A STRATEGY ANALYSIS OF YOUR FALL MEETINGS WITH THE CHINESE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-463-5-4-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 18, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE,
URGENT ACTION
September 18, 1975
EA - Philip Habib
S/P -- Winston Lord
NSC - Richard H. Solomon
SUBJECT: A Strategy Analysis of Your Fall' Meetings
with the Chinese
Beginning with your September 28 dinner session with PRC Foreign
Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, you will initiate a series of meetings with
Chinese officials that will include your late October visit to Peking,
perhaps a technical advance trip by other officials in November,
and the Presidential visit in early December. (All of these dates are
still contingent on explicit Chinese acceptance.)
On July 3 and August 4 we sent you two major papers which explored
policy options. on how we might proceed this year in the process of
U.S.-- PRC normalization. We understand your assumption that the
various post-Indochina and pre-1976 considerations, as well as some
objective arguments, make a move to full normalization very unlikely
in conjunction with the President's trip to Peking in December, and
your inclination to seek progress in our relationship with the Chinese
-through "half-step" measures.
From this policy perspective, the present paper is designed to give you
a tactical approach to your (and the President's) dealings with PRC
officials over the coming three months. The following analysis
seeks to:
-- Describe briefly the state of play of the PRC leadership situa-
tion which you and the President will face this fall.
NSC review completed
-- Analyze the posture Peking has adopted regarding the
President's trip, and China's longer-term strategy for dealing
with the U.S.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
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-- Suggest a counter-strategy for our dealings with the Chinese,
and how such a strategy could be implemented in the context
of the various fall leadership meetings.
-- And finally, highlight for you a number of decisions which
must be made, or planning measures which must be implemented,
if we are to prepare in an orderly manner for the President's trip
and your October advance.
Peking's Politics on the Eve of the President's Trip
Until the end of August the PRC domestic political scene seemed to
be moving in the direction of greater stabilization, reestablishment
of Party rule under the active leadership of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and
Chang Chun-ch'iao, the rehabilitation,of senior cadre purged
during the Cultural Revolution, and public emphasis on a law and
order program of economic development and political unification.
A meeting of the Military Affairs Commission in June and July restored to
active public life former Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing (purged in 1965), and
made decisi s ? which seemed' to? shi&Cl^ ina's rational ??def enJse line
toward an emphasis on military professionalism and technological
sophistication, and away from the politicized guerilla warfare approach
of the 1960s.
At the turn of September, however, a new political polemic burst
forth amidst otherwise bland press accounts of economic develop-
ment projects, surfacing what appear to be serious tensions within
the leadership over a broad range of policy issues. We frankly cannot
estimate at this point in time the full import of the policy debate which
seems to be reflected in the current criticism of Mao's favorite novel
Water Margin (All Men Are Brothers). The themes in this press
campaign do, however, reflect issues which have been visible in
Peking's political debate for the past several years: how far to go in
rehabilitating leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution; the
future of the Party's left wing; the role of the military; and China's
orientation to the U.S. and Soviets. What has made the current
material of particular interest, however, is the way in which it implies
criticism of "the Emperor" for granting amnesty to rebellious officials.
This obviously has the implication of an attack on Mao, something that
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most observers of the Chinese scene find hard to accept, were it not
for past instances of press criticism of the Chairman in historical
polemics which have been admitted to by the PRC, and the indications
in 1974 of uncertainty about Mao's position -- most obviously his long
absence from Peking and non-participation in the Party Plenum and
National People's Congress in January of this year.
All of this is occuring, of course, against the background of repeated
reports of Mao's, and Chou's, failing health -- the most recent of
which USLO conveyed from the Romanian ambassador in,/Peking, a
man with access to senior Chinese leaders and in the past a reliable
reporter. The implications of this situation for our dealings with the
PRC this fall are varied, and to some degree mutually contradictory.
The storm may pass without much effect on our relationship; yet
Peking may also be entering a period of immobilism on contentious
issues (such as the next stage in their relations with the U.S.), and
the authority of senior leaders -- even Mao -- may be dissipating.
If the Chairman really is under attack, he will have even less flexi-
bility in dealing with us on normalization issues than has been the
case thus far. Indeed, it(is possible that Peking may prefer to avoid
addressing the contentious issues between us under present circuin-
stances.
Alternatively, however, it could be argued that in view of the
current signs of debate in Peking on policy toward the U.S. and
USSR, it is all the more urgent to draw on'Mao's authority -- somewhat
attenuated thought it may be -- to consolidate a relationship with Peking,
and to undercut those in China who argue that the U.S. is just dragging
its heels on normalization while using its relationship with the PRC
essentially as leverage on the Soviet Union. This point of view can be
countered, of course, by the argument that if Peking's leadership situa-
tion is so unstable even a relatively favorable deal on normalization
might not stick.
We are well aware that -- quite apart from the conflicting implications for
U.S.- PRC relations of the present leadership situation in Peking -- our
national policy should basically reflect U.S. interests and the degree of
support the President may have at any given time for making difficult
decisions. At the same time, however, one factor which should be
considered in formulating a strategy for the Peking summit is the
state of China's internal political scene, and the strategy the PRC is
adopting for dealing with us,
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Peking's Strategy: "Lure the Enemy in Deep"
In early June Teng Hsiao-p'ing told a group of visiting American
newspaper editors that Peking will welcome the President whether or
not he has major business to transact. This gesture (subsequently
confirmed to you in private by Ambassador Huang) seems to have been
prompted by concern in Peking that Mr. Ford might postpone or cancel
his trip to China as a result of the unfavorable political climate in the
U.S. generated by events in Indochina. The Chinese clearly want
this fall's Presidential visit to take place.
What is Peking's current strategy for dealing with us? While
there maybe divided opinion on this
China should seek a settlement of the Taiwan question at some point,
the present semi-normal relationship with the U. S . is of value to the
PRC for security reasons even in the absense of a resolution of the
future of the island. Peking has engaged in a concerted campaign to
make this point clear to us -- and to the Soviets. Some leaders may
even be arguing that in the wake of Indochina Peking does not need
further changes in the East Asian power balance which could set in
motion forces which the PRC is not fully prepared to contend with.
question, the main stream of opinion in Peking seems to be that while
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In addition, the Chinese may also be calculating that the President's
chances of being elected in 1976 are reasonably good, but not strong.
They very likely prefer the continued incumbency of a Republican
Administration they know and have certain understandings with, and
may have decided not to jeopardize Mr. Ford's chances of election by
refraining from pressuring him on what they know are contentious
domestic issues associated with normalization.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing's line to you of last November that "while you owe
us a debt, we can wait if you still need Taiwan" seems.to have additional
tactical advantages to the Chinese. Peking may be calculating that by
adopting a posture of patience with the U.S. they will put the Adminis-
tration in a psychological posture of being beholden to them for their
"generosity" -- a sense of indebtedness for not being pressured on
the Nixon assurance of normalization by 1976.
The Chinese may also calculate that in a,second Ford term the PRC will
be in a more favorable strategic position to press us. Given the current
signs in our nub]ir dphnte of ernsion of support for detente with the
Soviet Union., Peking may hope that in two or three years worsened
relations with Moscow will make the Administration all the more desirous
of maintaining leverage over the USSR through good relations with the
PRC.
In short, for a combination of strategic and psychological reasons, the
Chinese appear to have decided that if the U.S. is unwilling to move
to full normalization, both PRC interests and good tactics are served
by playing out the present relationship with us for the next year or so.
A less evident line of argumentation in Peking -- but one which seems
to be reflected in continuing criticism in PRC media of those who
would compromise with "social-imperialism" -- may be that China
should expect no increment to her security from dealings with the U.S.
Some may be arguing that China's relationship with Washington is, in
fact, inciting Moscow to take more active measures to encircle and
pressure China, and that PRC security interests will be better served
by reducing tensions with the Soviets than by, seeking to counterweight
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them by tilting toward an increasingly passive U.S. At the least --
this line of debate may assert -- China will gain more from an indepen-
dent position in the great power triangle than by adopting a position of
strident hostility to the Russians combined with a relatively accommoda-
ting attitude toward the America
few tangible benefi
We see no evidence of lines of debate in Peking which call for either
greater accommodation with Washington or for more insistent pressure
on the U.S. for an early resolution of the Taiwan problem and establish-
ment of diplomatic relations. For reasons of bargaining approach as well
as sense of sovereignty and self-respect, the Chinese are unlikely to do
things which would put them in the position of appearing to want a rela-
tionship with us, or of beseeching us for progress on the Taiwan issue.
If pressure is ever applied, it is most likely to be through hard tactics,
not soft ones.
A U.S. Counter-Strategy: Put Peking on the Defensive
If we are correct in the judgment that Peking's primary strategy for
dealing with the U.S. is to string the Administration along and put
us in their debt until a more favorable time to apply pressure is
reached, how should the U.S. now respond? Given the constraints
on the President's ability to act on normalization issues at this time,
there are essentially three approaches that could be adopted in dealings
with the Chinese this fall:
1. You could directly tell them that in the wake of Indochina (or,
more vaguely, "under present circumstances") the time is not ripe for
movement on normalization, that we remain fully committed to the objec-
tives of the Shanghai Communique, but that the President intends to wait
until after 1976 to consider further developments in U.S.- PRC relations.
In the meanwhile, we believe mutual interests are served by maintaining
our relationship essentially at its present level.
Your past statements to PRC leaders about the harmful effect
a breakdown of the Paris Agreement on Indochina would have on our
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bilateral relationship provide, a basis for this line of approach, although
the Chinese will very likely respond by saying that the events in Indo-
china were a result of the failure of the U.S. and its allies to honor the
Paris agreement. At the same time, as noted above, the Chinese will
probably be "graciously accommodating" of our expressed desire to
delay consideration of normalization issues while taking note of the
even greater debt we owe them.
We frankly see no particular advantage to the U.S. in this approach.
It puts us increasingly on the defensive with Peking, and suggests a com-
plete freezing of our position. All the same, however, the Chinese have
indicated to us both publicly and privately that they can live with such
an outcome of the second Presidential visit.
2. As a slightly less defensive variation of the above approach,
you could say that while circumstances do not appear favorable for
movement to full normalization of relations, the U.S. remains committed
to the objectives of the Shanghai Communique; and as an expression of
good faith and our intention to resolve bilateral differences after 1976,
v;c prepoce certain partial measures or intermediate stei s -- such ac
were suggested in our paper of August 4 -- which will sustain movement
in our relationship. We think it is in neither side's interest to show
complete stagnation to the world. (Moreover, we should avoid suggesting
to Peking that the Administration is so constrained by domestic political
problems that it is totally immobilized on foreign policy issues.)
In your meeting with Huang Chen on July 7 you hinted that this
might be the approach you would take in conjunction with the President's
visit. It suggests a willingness to keep moving ahead in our course,
which is of benefit to both. sides internationally. It makes us appear less
weak or passive, and is more in the spirit of the relationship we are try-
ing to sustain with Peking.
On the other hand, this approach clearly reveals that we cannot
go all the way, and still puts us somewhat on the defensive in view of
Peking's "patience" line. All the same, it protects the President from
having to make difficult decisions during the coming months.
3. A third alternative is to attempt to put Peking on the defensive.
This we would do through a general posture of forthcomingness and
expression of interest in resolving outstanding differences (although we do
not expect the Chinese to agree to our specific proposals or policy positions)-
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You could tell Peking that despite the unfavorable impact of
Indochina we continue to believe that full normalization at an early date
is important to the strategic interests of both countries, and to give
future stability to our presently semi-normal relationship. You could
reiterate your acceptance of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's "three principles" for
normalization (as you expressed at the end of your November, 1974
discussions in Peking), and say that Chairman Mao's statement about
willingness to wait a hundred years to gain control of Taiwan, and
Premier Chou's suggested formulation that normalization can be
accomplished on the basis of "confirming the principle of one China"
provide the basic outlines of a settlement acceptable.to both sides. You
could then say that all that remains is to give expression to the Mao/
Chou principles through a set of private understandings and public
statements by both sides which would make it clear that while the U.S.
is affirming the unity of China, it is not casting off to a violent fate a
government and people who have looked to us for security. You could
point out that such a settlement would not only meet the Chairman's
criterion, but would do so in a way that would not be unduly disturbing
to Americans in the wake of Indochina events, or raise doubts in the
world about the constancy of America's role in security matters.
In evaluating this third approach, it should first be said that
we believe the chances are slim, or something less than even, that
Peking will volunteer an acceptable public statement on Taiwan's
security, or agree to other aspects of a normalization package (such as
we discussed in the paper of July 3) which would make full normaliza-
tion politically acceptable to the Administration. The particular advan-
tages of this line of approach are that it would avoid the obvious
liabilities of the first option; of playing into Peking's hands by making it
appear that the U.S. bears the responsibility for delaying normalization
and that the Administration owes.China a debt for her patience.
This option would leave open the possibility of falling back to
the second, partial-step approach if the Chinese at least indicate an
interest in making visible progress in our relationship short of establish-
ment of diplomatic relations. It would more forcefully stress our intention
to maintain a course toward full normalization of relations, and would
approximate more closely the original intention of U.S. policy which
you personally, as well as President Nixon, laid out in 1971-72. It is the
only approach by which we can probe whether there is any "give" in the
PRC position on normalization at this time. If there is not any flexibility
on their part, we will at least have positioned ourselves in a fully
defensible manner for consideration of the normalization issue at some
later time.
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There is, to be sure, a possibility that the Chinese might,
unexpectedly, counter an expression of interest in normalizing on our
part with a relatively favorable deal. It is highly unlikely, however,
that such a Chinese response would be so forthcoming as to place us in
the position of appearing to renege should we decide to hold back from
agreement. We could, moreover, regulate the degree of risk by the
way we presented Option 3.
Nevertheless, you obviously could not proceed with this approach
unless the President were clearly aware of the potential consequences. If
he does not want to run the risk of having to consider any Chinese pro-
posals on normalization, then the safest course would be to proceed with
Option 2.
If you can gain the President's authorization for this approach,
however, we believe that U.S. interests will be far better served by it
than by Option I (while Option 2 will remain as a fallback). At a mini-
mum we will have put the Chinese on the defensive and established a
more favorable posture for future negotiations on this issue; at maximum
we might unexpectedly reach an agreed formula for full normalization
which. iould ain,for,the U..S..t e g- termrstrat i~ ,a Ira Cages of a
non-- confrontation (if not fully cooperative) relationship with the PRC,
and at a cost which would very likely be lower than that which the U.S.
would have to pay in the future.
We now have about a week to prepare for your anticipated September 28
working dinner in New York with Ch'iao Kuan-hua (although the date
remains uncertain in the absence of a response from the Chinese). This
session with the Foreign Minister represents an important opportunity
to set the tone for your October advance trip to Peking. Depending upon
the approach which you and the President wish to take in organizing the
Peking summit, you can use the Ch'iao dinner to set in motion certain
.policy processes on the PRC side. In order to prepare for the dinner,
and to initiate other planning measures which will enable us to prepare
in an orderly way for your October advance trip and the President's
visit, we urgently need your guidance on the following questions:
Issues for Your Early Decision
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-- The approach, or approaches, which you and the President
wish us to take in preparing briefing materials and talking points.
We request a meeting with you as soon as you are in a position to
give us such guidance.
--- We need decisions on the NSSM 212 response (military sales
to Taiwan) n order to initiate orderly
planning for further American withdrawals from Taiwan and possible
modifications of our approach to selling weapons to the ROC.
Decisions on these packages, which are being staffed through the NSC
mechanism, will also enable you to inform Peking of future U.S. mili-
tary draw-downs from the island, something which Mr. Habib, at your
'instruction, informed the Chinese we would do before the end of the
year.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-- That you seek the President's concurrence on a general
approach for dealing with the Chinese this fall, particularly as it
relates to the normalization issue.
V- a
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and the President's trip. .~ .~
preparing for your dinner with Ch'iao and October visit to Peking,
--- That you meet with us at an early date to provide guidance for .
Approve isapprov ( / V 17-
--- That you act on the NSSM 212 response f
ul~_( i--) -ca ~
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