation I made an opening presentation which covered
most of our session. He asked questions and made comments but re-
served most of his positions for subsequent meetings. While it is not
yet clear to what extent he wishes, or can, move forward in our rela-
tions, so far their basic strategic perspective seems essentially un-
changed, including their preoccupation with the Soviet Union and their
desire to continue the normalization process with us.
3. I said that our bilateral relations were going forward well and
that our exchange programs were important both for their content and
their symbolizing of our developing relationship; we are prepared to
consider all means to emphasize this symbolic aspect. On Taiwan, I
reaffirmed your commitments and intention to carry out the principles
of the Shanghai communique.
4. 1 went over again at some length Soviet Union policy and pointed
to your handling of the Middle East crisis to demonstrate our realism
and firmness. Chou praised you highly for your ordering the alert and
was scathing of your domestic critics. I 'also rehearsed the rationale.
for the Agreement to End Nuclear War....
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0
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5. :Chou welcomed your Middle East policy and the results of my
trip. As I mentioned in yesterday's report, he shares our basic
perspective on this region and welcomes the negotiating role we plan
to play. He indicated that he had already been helpful with Egypt
and I said that we would welcome his continued counseling to the
Arabs about our good intentions and the need for some patience. I
made clear that while we will press for a just settlement, we will
continue to defend the existence of Israel. Chou suggested we talk
directly. to Syria, shared our perception of Iraq, urged inclusion of
the Palestinians in the negotiations and agreed that the Shah of Iran
is far - sighted.
6. On Indochina, _L: warned of the serious consequences of a renewed
North Vietnamese offensive in Vietnam, and left it to Chou whether he
wished to explore Cambodia. On the latter issue, I reaffirmed our
openness to a reasonable negotiating settlement. He reiterated that we
devoted too much energy to this small corner of the globe and said that
he- would have to think over whether he wished to pursue this issue
further.
7. Chou rehearsed the PRC suspicion of India, though perhaps in
somewhat more muted fashion than previously. I said that we sought
an improving of relations with New Delhi but would proceed slowly.
He reaffirmed their support of Pakistan and said they were concerned
about Soviet influence in Afghanistan. I outlined our general approach
to this whole region.
8. On the Korean item in the UN, Chou said they might need some
more time to line up their co-sponsors on the compromise resolution
which we and the Chinese agreed upon this past week. They emphasized
that they stood by the language we had worked out, and only wished to
avoid the appearance of US-Chinese imposition by moving too fast. On
this basis I have instructed. Scali to consult with their Ambassador in
New York and to agree to a delay if the Chinese there believe they need
it.
9. Chou reiterated that Japan is at a crossroads and I once again
emphasized the importance of that country staying close to the US. He
did not demur when 1. said that it would be healthier for us to join in
Siberian development rather than leaving this to the Japanese alone.
I said that we had not made a final decision, however.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0
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10. We meet again tomorrow afternoon and there will be continuing
counterpart talks on bilateral technical issues as well.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-9-0