U.S. CHINA POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 113
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 5, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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February 5,'1969
National Security Study Memorandum 14
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director for Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
The President has directed, that a study be' prepared
1. The current status of U, S. relaticnc
Communist China and the Republic of China;
2. The nature of the Chinese Communist
threat and intentions in Asia;
3. The interaction between U. S. policy and
the policies of other major interested countries
toward' China;
4. Alternative U. S. approaches on China and
their costs and risks.
The President has directed that the' NSC Interdepartmental
on U. S. Policy Towards China, on U. S. objectives and
interests involved and the broad lines of appropriate. U. S.
policies. The study should incorporate alternative views
and interpretations of the issues involved. It should
include summary statements of the conceptions and policy
lines of the previous administration.
. vi.vuy ivr rd.sL rtsia perform tars study.
The paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group
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The Study should include the following:
WASHINGTON
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We are disappointed the Chinese Communists cancelled the
ientatives had been instructed' to make or renew constructive
We especially regret this action "inasm uch as our repre-
rneeting scheduled in Warsaw for Thursday (February Lo).
suggestions.
These suggestions included consideration of an agreement
on peaceful coexistence consistent with our treaty obligations
in the area, the subjects of exchange of reporters, scholars,
scientists and scientific information, the regularization of
postal and telecommunications problems.
We continue to stand ready torneet the Chinese Communists
at, any time?
The cha ages made by the Chinese Communists that the United
States had engineered the defection of Liao Ho-Bhu are untrue.
(paged ofages)
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Io .
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NATIONAL. SSECLIRIrry COUiqC1L.
W/.SHINGTON. rD.c. zosoc
June 26, 1969
SECRET/SENSITIVE
I\Tational Sc c~ta:ii:y ~ecis ova einoranctirn 17
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
SUBJECT: Relaxation of Economic Controls Against China
The President has decided, on broad foreign policy grounds, to
modify certain of our trade controls against China. He has decided,
in'principle, that we should:
(1) 'Remove the restraints in the Foreign Assets Control
regulations upon foreign subsidiaries of U. S. firms on transactions
with China that are regarded as non-strategic by COCOM..
(2) Modify the Foreign Assets Control regulations prohibiting
purchase of Communist Chinese goods to permit Americans travelling
or resident abroad to purchase Chinese goods in limited quantities
for non-commercial import into the U.S.
(3) Modify the administration of the Foreign Assets Control
regulations and Export Controls to permit general licenses for
exports of food, agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizer and
pharmaceuticals.
(4) Follow these steps, at the earliest appropriate time, by
modifying import and export controls in non--strategic goods to permit
a gradual development of balanced trade.
The President desires early implementation of these decisions. He
has, therefore, directed that the Under SecrAaries Committee
supervise the preparation of the following documents, to be submitted
to him by July 7, 1969.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
(1) Implementing regulations (to be developed by State,
Commerce, and Treasury);
(2) A press and diplomatic scenario (to be developed by State);
(3) A scenario for Congressional consultation (to be developed
by State and Treasury).
The President has directed that until he decides when and how this
decision is to be made public, the SECRET/SENSITIVE classification
of this project be strictly observed.
}Icnry. . Kissinger
cc: The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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CHINA POLICY 1969-71
Internal Studies
and Decisions
1969 5 Feb: NSSM 14 asks for broad.
policy review (Tab 1)
Public Policy
Public Steps Statements
18 Feb: Rogers says US regrets
Chinese cancellation of
Warsaw meeting; US ready
to meet any time. (State-
ment, Tab 2)
15 May: RG meets on China policy
26 June: NSDM 17 relaxes economic
controls, asks Under Secre-
taries Committee to develop
detailed implementation (Tab 3)
17 July: TJSC submits implementation
for NSDM 17
21 July: State announcement
permitting tourist pur-
chases of $100 of Chinese
goods & validation of US
passports for travel to China
for certain purposes (per
NSDM 17) (Tab 4)..
8 Aug: Rogers, on Asian trip,
urges renewal of Warsaw
talks (Tab 5)
Sr 'RE T / SENSIT NE
,.a
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
Internal Studies ,...
and Decisions
14 Aug: NSC meets on China policy.
(No further action taken)
Public Steps
19 Dec: State announcement
Public Policy
Statements
5 Sept: Richardson: speech
disclaims US interest in
exploiting Sino-Soviet
gift. (Tab 6)
Dec.!- HAK end-of-year back-
grounder (Tab 7)
permits unlimited tourist
purchases, & relaxes limits
on trade in non-strategic
goods by US-owned firms
abroad. (per NSDM 17 (Tab 8)
8 Jan: US & China agree to
reopen Warsaw talks.
20 Jan: Warsaw meeting held
State of "the Union (Tab 9)
18 Feb: Foreign Policy Report
(Tab 10)
16 March: State announces
validation of US passports
for travel for any legiti-
cate purpose. (per NSDM 17)
.FRET /SENSITIVE 4:C' ab .11)
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
Internal Studies
1970
Contd
Public Steps
29 April: USG authorizes
selective licensing US
non-strategic goods for
export to China (per
NSDM 17)
. 24 July: Pres. approves sale of
80.Italian trucks containing
US-made parts to China.
(HAK memo to Pres. July 13)
Public Policy
Statements
27 Ju1j: State announces US
willingness to resume
Warsaw talks
28 July: Commerce official dis-
closes truck sale approval.
Aug: Lifted restrictions on US
oil companies abroad bunker-
ing ships carrying nonstrategic r
goods to China.
25 Oct: Ziegler states US opposes
f1V seating of China at
expense of Taiwan
I SECRET /SENSITIVE
t-
12 Nov: Phillips speech to
UNGA (Tab 12)
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Internal Studies
and Decisions
1970 19 Nov: NSSM's 106 & 107 ask for
Contd review on China policy and
Chirep (Tabs 13 & 14)
Public Steps
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Public Policy
Statements
10 Dec: President at press conf.
Tab 15)
23 Dec: Rogers hopes Warsaw
says no change in Chirep
policy at this time but we
will continue initiatives"
1
- talks will resume & China
policy under'review
(Tab 16)
24 Dec: HAK backgrounder
(,,Tab 17)
an? Rogers tells House
committee that US favors
gcientific exchanges even
,kith countries we have no
diplomatic refs. with.
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SECRET /SENSITIV E
1971
C ontd
Internal Studies
and Decisions
9 March: SRG meeting on
Chirep (NSSM 107)
25 March: NSC meeting on
Chirep (NSSM 107)
25 March: HAK memo to Pres.
on immediate & projected
steps (Tab 21)
12 April: SRG meeting on China
policy (NSSM 106)
13 April: NSDM 105 decides steps
toward augmenting travel
-5-
Public Policy
Public Steps Statements
4 March: Pres. press conf.
restates our desire to
normalize relations
(Tab 20)
15 March: State announces
discontinuance of re-
quirement of specially
validated passports for
travel to China.
15 March: State announces US
was seeking thru private
channels to restart Warsaw
talks
and trade with China (Tab 22)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
14 April: White House announce- -
ment of additional trade &
travel liberalization (Tab 23
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SECRET I SENSITIVE
1971
Cont' d
Public Steps
21 April: President endorses
Steenhoven= s invitation
to Chinese ping-pong
team.
26 April: Lodge panel report
backs two-China solution
to Chir ep.
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Public Policy
Statements
15 April Ziegler agrees new
a
p
ge" is turned, stresses
no anti- Soviet motive.
16 April: President says further
(Tab 24)
28 April: Bray suggests GR C-.PRC
telgotiation on status of
Taiwan.
29 April: President calls same
progress is "up to them, "
expresses hope of ultimately
_ vi Giti ng China.
idea "unrealistic," disavows
anti-Soviet motive, says some
recent speculation is not
use?ul."
(Press Conference,
Tab 25)
 SECRET/ SENSITIVE
1971
Cont' d
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Internal Studies
.and Decisions
13 May: USC memo to Presi-
dent reports on actions
taken and proposes de-
tailed lists of non-
strategic items. (USC
memo, and HAK cover
memo June 3, at Tab 27)
Public Steps
.7 May: Treasury, Commerce,
and Transportation
announce new regulations
allowing use of dollars in
transactions with PRC, use
of US-flag ships to carry
goods to non-Chinese ports,
and use of US-owned for-
eign-flag ships to stop at
Chinese ports.
(Tab 26)
Public Policy
Statements
25 May: President sees "great
historical possibilities,"
looking down the road, in
relations with PRC.
(Tab 28)
1 June: President predicts
decision on Chirep in 6 weeks,
and announcement on trade
on June 10.
(Tab 29)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Internal Studies
and Decisions
Public Policy
Public Steps Statements
1971 9 June: HAK memo to USC
Cont'd reports President's
decisions.
(Tab 30)
10 June: White House announces lists
of exports and imports to
be under general license for
PRC, and suspension of 50%
shipping rule for grain to
PRC, USSR, and E. Europe.
(Ziegler statement, press
release, and general li-
cense list, Tab 31)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.G. 20506
'The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECRET /SENSITIVE
National Security Study Memorandum. 106
agencies, such as Treasury and Commerce, to participate as
the Group, the Chairman should invite representatives of other
Asia and Pacific Affairs. In addition to the regular members of
Policy to be carried out by the Interdepartmental Group for East
The President has directed the preparation of a study on China
appropriate.
The study should include such subjects as:
- Long range* (5-10 year) U. S. policy goals as regards China;
- Short range policy goals toward China;
-- U. S. policy toward Taiwan including short-range goals of
our relations with the GRC;
Tactics to be pursued in carrying out the foregoing.
-- Coordination of policy consideration and tactics with other
countries which have a particular interest in China, e. g. ,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
-- Effect of U. S. -China policy on U.S.-Soviet relations.
w- Effect of U. S. -China policy on our interests in Southeast Asia.
This study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by'February
I`5, 1971.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
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SECRET
November 19, 1970
National Security Study Memorandum. 107
TO: The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Study of Exitire UN Membership Question:
U.S. -China Policy
The President has directed that a study be prepared of the membership
question at the United Nations.
The study should incorporate alternative views and interpretations of the
issues involved.
The study should include but need not be limited to the following:
/'{
1. The implications of new approaches, e. g. "universality, "
on the membership question for the United Nations itself
and on our ability to pursue U.S. interests within the
U.N. organization.
2. In addition to dealing with Korea, Vietnam, Germany, and
China, the study should treat with any other aspects of
U. N. membership likely to be affected by the adoption of a
new approach to the membership question.
3. The effect on our bilateral relations with other countries
which would be caused by adoption of a new approach to
U. N. membership.
4. The inter-action between U. S. policy toward Chinese
membership in the United Nations and our bilateral relations
with Peking.
Responsibility for this study is assigned to an ad hoc group chaired by the Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and including representa-
tives from CIA and the NSC Staff. The study should be submitted to the Senior
Review Group by January 15, 1971.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Joixt Chiefs of Staff
SECRET
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the Peoples Republic of China by removing obstacles to personal and
tional relaxations in our present controls. These steps would be intended
to further your policy of broadening communications between the'U. S. and
wit respect to Communist China with a view toward implementing addi-
produce some suggested changes in the U. S. trade and travel regulations
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Steps Towards Augmentation of Travel
and Trade Between the Peoples Republic
of China and the United States
you requested, I have asked the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to
commercial contacts.
The Under Secretaries Committee went all out and developed a large package
the Chinese would be required.
The Committee did so not in the expectation of any substantial immediate
increases in trade or travel, but because the adoption of these proposals
would show the genuineness of our desire to improve relations and possibly
eventually develop significant trade. No new legislation or negotiations with
of proposals which seta workable course in the direction which you desire.
ing these results, we could then consider whether to go on to the next segment.
Accordingly, I have broken down the large package from the Under Secretaries
Committee into three segments which we could carry out sequentially after
an assessment of the results attained (including the Chinese Communist, GRC
and Soviet responses) following each of the preceding segments. After assess-
to Peking willclearly need to be carefully considered.
GRC strains, and keeping a watch on Soviet reactions on the other. The
questions of timing and the extent to which we should go in our approaches
At the same time, however, the Committee's proposals would, if fully im-
plemented, put a severe strain on our relations with the GRC and perhaps
cause a crisis in U. S. -GRC relations. There would also be implications
for our relations with the USSR. It therefore appears that a balance will
need to be struck between furthering your objectives with respect to
Communist China on the one hand, and the desirability of minimizing U. S. -
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SECRET
.upon it via increased contacts between U. S. radicals and PRC intelligence
the additional strains which removal of the passport restrictions might; put
(Actually, in effect there were originally four segments, of which the 'first
was the non-extension of U. S. passport restrictions on travel to the Peoples
Republic of China after these restrictions expired on March 15. You have
already approved this step on the basis of the 1)osition put forward by State,
Defense, and other agencies -- over the opposition of the Department of
.Justice -- that the fabric of American society was strong enough to resist
agents. )
Group I - For Implementation Within the Near Future
Our purpose in this Group would be to show significant movement in the direc-
tion of easing travel and trade restrictions with Communist China while not
going so far as to antagonize or alarm the GRC unduly nor complicate our
relations with the USSR.,.
-- Entry of Chinese. Following the expiration of the restrictions against
agencies felt that the American people were sufficiently resilient to resist any
added subversive burdens which the presence of Chinese Communist travelers
might introduce. Very few Chinese are likely to apply in the foreseeable future.,
necessary to exploit commercial opportunities. State, Defense and the ether
willingness to facilitate on a reciprocal basis a flow of people between the two
countries, the Committee recommends a public statement by the U. S. Govern-
ment offering to expedite visas for groups of visitors from the Peoples Republic
of China to the U. S. This would implement your references to removing need-
less obstacles to broader opportunities for contacts in your Foreign Policy
Report. Justice opposes this because it would afford the PRC better opportunitie
for intelligence acquisition, permit close clandestine contacts between American
Maoists, advocates of domestic violence and the PRC, and make it easier for
the PRC to recruit intelligence agents. Commerce favored increased travel as
using U. S. passports to travel to Communist China, in order to establish our
'-- Currency Controls. Relaxation of our currency controls to permit
Chinese use of dollars would-be essential in conjunction with a decision to per-
mit direct trade with China (discussed below), but could also be -put into effect
Lion covers ships as.wvell, as ;planes, abut would not affect our existing controls
American oil companies providing. bunkers except on Chinese owned or chartered
carriers bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This relaxa --
-'Bunkering. The Committee recommends the ending of restrictions on
on entry of PRC. carriers into U.S., ports.
SE C lt.1~ T
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SECRET
~~ Shipping. The Committee recommends granting permission to U. S.
vessels to Garry Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports, and U. S. -owned
. of the individual moves.
scenes U. S. -Chinese contacts, but are not likely to make much of an issue out
The Soviets would be suspicious of ,our intent and also suspect some behind-the-
and would inspire little or no reaction from the GRC and the USSR. The main
GRC objection would be regarding the admission of Chinese Communists into
the U. S. , and we could anticipate receiving an official GRC expression of con-
cern at the Ambassadorial level. The totality of our moves would of course
bother the GRC, but-probably not to a point where real trouble would ensue.
All of the foregoing moves involve relatively minor adjustments on our part
foreign flag vessels to call at Chinese ports.
There is, however, a more complex proposal in Group I which deserves special
attention:
-- Trade, The Committee recommends that we should now commence re-
. PRC will be believed, and the more likely it becomes that Peking will eventually,
respond favorably to our initiatives. " Defense and Commerce take the position
that we should not set in advance a policy of bringing our trade controls with.
China into line with those affecting the USSR. In fact, a public policy of placing
China trade on a par with Soviet trade would be galling to both the GRC and-,the
Soviets.' The Soviets would take the equal treatment of China with them as an
laxation of our controls on direct trade between the United States and China.
With Defense and Commerce dissenting, it observes that, "The closer our
treatment of trade with the PRC approaches that applied to the Soviet Union,
the more seriously our assertions of willingness to improve relations with the
?'` intentional slight, and would profess to believe that this signified U. S. intentions
C> C>
matters of joint concern such as Chirep tactics.
Nevertheless, the recommendation for commencing relaxation of our controls
SECRET
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to go further in the political field. Even though many of the trade measures
would obviously be in the U. S. commercial interest, the Soviets would not
accept such explanations. The GRC's view would be that a stated policy of
putting China trade on.the.same basis as that with the USSR, when added to the
totality of the other moves in Group I, indicated a definite U. S. intention of
downgrading GRC interests in favor of improving relations with Communist
China. In the formal sense, the GRC's response would probably?be to lodge a
diplomatic protest;, but we might in addition expect GRC non -cooperation in other
co,,n!se the appr(,;4 c 1 favored by Defense and Co:rnnierce; to place zrd~ct ;~~1
on direct trade was, unanimous, and the upshot was to leave as an accepted
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items under general license for direct export to the PRC only after interagency.
forma protest frt'xx. the latter could be expe.ctcd.
review to determine if they are of strategic significance. No material adverse
reaction would be anticipated -from either the USSR or the GRC, although a pro -
then favor direct imports from China of a. similar and correlated limited nature.
Once direct trade of a limited nature is on the books, the Committee would.
Chinese is one of substance and not just show.
development of substantial two-way trade. With the Group I steps already on
the books, we would be making it. plain that the relationship we seek with the
of the results and the PRC, GRC, and Soviet reactions, the Under Secretaries
Committee would report to you the effect of these moves on our relations with
Moscow, Taipei, and Peking, and request approval to implement additional
moves, as set forth below. In making these moves, we would be going beyond
steps of a limited and still quasi-symbolic nature and working toward the
A reasonable period after implementation of Group I, and following an evaluation
-.'Ex 'ores. Approve export to the PRC of all' commodities currently under
to the PRC.
general license to the USSR except those deemed to be of strategic significance
-PRC on essentially the same basis as the Soviet Union in a manner correlated
Imports. Authorize direct commercial imports into the U. S. from the
with allowing direct exports.
. - Aircraft Sales. End the restriction against the sale of American and
provide the airlines with the capital to buy new American aircraft -- which
foreign airlines of older American civil aircraft not under COCORM restrictions,
on a case-by-case basis, after strategic equipment is removed. This would
cooperation in matters such as Chirep. If we did succeed in getting its co-
With the Group II moves we would be coming close to placing trade with China
and the USSR on much the same basis, and both the Soviets and the GRC would,
for the reasons outlined above, be disturbed. They on balance would both
probably live wita the situation, however, though we could anticipate a str%. ng
protest from the GR.G coupled with the difficulty already noted in obtaining its
would be much welcomed by our industry.
operation, the price would almost surely be considerably higher than would
nave o e-i Lnte ,ca;
I might note that the question of the sale of older American civil aircraft to
;China could become an active issue, since Pakistan International Airways is
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SECRET
attempting to dispose of some Boeing 720s to the Chinese. This issue, if it
a separate item from the other steps with fewer repercussions and problems.
actually arises (there has been no firm Chinese offer), could be handled as
pleasure.
to this end would 1e prepared to accept a large measure of Soviet and GRC dis-
Moscow, Taipei, and Peking, and request approval to implement a final group
of steps.' These would make it very evident that we would be willing to go a
considerable distance in improving relations with the Chinese Communists, and
A reasonable period after implementation of Group II, the Under Secretaries
Committee would report to you the effect of these moves on our relations with
Group III
public eye.
Justice, opposes for the same reasons cited under the travel option (Group I).
The Chinese delegation would by the very nature of the regime be an official
one, and ours would probably assume something of an official character in the
Trade Delegations. The Committee recommends authorization of a
proposal to the PRC to exchange trade delegations if circumstances warrant.
Moreover, regulations would have to be amended to permit U. S. ships to call
,to permit grain sales to the PRC -- a major importer of grain - would raise
the question of whether to allow more favorable treatment of the PRC than the
USSR by not requiring that 50 percent be shipped in American bottorn.s. If the
do extend the 50 percent requirement to apply to the PRC, we might defeat the
-purpose of permitting sales of grain to the PRC because of high shipping costs.
~- Graiil Sales. The Committee notes that a decision in the export field
the USSR; they would presumably be at least equally vociferous against
Communist China, for both commercial and ideological reasons.. The unions
would maintain their opposition against the USSR if we were to relax on both
Waiving the 50 percent shipping requirement would constitute more favorable
.treatment for China than for the USSR in,a historically sensitive area, and might
be misunderstood politically abroad. In addition, the longshoremen and other
unions have vehemently opposed any relaxation of the shipping requirement for
to avoid a discrimination in favor of China.
50 percent At
19-1 erican bottom shipping. regt_irez:.:e*_zt. However, Agriculture
al ow t e PIt R2' o favorable, (:rec?trne by en,?, S i:Lor the
If we were to take this step, you would betaking on a major domestic political
battle. Since previous relaxations would have placed our trade with China and
the USSR under approximately the same lovei of restrictions, I see no need to
vigorously favors this move.
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SECRET
If you disapproved waiving the 50 percent shipping requirement, you would
wish to consider amending regulations to permit U. S. ships to call at PRC
ports, which is necessary in view of the 50 percent shipping. requia ement to
make grain sales a credible possibility and thereby to avoid legitimate PRC
claims that our moves are a sham.
not cause as much of a reaction, but even in this case the Soviets would be
suspicisus that our motives were political rather than economic. Even if an
attempt to sell grain came to nothing, the Soviets would mark it down as a sign
A strong adverse reaction could be anticipated from both the USSR and the GRC
to the steps in Group III. From the Soviet standpoint, a more favorable treat-
ment for China than the USSR in the question of requirements for using
American ships would indicate that the U. S. attached a higher value to good
relations with China than with the USSR. Selling grain on the same terms would
. of a change in the U. S. attitude.
The GRC would focus first upon the official quality of the proposed trade dele-
gations, seeing in them a U. S. desire to move toward diplomatic relations with
Peking. Grain sales and shipments to China on terms more favorable than
those granted the USSR would signify the same thing to the GRC. (Grain sales
alone would not be regarded differently from any other non-strategic trade item,
however.) Since the GRC would assume as a corollary a U. S. disposition to
bargain away its interests, we would need to take into our calculus the possi-
bility of a severe crisis in U. S. -GRC relations.. Management of such a crisis
could prove very difficult, and we might not be able to count on the GRC's past
practice of backing away from extreme positions which it threatens to take.
That you approve the implementation1of the steps outlined in Group I.
That you authorize me to inform the Under Secretaries Committee that the
further steps proposed by it will be considered only after due consideration of
the results gained from the Group I steps, including an assessment of the re-
actions of the PRC, the GRC,- axkd the USSR.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
April 13, 1971
National. Security Decision Memorandum 105
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Attorney General
SUBJECT: Steps Towards Augmentation of Travel and Trade
Between the People's Republic of China and the
United States
The President has reviewed the recommendations forwarded by the
Under Secretaries Committee on steps to increase personal and
commercial contacts between the People's Republic of China and the
United States, and has directed that the following moves be undertaken:
---- Issuance of.a public statement offering to expedite visas for
groups of visitors from the People's Republic of China to
the U. S.
-- Relaxation of currency control to permit Chinese use of dollars.
Ending restrictions on American oil companies providing
bunkers except on Chinese owned or chartered carriers bound
to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba. This
relaxation covers ships as well as planes, but would not affect
our existing controls on entry to PRC carriers into U. S. ports.
Granting permission to U. S. vessels to carry Chinese cargoes
between non-Chinese ports, and for U. S. -owned foreign flag
vessels to call at Chinese ports.
Commencement of a relaxation of controls on direct bade
between the U. S. and China by placing individual items under
general license for direct export to the PRC after item-by-item.
interagency review to determine if they are of strategic significance.
The Under Secretaries Committee is to be charged with the
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SECRET
responsibility of determining which items should be placed on
general license, and should forward a report within 30 days
requesting approval of these determinations. Upon the com.-
mencement of these limited direct exports, direct imports from
China of a similar and correlated nature will be allowed.
The President has also directed that the Under Secretaries Committee
review and report to him after a period of four months the results of
the steps taken. The report should include an assessment of the
reactions to these steps by the PRC and the GRC. The President will
then determine whether implementation of additional steps recommended
by the Under Secretaries Committee may be warranted.
Henry A. 'Kissinger
cc: Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Commerce
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, United States Information Agency
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E A S T A S I A
US ANNOUNCES FURTHER RELAXATION OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS
AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA
On May 7 the Treasury, Commerce,. and Transportation Departments,
in accordance with the President's April 14 statement, announced
changes in regulations to allow expanded trade between the US
and the People's Republic of China. The Treasury Department
removed all controls on the use of US dollars or dollar instru-
ments (except those in blocked accounts) in transactions with
Peking. As a result, Chinese-Americans may now send dollars
which are not held in blocked accounts to their relatives on the
Mainland. (Certain Chinese accounts were blocked for use in
possible settlements with Peking as a result of the nationaliza-
tion of American-owned assets after 1949.) The Treasury
Department also announced that American-owned ships flying under
foreign flags may stop at Mainland China ports. The fueling of
Chinese vessels is now permitted, except for those vessels bound
to or from North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. US flag
vessels may now transport commodities destined for the Mainland
from US to non-Chinese ports, or from one non-Chinese port to
another. After the completion of the present high-level China
policy review there will be further announcements concerning
trade with Communist China.
Peking's Response
In spite of the fact that it continues to refrain from dealing
directly with American businessmen, the Peking regime has per-
mitted a few foreign representatives of American subsidiary
firms to attend the current Canton trade fair for the first
time. Chinese Communist trade officials in Hong Kong have
indicated that Peking may adopt new trade policies after the US
promulgates its list of non-strategic trade items. These devel-
opments suggest that Peking is shifting its policy toward the
US and that it may be ready to make further responses. (SECRET)
SECRET
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2?G
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
ACTION
June 3, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: China Trade
The Under Secretaries Committee (USC) has forwarded at Tab A its
recommendations on direct trade between the United States and the PRC,
as you directed in your April 14 decision. The Agencies have already put into
effect the other elements of your decision: visas, shipping, cargoes, bunker-
ing, and foreign assets controls.
U. S. Exports
You will recall that your decision in opening trade with the PRC was to
proceed in three stages: Stage I, to establish a trade level below that of U. S.
trade with the USSR; Stage II, to place trade with the PRO on a par w.iLli the
USSR; and Stage III, to go beyond the level of trade with the USSR. (This
last would have been via authorizing direct grain shipments to the PRC with-
out requiring that they be shipped on U. S. vessels, as is now necessary for
shipments to the USSR and Eastern Europe.) Your purpose was to provide
us with an opportunity to assess the reactions of the PRC, the Republic of
China, and the Soviets before proceeding to the next stage. The USC list
(Tab Al) is intended to implement Stage I of your decision.
I believe that the list of items USC has recommended for direct U. S. -.PRC
trade meets your conditions. Its level of trade would be at a level lower
than that with the Soviet Union, and there would be a number of significant
items which could be added to the China list later. (The excluded items
are at Tab A2.) The main differentiation is that the proposed China list
leaves out several items which Defense, Commerce and AEC believed
needed further review because of possible military use or of their greater
strategic benefit to China's low technological and industrial level. Examples
are automatic welding machines for pipe over 19 inches, propellers,
agricultural machinery with automatic transmission, cars with four-wheel
drive, steam boilers, engines, gas containers, some chemicals, radar,
cameras and lenses.
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SECRET
In addition, the USC list would appear to meet another issue which has
arisen in connection with direct U. S. -PRC trade: the strong indications
we have received that the Chinese will not be interested in such trade if
we restrict our exports to them significantly more than exports to the
USSR. The USC list contains 95% of the items allowed to go freely to
the Soviet Union, and this is probably sufficient to make the Chinese feel
that they are not being given second class status. If they should get a
contrary impression, they would probably state publicly that this was
the reason for their not sanctioning trade with the U. S. , thereby
causing American business interests to criticize you and not the Chinese
for the failure of trade to develop.
On the other hand, by accepting the USC list, we should be able to avoid
Chinese resentment by making it clear in the first announcements that
we are still continuing to consider further additions to the China list,
and that we will consider applications for special licenses for items. not
included on the general license list. Continuation of some differential
in favor of the USSR will also help avoid problems with the USSR and
Taiwan.
You should know, however, that SeereLary Laird does not wish to
release the USC list all at once but proposes instead to release it in
segments over a period of months contingent on PRC reactions. In
addition, Defense objects to the inclusion of two items, earth moving
equipment and railway equipment, on the USC list. I have no particular
brief on these items other than to keep the China list close enough to the
Soviet list to obviate the difficulties I outlined above. A piecemeal
release of the items on the USC list, though, would almost certainly
result in a cold reaction from the Chinese. It would also cause delays
and throw the question of what to release at any given time back to the
interagency process.
If you should wish to make even more dramatic your implementation
decisions, you could of course decide to go immediately to stage IT of
our decontrol program and make the original Chiiiese general license
list equal to the Soviet general license list without serious security
problems, i. e., by adding the items at Tab AZ. The Chinese could
probably get these goods from other sources in any case. I do not believe
it necessary, however, to move at once to the Russian list in view of the
ample nature of the Under Secretaries' recommendations with the State
additions, provided we release all the items on our list simultaneously.
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SECRET
Grains
The Under Secretaries' Committee, except Defense and Labor, strongly
urges that you approve a proposal to add wheat and feed grains to the
open general list not only for China, but for the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe as well. Maintenance of this restriction enables Commerce to
demand that 50 percent of all shipments be in American bottoms. This
eliminates the grain trade with Eastern Europe and will appear absurd
with China until we allow U. S. ships to call at Chinese ports. (NSSM 124,
Next China Steps, as it now stands in draft does, however, offer the
option of U. S. carriers calling at Mainland China ports, and it is due
shortly.) The China trade changes offer a good occasion to eliminate the
50 percent shipping requirement across the board, and it would be a
gesture to the USSR.
Grain is one of the principal potential exports from the Free World to
China, and it is difficult to explain to U. S. farming interests why we
refuse to allow that trade. Liberalization on this point may result in
further pressure to relax Eastern European restrictions, and it will
certainly increase pressure to allow U. S. ships to call at Chinese ports.
The Labor Department is opposed to relaxation of these controls without
first getting union agreement, since the move would antagonize the
unions, particularly George Meany, and may result in a refusal by the
longshoremen to load grain destined for the Communist countries.
Pete Peterson strongly urges a positive grains decision, since it would
have very favorable political results in border and agricultural states,
and specifically with Senator Dole. Peterson believes the agricultural
political aspects outweigh the costs with the unions and that the west
coast unions are prepared to load grain.
The Under Secretaries' Committee considered a fallback recommendation
-- that you include grain on the open list for China even if you do not do
so for Eastern Europe, or that you authorize individual licenses for China
without the 50-50 requirement. I cannot, however, recommend these
fallback positions for they would reinforce suspicions that improvement
in China relations is principally aimed against the USSR and would take
us right to Stage III in our China control program -- better treatment
for China than for Russia.
U. S. Imports
The Under Secretaries' Committee has considered three means of
controlling U. S. imports from China. The Trading with the Enemy Act,
by which we will control these imports, does not allow product differentiation.
SECRET
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e. 7
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SECRET
Imports from China will face high Smoot-Hawley tariff rates. Cotton
textiles will be held down by the long-term textile agreement. Before
the U. S. embargo on trade with China, 80 percent of our imports consisted
of items such as hog bristles, tung oil, wool, tungsten, feathers, eggs,
and menthol. The USC believes that even without controls, our imports
from China would take a few years to reach $100 million though they might
eventually reach $200 million. In view of the nature of China's exports
to the Free World -- mainly foodstuffs, crude materials, and semi-
finished manufactures -- the pattern of her shipments to the United States
and the potential volume of imports, the Under Secretaries' Committee
recommends that you approve the issuance of a general license authorizing
all imports from the PRC with an announcement that we may impose a
global import restriction in the future should it become necessary.
Other options considered and rejected were that (a) all potential imports
be licensed individually by the Treasury Department; and (b) a $50 million
quota be now announced limiting such imports. The Committee rejected
these recommendations as unnecesssary until we have a better view of
developing trade relations and because of the bad precedent that would be
established by initiating such a cumbersome bureaucratic procedure.
Further Review and Coordination
The Committee will review the results of your decisions in August and
report to you on possible future steps. Meanwhile, the agencies will
continue to make additions to the China list in the context of reviews for
the Eastern European list and send to you only those items on which there
is interagency disagreement. (I believe we can trust Defense to be
sufficiently vigilant in this respect.) The agencies will also consider on
their merits individual applications for export of items not yet included
on the general open license list.
Announcing Your Decision
To obtain maximum domestic and international impact from your decision,
we should issue a White House press release along the lines of the one at
Tab B. Pete Peterson, however, has written to suggest that we would
gain more domestic plaudits first conferring with interest (Tab C
This, however, would open the strong possibility of press leaks.
. ? SECRET
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SECRET
Recommendations-
1. That you accept the Under Secretaries' recommendation on items for the
U. S. export list including earth moving and railroad equipment. Pete
Peterson concurs
Approve
Disapprove, prefer the USG list without earth moving and railroad
equipment
Disapprove, prefer to accept USG recommendations but phase the
announcements over several months as suggested by Defense
Disapprove, prefer to go immediately to the Soviet level in our
Chinese export controls
2. That you approve the addition of grains for open gefier license export
to China and the Soviet Union. Pete Peters.pn stroqgly co urs.
Approve
Disapprove
Disapprove, open general license to hina or,
individual licensing for China without t e 5076 shipping requirement -
(I strongly recommend against these last alternatives. )
3. That we announce the licensing of all imports from the PRC under a
general license subject to possible future import restrictions should these
prove necessary. Pate Peter5An concurs.
Approve
Disapprove, prefer individual licenses, without dollar quota
Disapprove, prefer a global $50 million limit
4. That we announce the decision via a public release from the White House.
Approve
Disappro
SECRET
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 SfS 11U1163 IS, _1/ '/
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WASHINGTON
May 13, 1971
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Trade and Travel with the
People's Republic of China
On April 13 you directed that a number of moves
be taken to increase personal and commercial contacts
between China and the United States. I attach at
Tab A this Committee's report of the actions taken to
fufill your instructions as well as certain proposals
for your decision which will complete these first
steps.
The following is a brief summary of both the
major points of decision as well as the actions already
taken by appropriate agencies.
U.S. Exports to China (pages 1-3 of report)
As you requested, we have reviewed for strategic
significance and prepared for your approval at Tab B
a list of non-strategic items to be placed on general
license for export to China. In carrying out your
instructions, we have attempted to produce a meaning-
ful list, both in trade and political terms. About
95% of the items available to the USSR under general
license are on the recommended list for the PRC, and
some of the remainder are still under review. Omissions
include heavy construction equipment of possible
military use, overly broad categories which might
include items of strategic significance to the PRC,
but not to the USSR, and some atomic energy-connected
items.
There has been some, relatively minor, disagreement
between agencies as to the completeness of this list.
The Committee is satisfied, however, that the list at
A
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SECRET
(2)
Tab B, with or without the two additions recommended by
the Department of State but objected to by the Department
of Defense and placed for your decision at the end of
the list, will be received as a significant first step
in opening trade with China.
We therefore recommend that you approve the list
(Tab B) of non-strategic items to be placed on general
license for export to China, indicating at Tab B your
decision concerning the additional items proposed by
the Department of State.
Approve
Disapprove
Special Problem of Wheat Exports (pages 3-6)
We, except for the Department of Defense, recommend
that you approve inclusion of wheat, other grains and
wheat flour in the general license list. While the Dena.rtmen'
of Agriculture, in particular, feels strongly that this
recommendation should be adopted, the Departments of Labor
and Commerce do not concur unqualifiedly in this recommendation.
The arguments pro and con on this issue appear at pages
3 through 6 of the attached report together with a.space
for you to indicate your decision on page 6.
Public Announcement, Continuing Review, and Liberalization
of Exports (page 6)
Once you have taken your decision we would plan to
orchestrate appropriate agency and/or White House
announcements in order to capitalize on and reinforce
the thus far most favorable international and domestic
reaction which your April 14 announcement has generated.
For example, the Department of Commerce will make a
public announcement in the Export Control Bulletin, and
state that there will be a continuing interagency review
of items to be placed under general license to the
PRC, the additions to be published from time to time.
In addition, agencies will operate under the assumption
that if individual export licenses are requested for
items not on general license to the PRC, such applications
will be considered on their merits.
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(3)
The Department of Defense believes that the entire
list of eligible non-strategic items should not be
announced on the general list at one time, but should
be timed over a period of several months of 50, 25,
and 25 percent of the items, contigent on PRC reactions.
The rest of this Committee does not agree with
such a phasing of this step. Such an approach would
be not only impractical and unrealistic, but quite
out of keeping with your announced policy of measured
but steady movement to open contacts with the PRC
wherever possible.
U.S. Imports from China (pages 7-11)
You have stated that upon commencement of direct
exports, direct imports from China would be allowed, of
"a similar and correlated nature." In order to emphasize
U.S. interest in real, two-way trade, the Committee
recommends that you announce an appropriate import regime
at the same time the export list is published, making
clear, of course, that we are interested in a mutually
beneficial trading relationship, one that avoids damage
to domestic firms and workers in both countries.
We have carefully considered a large number of
possible import control systems, given our concern that
Chinese imports not damage in any way American manufac-
tures, particularly in such sensitive commercial areas as
textiles or shoes. After a study of such factors as
historic and present Chinese trade patterns and already
existing self-protection devices including non-Most-
Favored-Nation treatment"under the tariff, anti-dumping
regulations, and the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement,
we recommend that you approve the issuance of a general
license authorizing all imports (not otherwise restricted
by legislation) from the PRC, coupled with an announcement
that import restrictions may be imposed in the future
if trade developments so dictate (page 10 of the report).
The principal advantage of such a policy is that it
would permit the maximum amount of trade development
and would hopefully elicit the most positive political
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SECRET
(4)
and commercial response from the PRC. We would, of
course, keep a careful watch on imports and be prepared
quickly to take remedial action to prevent damage to
U.S. concerns. We have listed for your consideration
two other options, more restricted in nature, at pages
.10 and 11 of the report.
Recommendation
License all imports from the PRC under a general
license subject to possible future dollar quota.
Approve
Disapprove
Prefer other option (B or C)
Other Implementation Steps (pages 12 and 13)
We have prepared regulations carrying out your
instructions on the following three steps: 1) relaxation
of dollar controls; 2) ending of bunkering restrictions;
3) transport of Chinese cargoes by U.S. carriers.
The new regulations on these topics were announced on
May 7 and no further decisions from you are required
on .these points.
With respect to travel, we feel your public
statement on April 14 that "the United States is
prepared to expedite visas for visitors or groups of
visitors from the PRC to the United States" requires
no further supplemental action at this time.
Further Review and Coordination (page 13)
The Committee will continue to coordinate
implementation'actions in this field and will, as you
requested, provide you with an analysis of the results
of these initial steps after a trial period of four
months--that is, by mid-August 1971
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHING 1OIJ. D.C. 20506
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CHAIRMAN
June 9, 1971
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Trade with the people's Republic of China
The President has made the following decisions on the basis of your
memorandum of May 13, 1971:
The Department of Commerce should be prepared to release the
list of non-strategic items on general license for export to China.
- Wheat, other grains and wheat flour should be placed on general
license for shipment to the PRC, Eastern Europe and the USSR,.
Imports from the PRC should be permitted under a general license
subject to possible future import restrictions in the future if trade
developments so dictate.
For items not on the general list, individual export licenses
should be considered on their merits.
In the course of normal interdepartmental review of further items
for open general license to Eastern Europe and the USSR, the agencies
may consider placing further items on the China open license list.
The China items should, however, be submitted to the President
for approval before public announcement.
-- The Under Secretaries Committee should.provide by August 15 an
analysis of the results of these initial steps along with recommenda-
tions on further measures in this field.
Dispatched to Irwin Via SS w/ Recpt #2529 ecPeterson/Haig/Kenn/Sonn/llol
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7
The Department of State has announced new regulations that will
permit American touristy and residents abroad to purchase
limited quantities of goody originating in Communist China. This
modification in the Foreign Assets Control regulations will reduce
the inconvenience caused to American travellers desiring to
purchase Chinese goods for non-commercial purposes.
In this same spirit of reducing restrictions on U. S. citizens
activities abroad, the Department of State has decided to authorize
automatic validations of passports for travel to Communist China
for the following categories of persons:
Members of Congress
Journalists
Members of the teaching profession
te a.l- vA4V '.Y'AM?i post My, ~' Cs g ucew?r cruse a e. ii%4 iybis 4eii a'6i xz :i, y
enrolled in colleges and universities
Scientists and medical doctors
Reproeentatives of the American Red Cross
These new measures become effective upon publication in The
Federal Reinter July 23. Consistent with this decision,
persons in these categories receiving new passports can
automatically have the restriction on travel to Communi at China
removed from their passports. To facilitate the processing
of requests for removal of this restriction in passports which
already have been issued to persons in these categories, the
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 r `lam ' At' ! . 1 r /^/. i'
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i .1 A V N.v _ r,
security and progress of the Pacific community.
First, let me refer briefly to the situation in
Viet-Nam.
We had hoped that the carefully prepared
proposals for a negotiated solution put forward
by the United States and its allies would meet
with reciprocity from Hanoi and lead to serious
negotiations. So far, this has not been the case.
We have proposed mutual withdrawal of
troops and thus the deescalation of the war.
President Thieu has proposed free elections for
all of the people of South Viet-Nam, including
those, in the NLF [National Liberation Front] ;
he has proposed international supervision that
would assure the fairness of such elections.
Unfortunately, the position of Hanoi is
against mutual force withdrawals, against free
elections, against international supervision. In
fact, it persists in its position-an inhumane
position-of refusing even to provide us with
the names of American military personnel they
hold prisoners. These positions are indefensible
and are receiving little international support,
and they are inherently untenable.
We are convinced that settlement of the war
in Viet-Nam under circumstances permitting
the South Vietnamese people to decide their
own destiny is a necessary foundation stone for
futuiu security iu Southeast Asia. and in the
whole Asian-Pacific area. We firmly believe
that self-determination is the political force of
the future. We also believe that so-called
"strrriggles of national liberation," organized
and supported from the outside, increasingly
will become recognized for what they are :
vehicles for Communist colonialism.
We are entering an interesting period in the
affairs of Asia and the Pacific community. Not
only in Viet-Nang but elsewhere, new chapters
are about to be written.
Virtually all of the ambassadors of Com-
munist China have been in Peking for the past
3 years. Now, since the Ninth Party Congress
in Peking, many ambassadors are leaving
Peking for new posts.
Before the Moscow meeting of the Coin-
inunist parties in May, all of the Soviet Union's
ambassadors to East Asia were recalled to Rus-
sia. They----or their successors-are returning to
their posts. The deep and bitter conflict be-
tiveen the Soviet Union and Communist China
continues to fester and broaden.
At the recent Moscow meeting, Mr. Brezlunev
[Leonid I. Brezhnev, First Secretary of the
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Soviet Communist Party] made his elliptical
reference to the need for an Asian collective
security system, obviously directed against
Communist China. Thus, it is clear there is great
uncertainty in the Communist world about the
course of recent events.
By the way of contrast, there has been great
progress in recent years in non-Communist
Asia. Indeed, I belieNre, it is here that the most
exciting success story of the next decade may
be written. As leading members of the Pacific
community, Australia and New Zealand are
playing an important role in that story.
Japan has already beconne the second most
productive economy in the free world.
The Republics of Korea and Chinia, Thai-
land, Singapore, and Malaysia have all doubled
their gross national product in the last decade.
Indonesia is putting its financial house in
order and is launched on a development pro-.
gram which, hopefully, will put an end to the
long stagnation under the previous regime.
India, Pakistan, and the Philippines have
achieved significant breakthroughs in agricul-
tural production. These are dramatic examples
of what free societies can accomplish.
Before World War II the only independent
countries in East Asia were China, Japan, and
Thailand. Today, more than three times as
many countries of this area are independent.
Regional cooperation is becoming more of a
rule and less of all exception. This strengthens
political confidence and cohesion.
This is not to deny the existence of many
dangers and unresolved problems in and among
Asian countries. But it does show the many
changes that have occurred in Asia.
It was against this background of change, of
new expectations, and of many uncertainties
that President Nixon has just visited a number
of countries and I have made two trips to Asia
in the past several months. There are a few
observations I would like to share with you as a
result
First, a few words about the greatest ques-
tion mark over the future of Asia and the
Pacific: Conununist China.
We recognize, of course, that the republic 'of
China on Taiwan and Communist China on the
mainland are facts of life. fire know, too, that
mainland China will eventually play an impor-
tant role in Asian and Pacific affairs-but cer-
tainly not as long as its leaders continue to have
such an introspective view of the world.
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a
I
It goes without saying that most of the world
is concerned about a nation which opposes a ne-
gotiated settlement of the Vietnamese conflict,
which has such belligerent policies toward its
neighbors, which provides training and supplies
for insurrectionist, groups, and which is now
exhorting her people to make sacrifices in antici-
pation of war with the Soviet Union.
Although we are inclined to speak of China
as a "great power," we should remember that
this power is potential more than actual. I be-
lieve there is a tendency in many quarters to
build up the Chinese Communists by equating
their capabilities with their rhetoric.
Public expressions of attitude toward the
United States from Communist China since, the
inauguration of our administration in Wash-
ington certainly have been strident. They pre-
tend to feel they are encircled by hostile forces.
I doubt very much if Peking's leaders really
consider that they are threatened by the mili-
tary strength of the United States. I suspect
they sense that the real threat to them comes
from the superior performance of open societies.
The evidence is all around them.
While the Chinese Communists seek to repair
the economic damage of the so-called cultural
revolution-following the'disaster of the Great
Leap Forward-many of their neighbors are
experiencing economic growth at rates among
the highest in the world.
Alone among major nations, Communist
China has at best stood still. Communist China
obviously has long been too isolated from world
affairs.
This is one reason why we have been seeking
to open up channels of communication. Just a
few days ago we liberalized our policies toward
purchase of their goods by American travelers
and toward validating passports for travel to
China.3 Our purpose was to remove irritants in
our relations and to help remind people on
mainland China of our historic friendship for
them.
Previously, we had suggested other steps such
as an exchange of persons and selected trade in
such goods as food and pharmaceuticals. As I
have said on previous occasions, we were pre-
pared to offer specific suggestions on an agree-
ment for more normal relations when the Chi-
nese canceled the scheduled resumption of the
ambassadorial talks in Warsaw last February.
IS For background, see 13ULLPTIN of Aug. 18, X949, P.
None of our initiatives has met with a posi-
tive response.
Apparently the present leaders in Poking
believe that it serves their purposes to maintain
a posture of hostility toward the United States.
They seem unprepared for any accommodation.
Their central position is that they will discuss
nothing with its unless we first abandon support
of our ally, the Republic of China. This we do
not propose to do.
titre nonetheless look forward to a time when
we can enter into a useful dialogue and to a
reduction of tensions. We would welcome a re-
newal of the talks with Communist China. We
shall soon be making another approach to see if
a dialogue with Peking can be resumed. This
could take place in Warsaw or at another mutu-
ally acceptable site. We would liko to resume
this dialogue; we would hope that they do, too.
President and I have inade recently to Asia has
been to reaffirm the permanence of American
foreign policy interests in the well-being and
security of Asia and the Pacific. We are a Pacific
power, and we intend to remain so. We
have every intention of remaining constant to
our commitments in Asia-to SEATO, to
ANZUS, and to c-ur several bilateral tl Tense rz
rangements. Geography, history, economics, and
mutual interest make us a part of the Pacific
conununity, and we intend to continue to play
the supporting role to which we are committed
by treaty. There is no equivocation in our deter-
mination in this regard, and we have made
this clear.
At the same time we are changing the empha-
sis of our relationships in line with current
realities.
Policies designed to meet one set of conditions
should not remain frozen in the face of new
conditions. New conditions do exist in Asia.
There is a new dynamism, a new sense of confi-
dence, a new impulse toward regional coopera-
tion and regional responsibility in Asia. There
is an enhanced desire and capability among
Asian nations to assume larger shares of their
own security.
We thus increasingly look to the independent
countries of Asia to enlarge their own capacities
and responsibilities.
In particular we have stressed the need for
them to assume full responsibility for their in-
ternal security problems, and they agree. We
will continue, of course, to supply material as-
Department of State Bulletin
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 No Objection
nally instigated subversion or insurgency.
I have had extensive consultations with Asian
leaders. 1 airy persuaded that they are highly
responsive to this approach. So the new direc-
tion toward greater responsibility for security
and economic development and political com-
munity is something we want-and Asians
want-because it is natural and because it is
increasingly possible.
Security must continue to have it high prior-
ity in the quest for peace. Only with a sense of
security will governments and people make the
necessary efforts and sacrifices required for eco-
nomic and social progress.
The Soviet Union has floated the idea of a
new system of regional collective security in
Asia. We do not know exactly what the Rus-
sians had in mind when they broached this
vague idea. It must have been clear to everyone,
however, that, the Soviet objective was the coin-
tainmentt, of Communist China. Reactions in
Asia generally, as they have been reported to
.us, have been something less than enthusiastic.
. Obviously any Soviet proposal to cooperate
with non-Communist states in a security system
directed against another Communist state is an
interesting political development in itself. But
our own view is that the more constructive
course would be for the countries of Asia
to continue to develop institutions they al reads
have created, to expand associations among
1lieanwhile, it is our intention not to take
sides in the struggle between China and the
Soviet Union but to seek to improve our rela-
tionsh ps with either or both.
We do not intend to abandon negotiations
with the Soviet Union because the Chinese do
not like it nor to' give up pursuit of contacts
with the Chinese because the Soviets do not like
it.
IVe intend to disregard Peking's denuncia-
tions of United States efforts to negotiate with
the Soviet Union. And we intend to disregard
Soviet nervousness at steps we take to reestab-
lish contacts between us . and the Chinese
policy in Asia along the following lines:
-To achieve a peace in Viet-Nam which per-
mits the people of South Viot-Nam to determine
their own future free of external pressures from
anyone.
our determination to meet our treaty obliga-
tions in the area.
-To encourage the leaders of Asia to meet
their own internal security needs while provid-
ing material assistarice when required.
-To encourage continued rapid economic de-
velopment of the area with emphasis on increas-
ing regional cooperation.
-To stand unaligned in the Si.no-Soviet con-
flict while persisting in efforts to engage in it
constructive dialogue with both.
-To play a full supporting role in the gen-
eral evolution of it secure and progressive Pacific
community.
Ours is a world of pluralism and diversity.
But we know that beneath diversity there are
shared needs and universal aspirations. We
know that there is common ground between na-
tions which are different in their cultural back-
grounds, historical experience, and social pref-
erences. We know that we are interdependent
in the modern world. In the recognition of this
interdependence lies the road to peace.
Arrival Statement, August 1
Press release 2,10 dated August 4
I have looked forward for many years to the
opportunity to visit the Republic of China.
Your nation has a reputation, which it so justly
deserves, for preserving the best in the moral
and cultural values of Chinese life. In addition
to that, Taiwan's outstanding economic prog-
ress has won wide admiration and respect.
And you have been willing to share that success
with other nations by providing economic aid
to 21 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
During my brief stay I hope to be able to
carry away a better and more personal appreci-
ation of your great cultural tradition, now en-
hanced by the rapid progress you have made in
improving the well-being of your people.
This is what I wish to gain during Illy stay.
What I wish to give while I am here is an as-
surance of my country's continuing deep con-
cern for East Asia, it concern having firm roots
in history. We will continue to meet our treaty
obligations to our allies, including, of course,
our ally of long standing, the Republic of
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in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6 cific power and
 'A A
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AT sir r.t- Ak ?";, , cV-q 4. , .S"7 / '6
The planner in which the Soviet Union reacts
to our specific proposals oil specific issues will
afford a test of its basic intentions. If their
responses seem reasonable and their approach
to the conduct of negotiations appears to be
in good faith, then grounds will have been
established to hove forward. But no single step
ahead can in itself bring an end to East-West
tensions. Identifying, negotiating, and resolv-
ing disputed situations must be a continuing
process, one that will take time, patience, and
ingenuity. Genuine progress will be achieved
only if both sides are satisfied at each step along
the way that their security has not been
jeopardized.
Whatever, at any rate, may be the progress of
our negotiations with the Soviet Union, we shall
ill the meanwhile continue to pursue two par-
allel objectives. One---closely related to the
fulfillment of our treaty obligations-is to
strengthen our relations with our friends. This
was one of the objectives of the President's trips
to Europe and Asia. His European trip, for
example, assured our NATO allies that we view
the alliance as an evolving partnership, one
which is capable of growing to meet changed
needs. In the President's words, we see it not
as "the teinliorary pooling of selfish interests"
bpi; ".L colli,itiu ng lli'Ui:C 5S of cooperation." The
full and genuine consultation he promised has
reinvigorated our relationships in Europe and
brought forth greater frankness and trust on
both sides.
The other objective is to improve our relations
with countries not aligned with us, including
those that are hostile. This, of course, was the
purpose of the President's visit to Romania, and
the overwhelming reception given him there was
a graphic indication of the warmth many East-
In the case of Communist China, longrun im-
provement in our relations is in our own na-
tional interest. We do not seek to exploit for our
own advantage the hostility between the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic. Ideological
differences between the two Communist giants
are not our affair, We could not fail to be
deeply concerned, however, with all escalation
For President Nixon's remarks to the North At.l:an-
tic Council at Brussels on Feb. 24, see BuLLE-rix of
Mar. 24, 1969, p. 250.
Department of State Bulletin
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of this quarrel into a massive breach of interila-
tional peace and security. Our national security
would in the long run be prejudiced by a ssoc.iat-
illt; ourselves with either side against the other.
Each is highly sensitive about flillerican efforts
to improve relations with the other. We intend,
nevertheless, to put-we a long-term course of
progressively developing better relations with
both. We are not going to let Communist Chi-
nese invective deter us front seeking agreements
with the Soviet Union where those are in our
interest. Conversely, we are not going to let
Soviet apprehensions prevent us from atteinpt-
bin to bring Communist China out of its angry,
irmriess owarc our commitments,
realism toward change, and respect for other
nations can be seen in varying combinations in
all of this administration's approaches to the
problems of foreign policy. Although the
United States no longer has the overwhelmingly
one-sided margin of strength that was ours in
the shattered postwar world, we are still a great
power, and we have a vital stake in interna-
tional peace and stability. We cannot shrink
from the responsibilities that this fact and the
nature of our worldwide interests bring to us,
As President Nixon told the Governors on
Monday .[September 1] :
The new strategy for the seventies . . . means main-
taining defense forces strong enough to keep the
peace-but not allowing wasteful expenditures to drain
away resources we need for progress.
It means limiting our commitments abroad to those
we can prudently and realistically keep. It means help-
ing other free nations maintain their own security, but
not rushing in to do for them what they can and should
do for themselves.
These, in broad profile, are the directions the
foreign policy of this administration is now
taking. The unfolding international situation
presents us with difficult choices and makes
exacting demands. But it also holds before us
brilliant new opportunities. As President
Nixon stated it at his inauguration:
"The peace we seek--the peace we seek to
win-is not victory over any other people but
the peace that comes `with healing in its wings';
with compassion for those who have suffered;
with understanding for those who have opposed
us; with the opportunity for all the peoples of
this earth to choose their own destiny."
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HAK Backgrounder .- Dec. 18, 1969
We. have always made it clear that we have no
permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries,
including Communist. countries and specifically countrieU
like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not
on the basis of their domestic ideology.
And we hope we have started a process towards:
Communist China, that over a period of years, will periit
a more calibrated relationship to develop, and one in which
such a large part of humanity will not be. excluded from
the international community .
Q Dr. Kissinger, if I understood your remarks
concerning our attitude toward having no permanent enemies,
and you said we would judge each nation on the basis of its
action, including communist China, and it would have a more
calibrated reaction: to the Mainland Chinese. Does that not
in fact constitute a change, when compared with Preside.'.
Nixon's remarks at either his first or second news conference
in which it seems to me -- I am going on recollection here ---
that he said in effect there would be no change in our
attitude toward Communist China.
Could you expand a little bit for us on that"
DR. KISSINGER: Frankly, I don't have the text of
the press conference, and I seem to remember that.he was
speaking about the admission of Communist China to the
United Nations,. which we don't believe is the overwhel .".ng
problem since it involves a lot of other issues, including
the international position of Formosa.
But I would say it is clearly a change in American
policy of the post-war period, that' we are prepared too 1-.a,Je
serious, concrete and we hope, constructive talks with
Communist China. We make.-no attempt to overload the circuit
at this moment, the problem is one of restoring a c?egre e
of confidence and the basis for a possible dialogue,'ro4her
than any very precise shopping list,of ideas. There 1 ?,,
after all, been for aver 2.0 years an absence. of coi;,t,..u
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
But we have attempted, and I think to some extent
succeeded, in beginning to establish some communication and
at least to convey a different basic 'stance than has been
characteristic in the past.
Q Doctor, how about Communist Cuba in that
connection? Any openings foreseeable there?
DR. KISSING R: There has not been any change during_.
the past year with respect to Communist Cuba.
What we have attempted to do is to restore, '.is to
establish the basis of a western hemisphere consensus first,
and then to address the problem of Communist Cuba.
0 At the. National Security Council, do you ever --
I am going back to Communist China -- talk philosophically about
long-range Communist China? Do you ever relate -- let me
press you on one point on Communist China. You have said that
in the past, Dr. Kissinger, there is no problem of communication
with Communist China. There' is Warsaw and you yourself have
said there is no problem.
Can you take us further back, or can you really
elaborate on Communist China? . Just what is the stumbling block?
of : Communist Ch na, the evolution of Communist China, and
secondly,'I have said in the past that there is no problem of
communication with Communist Ciiina because of the Warsaw talks.
'DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether in the National
Security Council we ever discuss philosophically the question
DR. KISSINGER: -- of the many remarks I have made
Warsaw talks, which haven't actually taken place this year,
except for the one that took place last week, and then I ,
suppose there are other channels that could be found. But the
prohl:em isn't only the. existence of channels, but what moves
in these channels.
over the years, which of the many. remarks you may be referring
to.. And I think we have to distinguish two things: One is,
of course, there are channels in the sense that there were the
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
7
in this respect, we have tried to convey to
China at this stage what our basic philosophy of int ~}''. +.:ional
rel4 tions is, and how they fit into that basic phi1ov o -iy
of international relations.
This. is much more important than to engage in a
complicated raogoti.ation because the outstanding issutcL), ca,;.cr ote
negotiating i_:= sues between us and thorn, are relative :.y
few, and, therefore, at this stage of the game, after 20
Years of isolation, it seemed to us more important to convoy
our general attitude.
basic notion of basic evalu'~;_on: First of all, the Chinese
people are obviously a great people. They have the longest
unbroken record of cgovernmont in one area of any of the
existing civilizations; and secondly, 800 million people
representing 25 percent of the human race, is a factor that
cannot be ignored. They will influence international affairs
whatever we intend to do and declaratory Policy we adopt. . They
are a reality. And their policy, for good or ill, will
determine the pos: i bil i ti^s for peace and progress. And that
is irrespective of what we.. do.
Thirdly, a country of this size and weight is going
to affect all surrounding ' countries , again , irrespective of
what we do. Therefore, if it is true that the big problem
of the immediate post-World War II period was to avoid chaos,
and if it is true that the big problem of the next 20 years
is to build a more permanent peace, then it seems to us
impossible to build a peace, which we would define Ias something
other than just the avoidance of crisis, by simply ignoring
these 800 million people, whether they are aggressive or
relatively peaceful or something in-between is bound to
affect the whole structure of Asia and cf many other parts.
if one looks abtr-ill, if you .say what is ore's
Nor, do we over-estimate what we can do by
unilateral'-actions towards them.
They will make their decisions on the basis of their
conceptions of their needs, and of their ideology. But to
-the degree that -their actions can be influenced by ours,
we are prepared to engage in a dialogue with them.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
DR. KISSINGER: It is never easy to disentangle
what is produced by conditions that you did not create and
what is produced by your own policy.
All I can say is that I remember that during the
Berlin crisis in 1961,-and 19G2, it used to be argued that
Soviet intransigence was caused by their conflict with
Communist China, that they wanted to'clear their rear up
so that they would be ready for, the eventual conflict with
Communist China.
1 am not saying that was correct. All I am
saying is that whatever pol.iry the Soviet Union has adopted
to the west can be made to fit some a.rterp etation of Sino-
Soviet relationships.
I would have to guess that it is probably a combination
of both factors -- the fact that the Sino-Soviet conflict
is, of course, very much on the minds of Soviet leaders.
At the same time, if they believedb we were either
irreconcilably hostile or so .:.:.tnervious to the needs of
the situation ' t=hat. it was impossible to talk to us, then
they. would have to tal=e that into account all the more so
as their conflict with China is not one that they cannot
defer for any number of years or defer forever.
So my judgment would be that our policy has
contributed substantially. I don't think it is the o;,- y
factor that produces the Soviet policy.
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 P _ .^
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Following are excerpts from an article by Carroll Kilpatrick, .
Washington Post Staff Writer, published in the Washington 'Post
Zl Dec 69:
In a year-end review a White House official said that the President .
as me clear to both China an ussia Mal e ni tee States Fa_
no permanent enemies and will judge countries on the basis of actions
rather than their domestic ideology.
fetent basic stance, the official said.
The President is prepared for serious, constructive talks with Peking
and has begun to establish some communication and to convey a dif-
The announcement Friday of a relaxation of trade restriction against
China indicates the direction the Administration would like to travel.
?r
0
I N
The first problem with relation to China is one of restoring a degree )c
of confidence and the basis for a possible dia.loone rather than of 1s
negotiating on specific issues, the White House believes.
Mr. -Nixon recognizes that the Chinese cannot be ignored and that they
will have an influence in international affairs whatever the United
States does.
He has concluded that if the big problem of the last 20 years was to avoid
chaos,. the big problem of the next 20 is to build a more permanent pceacce.
While he does not overestimate what the United States can do to influence
800 million people.
.China he is convinced that the United States cannot ignore a nation with
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
CHANGES IN CHINA TRADE RESTRICTIONS
Changes in the Foreign Assets Control regulations were
announced b the State Department today. The changes are
summarized as follows:
1. For foreign subsidiaries of U. S. firms, most FAC
restrictions on transactions with China regarded as non-
strategic by COCOM are removed. This is intended to permit
American subsidiaries, insofar as FAC restrictions are concerned,
to engage in trade with, Communist China under regulations applicable
to other firms in countries in which they operate and to remove
restrictions which those countries view as interference in their
domestic affairs. This action will not affect Commerce Department
controls on export or re-export of U. S. origin goods or of unpublished
American technology.
2. Present restrictions on U. S. business participation in third-
country trade in presumptive Chinese goods are eliminated. This
will permit American firms (including banking, insurance, transport,
and trading) to purchase and ship to third countries commodities of
presumptive Chinese origin that they are now able to ship to the U. S.
under certificates of origin procedures. Although certificates will not
be required for third-country transactions, such goods may still not be
shipped to the U. S. without them. This change is responsive to argent
requests of foreign branches. of U. S. firms, and it is expected to
improve the competitive position of American business concerns over-
seas.
3. The $100 ceiling on non-commercial purchases of Chinese
Communist goods by Americans is removed, as is the requirement
that non-commercial imports from China enter the U. S. as accomoained
baggage. This will further relieve administrative difficulties of American
citizens and is responsive to the desire of American tourists, collectors,
museums and universities to import Chinese products for their own
account. It will not permit imports by persons or commercial organi
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Department is authorizing all foreign service posts to validate
their passports for travel to Communist China without reference
to the Department.
These changes do not affect restrictions on use of passports for
travel to North Viet-Nara, North Korea or Cuba or restrictions
.on financial transactions relating to these areas.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6 1470
if we are to have peace in the last third of the Twentieth Century,
a major factor will be the development of a new relationship
-between the United States and the Soviet Union.
I would not underestimate our differences, but we are moving with
precision and purpose from an era of confrontation to an era of
negotiation.
Our. negotiations on strategic arms limitations and in other areas
motivated by mutual self-interest rather than naive sentimentality.
will have far greater chance for success if both sides enter them.
It is with this same spirit that we have resumed discussions with
Communist China in our talks at Warsaw.
Our concern in our relations with both these nations is to avoid
a catastrophic collision and to build a solid basis for peaceful
settlement of our differences,
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6 ~aCt~
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~ , Ito 19-70
The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated
from the international communit
of more than 700 million people.
run no s a e and enduring
international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation
Chinese foreign policy re Iects the, complexity of China's historical
relationships with the out bide world. While China has the longest
unbroken history of self-government in the world, it has had little ex-
perience in dealing with other nations on a basis of equal sovereignty.
Predominant in Asia for many centuries, these gifted and -cultured
people saw their society as the center of the world, Their tradition of
self-imposed cultural isolation ended abruptly in the 19th century, however,
when an internationally weak China fell prey to exploitation by technologically
superior foreign powers.
The history inherited by the Chinese Communists, therefore, was a
complicated mixture of isolation and incursion, of pride and humiliation.
We must recall this-unique past when we attempt to define a new relation-
ship, for the future.
Nor can we underestimate the gulf of ideology between us or the appare it
differences in interests and how we interpret world events. While America
has historic ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and, rn..riy of our
basic interests are not in conflict, we must recognize the pr. sound gulf of
suspicion and ideology.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
the principles underlying.our relations with Communist .China are.
similar to those governing our policies toward the U.S.S.R. United
Mates policy is not likely soon to have much impact on China's
behavior, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our
interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world,
that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations
with Peking.
The key to our relations will be the actions each side takes regarding
the other and its allies. We will not ignore hostile acts. We intend to
.maintain our treaty commitment to the defense of the Republic of China.
But we will seek to promote understandings which can establish a new
pattern of mutually beneficial actions.
.I made these points to the leaders I met throughout my trip to Asia, and
they were welcomed as constructive and realistic.
We have avoided dramatic gestures which might invite dramatic rebuffs.
We have taken specific steps that did not require Chinese agreement but
which underlined our willingness to have a more norma and constructive
relationship. During the year, we have.:
Made it possible for American tourists, museums and others to
make non-commercial purchases of Chinese goods without special
authorization.
"` ~""Broadened the categories o? -Americans whose passports may be
automatically validated for travel in Communist China, to include
members of Congress, journalists, teachers, postgraduate scholars
.and college students, scientists, medical doctors and representatives
of the American Red Cross.
Permitted subsidiaries of American firms abroad to engage in
re-enter the international community.
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commerce between Communist China and third countries.
The resumption of talks with the Chinese in Warsaw may indicate that
our approach will prove useful. These first steps may not lead to major
results at once, but sooner or later Communist China will be ready to
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23 LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Our desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of exploiting
the clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no benefit to us
in the intensification of that conflict, and we have no intention of taking
sides. Nor is the United States interested in joining any condominium
or hostile coalition of great powers against either of the large
Communist countries. Our attitude is clear-cut--a lasting peace will
be impos Bible. so long as some nations consider themselves the
permanent enemies of others.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Under existing law as interpreted by our courts, United States citizens
h
These restrictions relate- to the use of the passport, and not to the
actual travel of the individual.
.(on travel to mainland China. North Korea, North Vietnam, anc
We have decided to continue the restrictions for another six months
l Cubal
ave e ,
are free to travel to any area of the world. The courts
however, that the Government does have the authority to control the
With respect to mainland China however, we follow a more liberal
1?d for any le itimate
a
I'm talking here about Cuba. North Korea, an
give passport validation only.in limited cases, that is, to newsmen,
scholars, medical doctors and scientists in the field of public health,
American Red Cross representatives, and certain humanitarian cases.
North Vietnam.
With respect to Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam, we normally
We believe that it would not be advisable at this time for the Government
to appear to be encouraging unlimited. trave1 to these areas, by removing
these restrictions. The conditions existing in each of these four areas,
including the dangers that United States citizens traveling there might
face, vary somewhat, and so accordingly, does our policy regarding
validation for travel to those countries.
validity and the use of the United States passport.
policy of passport validation and ova
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Mr. President, distinguished delegates:
We have before us for consideration once again a proposal sponsored
by Albania, Algeria and sixteen other states to expel The Republic of
China from the United Nations and to place in the same seat
representatives from the People's.Republic of China. I use the words
"once again" because this proposal, and the resolution which seeks to
effect it, differ not at all from similar proposals and resolutions
which we have considered -- and decisively rejected --- many times in
the past. My delegation hopes that it will be rejected;. again this
year.
We have heard it said before, and doubtless it will be repeated during
the course of this debate, that the People's Republic of China is a
play a constructive role among the i'ami7_y o na ions. o us are
mindful of the industry, talents and achievements of the great r,
people who live in that cradle of civilization. ,4
But let us also remember, Mr. President, that the Charter nowhere
reality that cannot be ignored. Indeed that is so. And I:.do not believe
any of us here today, or any of the governments that we represent,. ignores
that reality. As far as the United States is concerned, as most are
aware, we have actively Sought to move from an era of confrontation to
an era of negotiation. Representatives of my Government have met with
representatives of the People's Republic of China twice this year and
would have met more often had Peking been willing to do so. And my
Government has taken a number of concrete actions -- actions for which
we neither proposed nor anticipated'a quid pro quo -- to ease relations
between us. The fact of the mattes. i..s the United States in _,S
Cn
interested as an in is room to see the People's epu is ofChina
to carry out the obligations of membership, and that members may
be expelled only if they have persistently violated the principle of
any resolution is it written that a state may say "We will join, but
only if you expel Member X". What the Charter does say is that
membership shall be open to all peace--loving states able and willing
membership in the United Nations. Neither in the Charter, not in IK-
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
No, our policy wouldn't be based on expediency. It would
.Mr. President, si.nco the United Nations' vote on China, have
you found it expedient for the United States to revi.ew our
policy towards Mainland China?
be based on principle.
We have no pans to change our policy with regard to the
admission of Red China into the United Nations at this time.
However, we are going to continue the initiative that I have
begun, an initiative to relaxing trade restrictions and travel
restrictions, an attempting to open channels of conmRmication
with Communist China, having in mind the fact that looking
long toward the future we must have some communication and
eventually relations with Communist China.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
us what the current U.S. policy is toward Mainland China,
especially since the vote in the United Nations recently?
Mr. Secretary, before you leave the Asian area, can you tell
Well, the policy of this Administration toward Mainland
China is to do what we can to improve our relations with
Mainland China and, as you know, we have taken some steps
in that direction.
We also have been willing to discuss matters of common
be renewed.
they have not been renewed. We would hope that those talks will
interest with the Communist Chinese in Warsaw. The talks
were broken off at the time of the Cambodian incursions and
as we always have been,'to any attempt to expel the Republic
of China from the.United Nations. We continue to have very
close, friendly relations with the Republic of China. We
think they have been a very fine member of the International
Community and we, in our review, have no thought of changing
Insofar as current policy on admission to the United Nations is,
concerned, that matter is under review. We have not come to
any conclusion about it. We certainly are very much opposed,
our policy vis-a-vis the Republic of China.
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HAIL clcJ1" vktL
lec., 2L,/970
With respect to Communist Chinn, and other of the major Communist
countries, our position has been quite similar to the one that I
have just described towards the Soviet Union.
Early in the Administration, the President ordered an examination
of the possibilities of easing some of the irritations in the
relationship, especially in the field of trade and travel. And
we, therefore, took a number of steps which removed some of these
restrictions and which beyond that made clear to the Con-punist
Chinese that the United States was prepared to talk seriously and
to enable them to re-enter the international community.
We are in the process now of again reviewing the still existing
restrictions. We remain prepared, at Warsaw, or elsewhere, to
talk to,the'Communist Chinese about differences that divide us.
There were some talks in Warsaw last year that were interrupted,
but we stand prepared to resume them, applying the same principles
that I have indicated govern our relationship to the Communist
world, which is to seek, on the basis of equality, to remove the
causes that have produced the tensions.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6 Pal tC '? 1&
The Problem of China
The Peoples Republic of China faces perhaps the most severe problem of
all in adjusting her policies to the realities of modern Asia. With a population
eight times greater than that of Japan, and possessing a much greater resource
base, Mainland China nonetheless sees the free Japanese economy producing a
gross national product two and a half times that of her own. The remarkable
success of the Chinese people within the free economic setting of Taiwan and
Singapore (and the contributions of the overseas Chinese to growth elsewhere in
Asia) stands as an eloquent rebuttal to Peking's claim of unique insight and
wisdom. in organizing the talents of the Chinese people.
The Peoples Republic of China is making a claim to leadership of the less
developed portions of the world. But-for that claim to be credible, and for it
to be pursued effectively, Communist China must expose herself to contact
with the outside world. Both require the end of the insulation of Mainland China
from outside realities, and therefore from change.
The twenty-two year old hostility between ourselves and the Peoples
Republic of China is another unresolved problem, serious indeed in view of the
fact that it determines our relationship with 750 million talented and energetic
people.
It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the
crefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing th
Peoples Republic of China into a oast relationship with the world
community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.
We recognize that China's long historical experience weighs heavily on
contemporary Chinese foreign policy. China has had little experience in
conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations. l,'or centuries
China dominated its neighbors, culturally and politically. In the last 150 years
it has been subjected to massive foreign interventions. Thus, C'.-dna.'s attitude
toward foreign countries. retains elements of alorafness, suspicic:ri, and hostility.
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J
?7Sd 17 71
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
-83-
Under Communism these historically shaped attitudes have been sharpened by_
doctrines of violence and revolution, proclaimed more often than followed as
principles in foreign relations.
rLlil
Another factor determining Communist Chinese conduct is the intense and
dangerous conflict with the USSR. It has its roots in the historical development
of the vast border areas between the two countries. It is aggravated by contem-
porary ideological hostility, by power rivalry and nationalist antagonisms.
A clash between. these two great powers is inconsistent with the kind of
stable Asian structure we seek. We, therefore, see no advantage to us in the
hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China., We do not seek any.
We will do nothing to sharpen that conflict nor to encourage it. It is absurd
to believe that we could collude with one of the parties against the other. We
have taken great pains to make it clear that we are not attempting to do so.
At the same time we cannot permit either Communist China or the USSR
to dictate our policies and conduct toward the other. We recognize that one
effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict could be to propel both countries into poses
of militancy toward the non-Communist world in order to validate their creden-
tials as revolutionary centers. It is also possible that these two major powers,
engaged in such a dangerous confrontation, might have an incentive to avoid
further complications in other areas of policy. In this respect, we will have to
judge China, as well as the USSR, not by its rhetoric but by its actions.
We are Ere Pared to establish a dialogue with Peking. We cannot accept its
ideological precepts, or the notion that Communist M-Mna must exercise hegemony
over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position
that denies its legitimate national interests.
. The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of inter-
national order or our own commitments. Our attitude is public and clear. We
will continue to honor our treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies.
An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense.
Among these allies is the Republic of China. We have been associated with
that government since its inception in 1911 and with particular intimacy when we
were World War II allies. These were among the considerations behind the
American decision to assist the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan,
with its defense and economic needs.
Our present commitment to the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan
stems from our. 1954 .treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive,
and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of
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1%
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
V T
Our economic assistance to the Republic of China has had gratifying results.
Beginning in 1951, the U. S. provided $1. 5 billion in economic assistance. Its
effective and imaginative use by the Government of the Republic of China and the
people of Taiwan made it possible for us to terminate the program in 1965.
I am recalling the record of.friendship, assistance and alliance between the
United States and the Government of the Republic of China in order to make clear
both the vitality of this relationship and the nature of our defense relationship.
I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an
obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and
the Peoples Republic of China. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning
of my Administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the dif--
.ferences between Taipei and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved
by peaceful means:
balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake. We believe
that such a structure should provide full scope for the influence to which China's
For the United States the development.of a relationship with Peking embodies
precisely the challenges of this decade: to deal with, and resolve, the vestiges
of the postwar period that continue to influence our relationship, and to create a
our own country.
place as a member of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. We have
opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them.
The past four years have been a period of internal turmoil and upheaval in
Mainland China. A calmer mood now seems to be developing. There could be
new opportunities for.the Peoples Republic of China to explore the path of
normalization of its relations with its neighbors and with the world, including
nations. The question of its place, in tile ni.-e 1 a'ions is not, owever, merely
a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking
should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a
number of years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its
In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared
to see the Peo les Re ublic of China play a constructive ro e ~n ~e :a
achievements entitle it.
We continue to believe that practical measures on our part will, over time,
representatives in Warsaw, thus restoring an important channel of
communication. The subsequent cancelling of the scheduled May meeting
was at Chinese initiative.
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make evident to the leaders in Peking that we are prepared for a serious dialogue.
In the past year we took several such steps:
In January and February of 1970, two meetings were held between our
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
-- In April we authorized the selective licensing of goods for.export to
the Peoples Republic of China.
In August certain restrictions were lifted on American oil companies
operating abroad, so that most foreign ships could use American.-
owned bunkering facilities on voyages to and from mainland Chinese
ports.
-- During 1970, the passports of Z70 Americans were validated for
travel to the Peoples Republic of China. This brought to nearly 1, 000
the number so'validated. Regrettably, only three holders of such pass-
ports were permitted entry to China.
In the coming year I will carefully examine what further steps we might
take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and
American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the realiza-
tion of these opportunities. We hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of,
reciprocity.'
We should, however, be totally realistic about the prospects. The Peoples
Republic of China continues to convey to its own people and to the world its
determination to cast us in the devil's role. Our modest efforts to prove other-
wise have not reduced Peking's doctrinaire enmity toward us. So long as this
is true, so long as Peking continues'to be adamant for hostility, there is little
we can do by ourselves to improve the relatio ship. what we Can do, we will.
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o Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 "resI~pn~'S ~;.. ;5. !9?1
Page 6 ch Q Forei .7olpe
ig~re_61ater '
and for all change to be in the direction of self-
reliance.
Turning to the Far East: A new Asia is emerging.
The old enmities of World War II are dead or dying. Asian
states are stronger and are joining together in vigorous
regional groupings.
Here the doctrine that took shape last year is
taking hold today, helping to spur self-reliance and
cooperation between states. In Japan, South Korea, Thailand
and the Philippines, we have consolidated bases and reduced
American forces. We have relaxed trade and travel restrictions
to underline our readiness for greater contact with Communist
China.
Looking ahead in that area:
_r While continuing to help our friends help them-
selves, we must begin to consider how regional associations
can work together with the major powers in the area for a
durable peace.
--- We will work to build a strong partnership with
,japan that will accommodate our mutual interests.
--- We will search for constructive discussions with
Communist China while maintaining our defense commitment to
Taiwan. When the government of the People's Republic of
China is ready to engage in talks, it will find us receptive
to agreements that further the legitimate national interests
of China and its neighbors.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
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Cle X VI,fj ) i
QUESTION: In your foreign policy report,,you invited
better relations with Communist China, which is being,i.nterpreted
in Taiwan, I believe, with a little bit of apprehension. Are
you actually moving toward a two-China policy?
THE PRESIDENT: I understand the apprehension in
Taiwan,'but I believe that that apprehension insofar as Taiwan's
continued existence and as its continued membership in the United
Nations is not justified. You also have note d.-thi t -in..ry ...
foreign policy report I said that we stood'by our defense
commitments to Taiwan, that Taiwan, which has a larger
population than two-thirds of all of the United Nations, could
not and would not be expelled from the United Nations as long
as we had anything to say about it, and that as far as our
attitude toward the Communist China was concerned that that
would be governed by Communist China's attitude toward us.
relations with ?Corrnunist China if the cost of that policy is
In other words, we would like to normalize relations
with all nations in the world. There has, however, been no
receptivity on the part of Communist China. But under no
circumstances will we proceed with a policy of normalizing
to expel Taiwan from the family of nations.
kt at
Alk
QUESTION: You said earli
er about Communist China, at
least you were perfectly clear about your position on Communis t
China seeking entrance in the United Nations. Someone asked
YOU if you would favor a two-China policy, but you were not.
completely clear about that. Could you say, sir, if Taiwan
maintained its position on the. Security Council, if it maintained
its position in the United Nations, if you would favor seating
Communist China
name of the country, but Communist China r-; fuses
even to discuss the matter. Therefore, it would not be'
appropriate for me to suggest what we might agree to who,
Communist China takes the position that they will have no
discussion whatever until Taiwan gets-out. We will noi- start
with that k' d
n
a or the People s Republic of China,
which i understand stirred up people in Taiwan because that is
the official
THE PRESIDENT: That is a moot question at this time,
because Communist Chi
~ of a proposition. Ate..
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE APRIL 14, 1971
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE :W,-RTE
HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
In my second annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress on February Z5, 1971,
I wrote, "In the coming year, I will, carefully examine what further steps we
might take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese
and American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the
realization of these opportunities. It
I asked the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security. Council to
make appropriate recommendations to bring this about.
After reviewing the resulting study and recommendations, I decided on the
following actions, none of which requires new legislation or negotiations with
the People's Republic of China:
The United States is prepared to expeditte~ visas for visitors
or groups of visitors from the People's Republic of China to
the United States.
U. S. currency controls are to be relaxed to permit the use
of dollars by the People's Republic of China.
Restrictions are to be ended on American oil companies
providing fuel to ships or aircraft proceeding to and from
China except on Chinese-owned or Chinese-chartered carriers
bound to or from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba.
U. S. vessels or aircraft may now carry Chinese cargoes between
non-Chinese ports and U. S. -owned foreign flag carriers may
call at Chinese ports.
I have asked for a list of items of a non-strategic nature
which can be placed under general license for direct export to
the People's Republic of China. Following my review and
approval of specific items on this list, direct imports of
designated items from China will then also be authorized.
After due consideration of the results of these changes in our trade and travel
restrictions, I will consider what additional steps might be taken.
Implementing regulations will be announced by the Department of State and otl}er
interested agencies.
T 'u 'it
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 No Objection to Declassification in
American Society of Newspaper Editors
The President's Remarks at a Question and Answer
Session With a Panel of Six Editors and Reporters at the
Society's Annual Convention. April 16,1971
..
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MR. DEDMON. Mr. President, when you last appeared
before this convention prior to. becoming President, you
mentioned that laying the groundwork for future rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China would be one
of the primary goals of your administration.
In light of recent events, as well as the trade review
which you have ordered, it looks like this is one area
where you are considerably ahead of schedule.
Do you think that we can anticipate an establishment
of diplomatic relations. with the People's Republic of
secona:
THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Dedmon, since you have been so
kind to me, I will be kind to you.
Let the record show-and some of you will remember
that time I was here in 1968-that Mr. Dedmon was the
one that asked me the question about the People's Re-
public of China or Mainland China, if you want to call
it that, and also let the record show, as you may recall, that
at an editorial conference at the Chicago Sun-Times last
year you asked me the question again.
The first two times I struck out. The third time we got
a hit. That is all we can say.
Let me put it all in perspective, however.
What we have here is the result of a long process that
began in my own thoughts even before 1968, the spring
of 1968, when I answered that question at this conven-
tion. I wrote an article for Foreign Affairs-as a matter
of fact, I think your question played off of that article at
that time----in which I pointed out that we could not have
what will be by the end of the century a billion of the
most creative and able people in the world isolated from
the world and that whoever was President of the United
States had to develop a policy which would bring the
isolation of a billion Chinese from the rest of the world to
an end.
I also pointed out that that was a long-range goal. The
long-range goal of this administration and of the next one,
whatever it may be, must be two things: one, a normal-
isation of the relations between the Government of the
United States and the Government of the People's Re-
public of China, and two, the ending of the isolation of
Mainland China from the world community.
Those are long-range goals.
Let's begin with what we have done then. We can't go
that far that fast in one jump. We cannot do it now. I
will not speculate on it now, because it is premature to
talk about either of those subjects, either recognition or
admission to the United Nations.
But I can point to the goal and what we have done to
get toward that goal and what it can. mean to the future.
Over a year ago we relaxed, as you know, our travel
conditions with regard to going to China, and also we.
made some relaxation with regard to trade.
Finally, we had a response from the Chinese, as you
know, last week. Then, on Wednesday of this week, I
announced an additional relaxation with regard to trade
restrictions and a relaxation with regard to Chinese who
wanted to come to the United States.
Now it's up to them. If they want to have trade in
these many areas that we have opened up, we are ready.
If they want to have Chinese come to the United States,
we are ready. We are also ready for Americans to go
there, Americans in all walks of life.
But it takes two, of course. We have taken several
steps. They have taken one. We are prepared to take
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a
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
other steps in the trade field and also with regard to the
exchange field, but each step must be taken one at a time.
I know that as editors and as reporters, looking for
that, you know, that hot lead or headline for the morn-
ing, this is not a satisfying answer. But from the stand-
point of policy, it is the right answer. Because to try to
make a headline by saying that tomorrow we are going
to do this or that or the other thing would be misunder-
stood among many countries of the world where this
matter has to be discussed and also might have exactly
the reverse reaction with the Chinese.
I think the steady ordered process that we have engaged
on now begins to bear fruit. I will just conclude with this
one thought:
The other day was Easter Sunday. Both of my daugh-
ters, Tricia and Julie, were there-and Tricia with Eddie
Cox-I understand they are getting married this June-
and Julie and David Eisenhower.
And the conversation got around to travel and also,
of course, with regard to honeymoon travel and the rest.
They were asking me where would you like to go? Where
do you think we ought to go?
So, I sat back and thought a bit and said, "Well, the
place to go is to Asia." I said, "I hope that some time in
your life, sooner rather than later, you will be able to
go to China to see the great cities, and the people, and
all of that, there."
I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope sometime
I do. I am not sure that it is going to happen while I am
in office. I will not speculate with regard to either of the
diplomatic points. It is premature to talk about recog-
nition. It is premature also to talk about a change of our
policy with regard to the United Nations.
However, we are going to proceed in these very sub-
stantive fields of exchange of persons and also in the
field of trade. That will open the way to other moves which
will be made at an appropriate time.
Mr. Risher.
MR. RISHER. I just want to follow up on that if I
could. Do you think that this might lead to a resumption
of the meetings in Warsaw that were broken up about a
year ago, I think?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Risher, as you recall those
meetings were resumed after we came into office. That,
again, was a result of an initiative that we took. And
then they were broken off again. We are ready to meet
any time they are ready to meet.
I cannot-I don't have any information indicating that
they want to resume them at this time, but we certainly
have the door open. We are not pressing them, although
we would welcome them opening them.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
THE PRESIDENT'S
NEWS CONFERENCE OF
APRIL 29, 1971
Q. Mr. President, the Commission on the United Na-
tions that you appointed, headed by your 1960 Vice
Presidential running mate, has come out rather strongly
for a two-China policy. The last time we saw you you
weren't prepared to talk about that. I wonder if to-
night you could say how you feel about those proposals?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Cormier, that recommen-
dation by that very distinguished committee, of course,
is being given consideration in the high councils of this
Government, and I am, of course, considering it along
with recommendations which move in the other direction.
I think, however, that your question requires that I
put, perhaps, in perspective much of this discussion about
our new China policy. I think that some of the specula-
tion that has occurred in recent weeks since the visit of the
table tennis team to Peking has not been useful.
I want to set forth exactly what it is and what it is
not.
First, as I stated at, I think, one of my first press con-
ferences in this room, the long-range goal of this admin-
istration is a normalization of our relationships with
Mainland China, the People's Republic of China, and
the ending of its isolation from the other nations of the
world. That is a long-range goal.
Second, we have made some progress toward that goal.
We have moved in the field of travel; we have moved in
the field of trade. There will be more progress made.
For example, at the present time I am circulating
among the departments the items which may be released
as possible trade items in the future and I will be making
an announcement on that in a very few weeks.
But now when we move from the field of travel and
trade to the field of recognition of the Government, to its
admission to the United Nations, I am not going to dis-
cuss those matters, because it is premature to speculate
about that.
We are considering all those problems. When I have
an announcement to make, when a decision is made-and
I have not made it yet-I will make it..
Z5.
But up until that time we will consider all of the pro-
posals that are being made. We will proceed on the
path that we have been proceeding on. And that is the
way to make progress. Progress is not helped in this very
sensitive area by speculation that goes beyond what the
progress might achieve.
I would just summarize it this way: What we have
done has broken the ice. Now we have to test the water
to see how deep it is.
I would finally suggest that-I know this question may
come up if I don't answer it now-I hope, and, as a mat-
ter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China sometime
in some capacity-I don't know what capacity. But that
indicates what I hope for the long term. And I -hope to
contribute to a policy in which we can have a new rela-
tionship with Mainland China.
Q. Mr. President, the State Department has said that
the legal question of the future of Taiwan and Formosa is
an unsettled question. Would you favor direct negotiations
between the Nationalist and the Communist Governments
to settle their dispute?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I noted speculation to the efieci
from various departments and various sources that the way
for these two entities to settle their differences was to nego-
tiate directl}CI think that is a nice legalistic way to
approach it, but I think it is completely unrealistic. I am
only saying at this point that the United States, is seeking
to in a very measured way, while maintaining our treaty
commitments to Taiwan-we are seeking a more normal
relationship with the People's Republic of China
There is one other thing I think it's very important
to make.
There has been speculation to the effect that the pur-
pose of our, or one purpose of our normalizing our
relations or attempting to normalize our relations with
Mainland China is to some way irritate the Soviet Union.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
We are seeking good relations with the Soviet Union
and I am not discouraged by the SALT talk progress. I
can only say that we believe that the interests of both
countries would be served by an agreement there. We
seek good relations with the Soviet Union. We are seek-
ing good relations with Communist China and the in-
terests of world peace require good relations between
the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would make
no sense for the United States, in the interest of world
peace, to try to get the two to get at each other's throats,
because we would be embroiled in the controversy our-
wives.
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0
Birmingham, Alabama
The President's Remarks to Southern Media
Representatives Attending a Background Briefing on
Domestic Policy Initiatives. May 25,1971
Gentlemen, I do know that from the schedule that I
have read that you have been exposed to a great amount
of material already with regard to some of our domestic
programs. I know, too, that you are aware of the fact that
this is the first of four regional briefings that we are going
to have on domestic policy, just as we previously had four
on foreign policy, and perhaps we will be able to repeat
these from time to time in the future as various issues
develop.
Now when I read your schedule, I could see that there
was not much left for me to talk about, because Governor
Romney, of course, covered various aspects of revenue
sharing; and Secretary Hodgson covered other aspects of
manpower training; Herb Stein knows all about the
economy-l wish he would tell me, but he knows all about
it-and, of course, John Ehrlichman, in terms of Govern-
ment reorganization, and the other issues, has talked to
you and answered questions, and I know that Herb Klein,
too, has filled you in on some aspects of it.
What I would like to do is to try to put these domestic
programs in this period of the seventies in a broader per-
spective. In order to do so, it will be necessary for me to
talk about foreign policy first, not in precise details, as
would be the case in a foreign policy briefing, but in more
general terms, so that we can see why domestic programs
of the types you have been hearing about today, programs
that normally just don't make the first lead on television
or a front page today in the newspapers due to the over-
whelming interest in foreign policy, why that domestic
policy is so important for the future.
I begin with the developments in foreign policy with
which you are all familiar. While it must seem at times
that the more things change in foreign policy, the more
they remain the same, I think that a sophisticated observer
would have to agree that historians in the future will look
to this period, and they will probably write that the Amer-
ican people, and through the American people, through
their relations with other people in the world, were going
through a very historic change insofar as our relations
with other nations in the world were concerned.
The word "new era" is overused. I will only say that
if there was ever a new era in the field of foreign policy,
we are now in the middle of it. We are on the threshold
of it.
` I think the most significant changes in American foreign
policy and the most significant changes in the relations
between major nations in the world are taking place now
than at any period since World War II.
Now this is not because we made it so. I speak of "we"
in terms of this administration. We played a role, but
what has happened here is that we see a number of devel-
opments coming together contemporaneously. The one
that of course is first and foremost in your minds, and
should be, is the war in Vietnam.
There is argument about how that war should be ended,
when it should be ended. There is no argument, however,
among any sophisticated observers on the point that the
war in Vietnam, after a long period-5 years-in which
no end was in sight, in which more and more Americans
went to Vietnam, and in which more and more casualties
occurred in Vietnam, that now the situation is changed.
Americans are coming home. Casualties are going down,
and we can say confidently today that the war in Vietnam
will be ended.
You know the arguments, and I will not go into them
now, why we cannot, in our national interest, accept the
proposition of setting a deadline as far as our own with-
drawal is concerned. I will only say that there is no ques-
tion but that this administration's policy is succeeding
and bringing the war to an end and bringing it to an end
in a way which I believe will contribute to our goal of
discouraging that kind of war, that kind of aggression
that brought this war on, in the future, and thereby bring-
ing it to an end in a way that will not guarantee-we can
never guarantee anything in world events-but that will
give us a chance to have a more peaceful Southeast Asia,
a more peaceful Pacific.
Now, if we are able to accomplish this goal-and I
am confident that we are accomplishing it and that we can
see it now in sight-this is in itself, by itself--although by
itself not the major development which we are presently
seeing-but this by itself has enormous significance, be-
cause both World War II and the Korean War, as far as
the United States was concerned, did come from the
Pacific, and so did Vietnam.
So a peaceful Pacific and an end to this conflict in a
way that will maintain the position of confidence of the
United States in the Pacific is enormously important in
terms of achieving our broader goal of peace in the world.
The second point that of course has been much in the
news this past week is our relations with the Soviet Union.
The announcement that I made last week deliberately was
brief. I will not expand on it now, because that would not
be in the interest of achieving the goal that the announce-
ment set forth. Suffice it to say that now at the highest level
of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United
States, the leaders have committed themselves to taking a
first, very significant step toward limiting both defensive
and offensive nuclear weapons.
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 2y
exchange of persons and travel, where again, on a precise
step-by-step basis, they are beginning to have a different
relationship than they had previously. As I put it, what
we have done really is broken the ice; now we have to
test the water to see how deep it is. More steps will be
taken on our part and on their part when it is to the re-
ciprocal interest of both to do so.
I do not suggest that any steps are presently being con-
templated on either side. That would not be in the interest
of having that come about. But I do say that the very
fact that the United States and the Government of Main-
land China, the People's Republic of China, have finally
moved in these limited areas toward a relation of normalcy gives us hope that not immediately-not within
a year, for example-but looking to the future, that 800
million Chinese will not be isolated from the rest of the
world.
Let me just say parenthetically that when we think of
the dangers to peace of the world, I can think of none that
would quite exceed the fact that 800 million, and then
perhaps in 25 years a billion, of the most capable and able
people in the world would be isolated from the rest of
the world, living there, not knowing the rest of the world,
and with a growing and very dangerous nuclear capability.
I do not suggest that the steps that we have taken have
dealt with that problem conclusively up to this point, but
again we have made movement and more movement will
take place as we, on either side, find that it is in our best
interest.
We look to another area of conflict, the Mideast. Here
the Secretary of State has just completed a very significant
trip. It did not, and none of the reporters who went with
him expected it to happen-and they, incidentally, wrote
it very objectively, and, it seems to me, in a highly pro-
fessional way-it did not settle the differences. We did not
expect that to happen.
But when we look at that troubled area of the world,
it can be said now that we have had a truce for 9 month
and that is some progress. It can be seen that while the two
parties are still, it seems, very, very far apart with an
irreconcilable difference-that is what it seems on the sur-
face-them is still the fact of discussion going on through
third parties, but nevertheless going on, which will not
resolve those differences completely. And no one suggests
that they may be resolved completely at any time in the
future, but that may resolve them in part, again on a
step-by-step basis.
Now let me put all of this together in terms of what
it means in foreign policy and then why our own policies
in the United States and in the domestic field are important as they relate to this.
Let's look to the future, what could happen. Here we
must put our hopes high. As I said at Mobile earlier today;
every President in this century, and I suppose every Presi?
dent long before this century, has spoken in terms of
peace, not only for America but for the world.
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..That commitment, having been taken publicly, thereby
gives us at this period, sine it was committed publicly
in terms of attempting to achieve it and hoping to achieve
it this year, it gives us an idea as to what could develop
from now on out between the two superpowers.
Again, it does not guarantee that because the two
superpowers may agree that their mutual interest will
be served by a limitation on the one hand on our part
of defensive weapons and a limitation on the part of the
Soviet Union as far as offensive weapons are concerned,
that the two powers are not going to have other
differences.
It does not guarantee that they will agree on every-
thing else, that they will agree on the Mideast, that.they
will agree on East-West relations as far as Europe is
concerned, and so forth. But the fact that this step is
being taken in the field of negotiation is enormously sig-
nificant simply because it has happened.
The announcement is significant, the commitment on
the part of the leaders is significant, but even more im-
portant, if that commitment can become a reality- -end
it will take hard negotiating on the part of both sides to
bring that reality into being-but if that can become a
reality, then the two superpowers, not by rhetoric, and
we have had cool rhetoric ever since this administration
came into Washington, but indeed the two superpowers
will have entered into a new period of better relations.
You can see what that would mean in contributing to
the peace of the world, because wherever the two super-
powers rub against each other, whether it is in the Mideast
or whether it is in the Caribbean or whether it happens to
be tangentially in a place like Vietnam, where it is tan-
gential, as far as the Soviet is concerned, but nevertheless
real, or whether it is the blue chips involved in Europe,
all of this, of course, potentially carries within it the danger
of conflict at the very highest level. And so making a
movement toward reducing or limiting arms, making
this kind of step indicates and gives us at least some hope
that a different relationship between the two powers will,
on a step-by-step basis, develop in the years ahead.
A few weeks ago you all, of coarse, covered in your
newspapers, on your television and radio programs, the
developments with regard to China, Mainland China.
In a recent press conference, you may ro at said
that, when asked about what this meant, I said we must
realize that what happened was significant, not simply
the visit of the table tennis team---that had some sig-
nificance and, of course, great interest because of its
rather bizarre character as far as we were concerned,
but because in the field of travel and in the field of trade,
in the field of exchange of persons and in the field of
trade, to put it more precisely, we see a very significant
change occurring for the first time since the Government
which presently is in power in Mainland China, the
People's Republic of China, that Government and the
Government of the United States have found two areas,
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0
Woodrow Wilson, I think, honestly felt that the war
that he was involved in, World War I, would be a war
that would end wars.
Franklin D. Roosevelt felt very strongly that World
War II, particularly with the United Nations following it,
could be the war that, as far as major powers were con-
cerned, that would be the last great war.
And certainly my predecessors, President Eisenhower,
President Truman, President Kennedy, President John-
son, were all dedicated to that proposition, as I am.
At this time I think we could say that because of these
significant developments, first, the end of the American
involvement in Vietnam, which we know is coming, and
on a basis which, in my view, will contribute to a more
peaceful rather than a less peaceful era in the Pacific.
Second, a significant change in the relation between the
Soviet Union and the United States.-still a long way to
go, but still a significant change at the highest level with
the leaders involved.
Third, a change, not as significant, as far as our rela-
tions with the Mainland Government are concerned in
China, but nevertheless looking down the road, with
great historical possibilities.
Fourth, the situation in the Mideast that I have just
referred to.
With all of these developments occurring, what we in
the United States may be facing and may be confronted
with-and this is something I guess we would all like to be
confronted with-is an era in which we could have peace
f a oration
r
em
0
when there is a chance to have a live-and-let-live attitude,
o
g
.
Now having said that, that will also carry with it enor-
mous problems for this country-enormous problems be-
cause once you have peace, what do you do with it? How
do you maintain it? How do you keep it?
Here I think that we have to be-as opinion leaders, in
the South I would commend these thoughts to you as they
have been commended to me by my advisers--here we
must recognize that there will be no instant peace in any
part of the world. Once these different relationships occur,
if they do, if progress is made with the Soviet Union, later
with China, the People's Republic, in the Mideast and in
Vietnam and the rest, this does not mean that as a result
of these developments that the differences between nations
end, that their interests will be the same, and that the need
for a continued, strong American presence in the world
and strong defense will have evaporated.
On the contrary, we must recognize the fact that we
are going to continue to have differrences, very significant
and deep differences with other nations in the world.
And looking again at a very difficult and explosive part
of the world, the Mideast, no matter what kind of arrange-
ment is made there, no matter what kind of an agreement
is agreed to, because of the historical differences that have
existed there for centuries, there is not going to be a period
when people are going to have a relationship that can be
a completely comfortable one.
But on the other hand, we are entering that period
f
a settlement of differences by peaceful means, peaceful
competition, and so on down the road.
_. Now, what must the United States do in this period?
First, it is almost a cliche to say that we must maintain our
strength. That does not mean we maintain our strength
out of any sense of jingoism, but it does mean we only re-
duce our strength on a mutual basis.
Now there are many well-intentioned people who con-
stantly-whether in the Senate or sometimes in column=
in the press or on radio and television-suggest that the
way that the United States can demonstrate its interest
in disarmament and thereby in peace, is to discontinue our
ABM system, reduce our offensive capabilities in the nu-
clear area, and that that demonstration will lead others
to do likewise.
That is not the way it will happen. In my view, wher-
ever you have two nations, as you have in the Soviet
Union and the United States; wherever you have two na-
tions that are competitive, whose interests are different.
where both mutually reduce their forces, that contributes
to peace.
But where one or the other unilaterally reduces its force,
and becomes very significantly weaker than the other, that
enormously increases the danger of war. Therefore, the
United States-and I would say the same if I were a leader
of the Soviet Union-the United States does not serve
.the cause of peace by unilaterally reducing its forces with-
out at the same time mutually negotiating a reduction on
the part of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union leaders, I think, understand that.
That has certainly been the way they have approached the
problem. We understand their position. We do not expect
them to reduce their forces unilaterally. We will not ours.
So whether it is our forces of a conventional type in
Europe, or whether it is our nuclear forces, offensive or
defensive, the United States, it seems to me, serves the
cause of peace by maintaining its strength and reducing
that strength only as others who may have different inter-
ests reduce theirs.
The second point that I would make is on the economic
field. We enter a period when it is enormously important
that the United States not lose the position of economic
leadership which it presently has' in the world. I sad
presently. That position is being jeopardized. It is being
jeopardized perhaps not so much because of our failings.
although that may be partially the reason, lout it is being
jeopardized because the whole situation is changed, and
we should be gratified in a sense, that it has changed, since
World War II.
Take the two defeated nations of World War II, the two
major ones, the Japanese and the Germans. At the present
time they are our major competitors in the world, and as
they compete anti as they become more efficient, the
United States finds that as far as its world markets are
concerned, and as far as its markets in the United States
are concerned, that Japanese competition, German, and as
Britain enters the Common Market, European competi-
tion is going to be a continuingly more difficult problem.
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THE PRESIDENT'S
NEWS CONFERENCE OF
JUNE 1, 1971
i
0
CM11% Pout
Q. Mr. President, since April you have been consider-
ing policy studies on the China question, easing trade with
China, and representation at the United Nations. Can
you say where these stand now, please? .
` Tila Paasmarrr. With regard to the United Nations
question, a significant change has taken place among the
members of the United Nations on the issue of admission
of Mainland China. We are now analyzing that situation
in consultations with the Republic of China on Taiwan
and with third countries.
After we have completed our analysis, which I would
imagine would take approximately 6 weeks, we will then
decide what position we, the Government of the United
States, should take at the next session of the United Na-
tions this fall, and we will have an announcement to make
at that time. with regard to that particular problem.
A number of various options are open to us.
With regard to trade, the various agencies have now
completed their review of the situation and have submitted
their recommendations to me. And on June 10th. I will
make an announcement releasing a wide variety of items
which previously had been banned. These are all non-
strategic items in which trade can be conducted with
Mainland China.
Let me put all of this in context by saying that there
are only two areas where we have moved. They are sig-
nificant, however, in themselves. In the area of opening
the door to travel and opening the door to more trade,
we have made significant movement. I think what, how-
ever, we should realize is that we still have a long way to
go.
As I recall, there is a Chinese proverb to the effect that
a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
We've taken two steps, but the important thing is that
we have started the journey toward eventual, a more
normal relationship with Mainland China, and even-
tually, and this is vitally important, ending its isolation
and the isolation of 700 million people from the rest of the
people of the world. This we think is a goal well worth
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JUNE 10, 1971
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
TEXT OF STATEMENT BY
THE PRESS SECRETARY
On April 14, the President announced that he would
shortly open the possibility of trade between the United
States and the Peoples Republic of China. That announcement
followed a series of moves begun in 1969 to end the strict
isolation between the United States and China. Today, Presi-
dent Nixon is announcing the details of the trade controls
which he is now lifting.
The United States will permit the free export to
China of a range of non-strategic U.S. products. These in-
clude most farm, fish and forestry products; tobacco; ferti-
lizers; coal; selected organic and inorganic chemicals; rubber;
textiles; certain metals such as iron, zinc and tin; agricul-
tural, industrial and office equipment; household appliances;
electrical apparatus in general industrial or commercial use;
certain electronic and communications equipment; certain
automotive equipment and consumer goods.
President Nixon has also decided to permit the free
export of grains to China as well as to the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. In the past, these exports have been governed
by regulations that have hindered the export of grains to these
countries.
The President has also decided that the Government
will examine requests for the export of other items to the
Peoples Republic of China, and permit those transactions which
are consistent with the requirements of U.S. national security.
The U.S. will also permit for the first time commer-
cial imports from China, while keeping the possibility of
future controls on these imports if necessary.
President Nixon looks upon these measures as a
significant step to improve communications with a land of
800 million people after a 20-year freeze in our relations.
The President will later consider the possibility of further
steps in an effort to reestablish a broader relationship with
a country and people having an important role for future
peace in Asia.
31
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JUNE 10, 1971
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
The President announced today the first broad steps in the termination of
U. S. controls on a large list of non-strategic U. S. exports to the People's
Republic of China. In the future, a range of U. S. products listed on the
attached sheet may be freely sold to China under open general export licenses
without the need to obtain Department of Commerce permission for each
specific transaction.
The items to be released from trade controls have been recommended by
the NSC Under Secretaries Committee chaired by the Department of State.
They include: most farm, fish and forestry products; tobacco; fertilizers;
coal; selected chemicals; rubber; textiles; certain metals; agricultural,
industrial and office equipment; household appliances; electri cal apparatus
in general industrial or commercial use; certain electronic and communica-
tions equipment; certain automotive equipment and consumer goods.
The President has also decided to terminate the need to obtain Department
of Commerce permission for the export of wheat, flour and other grains,
to China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, suspending the 50% U. S.
shipping requirement for these items.
Items not on the open general license list may be considered for specific
licensing consistent with the requirements of U. S. national security. The
Department of Commerce and other agencies will continue to review our
export controls.
The President has also decided to permit all imports to enter from China
under a general license, while retaining standby authority for future controls
if necessary. Imports from the People's Republic of China will be subject
to the tariff rates generally applicable to goods from most Communist
countries. They will also be subject to the normal conditions governing our
imports from all sources such as cotton textile controls and anti-dumping
and countervailing duty legislation.
0
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
GENERAL LICENSE LIST
FOR
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Food and live animals, including grains.
Beverages and tobacco.
Hides and skins.
Animal and vegetable oils and fats; oil seeds, nuts, and kernels,
and flour and meal thereof.
Crude natural rubber and certain syntli,.:tic rubbers.
Wood, lumber, and cork.
Pulp and waste ap per..
Most textile fibers.
Manufactured fertilizers, except those- closely related to explosives;
crude fertilizers and crude minerals such as sulfur, iron pyrites,
and natural asphalt.
Crude animal and vegetable materials.
Coal and coked except # .ilsonite.
Selected organic and i_norgan-~.c chemicals, including certain defoliants,
herbicides, pesticides ar.: insecticides.
Most d ein tannin and coloring materials, rintin inks and paint.
Medicinal and pharmaceutic-aI products, with minimal exceptions.
Essential oils and perfume -sterials; toilet and polishing preparations
and cleansing preparations.
Miscellaneous chemical materials and products in general use.
40
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leather manufactures and cl.~:c.:;se:d fur skins.
Rubber manufactures, except military type tires, aircraft tires and
tubes and other specialized commodities. --
Wood and cork manufactures and paper and pa.perboar_d and manufactures
thereof.
Textile yarn fabrics and related products, except used or reject or
reject fabric bearing design of U.S. flag or commodities made of
strategic-type synthetics.
Common metals, ferrous and nonferrous including steel, iron, tungsten,
lead, zinc, tin, titanium, chromium and manganese. Forms include
ores, concentrates, nonferrous scrap, ingots, castings, bars, plate,
shapes, wire and pipe.
Metal manufactures such as septic tanks, gas cylinders, containers,
cables,
Certain, agricultural and dairy machines, internal combustion engines
water turb-i-arc>.s and cngin? s, wheel. tractors, and tillers any parts
such as typewriters, checkwriters, calculators,
accounting machines, duplicators, and parts and accessories.
Comput ers, certain low-grade analog and digital types.
Manually operated metal polishing 'and buffing machines, and portable
pipe bending machines, and parts; certain foundry equipment.
Machine for textile pulp and paper, rint:in., food processing _and
&l.assworking in.dustries.
Certain construction and maintenance equipment,such as road rollers,
ditchers, trenchers, snow plows, plaster and concrete mixers,
concrete and bituminous pavers, finishers, and spreaders, and parts
and accessories.
Cer-tai.n types of air conditioning and refrigerating equipment and
compressors therefor; furnaces; furnace burners; stokers;
t ,.ker vs erg ; cooking and food warming equipacnt, and parts
and acce:ssori.es.
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 0
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General purpose pump, such as beverage, fuel, household water, service
station, measuring and dispensing pumps for fuels.
Filters, purifiers, and softeners for water treatment, sewage disposal,
and commercial and industrial &n.gines, and parts.
Certain liftin loading, and handling machines and equipment, such as
industrial. lift trucks and tractors, jacks, lifts, elevators and moving
stairways, winches, and parts.
Weighing machines and scales, and automatic merchandising machines, and parts.
Sprayers and dusters for agricultural, industrial, or commercial, uses,
and parts.
as cement and fabricated building materi.a:l.s, valves and regulators,
and measuring and checking instruments.
metallic and nonmetallic manufactures, such
des of eneral industrial and c runercial r. achi_n es and mcechanic.al.
working wood, ceramics and stone; and paclUng, wrapping,fLliUng, and
sealing machines.
appliances, such as power,operated nonelectric hand tools, machines for
Flectr. ical apparatus in eneral, i.ndustrial or co=cr. cial.. use, such as
generators, transformers, circuit breakers, storage batteries,
telephone and telegraph equipment, test equipment, and hand tools.
Certain electronic tubes,-resistors, ca
electronic parts.
Home-type radio and television receivers, refrigerators, freezers water
heaters, washing machines, parts and accessories.
Medical and dental Uparatus.
Automobiles and other road vehicles: passenger cars, rear axle drive;
motor cycles, motor bikes and scooters; invalid carriages and certain
trailers, and parts therefor.
lumbing, and heating and lighting fixtures and fittings.
Consumer-t e optical Roods, certain laboratory instruments surve
and engineering_ instruments, certain photograhi.c materials.
Recording and rc roducin e ui mcnr. for voice and music onl, , dictating ma-
Watches, clocksand parts.
chines, phonograph;, record players, musical instruments, and parts.
Consumer Mods such as furniture cl_otlyin. footv;ear wnrks of art 'cwelr
silverwcr(',printed matter, children's good7,oiiic
Coins, not sold and not legal tender.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
GD11 RAL LICENSE LIST 70':`t P OPLE' S ITZEPUBLIC Or CHINA
The following cor odities will be placed under general license for export to
the People's Republic of China upon publication of an Exhort Control Bulletin
which is expected shortly. The commodities are listed by the Export Control
Commodity Numbers that are used in the Commodity Control List 8399.1 of the
Export Control Regulations.
1Fx ort Cont of Comnod;ty Number and Commodity Descrantion
0(1) and (2) Food and live animals, excett inbred cereal gain seed.
1(1) Beverages, tobacco, and tobacco manufactures.
2111) Rides, skins, and fur skins, undressed.
22(1) Oil seeds, oil nuts, oil kernels, and flour and meal thereof.
23(i) Crude natural rubber and similar natural gu.m.; neoprene (polymers of
chioroprene); alkyl polysulfide liquid rubber, n.e.c.; styrene-butadiene
rubber and butyl rubber, and reclaimed rubber, waste, and scrap, thereof.
21(3) Wood, lumber, and cork.
25(T) Pulp and waste paver.
26(,x) Textile fiber,, not manufactured into yarn, thread, or fabrics, and
their waste, except staple not carded. or combed, and continuous filament
tow wholl'ir made of fluorocarbon no1_-%,?nerc or CO";>oll ..ers" IInG? used obsoleteand re.lect rte tf?ri n1 bear r r ! y.e
es f
2T(5) Crude fertilizers and crude
i
l
(
m
nera
s
excludinC cl
oa, petroleum., and
precious stones), excent natural graphite; natural auertz? lithium ores and
concentrates; celestite. Mall.i.ur.I sesnuioxi.de: 1utetiu
7 s m o i e; s rortiu xi
~s?Ando. .1 ,. _~_y
28 21) Terne plated scrap,; and tin-plated scrap which has not, been detinned.
28(21) Metalliferous ores and concentrates, as follows: antimony, bauxite
and aluminum concentrates, chromium, cobalt, iron, lead, manganese containing
over 10 percent manganese, platinum-and platinum group, silver, tin, tungsten,
vanadium, and zinc.
28(21) TNon-ferrous base ash and residues, as follows: aluminum, lead, tin,
and zinc.
28(21) Ion-:ferrous metal waste and scrap as follows: aluminum, lead, mag--
nesium except as listed in entry No. 28(19), platinum and platinum group,
silver, tin, and zinc (including zinc dust).
29(3) Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.c., except inbred forarce
sorghum seed; cinchona bark; rethrum? and rotenone--bearin., roots crude
flro nd _ or ?r~nt,rl'~ rc
09+7/03
0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
4.
(2 Arn.mal r;nd vegetable oils and fats, extent oils boileo_, oxidi,zea.,
3(l5) Coal, charcoal, and coke and briquets, e:rcert a.i1nocarbon coke or
dafluoromethane brornotrafluara~ :ethane . chloronentaf'l.uoroethane chloro-
trifluoromethane difluoroethane diorr-ano siloxanes canahie of being
ol"..eri.zed to rubber products monochlorodifluoroethar.e rionochloro-
A 'S-M1YA'Nnmd 7w - .F?.w.M....:..L',___-I r 111.__-
512(- Corsi, tar and other cyclic chenical intermediates listed in 6399.2,
Interpretation 24(a), except resorcinol and toluene.
512(20) Synthetic..organic medicinal chemicals, in bulk, listed in 0399.2,
Interpretation 24(a).
512() Rubber compounding chemicals listed in 8399.2, Interpretation 2b(a).
512(?-J) Plasticizers listed in 8399.2, Interpretation 24(a).
512(22) Synthetic organic chemicals listed in 6399.2, Interpretation 2b(a.)..
512'0) Miscellaneous industrial and other organic chemicals listed in
6399.2, Interpretation 24(a), except boric acid esters bro-nononochl,oro-
xlsn and rich liver oils, including unnixed and these i- in+ have not
51.3(2 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides, hydroxides, peroxides, and
l
h
a
ogen ;alts listed in 8399.2, Interpretation 24(a), except pyro ran?rite
56(2) Manufactured fertilizers, extent nitrogenous chemical fertilizers
514(.a2)-- Inorganic chemicals listed In`8399.2, Interpretation 24(a), except
refined borates, boron compounds and mixtures niobium eor?pourzds silicon
carbide, tantalum comp ands tantalur--niobium compounds titanium carbide
titanium tetrachloride, and tit-9.nium trichlorjcle.
52(2) Mineral tar; anmoniacal gas liquors and spent oxide produced in coal
gas purification; crude benzene, or pyridine; creosote; creosote oil dis-
tillates; dead oil; and resinous oil X?1.
53(,x) Dyeing, tanning, and coloring materials, natural and synthetic; and
pigments, paints, varnishes, and related materials, except those listed
i.n entries iro.l-3(l) through (6).
5 (D 4edicinal and pharmaceutical products, except those listed in entries
Na. 24(1) (
55(2 Essential oils and perfume materials; and toilet, polishing, and
en ar on and neon chlorosulfonic acid; other zinc oxides n.e.c.and
57(.Z)-
7 3 Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 571.1100 through 571.Zi030,
except huntin and sporting ammunition n.e.c.? and parts n.e.c.? and those
listed in entri
Pf
(
)
es
o. 57
1
through (6)
063/01
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
is
n.e.c., and those listed-_in entries No
articles of ceramic materials, except carbon or graphite refractory product
mica and articles thereof, mineral, insulating materials, articles of
plaster, concrete, cement, stone, carbon or graphite, refractory products
other than construction, asbestos manufactures, friction materials, and
655 Felts and felt articles; bonded. fiber and articles; coated or im-
pregnated fabrics; elastic fabric; cordage, cable, rope, and twine and
manufactures thereof; hat bodies; wadding and articles thereof; textile
fabrics and articles used in machinery or plant; wicks; gas mantles exxcMt
those containing thou and textile belts, belting,.tubing, and hose;
except those listed in entries No. 655(1) throe h 12).
656(:L) Textile bags, sacks, made-up canvas goods, blankets; linens and other
furnishing articles, and other' made--up textile articles, , p.e.c. , except
those listed in entries No._1656(1) through (6)
657(1) Carpets, rugs, linoleum and other floor coverings,. and tapestries.
661(Y) Lime, cement, building and monumental stone, asphalt and tar roofing,
siding, and similar materials, building materials of vegetable substances
agglomerated with mineral binding substances, and asbestos-cement or
fiber-cement articles.
662(2) Heat insulating bricks, blocks, tiles, and other heat insulating
goods of infusorial earths,'kieselguhr, siliceous fossil meal,, or similar
siliceous earths; and other refractory and non-refractory construction
materials, except those listed in entry No. 662(1).
663(a) Grinding and polishing wheels and stones, coated abrasives, worked
65 Narrow woven fabric, trimming, embroideries, and lace machine fabrics,
653(j) Broad and narrow woven fabrics, except those listed jn entries
Nos . 613(1) through (7).
exce t those listed in .entries No. 6 1 1 through (6),
652(g) Fabrics, woven, except . used or reject fabric bearingthedesi
61(1) Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.c., and dressed fur skins.
62(11) Rubber manufactures, n.e.c., except those listed in entries No. 62(x)
throe h (12L.
631) Wood and cork manufactures, excluding furniture.
6tt(1.) Paper, paperboard, and manufactures thereof.
651T )
.1 Textile yarn, roving, strand, thread, tire cord and tire cord fabric,
59(21) Chemical materials and products, n.e.c., listed, in 6399.2, Interpretation
581(18) Polymers, copolymers, and their products, unfinished or semifinished,
listed in 6399.2, Interpretation 24(a), except riolycarbon resins, molding ii
.5-A rs,. -, w.t..... .v...,....... -_ - - . - _ - ' - -
I) Glass and glassware classified under Schedule B Nos. 66)4
1300 throu
h
.
g
664-.9450, except other nonflexible fused fiber optic plates or bundles in
which the fiber pitch (center tocenterspacing) is less than 30 microns
Articles of glace, n.e.c., classified under Schedule B Nos
64r, "I'M
_
.
ybz ough 663.8500.
063/02
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
666(i) Household ware, ornaments, and furnishing goods of porcelain, china,
or ceramic materials classified under schedule B Nos. 666. x+000 through
o
steel, an erraa y >
and
672(5) ingots and other primary forms, iron or stee , eYcent thane cantarari
"nn e n _m nr r.nn'i-.:.~ i ni nrr a total. of 35.
ang u.),ar gr1Ti .1 au W.A..G-G k.+4~..~c: vP 9
ed in entry es Tra. 671_(1) t ~raurrh
except those last
ll
a
1a
stones classified under Schedule B r,os. ~7? _----
those listed. in entries Nos. 667(1 throunh 4
677 Spieeleisen; pig iron, including cast iron; iron or steel shot,
.. __- _ - 1, --1-- ~rnr,rra irnn or
666.6000. .
6670) Pearls, diaanonds, quartz crystals, and other precious and semiprecious
u h 667 4020 except
00 thr
1 61
673) Bass, rods, angles, shapes, and sections, iron or steel, except those
a
containin!; 6 percent or more cobalt A--- t-t e 09--S--Cb-Ta or co-t-4-
total of 3- rercEnt or more of alloyin elements and those lasted in entries
e 1e:3
Carbon or alloy steel hoop, strip, and sitelp, except AIS t Te 3O9-$~-
Cb-Ta, or containing a total of 3 n~rc~nt ar more of a.llayan elements, and
Lau. U .~- ...,a
an
674(4) Uncoated plates and sheets, iron or steel, except those in
t 67 (1) thraurh ~') and (5); and tin mill products.
t 67
677(3) Carbon or alloy steel wire, coated or uncoated, except glass ~o petal
sealing a to c ntainin 6 percent or more cabal( AIS tyse Q _S-Qi - Ta, or
4-11
or more of ailovint* eleneni.s and_
678 8) Cast iron pressure and soil pipe; welded, clinched, or riveted steel
tubes and pipes; electrical and high pressure hydro-electric conduits,
bill steel grades; and iron or steel tube and pipe fittings; ;_ cnnt
tubes and pines, nicl:rl lacar ~n ~i~n'tr,^ ;trci I I ~.V e~~ `rw Cis-`i' - { cr y
.......-.~-~---~ ...-. __ - _ ._.~ ~-- -.. ..... `.-?i. ~` nl 7 ry,ri 1~rf A I !'+ili (-~Y1 ~: .. ldrrr l~'~ :.i 4e?~.E.
designed. fOr a vorkin,: pressure of O-Ver 300 psi as e e e,
0
051/03
3/
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
679(3) Carbon and alloy steel or grey iron and malleable iron castings and
forgings in the rough state, except AISI t e 30 -S--Cb-Ta or contain
atotal of ercent or more alloying elements' and those listed in
entries No. 1 and (2).
80(l) United States and foreign coins
all metals other th
l
,
an go
d
.
681(rt) Silver-copper brazing alloy and silver leaf.
685(1) Lead or lead alloys, unwrought or wrought.
686(1) Zinc or zinc alloys, unwrought or wrought.
687(1) in or tin alloys, unwrought or wrou
ht
g
.
6894th) Tungsten or tungsten alloys, wrought or unwrought, and waste and
scrap, except those listed in entry No. 6891+(1).
6895(22) Base metals and alloys, wrought or unwrought, and waste and scrap,
of antimony, chromium, germanium, manganese, thereto bimetal, thermometal,
thermostatic metal, and titanium, except those listed in entriesgo. 6895
(1) through_ _(18), and
691 Finished structures and structural parts classified under Schedule B
Nos. 691.1015 through 691.301+0, except those listed in entries No 691(2)
and
692(2) Metal ccontainers for storage and transport, exce t those listed in
ent Na. 6 6 1 .
693 Wire products other than insulated electric, except 'wire cable, rotae.
6914(1) Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets, ~and~similar ?articles of iron,
steel, or copper.
695(5) Hand tools, cutting tools, dies, and machine knives and blades; and
parts therefor; exce those listed in entries No. 69(l) thro h (4).
696(1) Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 69 .0310 through 696.0935.
697(1) Household equipment of base metals classified under Schedule B Nos.
697.1010 through 697.9300.
6981(i) Padlocks, door locks, hinges and other hardware of base metals, and
parts therefor, classified under Schedule B Nos. 698.1110 through 698.1280.
69$2(1) Insulated safes, vault doors, interior equipment for vaults, strong
rooms and fittings, and strong boxes; and parts, therefor.
6983(1) Chains, iron or steel, and parts classified under Schedule B Nos.
69873010 through 698.3010.
6984(1) Anchors, grapnels, and parts therefor.
6985(D Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 698.5100 through 698.5300.
005/02
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6 3 I
-6-
6986(2) ~ Springs and leaves for springs, except those listed in ent No.
6 8 1 .
6988(16) Chains, copper or copper alloy, and parts; crown and canning
closures; and metal plates, signs, and tags.
6989(,20 Articles of iron, steel and nonf
Inte errous metals listed in 8399.2,
Interpretation 32(a), except castings and for in.s of niobium and electrical
steel unchin s.
~
711.2 Outboard, motors, 15 horsepower and d
u
n e, and internal combustion
engines, 50 horsepower and under exce die
Qv and en roes for watercraft
and automotive vehicles. water turbines and engines, excet~t those listed in
entries No. 7-1-1-7-21) and C2 a
712 8) , and parts and accessories, therefor.
Agricultural machines and appliances, except those with automatic
transmissions; farm and'industrial dairy machines; evera a making; and crushers,
g -e logging gging skidders; and wheel tractors under 125 power take-off
horsepower, except military; and parts and accessories, n.e.c.
714(12) Typewriters, checkwxiting, calculating, statistical, duplicating
and other office machines n ,
?e?c., and parts therefor; except those listed
in entries P1o. 14 1 through 6 and
t
hroe h 11 .
71510 Portable pipe bending machines; and metal-polishing and buffing
machines, manually operated bench and floor types.
7152() Ingot molds for heavy steel ingots.
717(1. Machines for: extruding fibers; preparing and processing fibers into
yarn; winding; weaving; knittin rod i
articles; washing, p uc ng trimmings, braids, net and similar
cleaning, drying, bleaching, dyeing, dressing, or finishing
41
textiles; commercial laundry, dry cleaning, pressing, and related equipment;
household laundry equipment; shoe making and repairing; preparing, tanning,
or working hides, skins, or leather; sewing machines and needles; and parts,
n.e.c.
718(11) Machinery for making or finishing cellulosic pulp, paper, or paper-
board; papercutting machines and other machines for the manufacture of
articles of pulp, paper, or paperboard; bookbinding machines; type making and
typesetting machines; printing machines; food processing machines; self-
propelled road rollers; self-propelled ditchers and trenchers incorporating
engines rated 60 horsepower or less; asphalt cutters; clay spades; dredging
machines; dirt tampers; farm-type snow plows; briquetting presses; buggies;
cutting machines; grout, plaster, or mortar mixers; and brick, tile, house-
hold ceramic, and concrete products manufacturing machines; standard equipment
for the assembly of entertainment type receiver tubes or television tubes;
glissworking machinery, except those listed 3n entries No. 7l8 10 throe
12 and parts, n?e.c.
7191 31) Acetylene gas generating apparatus, unitized; oil and gas furnace
burners; mechanical stokers and grates; ash dischargers; bakery ovens;
carbon black furnaces; ice-making machines; soda fountain and beer dis-
pensing equipment; air-conditioning and refrigerating equipment, n.e.c.;
commercial type cooking and food warming equipment; dental, medical,
surgical, and laboratory sterilizers and autoclaves; asphalt heating kettles;
bituminous heaters; machines and equipment for processing by means of a
047/05
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23 : LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
change in temperature for paper, rubber, or food products industries; and
parts, n.e.c.; except those listed in entries No. 7191(l] through
7192(26) Pumps, compressors, blowers, and fans listed in 13399.2, Interpre-
tation 29(a), except centrifugal and axi flowcompressors. horizontal
balanced opposed reciprocating c ressors an a engine v n t Pgal
angle rec rocs n c essors? and part and attachments, .e. .
7192 Centrifuges, separators, and filtering and purifying machines listed
in 13399.2, Interpretation 29(a).
7193(6) Construction jacks; drill jacks; pendant type overhead hoists;
casket lowering devices; elevators and moving stairways; fishing boat
winches'; self-propelled logging vehicles; logging sulkies and arches; non-
military type industrial tractors and lift trucks; industrial trucks,
tractors, and portable elevators of a kind used'for moving goods in plants,
docks, and similar installations; automobile lifts; automotive and aircraft
jacks; hand-operated mechanical or hydraulic jacks; farm elevators; and
conveying equipment other than, automated, the following only: gravity,
overhea& trolley pneumatic tube, portable, underground mine, loaders, and
vibrators; and parts, n.e.c.
719l(j) Domestic food=processing appliances, refrigerators, freezers, and
water beaters, non-electric; and parts.
7195(11) Machines for working asbestos-cement, ceramics, concrete, stone,
and similar mineral materials, wood, cork, bone, ebonite, hard
plastics, and other. hard carving materials; and parts, n.e.c.; and parts
for manually operated bench and floor type metal polishing and buffing
machines.
7196(1) Calendering machines and similar rolling machines; dishwashing,
bottling, canning, packaging, wrapping, filling, and sealing machines;
weighing machines and scales; sprayers and spraying equipment; automatic
merchandising machines; railway track fixtures and fittings, n.e.c.; signalling
and controlling equipment, mechanical., not electrically powered, for road,
rail, water, or airfield traffic; and parts, n.e.c.
711980(2) Machines and mechanical appliances listed in 13399.2, Interpretation
29(a)
7199(21) Molding boxes and molds other than ingot molds, except for artilleryy
molding or casting; taps, cocks, valves, and similar appliances, exc
those listed in entries Na. 7199(1) through 1) gaskets (joints laminated
metal and nonmetal material, or set of gaskets of two or more materials,
excc t those listed in entries No. 7l9(17) thro h ? oil seal rings;
and paddle wheels for watercraft; and parts, n.e.c.
722(10) Motors; generators; generating sets; rotating equipment; transformers;
fluorescent ballasts; regulators; rectifiers; coils; reactors; chokes; power
supplies; electrical apparatus for making, breaking, or protecting electrical
. circuits; industrial controls; connectors; resistors; potentiometers; current
carrying devices; electrical control equipment for motors and generators for
railway equipment; and parts, n.e?c., except ose st Addle No.
722(l) t k (2 .
723(nIgounition harness and cable sets, automotive type; appliance cord sets
and other flexible cord sets; electrical insulators, fittings, and conduit
005/04
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
tubing and joints of base metal, with insulating materials, except fluoro--
Carbon Polymers or coo ers? and insulating nickel wire of alloys composed
of 50 percent or more copper, and alloys of chief weight copper, irrespective
of nickel content, except fluorocarbon er or coo er insulation.
724(x) Television broadcast receivers, whether or not combined with radio or
phonograph, and parts, n.e.c.; television or radio tuners, chassis, and
unassembled kits; household type radios including radiophonograph combinations,
and parts, n.e.c.; automobile radios other than two-way radios, and parts,
n.e.c.; telephone repeater equipment; microphones; audio frequency sound
amplifiers; public address systems; loudspeakers; and untuned amplifiers
having a bandwidth of less than 30 MHz and a power output not exceeding 5
watts; except those listed in entries go. 721+ 1 t o h 20 .
725(1) Household type refrigerators, freezers, and washing machines; electro-
mechanical household and commercial type appliances, n.e.c.; electric
shavers and hair clippers; and electric household type cooking equipment
and electro-thermic appliances, n.e.c.; and parts, n.e.c.
726(6) Electro-medical and electro-therapeutic apparatus, medical and dental
X-ray and gamma ray equipment, and medical and dental apparatus based on
the use of radiation from radioactive substances, except those listed in
entries No. 726 1 thra h ? and parts, n.e.c.
7291(j) Primary and storage batteries and cells, exce t electro-chemical
and radioactive device listed in entry No. 1 ? and parts, n.e.c.
T2920 - Filament lamps bulbs and tubes up to and including 3/4 inch base;
single coil tungsten filaments; filament bulbs over 3/4+ inch, the following
o : carbon, clear, frosted, incandescent, metal, photoflood, or pro-
jection; and parts, n.e.c.
72930(21) Electron tubes, solid state semi-conductor devices, and piezoelectric
crystals; and parts, n.e.c., except those listed in M tries No. 72250(l)
thra h 124).
729~i)Electrical starting and ignition equipment, except those listed in
entries No. 12 U land 21; and motor vehicle lighting and signalling
equipment, including wipers, horns, and defrosters; and parts, n.e.c.
T295(i) Other cathode ray oscilloscopes; and other electronic devices for
stroboscopic analysis designed to be used in conjunction with an oscilloscope;
exce t thos listed in entries No.7295(1) and (2)-.
7295 Electricity supply meters; and instruments, n.e.c. for measuring,
analyzing, indicating, recording, or testing electric or electronic quantities
or characteristics, exce t instruments n.e.c. o eratin at frequencies of
00 MHz or less; and those listed in entries No. 7295(11, 12 ),-and thr h 8 .
729 0 17.ectro-mechanical hand tools; and parts.
7299(5) Electro-magnetic and permanent. magnet chucks, clamps, vises, and
similar work holders for metalworking machines and machine tools, ex_..ct
ft-gol listed loo. 7299(3) ? electric dental furnaces; infra red and
?005/05
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
_9-
high frequency industria:j ovens for biscuit baking; and parts, n.e.c,
7299(j) Railway and other electric traffic control equipment other than
computerized types; electric lighting signal apparatus, except for air rat `t;
electric or electronic alarm and signal systems, including sound signal,
except for aircraft; Capacitors for electronic applications, except those
listed 1n entries No. 729 29 2 a and 0 other capacitors, except
for aircraftbrush plates, electrical carbon brushes, and lighting carbons,
exce t electrodes and electrical 'carbons and those listed in entries No.
throw h 2 ? resistor-capacitor assemblies and subassemblies,
except those listed in entries No. 2 0 thro h 2 ? and electric
windshield wipers; and parts, n.e.c.
731(1) Parts for locomotives, exce t axles and wheels.
732(2,0 Passenger cars, exce those havin front and rear le drive? motor-
cycles; motor bikes; and motor scooters; and parts and accessories, n.e.c.
732( ) Parts and accessories, n.e.c., for (a) logging skidders, and (b) wheel
tractors under 125 power take-off horsepower, except mil tar .
733(1) Commodities classified. under Schedule B Nos. 733.1100 through 733.14000,
exce t those 1 sted in entries No. 1 throw h
73 1 Nonmilitary gliders, sailplanes, and other nonpowered aircraft, n.e.c.,
and balloons, exce t balloons listed in ent No. 7314 8 ? and parts and
accessories, n.e.c.
735(2) Buoys, all metals.; pontoons for pipe lines, iron or steel; and fiber
glass swimming pools, floating.
81(2) Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 812.1010 through 8)2.1+320,
exce t those listed in ent No. 81 1 .
82 1 Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 821.0200 through 821.0885.
83(1) Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 831.0010 through 831.0050.
814(1) Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 8141.1102 through 8142.0200.
85(1) Commmodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 851.0010 through 851.0090?
8611(2) Lenses and other optical elements for X-ray powder cameras; halftone
glass screens; projection lenses; and optical elements, mounted, exceptnon_-
flexible fused fiber o tic fates and or bundles o tical vorlked in w .ch
the fiber pitch center to center s acin ) is less than 30 microns? and t ose
listed in entries No. 861IS-ILthrouah .
8 12 l Spectacles and goggles; and parts.
8613 () Optical appliances, n.e.c., exc t those listed in entries No, 861 1
throe h .
8614.00) Hand type still cameras, fixed focus; microfilming cameras; still
camera stands; tripods; flash synchronizers; and X-ray powder cameras; and
parts and accessories.
8616(2) Still picture photographic projectors, enlargers, and reducers, and
parts, n.e.c.; photoscales (enlarger parts); microfilming equipment, n.e.c.,
photocopying equipment, as follows: office and document--copying machines,
including but not limited to equipment employing the silver process, transfer
process, thermographic process, and the electrophotographic or electrostatic
process; and still picture equipment, as follows: analyzers,'cutting boards,
developing equipment, dry mounting presses, hangers, glass photo baths, print
rollers, printing frames and masks, and shading machines; and parts therefor.
01+7/04
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
o
listed in entries No, 861 1 throe h .
5618(l) Gas or liquid supply meters.
8618(1) Revolution, counters, production counters, speedometers, and similar
counting devices, not electric or electronic, pace t those listed i e tries
No. $618 and
8619(W Parts and accessories, n.e.c., for meters,-instruments, appliances,
and devices included on this list under entry Nos. 7295(a) and (a), and
8618(1) and (i).
8619(61` Instruments, appliances, or machines, not electric or electronic,
as follows: surveying, hydrographic, navigational, meteorological, hydro-
logical, geophysical, compasses, rangefinders, laboratory balances, drawing,
marking-out, calculating, drafting, measuring, checking, hydrometers and
similar instruments, thermometers, pyrometers, barometers, hygrometers,
and psychrometers; and parts therefor; except those listed in entries No.
8617(b) Medical, dental, surgical, ophthalmic, and veterinax instruments
and apparatus, other than electro-medical; and mechanical physical therapy
appliances and respiratory equipment; and parts therefor! except +h
0
bb2(6) Prepared photographic' chemicals, the following on developers,
except those listed in ent No. 1 fixers, intensifiers, reducers, toners,
clearing agents, and flashlight materials; except photoresist formulation
based on urill occurin glues s elatins albumen, shellac o
lac uers.
86 Watches and clocks; and parts, n.e.c.
8970) Magnetic recording and/or reproducing equipment designed for voice
and music only; dictating machines; phonographs; record players; magnetic
recording media designed for voice and music only; phonograph records and
record blanks; musical instruments; and parts and accessories, n.e.c.
892(5) Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos. 892.1110 through*
hrough 892.9850.
$9300(11+) Finished articles (other than laminates and unsupported film, sheet,
and other shapes) of artificial plastic materials, n.e.c., exce t no flexible
fused fiber tic ates or bundles and those listed in a trie No. 803-0-0-01T
thro i
894(3) Commodities classified under Schedule B Nos.'891.1010 through 894.5000,
exc those listn entry 894(1)
895 1 Office and stationery supplies, n.e.c.
896(1) Works of art, collectors' pieces, and antiques.
897(1) Jewelry and goldsmiths' and silversmiths' wares, exce t Platinum-clad
mo bdenum tubing.,
899 ) Manufactured articles, n.e.c., exce those listed in en ies No. 822
1 throVhJUI, and .
9(10 Live animals, n.e.c., including zoo animals, dogs, cats, insects, and
birds; and coins, other than gold coins, not being legal tender.
04+7/06
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Ideas and actions concerning China should be areviscd.. Ma.v+
they were once justified, but changes. in the situation make
necessary to reconsider, to.find ways to draw China in. T1'
is the most important problem today.
I would also like to say something 'about China's aggressivet
President Ceausescu clarified this. Asia has the greatest rm.:
for change economically and socially. Two continents, Afrf
and Asia, most need economic and social aid--they, are very
backwards. It is difficult for people today to go through all t,.
stages we passed through. We must contain the problem of
change and not let it develop into an international question.
The question of USSR-China relations is difficult to answer.
They are clouded by violent polemics, differences in ideoloiyy,
Both progress in different ways. There are a number of
conflicts --problems which instead of cooling down were blot,,
up. The U. S. policy of not getting involved is correct; into r
ference can be justified only to stop conflict. The most ser
danger to the %vorl&is USSR-China conflict.
Our impression is that as certain objectives have been attair::
China is thinking of action to develoa negotiations with other
countries.
Nixon: When I became President I asked the Chinese to meet us in
Warsaw, and they refused.
P. M. Maurer: Americans should know the Chinese better than that; they ha,.
a peculiar mentality. China's orientation toward developing
relations should be taken advantage of,
Ceausescu: China is a serious problem, but don't forget that other than
Japan, China alone has solved iits problem of food for it,~-
people. One hundred dollars annually per capita are earin::-`_c5.
for development---this makes 17 billion dolly rs. A major p_i-;_
has been to assure more rapid development and progress of
economy and industry. You saw India, even that gavernznf
passed nationalization of banks. So these pci~cic!, :s?houl.d a'),-
an obstacle for you in developing relations-witic coitr-,tries Sri
different systems than yours.
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 is not crucial in the USSR.-China
lo
id
gy
eo
The problem of
dispute. My observation is that the real issue is national---
the Soviet reluctance to concede China its proper place in
international affairs. Chinese will no. play a second class
role. We believe the Soviet Union's thinking will come to
under stand reality. We think that there will not be a war.
Of course, the unexpected, can happen. We are in agreement
sharpen
to
thin
g
with what you have stated. We should do no
uld have nothing to gain from this
S
. wo
the conflict. The U.
development.
Nixon: agree. I think you have played a proper role in this area
? ,,-A- 1,,,+1,? in the long run this is alto
by having reiacu.ons WILD ...,~.., ---
t to our short run problems with China,
With respec
our aim. and
we have taken actions like re e rnovi willalcevmore restrictions
these s areas.
allowing tourist purchases;.w
interest and the interest of your
if it serves your
Frankly,
government, we would welcome your playing a mediating role
between us and China.
ression* we a,re certain of the r. eality
Ceausescu:
It is not only our imp
China's willingness to res:ame relations with other states.
to develop relations
ti
ons
They have told us they will take ac
with other states. We must not look at public articles in the
press but should take practical ac.t_ion. As to our willingness...
to mediate between the U. S. and China--the U. S. has every ati on-
possibility to talk directly with the Chinese
cl of your
Chi nee, an
to
I will say we. shall tell our opinion
opinion of this problem. We shall act to establish relations or
the basis of mutual understanding.
It is getting late. If you wish we can-meet a.ga.in tomorrow
Nixon for
first about our Vxctta,Lm position.
an hour. I want to tell you
I'll put it in perspective by saying if the war its, Vietnam is en(
on the right basis it will open many doors for better relations
for trade with Romania and relations with China as we discus!
our a.
earlier. We look at Vietnam through differen', e~4e"next three
is the same : to gain peace and end the war.
months will be critical; they will determine vha?' 'a the war
be ended by peaceful negotiations:
Tomorrow I want to tell you confidentially what is going on,
where we are, etc.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Ceausescu:
This is an important problem we have not discussed how we
look at it. You and I talked about it in 1967 and our points
I agree and will make good use of dinner tonight.
we can make it for an hour and a half.
seem the same. Our basic interest is a peaceful solution
by negotiation. We will discuss this tomorrow.
We can talk at dinner. My time is at your disposal. Tomorrow
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
In the light: of r: cellu vcmLs, it ;SGT 1T13 i.211p1)t't )]t to have a
reliable channel for com.7"n1!11lic;70,ion be.fwcen our t`,%,o Covi~r-mmn)ts.
If the C'avornniont ot the People's Republic o China cleyires
talks that are strictly conEident.ial, t-hePresident is ready to ce:;tablish
such a chauiiel directly to him for matters of the most e: trelnc sensi-
tivity. Its purpose would he to bring about an imp:irovement in US.
Chinese relations fully recognizing differences in ideology, On the
United States side, such a chaiulei Would be known only to the Pi sident
and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and would not be
re~?ealed to any other, foreign cotultry.
If you arc interested in pursuing this proposal, initial contact
should be made with the beaie:i of this conlnau.nica4iox1, Mcljor c e:ieral
Vernon A. Walters, the U. S. Defense Attache in Paxis, Dr, CZcnry
Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs,
Would be prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on US-Chinese
relations with whomever might be designated by the People's Republic
of China to explore the subject further,
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
April 30, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Review of Contacts with PRC Officials
on Questions of US-PRC Relations Since
January 1969
In response to a request by General Haig, the
relations,
enclosed chronology summarizes contacts with PRC
officials since January 1969 on the subject of US-PRC
Enclosure:
Chronology with attachments.
SECRET/NODIS
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Mkt 3t.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Contacts with PRC Officials Concerning US-PRC Relations
that have Taken Place Since January 1969
Formal contacts between U.S. and PRC officials
Jun 1970
Dec 1969
Apr 1970
gatherings, with the Chinese taking the
initiative to make the contact in four of
these instances. The contacts occurred in
such diverse places as Hong Kong, Rawalpindi,
Dacca, Uganda, Moscow, Budapest, London,
Paris, and Sweden. In only two instances,
however, did the conversation go beyond
social banter. These contacts mark a PRC
departure from Chinese behavior earlier,
when PRC officials abroad would break off
as soon as possible any social contact they
might have found themselves in with U.S.
officials.
Our Deputy Consul General in Hong Kong,
Harald Jacobson, made contact with the top
NCNA official in Hong Kong, LI Chung, through
an intermediary. (LI's immediate superior
reportedly was PRC Vice Foreign Minister
CH'IAO Kuan-hua.) Although Jacobson was not
able to talk with LI directly, he received
.what were believed to be credible communica-
tions from LI that: (a) Although the com-
plexity of Sino-U.S. differences would require
many years to resolve the problems involved,
o Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
The. Warsaw Talks of January 20 and
February 20, 1970 (Embassy Warsaw's reports
on the Talks are attached).
There were at least 10 instances in which
U.S. Embassy officers, including military
attaches, met PRC Embassy officials at social
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
some form of relations between Washington
and Peking would be established before 1973.
(b) The principal problem in Sino-U.S. re-
lations was Taiwan; and that while the PRC
understood the U.S. could not abandon the
GRC and while it held Taiwan to be an
internal Chinese problem, it objected to the
USG's not having given some indication of
its idea of how to resolve the Taiwan
problem.
Dec 1969 -- Dr. Thomas Manton, Director of the
Mar 1970
International Relations Department, United
Church of Christ (and in addition as of early
1970 the General Secretary of the Committee
for a New China Policy), claims to have dis-
cussed with PRC Embassy officials in Paris
in December 1969 permission for a group of
U.B. businessmen to attend the Canton Trade
Fair as well as the question of improved
US-PRC relations in general and PRC entry
into the U.N. Manton, who is inclined
towards the new lef t, said he covered the
same ground with PRC Embassy officials in
Ottawa in February 1970. Manton also
organized an early March 1970 meeting of the
Committee for a New China Policy (CNCP) held
in Montreal, which was attended by a variety
of U.S. academic Asian specialists as well as
Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times.
Also in attendance was Professor Paul T. K.
Lin of McGill University in Montreal; Lin,
who reportedly served as English secretary
to CHOU En-lai until 1964, has until recently
reputedly been the PRC's top unofficial
representative in North America.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
5X1 5X1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Early 1970
present
Apr 1971
better relations.
The Norwegian Government through its
Ambassador to Peking (Algard) has provided
us with an additional channel to clarify PRC
intentions, particularly on Indochina, and
to convey our views to the PRC. PRC Vice
Minister CH'IAO Kuan-hua has indicated to
Algard appreciation of flexibility in US
China policy and Peking's desire to achieve
Consulate General Hong Kong received tentative
indications that PRC authorities in Hong Kong
were willingL'b consider permitting two officers
of the Consulate General to accompany a U.S.
businessman to Canton to investigate a pro-
spective business arrangement with a Canton
firm for the export of edible marine products
to the U.S. The Department decided not to
proceed with the applications for visas for
the Consulate General officers when we re-
ceived intelligence on the U.S. businessman
raising serious questions as to his bona fides.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Apr 1971 Following. the PRC invitation to our table
tennis team and admission of several U.S.
newsmen, Prince Sihanouk in a letter of
April 11, 1971 to Senator Mansfield conveyed
Premier CHOU En--tai's invitation for Senator
and Mrs. Mansfield to visit Peking. (CHOU
in mid-1969 had turned down Senator Mansfield's
request to visit mainland China.)
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 ..
FE
N E A
Cu
IL
P
10
F130
AID
FRO
INT
TAR
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XMB
ARMY
NAVY
NSA
CIA
TO: Action Info.
AMA/
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CONS
AOM
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Usls
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
l ?. 'S 6 K. tf. Wr Y L, V fT / L+V aj --~.
C c f c e t tl Y/ w
Original to be Filed in Decentralized Files.
P wIO CITY .SEC rT/iMDI $
HANDLING INDICATOR
TO Department of State
FROM ' Amombassy 17r"~RSAW
SUBJECT Stoessel-Lei Talks:
January 20, 1970
REF
NO DISTRIBUTIO{
DATE:
A=-25
5
January 24, 1970
Report of 135th Meeting,
The American side was met at the front door of
the PRC Embassy by staff members and led to. the second
floor where the Charge, LEI Yang, and his staff were
.waiting. Both sides introduced themselves and there
were handshakes all around.
Participants on both sides were:
United States
.."''Ambassador Walter J. . Stoessel, Jr.
Paul Ir. Kreisberg -- Advisor
Donald M. Anderson -- Interpreter
Thomas W. Simons, Jr. - Scribe
People's Republic of China
Charge d V of the ; ubjects I have mentioned in 'my remarks today or other matters
on which we might agree.
In any er:nt, in closing, ;fie. ChargC'd? ffaires, I. would like
to restate once again my Government is hope that regular contacts
between us can take place at frequent- intervals and that those talks
will enable us to move ~totirard a new phase in Sino-American relations
based on mutual respect.
This conclude= .my' Statement.
No Objection
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
Lei said
SECRET/NODI S
Warsaw A-25
Mr. Ambassador, in dealing, - wi4h the question of relations
bet% eon countries having different social systems, tae Govt rnr ent
of the People's Republic of China, following the principles of
diplomatic policy pe sonally set forth by Chairman MAO ase Tung,
has consistently stood for peaceful coexistence based on the
principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal
a=ffairs of others, enuality and mutual benefit, and p .:ceful
coexistence. In.pursuing these principles the Chinese Government
has in the past twenty years established and ceveloped normal friendly
relations with, many countries. 'These principles initiated. by our
Govornnient have won. act lve support and w>>ari praise from all countries
and peoples of the.world who genuinely cherish peace. Only by
strictly adhering to the five principles can peaceful coexistence be
realized. If one country forcibly occupies the territory of another
.country, encroaches on its sovereignty, and interferes in the internal.
affairs of that country, how can one speak of peaceful coexistence?
The People's Republic of China never will commit aggression or
interfere ai other countries, but on no account can it tolerate
interference and aggression against China by other countries,
wherever the interference and aggression may come from.
In your statement read out at our meeting on the 8th
:Mr
Amb-
ssa-~
,
.
.
?or expresoed the wish of the U. S. Government to widen the dialogue
and contacts between us but failed to mention a single word about
Taiwan. We must point out that there have long existed serious disputes
between China and the U.S. and that the-crux of these lies in the
question of Taiwan. This question is a political one, having direct
beaming on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It is not a
iluestion of ideology. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's
territory; it is .a province of the Peopl.e's.'Republic of China. Both Z
the Cairo Declaration .and the Potsdam Declaration, to which the U. S.
Govern ent affixed its signature, explained that Tai-%w,nn and the
Poscadores Islands should be returned to China. Even as-late as
January 5, 1950, the then U. S. President and Secretary of State still
issued soleiiin statements recognizing that Taiwan is China's territory.
Shortly' afterward, in June 1950, the U.S. Government, using. the Korean
War as a pretext, dispatched the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan and the Taiwan
Straits, area, and has since been occupying the area by force of
-arms. An armistice in the Korean War was brought about as early
as 1953. But not only has the U. S. Government failed to pull out
its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area, what is riore,
it signed in December 1954 the so--called Treaty of Joint Defense
with the CI3l;;,NG .Lai 3hek clique, which has long been repudiated by
the Chinese people, in an attempt to legalize by this treaty this
occupation of Ta.L an. Thereafter the U. S. Government has all along
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-467-6-1-6
6
Warsaw A-25
used Taiwan as a base for continuing to pose war threats against
the Chinese people and to use it for maneuvers to carry out "two-
'China" or "one China-one Taiwan" activities in an attempt to
separate Taiwan fro: Chin-a. Recently the U.S. Government still.
talked, a great deal about pledging to honor .its so-called treaty
commitments to the Chiang, Kai Shek clique and. announced it would
give the Chiang clique a batch of military planes. All . of, this
daps t;--ituft'os' "initerference and aggression against Chid" .. The Chinese
people v rill assuredly liberate Tai wan; this is a question of china's'
internal affairs. The Chinese people absolutely will not allow any
country to occupy Chinese territory and to interfere in its 'internal
affairs. With regard to this ciuestion of 'important political
principles, the .position of the Chinese Government is firm and ur.-
svervin . A1l fond hopes that China will change its position are
doomed to fail.
Mr. Ambassador, the talks between China and the U.S'. have gone
on for over ten years. In the course of these talks, the U. S.
Government has invariably advanced an evasive attitude toward the
questions of fundamental principles between the two countries and..
has confined itself to side issues, thus preventing the talks achiev-
ing results on fundamental issues bet ;peen the two countriies . Now
that the U. S. "Government wishes to increase the dialogue with our
country and improve Sino-US. relations, presumably the ciuVstion of
how to deal with the fundamental principles of the relations oT" our
two countries is already under your consideration. The Chinese
Government has always stood for the peaceful settlement of-disputes
between China and the U.S. through negotiations; it-has done so in
the past and is prepared to do like;,ise i n the future. .'le would
~elcom studies and explorations on the fundamental question.of how
to settle relations between the two countries. We are will4ng to
consider and discuss whatever ideas and suggestions the U. S. Govern-
ment might put forward in accordance with ,the five principles of
peaae'~ul coexistence, therefore really helping to reduce tensions
between China and the U. S. and fundamentally ii-prove relations
between China and the U. S. These talks may either continue to be
conducted at the ambassadorial level or may be conducted at a higher
level or through other channels acceptable to both sides. I have
carefully listened to the statement the Ambassador just made." We
'will study it and set forth our views at the nVxt rmeeting.
I said
Mr., Charge d'Affaires, I listened carefully.. and with interest
to the views expressed by you 'in your statement. I noted in particu-
lar the position e