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Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
January 4, 2010
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-469-11-1-8.pdf94.38 KB
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/04: LOC-HAK-469-11-1-8 TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY LATIN AMERICA 1. NOVEMBER 1973 TALKS Chinese Position in November 1973 ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY -- Although Soviet ambition is great, their capacities are meager. Take for instance Cuba. The US intimidated them and they left. (Mao) -- China is very suspicious of this country [Cuba] that wants to have some relations with us. Delegations sent by Castro tried to make peace with us on behalf of the Soviet Union. They tried to persuade us not to continue the struggle in the ideological field. (Mao) -- China signed the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone treaty in order to satisfy the demands of countries like Mexico, but made a separate statement. The US signed it, but hasn't withdrawn its military bases from Cuba. China hopes the Soviet Union will sign it. -- Che Guevara told Chou he didn't want to stay on in Cuba. So he went to Bolivia. It was very difficult for him there. He asked for Chinese help to build the biggest broadcasting station. Was he mad to think of having such a large broadcasting station to go along with such a small guerrilla force? -- The coup in Chile was terrible slaughter. Could the US influence it? -- The Allende Government itself was much too complicated. Allende himself admitted it, but his subordinates made great publicity. The pro-Moscow Communists there wanted the Soviet Union to supply them with weapons. And the Che Guevarists, divorced from the masses, tried activities quite similar to their Cuban guerrilla forces. A putschist group, they thought if they had weapons in hand, they could kill some people and burn down some houses. -- The Soviet Union was making use of Che Guevara, and also making use of Trotskyites. In Chile you can find both Guevarists and Trotskyites. -- Massacres in Chile will give rise to revolution on the part of the people. It is also inevitable that it will be so, though no one knows how long it [the regime] will last. It has also enabled the Soviet Union to gain publicity about it -- as when Gromyko demanded that they not execute a trade union official. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE v EX CT TWTYTV'T [T ?c7 'O r%1 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/04: LOC-HAK-469-11-1-8 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/04: LOC-HAK-469-11-1-8 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY -2- (Chinese Position in November 1973) -- Chou wrote to Allende asking him not to do too many things in a hurry, and to make preparations for nationalization, and he didn't. So as a result, their production went down and they made too many promises to the people which could not be honored. -- China gives only limited support to Latin American revolutions. China is still learning. The US needn't fear. It takes time to have the people rise up. Latin America is a complicated area and is very different from Asia. US Position in November 1973 -- We drove the Soviets out of Cuba a second time, though we didn't announce it. They moved several submarines; we moved several ships, and they left. (to Mao) -- The US has exercised considerable influence to prevent slaughter in Chile. We believe executions have stopped, but we will look into it again and let China know. We will use our influence in that direction. -- We wish the CIA were as competent as the Premier believes. The CIA did not have.a hand in the coup in Chile, and it could not control the situation. It was the incompetence of the Allende Government. We would not give assistance, would not make their task easier, but we did not have anything to do with the actual coup. -- Che Guevara was an adventurist; Chairman Mao is a student of the Rerolution. Che had no objective or political hope in either place, either the Congo or Bolivia. TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/04 : LOC-HAK-469-11-1-8