BRIEFING BOOK FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-469-16-1-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 15, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

'F'st^tYPITI /QPNIC TIP 1-17-a4
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-GSA PPIHR (41 CFR) I01.11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
DIA review
completed.
State Dept. review completed
TO EA - Mr. William Gleysteen
FROM : INR/REA - Herbert E. Horowitz
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DATE: October 15, 1975
MORI PAGES 21-28&
54-62
SUBJECT: Briefing Book for Secretary Kissinger
bqk Com KEATS'
/k)
C1 ,FAP'Er--5
kt-t,c, )
We have looked over the briefing book for the Secretary's visit
which you showed us, and--with the exception of the internal political
paper--we consider it good work. The Sino-Soviet piece is very well
done, and we have no problems with the two military papers. The
articles on China's view of relations with the US and the general
wrap-up on PRC foreign policy are also good, though we have a few minor
criticisms which I will mention below. Our main problem is with the
internal paper which we feel contains considerable over-interpretation.
Rather than prepare a point-by-point critique, Chris Szymanski has
drawn up an alternative view, which I enclose.
In our view, one major problem with the internal paper is its
portrayal of a Mao under attack. This seems to hinge in part on
interpretations of the recent Water Margin campaign with which we do
not concur and which--at the very least--are debatable. Related to
this inaccurate picture is the portrayal of a die-hard, anti-Soviet
Mao "digging in his heels" against presumably powerful forces favoring
relaxation in Sino-Soviet tensions. The paper admits that these
supposed forces cannot be clearly identified, and this is a significant
flaw. We do not see sufficient evidence to justify the assumption that
a sizeable number of leaders, civilian or military, currently oppose
Mao on this issue. Admittedly, "capitulation to Soviet revisionism" was
mentioned in connection with the Water Margin campaign, but our readings
of the material indicate that it is "capitulation to revisionism" in a
domestic context which is under attack and that foreign policy is not
directly involved. Another point--Huang Hua's alleged attack on Mao's
Soviet policy which supposedly "identified him" with "the opposition"
is apparently based solely on comments he made a while ago to an
academic. We find it hard to justify such sweeping conclusions on the
basis of one reported conversation.
Another, misimpression regards the PRC military and its role in a
presumed debate over China's Russia policy. ("The core element arguing
for a change in policy is almost certainly the military.") We agree
it is logical there must be some sentiment for PRC-USSR rapprochement
in military quarters but see no hard evidence that such feelings are
widespread. We agree that regional military commanders were under
attack in last year's anti-Confucius, anti-Lin Piao campaign and that
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the campaign also contained attacks on persons accused of wanting
to "sell out" the country to a foreign power. However, we saw no
clear linkage in those debates between the former and the latter.
The main issue for which regional commanders were under attack
involved domestic politics and the commanders' alleged lack of
responsiveness to central authority.
At another point, the paper overstates the civilian-military
rivalry in China today, That Teng's job is to "chastise, split and
partially mollify" the military establishment is a bit too dramatic.
This is a basic problem with the entire paper--it generally paints
too stark a picture of the "deep cleavages" in the "body politic" and,
through overstatement and overgeneralization, creates an impression
that is inaccurate and too pat.
Turning to the two other papers, the one on PRC views of relations
with the US gives a slightly darker picture than we would paint, though
it is generally close to the mark. The Chinese probably are more
skeptical of the benefits of US-PRC detente now than they were two years
ago. Certainly they worry that we are weaker today vis-a-vis the USSR
than we were earlier, particularly before the fall of Saigon. Neverthe-
less, the PRC clearly wants Sino-US dialogue and normalization to stay
on track. As the final sentence in the briefing paper points out, there
is no indication whatsoever that the Chinese would want to run the risk
of a return to their former hostile relationship with the US. As for
the paper's contention that China is unwilling to "make many sacrifices"
for continued good relations with the US, while the Chinese may not
compromise on certain issues (e.g., on Tibet, the performing arts troupe,
Mayors delegation, .etc.) they do continue to make some significant
concessions. Not the least of these is their willingness to maintain a
high level diplomatic relationship with us despite our continuing 25X1
recognition of Taipei. With no other country have they tolerated si4i
an arrangement.
Concerning PRC intentions regarding Taiwan, the paper (and other
portions of the briefing book) is too ominous and invites a seriously
erroneous conclusion.
The paper on PRC foreign policy orientation is an excellent wrap-
up of Chinese foreign policy goals. Again we think "plans 'to liberate'
(Taiwan) perhaps within five years" gives an incorrect impression, and
we do not believe it is "fairly certain that some important leader25X1
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prefer a less abrasive relationship with the Soviets." We also
wish the authors of the paper and of the entire book would disabuse
themselves of the idea that the recent further deterioration in Sino-
Soviet relations can be traced to Mao's return from the provinces
six months ago. In our view, the heightened Chinese Anti-Soviet line
stems from events both pre-dating and post-dating the fall of Saigon,
as well as from the changed situation in Southeast Asia brought on by
that event.
INR/REA/NA:WFRop
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China in 1975: The Domestic Political Situation
The Chinese political situation in the past year has been
characterized by a renewed emphasis on political stability,
restructuring the government, and economic development. However,
tension remains over such issues as succession:, rehabilitation
of cadres purged during the Cultural Revolution, local faction-
alism, and industrial problems. Disagreement over internal
issues continues, and will most likely compound the succession
process, but it is not evident that the Chinese leadership has
hardened into several competing factions. There is no reason to
postulate that there is active opposition to Mao Tse-tung not
solid evidence to suggest Major disagreement over foreign policy
issues. It is unlikely that Chinese foreign policy will be
radically altered as a result of Chou's or Mao's death.
* * * * * * * * * * *
With Chou En-71ai's health apparently worsening and precluding
active involvement in state and Party matters, Vice Premier Teng
Hslao-p'ing has emerged as China's day-to-day leader. Since the
restaffing Of the government bureaucracy at the January National
People's Congress: (NPC), Teng has established himself as the PLA
Chief.-of-staff, a vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
and a member, of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. .Both
Mao and Chou have come to rely increasingly on Teng who can be
expected to succeed Chou as Premier and play a key role in Party
affairs after Mao's death. However, without the presence and
support of Mao and Chou, the once-disgraced Teng could find his
prestige and authority weakened, leading to increased leadership
Competition
Compounding the succession problem is the recent rehabilita-
tion of key figures purged during the Cultural Revolution who
may or may. not be allied with Teng. With the support of Mao, a
September: central directive called for the rehabilitation of
once prominent pre-Cultural Revolution figures such as Chou Yang,
Hsia yen, Yang Han-sheng, Pa Chin, and Yu Chen-fei. Paralleling
this are persistent rumors that former Peking mayor and Polit-
buro Member Peng Chen, once accused of actively opposing Mao,
Might be restored to a government position. To rehabilitate
such individuals and restore thousands of other purge victims
to important government and Party positions calls into question
the goals and achievements of the Cultural Revolution itself.
Many of Peking's so-called leftist leaders such as Chiang Ch'ing,
Ya(t) Wen-yuan, and Chang Chun-ch'iao based much of their careers
On striking down these "rightists" and "revisionists." It would
appear that beneath the surface the "left" would be deeply
incensed and apprehensive Over the widening circle of rehabilita-
tion. Recent appearances of the leadership seems an obvious
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attempt to portray a sense of "stability and unity" at home
and abroad. Meanwhile, local factional disputes such as the
tumultuous Chekiang situation continue, coupled with bottle-
necks in coal and steel production as China struggles, amid
continuing labor problems, to meet the goals of the fourth
five-year plan.
Despite the emphaSis on stability and economic themes in
the past year, the Chinese leadership and particularly Map
remain Committed to the achievement of ideological purity in
Chinese society a potentially disruptive issue. A resurgence
of 'revisionism" and a "restoration of capitalism" has been a
real fear to the Chairman since the 1950's. Immediately after
the January NPC, with its emphasis on stability and economic
development, a ."Dictatorship in the Proletariat" campaign was
launched to remind the Chinese populace to be on guard against
the spread Of "bourgeois rights" and "bourgeois factionalism."
More recently, the Criticize Water Margin campaign may be
seen: as: part of the :historical effort by Mao to prevent the
development of "revisionism" in China. While the initial stages
of the Campaign in August suggested that one or more Chinese
leaders such as Teng Hsiaop'ing, Wang Hung-wen, or even Chang
Chun7ch'ia0 might be coming under attack, later articles and
statements by Chinese officials suggested broader themes. The
campaign, reportedly initiated by Mao himself, remained within
closely guarded parameters. The evidence available does not
indicate that Mao was under attack or that some elements were
attempting a defense of the deposed Lin Piao. As the campaign
broadened, its attack centered on the general issue of'."capitu-
lation to revisionism" within China (i.e., backsliding towards
capitalism reduction of ideological commitment, etc.), rather
than focusing on specific individuals. The campaign did not
directly involve foreign policy issues, although fear of
"capitulation to Soviet revisionism" did emerge as a
minor theme in conjunction with the caMpaign. In any case,
the campaign lost national focus after only one week of press
attention, and the political mood shifted to the more mundane
topics of agricultural development and the October 1 National
Day celebration. The latter were marked by the conspicuous
absence of the traditional October 1 editorial and the non-
appearance of Chou En-lai, who has not been seen publicly since
September 7: amid reports of worsening health problems
One area Where Chinese policy seems to be less controver-
sial and has achieved broad agreement lies in the reassessment
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Of Chinese foreign policy and Strategic objectives in the wake
of the Indochina, denouement. Last May the Chinese leadership
probably undertook a broad reevaluation of China's strategic
world position... Since then, publicly and privately the Chinese
have expressed increased concern over possible expansion of
Soviet influence in, the Far East and seemed to worry that the:
Soviet "Asian Collective Security" arrangement might be more
than a remote POSSibility. Some Chinese officials have even
commented that China can no longer hope to avoid involvement
in a war between the two superpowers. ,In this context, there
has been no evidence that any group or individual Chinese '
leaders are actively pressing for a rapprochement with the USSR
at this time.
Paralleling this, 4 series of central level meetings in
June and July resulted in a re-evaluation Of PRC defense polity.
At 4 July meeting of the Military Affairs Commission, Teng and
Defense Minister Yeh Chienying criticized China's army as weak
and inefficient, A subsequent central directive, endorsed by
Mao., called for Modernization of the air force and the navy as
well AS streamlining the army And improving its combat readiness.
,Such a Shift to 4 l'ac:47e conventional defense posture with less
political involvement for the armed fortes represents the
culmination of a process begun following the Ninth Party Congress
in 1969 and accelerated by the Lin Pia() affair in 1971. Through-
out this past summer, little evidence emerged to suggest major
disagreement Or 'factional disputes over these foreign policy and
military issuei. This apparent consensus stands in contrast to
cOntinued tension and differing policy stances over such domestic
issues as succession, , rehabilitation Of purge victims, And the
broader issue Of Maoism versus revisionism.
INR/REA:CJSzymanski/eb
10/15/75
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
INDEX
A. China's View of Relations with the
United States
B.
C.
D.
PRC Foreign Policy Orientation
The Domestic Political Situation in China
The National Defense Posture of the PRC
E. The Status of China's Strategic Weapons
Program
F. The Status of Sino-Soviet Relations
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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10 On obeAr 1975
MEMORANUUM
SuBJECT: China's View of Relations with the United States
China continues to see the United States as a major
piece in the international chess game, but it seems to
be more skeptical of the immediate and tactic./ advantages
of the relationship than perhafs it was in the 1971-1973
Period. The Chinese at this Etat* do not seem prepared
to see the US connection deteriorate visibly, but they
also do not seem prepared to Oak* Vmar sacrifices to keep
it on course. Although the Soviet Union continues to
receive the lion's share of adverse Chinese propaganda,
in the peat year the decibel level of anti-US rhetoric has
risen somewhat; moreover, Peking obviously has no qualms
in accepting such strains as the flops over the Chinese
cultural troupe and the US mayors' delegation have produced.
The Chinese entered into the present relationship
with the Soviets very much in mind, and this consideration
is still paramount in China's View of the Washington
connect:IMO. Because of its possible salutary effect on
Soviet attitudes the Chinese have very much wanted the
Presidenes visit to take place. Their reading of the
political atmosphere in the United States in the wake
of the Vielinam debacle, however, appears to have suggested
to them that the trip might have been deferred. To
ensure that it took place on schedule, throughout the
spring and Summer they were busy passing the word in
all quarters that Mr. Ford would be welcome in China,
that Peking considered the visit important, and that there
were no preconditions attached to it. At the same time
domestic audiences were being conditioned to expect little
in the way of substantive advances In the bilateral
relationship as a result of the trip. Specifically,
they were informed that a breakthrough on the Taiwan
problem lOme unlikely.
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These themes have also been prominent in Chinese
conversations with goreigners. Chinese leaders and
diplomats have stressed that China remains patient
concerning the Taiwan problem and that it is in no
hurry to see the issue ricallv0A T"ri. 11142"(1-n4T"
in
particular has stressed,
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the proposition that China
would prefer a peaceful
resolution of the issue;
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An actual attack on Taiwan would divert considerable
military resources from China's defense against a possible
Soviet thrust; moreover, such an attack would not only
destroy the nascent relationship with Washington but also
that with Japan while souring relations with Western
Europe and scaring off the nations of Southeast Asia.
For these reasons it is unlikely that China is actually
contemplating a move against the island, particularly
within the time period mentioned in the documents.
Nevertheless, these directives and instructions may well
represent an accommodation to those who may be arguing
that the current relationship with Washington has brought
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re cove
an no nearer,/
The five-year deadline mentioned in the instruction would
correspond with the 1980 elections in the United States
and could mean that Chinese leaders were considering
stepped up pressure on Washington if it appeared at that
time that the United States was prepared to postpone
resolutioh of the problem indefinitely.
SignS'of frustration regarding current US attitudes
do not appear to be confined to this bilateral issue
but also seem to spill over into areas of greater
ultimate importance to China. Peking seems genuinely
concerned about what it considers to be a deterioration
of the balance of military power between Washington and
Moscow, The Chinese appear to believe that Washintgon's
overall international posture is defensive, while that
of Moscow is aggressive; they seem concerned that the
United States is entering at least a temporary period
of neo-isolationism and probably fear that quarrels
between the executive and legislative branches could limit
Washington's freedom of action. US congressmen have
been repeatedly advised to build up the American military
arsenal, particularly in the area of conventional weapons.
In this connection the Chinese have generally pointed to
the possibility of a conventional war in Europe.
A parallel concern for the Chinese is continuing
US efforts to cement detente with the USSR. They almost
certainly believe that far greater. US time and energy
is expended on furthering the Soviet relationship
than is expended on the Chinese connection, and that this
effort has tended to strengthen Soviet self-confidence
while correspondingly weakening the US will to resist
putative SoViet encroachments. They also seem to suspect
that the executive's defense of its Soviet policy in
the public forum and in congress tends to create "false
illusions" both among the US public and in Western Europe.
The current negotiations concerning Soviet purchases of
U8 wheat, for example, are almost certainly viewed in
Peking as an example of US "defensiveness" and willingness
to selieve Soviet distress. Given the multifaceted
nature of the current US-Soviet connection compared to
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the much more limited connection with Peking, the Chinese
probably now, suspect that Washington has pursued ties
with Ch*ne arqely as? a means of securing a "better deal"
with MoS000,?//
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Peking, to be sure sees such events as the Sinai II
agreement as,a positive development, but in the Middle
East as in Europe it does not seem convinced that US
staying power is very great, and the Chinese have warned
the Egyptians and other Arabs to be prepared for a Soviet
riposte, In any event, gains in the Middle East are
probably offset in Chinese eyes by what they consider to
be the deleterious effects of the Helsinki summit on the
situation in Europe. They seem genuinely to subscribe
to the semi:what simplistic view that at the conference
the US gratuitously accepted the legitimacy of the Soviet
position in Eastern Europe.
All of this does not imply that the Chinese no longer
see much utility in the US connection; obviously they do.
However, Peking's recent return to the theme that'China
must be prepared for war with the Soviets, which was in
abeyance in the past two years, suggests that its view
of the international scene, and by extension of the US
connection, has darkened in the past six months or so.
The Chine**, nevertheless, probably doubt that the factors
they seem to believe limit DS flexibility in the international
sphere are permanent. And in any event they clearly do
not, at this juncture, wish to run risks even greater than
those they now face by reactivating an unlimited quarrel
with Washington or permitting a public breach in the
current relationship.
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10 October 1975
OCI No. 1026-75
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: PRC Foreign Policy Orientation
There have been no major departures in Chinese
foreign policy over the past year, although Peking has
continued to make adjustments in .he general diplomatic
orientation it established in the early 1970s. In the
Past half year there has appeared to be a growing sense
of strain, 'Underlying China's view of its prospects '
abroad, to which the outcomeof the war in Vietnam, the
Helsinki summit conference and continuing stagnation in
its bilateral relations with the United States have
probably ,all contributed. Despite the sometimes
spectadulardiplomatfti gains of the early 1970s, Peking
at this juncture does not seem pertain that it has
achieved a Permanent and decisive breakthrough in the
international sphere. But while there may be a growing
sense of Pessimism in China, this mood does not yet
appear so pronounced as to result in a major reorientation
of policy.
major preoccupation continues to be the
-Soviet Un1ori. Peking continues to attempt to undercut
Soviet po1i Wherever possible, and to consolidate its
own influence at Nbsocies expense whenever it can. Since
last springy however, Peking has appeared to view Soviet
intentions With greater apprehension, showing renewed
concern that Moscow is maneuvering to "surround" and
isolate Chia*. ?This heightened concern seems directly
related to the outcome of the Indochina war, which the
Chinese Seta to believe foreshadows further diminution
of US power in Asia and consequent opportunities for
Moscow to pick up some of the slack, particularly in
Southeast Asia. Since last simmer Chinese anti-Soviet
rhetoric hsnoticeably increased and has acquired a
sharper e
between tw
there is at
It is possible that some sort of exchange
ers may have occUrred in the summer, but
t no direct evidence
STATE DEPARTMENT REVIEWS COMPLETED,
PP. 12-20
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Chinese, however, have again begun to stress the possibility
of a Soviet attack to domestic audiences, and a
"preparations for war" movement reminiscent of that of
1969-72 appears to be beginning./
a decision was apparently taken to streamline and
modernize the Chinese force structure over the next
several Years; this decision was justified in terms of
the necessity to fend off a putative Soviet attack.
Bilateral relations between the two powers remain
frozen, and both have claimed that there are no prospects
for early improvement. The Chinese, moreover, have recently
begun to raise in public issues of considerable sensitivity
to Moscow. , They have begun to refer to the Soviet
helicopter they downed in northwest China for the first
time since shortly after its crew was captured in mid-March
1974, and in a speech early this month a member of the
Chinese Politburo raised the spectre of a Soviet attempt
to stir up trouble among the ethnic minorities in Sinkiang
province. The annual Sino-Soviet river navigation talks
(which normally deal with such mundane matters as the
setting of navigational buoys in the Ussuri and Amur
rivers) were skipped this year because of Chinese
insistence that the discussions would have to include
larger issues. The border talks in Peking remain
deadlocked and are currently in recess.
Signs continue to surface in China from time to time
that the issue of the proper relationship with Moscow is
a contentious one in the upper reaches of the regime. It
seems fairly certain that at least some important elements
in the Chinese leadership would prefer a less abrasive
relationship with the Soviets, but it is impossible to
judge how widespread this sentiment is. In any event,
it is likely that some at least consider the issue less
as a serious policy question than as a means of scoring
points off possible opponents in the jockeying for power
now taking place in Peking. In fact, relations with
Moscow have probably deteriorated rather than improved
over the past six months--that is, since Mao returned
to the capital after a long sojourn in the provinces.
Chinese concern that Moscow might succeed in isolating
and "surrounding" China has clearly conditioned Peking's
approach to relations with North Korea. In the past
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year China hag supported Pyongyang's position on
reunification and withdrawal of US forces from the
peninsula and on related issues in the United Nations
far less equivocally than was the case in the early
1970s. Kim Il-song's visit to China last spring and the
recent visit of Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao to
Korea clearly was meant to underline the closeness of
the present relationship?from China's point of view at
least--at the expense of Moscow. This unabashed
cultivation of Pyongyang has paid off to some degree.
For the past year the Koreans have not bothered to edit
out anti-Soviet remarks by Chinese leaders when replaying
their speeches in Korean media. Moreover, by identifying
closely with Chinese support for Prince Sihanouk and
with the Chinese position On Cambodia generally the
Koreans have appeared to endorse--by implication at
least?Ching-Se attempts to circumscribe Soviet influence
in Indochina. "Wang's cultivation of Pyongyang
underscores its belief that it is playing for high stakes
in Korea and that its vital interests are involved in
the attempt to ensure a lesser degree of Soviet influence
on the peninsula than it seems to believe now exists in
Indochina.
concerns about Soviet machinations also condition
Peking's relations with Japan, but in this case China's
fears are clearly exaggerated. The Chinese game here
is to keep Moscow off balance and to throw as many
roadblocks as Possible in the development of closer
Japanese-Soviet relations. In any assessment of the
possibility of expansion of Soviet influence in Asia,
Japan obviously assumes an important place in Chinese
eyes, and Peking's hardening on the issue of the anti-Soviet
"hegemony clause" in the proposed Sino-Japanese treaty
of peace and ,friendship roughly paralleled the denouement
in Indochina. The Chinese clearly see the issue as a
litmus test Of current Japanese attitudes toward Peking
and Moscow respectively, and crude Soviet pressure on the
Japanese to resist inclusion of the clause in the treaty
certainly raised the stakes for the Chinese. Moreover,
Peking is apparently more suspicious of Mai than it was
of the amiable Tanaka, and this suspicion doubtless was
reinforced by what the Chinese clearly regard as Japanese
backtracking from the position Tokyo adopted when relations
were established in 1972.
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? However, despite the continuing difficulties over
the hegemony clause, Peking is certainly not prepared
to write off Tokyo. The Chinese took a relatively
relaxed view of Jap'anese arrangements allowing for
resumption of air traffic to Taiwan and Chiao Kuan-hua
showed considerable flexibility in exploring face-saving
formulas to resolve the hegemony issue in his recent
talks with Miyazawa in New York i Economic relations
between the two countries remain strong, and the Chinese
have largely kept the negotiations on the peace treaty
isolated from other aspects of bilateral relations.
PliyataWa's talks with Chiao were characterized as the
most extensive and productive discussions between the two
countries since relations were established.
Peking continues to go through the motions of
searching for a gesture that would lead Taipei to enter
into meaningful talks on the future of the island--the
latest such gesture was the release of a considerable
number of "agents" who had been captured while infiltrating
the mainland in the 1960s, but it clearly does not expect
a response from ,the Nationalists. In fact, the Chinese
mood with respect to the Taiwan problem has darkened
somewhat in the past few months. Teng Hsiao-ping
continues to tell foreign visitors that Peking is prepared
to wait for quite some time before the resolution of the
problem and can afford to do so, but internal audiences
are now being warned that there is a strong possibility
that Nationalist leaders--in particular Chiang Ching-kuo
himself?will attempt to reach an accommodation with
Moscow. At the same time the populace is apparently being
told that China's military establishment has been
instructed to draw up plans to "liberate" the island,
perhaps in five year's time--that is, by the time of the
1980 elections in the United States.
It is unlikely that the Chinese leadership rates
the possibility of a rapprochement between Moscow. and
Taipei as highly as these internal instructions 'would
suggest, or that, given China's problems with its northern
neighbor, it would be willing to divert the major military
resources required for a conquest of the island while
at the same time ensuring a disruption of its relations
with Washington and the creation of major problems in
its relations with Western Europe, Japan and the countries
of Southeast Asia. However, the new instructions may
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represent e 00nCession to elements in Peking who may be
arguing that China's current foreign policy line has not
brought reunification of the island with the mainland
significantly closer. It is probably no coincidence that
the Chinese Populace is also being told not to expect a
major breakthrough on the Taiwan issue as a result of
President Ford's upcoming visit to China.
In contrast, the Chinese undoubtedly consider
Southeast Asia an area where they have made some progress
in the past year. Thai recognition followed quickly on
that of the Philippines; both moves were clearly a gain
for Peking, bUt,it almost certainly does not expect
either Indonesia or Singapore to follow suit any time
soon. China is Continuing to offer material aid to the
insurgencies in Burma and Thailand and to offer moral
support to insurrectionaries in Malaysia and the Philippines,
but its current emphasisis clearly on state-to-state
relations. Ne, Win, for example, will visit China later
this year. wpart of their effort to draw the nations
of Southeast Asia closer to Peking, the Chinese are
emphasizing the potential threat from the USSR--an
expansionist superpower with vast if undefined designs on
the region. These scare tactics undoubtedly reflect
genuine Chinese concerns, but Peking is also very much
aware of the utility,of this line of argument in
creating a bond of common concern with the countries
in the area. A similar mix of genuine concern and tactical
considerations lies behind Peking's parallel claim 'that
the Southeast Asian nations have much to fear from Hanoi
but little to fear from China; this second argument is
likely to fall on fertile soil and already has had a.
positive effect in building a new relationship with
Thailand. At this juncture the Chinese clearly see a
period of relative stability in the region to be in their
interest; they remain relaxed on the question of US
bases in Thai/and and the Philippines, both with Thais
and Filipinos and with third parties.
In contrast, Peking does not appear to be relaxed
about relations with Vietnam;.
While the Chinese view of Soviet influence in Hanoi is
undoubtedly exaggerated, Peking certainly does believe
that Moscow has the inside track in Vietnam?,-a? view that
is apparently shared by the Soviets theinselves. Even
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apart from pRtative Soviet influence in Hanoi, the Chinese
appear to consider Vietnam a relatively well-armed,
potentially expansionist and generally troublesome close
neighbor, and it seems prepared to take the lead in
keeping Hanoi in check. Chinese relations with Cambodia
are apparently being cultivated with an eye to both
Moscow and Hanoi without very much regard for Vietnamese
sensibilities, and Peking has been telling its populace
in south China that a dispute with Hanoi over the common
border is developing. It has also instructed its diplomats
to admit to differences with Vietnam if asked, and it is
apparently preparing to emphasize publicly its claims in
the South China Sea through a slogan calling for "liberation"
of the Spratly Islands, many of which are occupied by
Vietnam.
The Chinese undoubtedly recognize the disadvantages
of an open breach with Hanoi, however, and it is not yet
clear how far they are Prepared to push their differences.
If the recent visit of Le Duan to China was designed to
patch up the developing quarrel, it does not seem to have
achieved this and. There are indications that the
Chinese were fairly niggardly in their aid offers, and
the VietnaMese left without the publication of a joint
communique and without entertaining the Chinese at the
customary farewell banquet. The Chinese seem relatively
relaxed about Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Laos,
however, claiming that Lao xenophobia will eventually
reduce the role of both Hanoi and Moscow in that country.
Relations with India, like those with the USSR,
remain frozen. The Chinese seem somewhat more relaxed
about the Himalayan border kingdoms than they did a year
ago, but they are certain to consider Mrs. Gandhi's
"legal coup" a good indicator that relations with Delhi
will remain strained for some time to come. Peking is
apparently unwilling to provoke India--it may have possible
Indian moves in the Himalayas in mind--and it has
reported the developments in Delhi in low key, but the
Chinese are probably pessimistic about a significant
improvement of their position on the subcontinent. They
undoubtedly take satisfaction both in the coup in Dacca
and in their subsequent establishment of relations with
Bangladesh?Chiao Kuan-hua played a major part in the
Bangalee-Pakistani negotiations which paved the way for
the latter development, but Peking is not likely to
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believe these gains greatly alter the balance of power on
the subcontinent and may even fear that Delhi will be
tempted to intervene in Bangladesh in order to restore
the status quo ante. The Chinese continue to cultivate
the Pakistanis" and are perhaps more relaxed about the
situation in Afghanistan than they were a year ago.
Peking continues to see Iran as the key to its Middle
East policy and is persisting in its low-key wooing of
Teheran. The Chinese have told the Iranians that they
welcome improvement of Iran's relations with Iraq, but
they consider Syria far more important to the balance of
forces in the area than Baghdad and have urged Teheran to
forge ties to Damascus in order to draw Syria away from
Moscow. The Chinese are clearly pleased with the Sinai II
agreement and have told the Egyptians as much, in particular
commending Sadat for his open criticism of the Soviets.
Peking is not especially optimistic that anti-Soviet
momentum in the area can be maintained, however. The
Chinese appear to fear Syrian intervention in the Lebanese
situation, and they seem to think that Moscow may attempt
to play the Palestinian card, arming and encouraging the
fedayeen. To cover their flank they continue to refuse
to write off the Palestinians entirely and they continue
to offer them verbal support in the United Nations and
other forums. China's current interest in the Gulf states
does not appear to be especially high. As they have since
late 1973, however, the Chinese conianue to endorse the
actions of OPEC. Nevertheless, they seem unable to
reconcile their position on this matter with arguments
that rises in the price of oil tend to harm the economies of
the Western European and Third World states, and have
generally responded to such arguments with embarrassed
evasions.
In general. the Chinese continue to make what they
consider the proper noises with respect to Third World
issues. Much of this rhetoric, however, is just that;
in practice Chinese actions remain cautious. Historically,
Chinese interest, in the underdeveloped nations has been
highest when Peking has been unsure of its position in
the international arena. Attention to the Third World
in the past two years is probably a reflection of current
uncertainty, In the past year some strains--none thus
far overwhelming-..have developed in China's relations
with several -African states which Peking has been
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cultivating for some time. Last summer the Chinese were
at odds with Zaibia over Kaunda's desire to achieve a
solution to the Rhodesian problem in concert with South
Africa. The Chinese pressed for an insurrectionary policy
and argued vigorously against cooperation with Pretoria--
a position they doubtless thought would keep their
revolutionary credentials untarnished without much cost.
Peking is also almost certainly concerned about gains by
the MPLA in Angola, but thus far they have not protested
a Tanzanian decision to embargo Chinese arms shipments to
Holden Roberto's rival MLA.
Chinese interest is much more directly focused on
Europe, which continues to remain the central factor in
Peking's rhetorical and rather apocalyptic public
analysis of the international scene. China continues to
cultivate nearly all of the West European states; streams
of visitors, both officials in office and opposition
leaders, have visited China in the past year. Both
Franz-Joseph Strauss and Edward Heath have recently
completed second visits to Peking; Teng Hsiao-ping visited
France last spring--his only official visit other than to
the United Nations since his return to power in 1973. The
burden of the Chinese message to the Europeans remains
constant: Unremitting vigilance is necessary to frustrate
Soviet designs on Europe. This message in only slightly
different form is being passed to the maverick nations
in Eastern Europe as well. Official Romanian delegations
to China have all but tripped over each other in the past
two months, and the Yugoslav premier is currently in China--
the first Yugoslav premier to make the journey. At the
welcoming banquet for Bijedic, Teng Hsiao-ping unabashedly
raised the spectre of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia
following Tito's death, occasioning a Soviet walkout.
Chinese importunings in Europe are obviously undertaken
with an eye toward Moscow, in the hope that if the Soviets
become more preoccupied with their western flank they will
have less energy and inclination to concentrate on problems
in the east. Peking's interest in Europe, however, is not
simply tactical; they seem genuinely concerned that Moscow
is gaining a freer hand there. In this regard, the recent
Helsinki summit unquestionably increased Chinese anxieties.
Although they have not devoted as much propaganda attention
to the meetinq at; they have to some other issues, the
Chinese almst certainly believe that the conference tended
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to legitimize the SoViet position in Eastern Europe while
presenting Moscow with opportunities for political
advances further west. The publicity surrounding the
signing ceremony and the fact that the meeting was held
at the summit level probably reinforces this line of
Chinese analysis and may have increased Peking's current
sense of relative isolation and vulnerability.
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MORI PP. 21-28 PER
C03420815
MEMORANDUM
STATE DEPARTMENT HAS
REVIEWED, PP. 21-28
10: Odtober 1975
OCX No. 1025/75
SUBJECT: The Domestic Political Situation in China
China has damped down the political ferment so
evident last year and has made some progress toward
defining a new structure of power in anticipation of
the death of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Last
January's National People's Congress (NPC) restaffed
the governmental apparatus and probably defined the
political roles of several leading figures more clearly.
However, deep cleavages remain in the body politic,
evidencad by Continuing unrest in several provinces,
strikes in trial sector, and the emergence
of a new calopm, .tieising the 14th century novel
"Water Ma At this juncture political problems
do not seem to hIVe. gotten out of hand, as they may
have done in the spring of 1974, but despite repeated
calls for "stability and unity," that goal has not yet
been achieved in a meaningful sense.
Chinese politics continue to be dominated by the
succession question. This is a problem of at least ten
years standing, but in many respects it is still
unsolved. 00keYing for position is more muted than
last year, but it obviously continues just below the
surface of events. Major political fault-lines remain
a split between left and right within the party and a
cleavage between civilians and important elements
within the military. Within these major groupings
personal olive's and political shadings almost certainly
also exist. Despite the obvious gains associated with
the NPC and its ancillary meetings, Vice Premier Teng
Dsiao-ping recently admitted to a group of New Zealand
journalists that the succession, when, it occurs, is
likely to be troubled.
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Teng himself has been a major gainer over the past
year. As PLA chief-of-staff, he now holds a major
position within the military hierarchy; he is in addition
a vice chairman of the party and a member of the powerful
Politburo Standing Committee. He is clearly slated to
succeed Chou as premier and already runs China on a
day-to-day basis. Over the past year Chou has remained
a highly influential figure behind the scenes, but his
recent relapse has almost certainly placed him on the
sidelines for the moment. He could partially recover
from his present illness, as he did late last year, but
continuing bouts of illness are likely to make his role
? in decision-making a constantly diminishing one. His
death, however/ would not be as traumatic for China as it
would have been a year ago or in an earlier period.
Indeed, the regime can count as a major success its
management of the transition from Chou to Teng of primary
administrative Authority.
Although Tang's central responsibilities are
governmental, he has long been an advocate--and a symbol--
of party supremacy in the management of the state. As
his political fortunes have risen, not surprisingly the
institutional balance of power within the regime seems to
have shifted somewhat toward the party, partially at the
expense of the military. The "rehabilitation" of party
aParachiki disgraced during the Cultural Revolution has
been going on for some tine, but it seems to have
accelerated since the NPC, and has included an increasing
number of controversial party figures who were major
targets of the 1966-1969 upheaval. Most of these figures
have been close associates of Teng, and many have been
reappointed to the very jobs they held prior to the
Cultural Revolution. Revitalization of the party is far
from complete, however. The important Central Committee
secretariat, which went into limbo early in the Cultural
Revolution, has not yet resurfaced. Moreover, given his
close association with arch-villain Liu Shao-chi before
that "revolution" and his own fate during the upheaval,
Teng is a far more controversial figure than Chou En-lai
has ever been.
As an advocate of the "rehabilitation" process and
as the primary beneficiary of that policy, Teng is almost
certainly regarded by the left wing of the party with
some antipathy and apprehension. Signs of opposition
to him have surfaced from time to time in domestic
propaganda, and an attack on the "rehabilitation" policy
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appeared ?to be a major theme in the 'initial propaganda
associated 4ith the campaign criticizing "Water Margin."
But the left 'does not appear to be doing well at this
juncture.
This is particularly true of the chief spokesman
for that wing of the party, Chiang Ching, who appears
to have been eased out of her sensitive position as
overseer of Cultural and educational affairs.
A recent directive, endorsed by the
Chairman, which rehabilitates a considerable number of
cultural bureaucrats who were major targets of the early
Phases of the Cultural Revolution is still another
political body blow to Chiang Ching. In fact, the
symbolic importance of several of the cultural bureaucrats
is such that their restoration to grace tends to undercut
the entire rationale of the Cultural Revolution itself.
The legitimacy of the 1966-1969 upheaval still
remains a political issue in China, and one in which
Mao's own prestige is engaged. But he now may be prepared
to suffer losses on this score in order to make gains
in other quarters. The newly-rehabilitated cultural
figures were advocates of literary policies which the
Chairman opposed for many years, but those policies
include an effort to create a more popular and less
overtly propagandistic cultural milieu. Mao may hope
to broaden the base of support for policies he currently
considers to be of overriding importance by cultivating
China's influential intelligentsia. Moreover, some of
these newly-rehabilitated bureaucrats are close personal
friends of Tang Hsiao-ping. Mao now seems prepared to
rely on Teng and on the strength the vice premier commands
through his ties and contacts in the party and government
apparatus even if this means giving way on minor policy
issues and tolerating personnel appointments he might
abjure in ideal circumstances. This approach roughly
parallels that which he took with Lin Pia? and Chou
En-lai in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s respectively.
? It may well be that at this ptiifit the Chairman
feels it necessary to co-,opt strength where he can find
it. The peat year does not seem to have been an easy
one for him. The'problem of the succession is as much
on his mind as it is on the minds of his subordinates,
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and he appears to be far from certain that the policies
he has been pushing most strongly -for the past several
years--in particular unremitting opposition to the Soviet
Union--will be pursued with equal vigor after his death.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that he would have
preferred last year's anti-Confucius campaign to have
continued somewhat longer than it did--perhaps until it
had claimed several significant victims. There were
almost certainly aspects of last January's National
People's Congress about which he was unhappy--his absence
from the congress and the party meeting immediately
preceding it was a telling and unmistakable gesture of
disassociation. More interestingly still, Mao in the
past year Seems to have been subject to personal criticism
unparalleled since the difficult days following the
collapse of the Great Leap Forward.
This criticism has not been widespread or concerted,
but it is obviously significant. The Chairman appears to
have been vulnerable on two counts. On the one hand,
he has been accused of choosing his lieutenants (particularly
Lin Piao) unwisely, of shifting domestic policies
erratically, and of undermining the prestige of the regime
by encouraging the ferment associated with the Cultural
Revolution and the anti-Confucius campaign. On the other
hand, Mao has also been accused ,of being too rigid in his
opposition to the Soviet Union. One of those making this
charge was Huang Hua, China's ambasSador to the United
Nations. Finally, a. call to criticize the Chairman on
unspecified grounds appears to have been embedded in at
least one of ttis initial articles associated with the
"Water Margie campaign.
Mao seems to have readted to this criticism in
two ways. AS, noted above, he appears to have attempted
to mollify and co-opt his critics on the right by
further disassociating himself from his wife and from
the Cultural Revolution itself. These moves undoubtedly
have net sat well with the left wing of the party, and
the cry to oppose the "emperor" which sounded at the
outset of the "Water Margin" campaign was probably a
leftist reaction to them. On the other hand, Mao has
continued to dig in his heels on the issue of opposition
to the USSR. He is obviously obsessed on this subject
and is probablY prepared to sacrifice a good deal to
gain his way on this issue,
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The suggestions that Mao was overly rigid on this
question surfaced shortly after the National People's
Congress, and it is entirely possible that the Chairman
came under some pressure to modify his Soviet policy at
the congress and in the months preceding it. It would
appear, however, that he has subsequently attempted to
turn the tables on his critics. The key moment may have
occurred last spring when, after nine continuous months
in the provinces, Mao suddenly reappeared in Peking. His
reappearance in the capital coincided almost exactly with
the fall of South Vietnam, and it is likely--although
direct evidence is lacking--that the Chairman seized on
this event to argue that the Soviets, with greater
influence than China in Hanoi, were in a good position
to "surround" and isolate China--and that consequently
his policy of unyielding opposition to Moscow was the only
reasonable course to follow. Subsequent events--Moscow's
renewed interest in an Asian security pact, Mrs. Gandhi's
"legal coup" in India, and large-scale Soviet exercises
in Siberia--could only have reinforced this argument.
In any event, following Mao's return to Peking Chinese
propaganda against Moscow hardened noticeably, relations
with Hanoi deteriorated markedly, Peking grew more rigid
on the issue of the anti-hegemony clause in the proposed
Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship, and for
the first time in two years Peking began to stress the
possibility of a Soviet attack on China to domestic
audiences.
If these signs represent a tactical victory for the
Chairman, there is no indication that the fundamental
issue has been resolved. Chinese propaganda continues
to inveigh against possible backsliding and eventual
compromise with .Soviet "revisionism." Low level Chinese
cadre are being officially told that the "Water Margin"
campaign is designed to immunize the country against this
possibility, and in fact the emphasis on the propaganda
connected with the campaign has shifted from an initial
attack on the evils of "amnesty"--i.e. rehabilitation--
to the terrors of "capitulationism," a shorthand phrase
for compromise with Moscow. While this strongly suggests
that the debate has not been still-ed, the propaganda
presents the possibility of Chinese leaders knuckling
under to Moscow not so much as a clear and present danger,
as was the case during the anti-Confucius campaign, but
rather as a danger in the period after Mao's death.
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It is, however, much easier to identify the outlines
of the debate on the issue of relations with Moscow than
to identify specific individuals who may be arguing for
a less antagonistic policy toward the Soviets. Those
Chinese officials who have commented on opposition to
Mao's rigid approach to this issue have suggested that
this opposition included a number of disparate elements;
the fact that Huang Hua appeared to identify with the
opposition suggests that at least some members of the
foreign ministry may question current policy--not
surprisingly, since diplomats would be likely to see the
disadvantages of unrelenting antagonism to Moscow in
the context of the Sino-US-Soviet triangular relationship.
But the core element arguing for a change in current
policy is almost certainly the military. Traditionally
the PLA, or at least some portions of it, have seen
advantages in a greater degree of cooperation with
Moscow; both Of China's former defense ministers,
Peng Te-huai and Lin Piao, were accused of preparing
to "sell out" to the Soviets. moreover, propaganda
connected with the anti-Confucius campaign, while not
identifying specific individuals, seeted to indicate that
opposition to current policy was centered among the powerful
regional military commanders.
For Mao the military may be an obsession second only
to the Soviet issue itself. He has many reasons to
distrust important elements in the military hierarchy,
particularly the regional commanders. They tended to
play their own power game during, the Cultural Revolution,
and a number of them may have sat on the fence during the
Lin "coup" ,crisis in 1971. The power of these men and
of many Of their subordinates has declined in the past
several years, but--significantly-,-zone has suffered
ultimate political disgrace, despite the major assault
on them mounted during the anti-Confucius campaign. In
fact, several commanders who remained under a political
cloud Wore apparently restored 10 good standing at
a major mset?ig of military leaders in Peking early last
suOmer.
This meeting seems to have been of major importance,
and the decisions that have flowed, from it smack strongly
of compromise. Individual commanders were given a clean
bill of health, but the military establishment as
a whole was satjected to a new assault, initiated by Mao,
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by Defense banister Yeh Chien-ying and by Teng Hsiao-ping.
All charged that the military was flabby, inefficient and
overly concerned with political action at the expense
of military preparedness, the remedies prescribed were
streamlining, specialized military training and modernization
of the military Plant. Taken together, the assault and
the remedy are likely to further diminish the army's
prestige, reduce its active political role and to make it
more responsive to centralized political direction. At
the same time the prospect of specialized training and
modernization are likely to make a powerful appeal to
those elements of the military who have long argued for
greater efficiency and professionalism; this group suffered
a mslative eclipse in influence during the Lin Piao era.
Significantly, the appeal for greater professionalism
was made in the context of the need to prepare for a possible
Soviet attack on China.
This line, which, as noted above is being fed to the
general populace as well, represents a departure from
that which was dominant last year, when Chinese propaganda
appeared to argue that neither compromise with the Soviets
nor a step-up in development of advanced weapons was
necessary since MOSCOW was planning to attack in the
WeSt, not the East. Although the possibility of a Soviet
attack is now conceded, the issue of advanced weapons
procurement is carefully avoided in the document which
sets forth the decisions of last summer's military
conference. Recent propaganda indicates, however, that
while modernization of China's conventional weapons
armory is contemplated, no crash advanced weapons program
is likely to be undertaken. This essentially is the
"Maoist" position established in last year's anti-Confucius
debates.
This half-a-loaf policy coupled with the effort
further to diminish the PLA's prestige undoubtedly does
not recommend itself to at least some elements within
the military. Indeed, the issue of the army's prestige
was raised directly in several articles connected with
the opening phase of the "Water Margin" campaign; these
articles harked back nostalgicly to the palmy days of
Lin Pia? and appeared to defend and praise Lin for the
glory he reflected on the army. Like the apparent
leftist harping on the "amnesty" issue which occurred
at the same time, these articles suggest that China's
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411111
current political "outs"--the left and the military--
attempted tol capture the new campaign, much as they
attempted tO divert the anti-Confucius campaign in the
spring of 1974. An authoritative People's Daily editorial
on September 4, however, appeared to turn back this
challenge, and the campaign has subsequently subsided
into a relatively low-key affair.
In the complex attempt to chastise, split and
partially mollify the military establishment, Teng
Heiao-ping is undoubtedly playing a major role. His
relationship t? the soldiers, like his relationship to
Mao, is ambiguous: he acts as their civilian overseer
and taskmaster, but he is also more acceptable in this
role than many other civilian leaders. Teng undoubtedly
hopes to secure the support of significant military
elements during the succession period, and he has been
inserting men, -close to him in important posts within the
central military hierarchy, some in the Political
Department headed by the army's other civilian overseer--
and Tong's Potential rival?sChang Chun-chiso.
Teng, bOANover, has constituencies other than the
army to consider. He is, for eXample, playing an
important part in the drive to develop and modernize
China's economy--a drive which the low-keyed "bourgeois
rights" campaign initiated early this year seems designed
to support. He is also deeply involved in a recent effort
to mechanize Chtnese agriculture. Both these efforts
are likely to absorb a significant portion of China's
limited budget, leaving less for a resentful military.
Moreover, the conservative cast of these policies is
likely over time to generate counterpressure from the
now-eclipsed left, which still has deep roots in the
political soil. In short, the potential for powerful
strains which could pull apart the collegial leadership
slated to share power after the demise of Mao and Chou
is already present?and most of the major domestic
problems of the past decade still remain largely unsolved.
A period of prolonged division in Peking could very
largely immobilize China both at home and abroad before
the eventual emergence of a younger and presumably more
technically oriented leadership group.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 1975
THE N?TIQNAIJ DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE PRC
1. Peking has the largest conventional armed forces
in the world and a small, but growing nuclear capability.
China's army, navy, and air force have a combined total
of more than four million men. These forces maintain
largely a defensive posture. Peking reportedly intends
to streamline and modernize its armed forces in order
to improve their combat effectiveneSs.
2. The Chinese army currently has approximately
three and a half million men in main, local, and support
forces backed up with 6000 tanks and assault guns and
14,000 pieces of field artillery. Most of the main
forces are organized into 37 armies. Nearly half of the
Chinese ground forces are nowconcentrated in the four
military regions which border the Soviet Union.
-Following a meeting of the party military
commission in,July, Peking distributed a new
central directive which calls for reducing
the armed forces in size and giving increased
emphasis to specialized units.
the only evidence that Peking might be imple-
menting this directive has been an increase in
naval training.
TOP SECREUSENSITIYE
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?
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China-Ground and Air Forces by Military Regions
SHEN -YANG
480,000 men
1,140 aircraft
SINKIANG
130,000 men
75 aircraft
PE-PING
680,000 men
BOO aircraft
OU
300,000 men
-175 aircraft
320,000 men
CH'ENG-Tii
80 aircraft
K N M1G
185,000 men
250 aircraft
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rOP. SECRET/ SENSITIVE
--The-billk 0
by the army,
he cuts clearly would be absorbed
large and inefficient bureau-
cratic staffs are prime candidates.
--The paring of staffs and even the large cuts
troop Strengths should not seriously
hamper. China's military capability.
manpower reductions will_at least
partially be offset by increases in
mechanized
anti-tank, chemical, and other
technical and specialized forces. These
should enhance China's firepower, mobility,
and flexibility.
3. China currently has the third largest air force
in the world/ but it is no longer growing as fast as
it did in the late sixties.
--Most of China's 5,000 aircraft consist of
outdated MIG-15,_17, and 19 jet fighters,
lthOugh the Chinese also possess several
dozen of
the more modern MIG-21s and some
350 of the locally produced F-9 fighter-
bomber. China's bomber force consists of less
600 aircraft, mostly old IL-28s.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
air force is clearly a defense force.
? 4ftile jet fighters are scattered through-
Out the country, Peking has concentrated
almost half of its MIGs at eastern bases.
--None of these aircraft measures up to the
performance and sophistication of modern
EIS or Soviet aircraft. Nonetheless, because
of sheer numbers of fighters, the Chinese
are capable of inflicting heavy losses on
an attacking air force duringclear weather.
They are less effective against high speed
aircraft and have a limited nighttime capability.
4. China's aircraft do not compare favorably with
modern Soviet and Western aircraft, consequently they
do not adequately perform the complex military tasks
necessary in modern warfare. In an effort to overcome
this shortcoming, Peking has embarked on a modest program
of aircraft development coupled with selective import of
foreign aircraft technology.
na has been working for more than five
years on a new fighter which we call the Hsi-an A.
It is a large delta-wing interceptor with twin
and we estimated that it is capable
-3-
RET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
of flying at high altitudes at speeds
greater than Mach 2. The Hsi.-an A, which
was first seen in 1970, has undergone
periodic flight testing. There is no evidence,
however, that it has entered series production
and it could not be operational in significant
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numbers
--The Chinese also have developed a large new
amphibian aircraft for use in antisubmarine
warfare,/
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--Occasional rumors that Peking is interested
in obtaining French or British fighters remain
unsubstantiated. The Chinese have not made
a serious effort to obtain foreign combat
aircraft.
4. The dbinese navy continues to perform essentially
as a coastal defense force, although it is slowly
attaining a modest capability for more extended operations.
The navy consists of 20 major surface ships, more than
150 guided missile boats over 70 attack submarines, and
large numbers of small, lightly-armed patrol craft.
-4-
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ULUILL1/ OG111011111A.
--At the present time the navy lacks a surface-
to-air missile capability. This shortcoming
forces them to limit their naval operations
to areas along their coast where their
naval forces can be protected by land-based
aircraft.
--China produces her own naval ships and weapons
and has made no attempt to obtain them from
foreign sources.
--In addition to the ships that they obtained
from the Soviets during the 1950s, the Chinese
have produced their own version of some Soviet-
designed ships as well as some of their own
unique design. The Chinese now produce
several destroyer escorts, patrol boats, and
submarines. They have produced one nuclear-
powered attack submarine of their own design
which has been under going sea trials
:Strategic considerations
$. As can be seen from this overview of the forces
at Peking's command, the capability of Communist China's
general purpose forces is impressive. But there are
constraints Under which the strategic planners of the ?PRC
are forced to Operate, and these" constraints as well as
changing circumstances haV:eshaped the national defense
posture that we see today. TflPCITINT/UNITIVt
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Taipeiv an
4
Hong Kong
U.K.)
Luzon
Philippines
502601 6-75
Australia
Perth
MLHboureti:
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'PA I% OLIN mirmatam ???????L I Ilk wiroar
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- I WEER *WV V ? all
?
6. Before 1969 the major threat perceived by
Peking was an attack from the sea by the US and/or
the forces of the Republic of China. But after the
Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 (the Damansky Island
incident most notably) Peking was increasingly concerned
with the threat of attack by the USSR. Accordingly, those
in charge of defense planning were forced to rethink
their defensive concepts and to reorient the armed
forces to meet these new conditions.
7. They wasted little time. By mid-1970, five
armies were repositioned northward--three armies rein-
forced the immediate border regions and two armies
became part of the augmented strategic reserve forces
in the Wuhan Military Region. Concurrently, units were
reoriented within the border regions to defend against
a Soviet attack.
--Illustrative of these deployments is the
fact that prior to 1969 there were six
armies in the Peking Military Region--five
? in the north China Plain and one in reserve.
--Sy 1970 the force had been increased to nine
armies. Two army groups of three armies each
were positioned in the mountains north of the
capital with one army group in reserve.
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TOP SECHET/SENSIIIVt
8. Clearly the Soviet threat--in both the short
and the long term--had become the dominant factor in
Chinese strategic planning. BY the time the Chinese
had completed their force re-orientation, almost half
of the ground forces (about 1.6 million men) and the
air force(over 2,000 aircraNwas committed to counter
the Soviet threat.
--In addition to this formidable force, an
additional 425,000 troops and 250 aircraft
is immediately available to reinforce from
the central reserve in Wuhan.
--Further, almost three-fourths of the tanks
and over, half of the ground attack aircraft
in the Chinese inventory are positioned to
detWid those areas threatened by the USSR.
9. Despite this relatively massive repositioning
of forces to the North, other areas of the mainland
have not been neglected. For example, along the eastern
coast the PLA planners continue to position some 875,000
men and 1,700 aircraft.
-7-
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
10. Peking's current military strategy can best
be described as all-around defense but with a preponderance
of power in the Sorth. The forces are propositioned
in each throat area at levels perceived sufficient to
blunt initial assaults.
-- All reserve forces are required to be
propositioned and prepared to act quickly
to bolster areas under attack. Once these
formations are committed, units in other
parts of China probably would be required
to move into vacated staging areas and assume
a role of reconstituted strategic reserves.
At some point the mobilization of civilian
manpower (in militia units) would be required
to replace deployed units.
Limiting raptors
11. A faOtor severely limiting the PRC's capa-
bility to form new units is the Lack of heavy weapons
stockpiles and a restricted capacity to produce these
weapons.
-- Even if we assume that Peking's vulnerable
? weapons production facilities could continue
? to produce at reduced levels after being
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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iur SEUREUSENSRIVL
acked, and that some new facilities
could be activated it would still be
difficult to replace equipment lost or
destroyed in combat.
-Only in the long term would industry possibly
begin to produce enough heavy equipment to
equip
any substantial numbers of new units.
--Until then, fully equipped units would be
available only from those existing at the
commencement of hostilities. This means
? that no one area of operation would be
self-sufficient even for the short term.
attack against any sector eventually
reduces the conventional forces available
for all-around defense and links together
the fortunes of each threat area. Moreover,
any Chinese attempt to launch offensive operations
draws down forces essential for the defense of
China.
12. It is our judgment that as long as Peking's
relations with the USSR are strained, the border situation
remains tense, and large numbers of Soviet forces are
deployed along the border, China is not likely to mount
major military operations elsewhere.
-9-
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Limited military operations are, however, still
a possibility in situation where there is a
high expectation of success with relatively
little risk. The best example of this would
be the operation in_the Paracels which occurred
last year.
-- We do not believe that Peking has the
capability to initiate a successful major
operation against Taiwan or the Pescadores
event though Communist spokesmen have
recently reiterated that force is one option in
solving the Taiwan problem.
An attack against the offshore islands of
Chinmen and Matsu is possible but this carries
,degree Of risk which would probably preclude
a direct assault on the islands. However, a
sea And air blockade is an option that Peking
could probably carry out.
-10-
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TflD UPDET ternernur
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STAE DEPARTMENT REVIEWS
COMPLETED, PP> 54-62
October 1975
TUS OP SINO-SOVI T MATIONS
Sino -Soviet gOlitical Relations
1.
range o
Th? Si:110
Soviet dispute Which covers an entire
remains intense, and there are no signs
of r conCiliatiOn. In fact, the Soviets and Chinese
disagree so thoroughly and the demands are so
extreme that reconciliation" is not the proper concept;
"a reduction of the degree of hostility" would be more
appropriate...to the situation. Senior Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping recently told
that there had not been "an inch of progress" in Sino-
:,
Soviet relations and implied that there would be no
change even after MAO s death.
-,The Chinese have not Withdrawn their demand,
in the bOrder dispute, for a withdrawal of
jet troops from ,M11 areas designated as
by Peking. the Soviet leaders
4
'ha** indicated that they will,not comply
w1th4the demand (except tor"turning over
islands to the Chinese--an offer
chinese rejeo:t as insufficient).
Chinese refuse tO reestablish party-to-
arty relations, which' re broken off in
MORI pp.54-62
PER C
03325372
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?Ark munrtrr inrimnitne
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have asked the Soviets derisively
as to where ("in which drawer") they have
tered the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950.
--the Chinese refuse to
end the public political
POleMict sustaining attacks on,Brezhnev by
2. Strategically, the Chinese:are
less concerned
about the possibility of an iinent Soviet attack than
they were in 1469. Although they have recently briefed
cadres on the probability of China being involved in any
future US-U war, they still take the position that the
main Soviet threat is to the West and that a US-USSR war
is the most likely, form of war.
-.The line that China probably would be involved
? in a new world war is not new: the Chinese
have said, and continue to say privately, that
a Major Soviet attack in the East would involve
Mims (after involving the US and Japan).
-The Chinese are still .avoiding aggressive
Patrolling along the Sino-Soviet border, which
ebained free of fire-fights ever since
the Chinese agreed to.resmte border negotiations
fall of 1969. We calculate that the
will want to 4VOid provoking the
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Soviets by resuming such patrolling or by
withdrawing from the border negotiations.
A continuation of the negotiations stale-
mate seems to be the prospect for the near
fUture.
An increasingly active concern is the Chinese
fear that the Soviets might further "encircle"
(POUng's word) China by attaining bases in
Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia as
the US reduces its presence.
3. The Chinese despite the events of April 1975 in
Indochina, still view the US as the only counterweight
to the USSR globally. They seem willing to acquiesce in
a continued up military presence in the Far East (other
than in the Special case of Taiwan) and have privately
chided foreign diplomats for opposing the building of a
U$ base in the Indian Ocean.
4. TheliAr,0 also worried about the Helsinki Con-
ference
fearing that Europeans will not further
expand, andAindeed may even redu*e, their armed forces.
--Tong itsiao-ping recently stressed
that the US must recognize the significance
of a strong and united Europe because the
fOCUS of Soviet policy was Europe.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
--The Chinese position is: any reduction in the
overall military strength of Western Europe
improves the Soviet capability to deal
militarily with China.
5. The Soviets see no sign of a diminution of
Chinese hostility to Moscow, and their private assess-
ment--namely, that even Mao's immediate successors will
not significantly reduce this hostility--has been surfaced.
--The Soviet party journal, Kommunist, which
declared in August 1975 that it would be
"unrealistic to expect change" in Peking's
policy only as a result of Mao's or Chou'S
death (only as a result of "one or two
crisis phenomena" in China).
6. Our own estimate is that Mao's antii-Soviet
animus exceeds that of other Chinese leaders, and that
his death probably will allow for a reduction of ?the
intensity of Peking's hostility. The result probably
will be a UmAted improvement of relations, however, and
still short of reconciliation.
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sino soviot WAtoxy Ba;a0pe
7. The military situation along the Sino-Soviet
border continueS to be relatively stable, andaside
from small skirM4Shes near the border, we see 1itt14
chance in the short term that either side will resort
to military action to
territorial disputes.
-5 long ,standing
ars to have adequate
As things stand
forces to defend its owfi territory.
now:
--The Chinese still hold the Soviet crew as well
as the helicopter that strayed across the border in
early 1974.
--There have been unconfirmed reports of occasional
clashes between Soviet and Chinese forces, and during
the summer navigation season on the Ussuri River, both
sides frequently comp
ained of provocationt.
MP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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