MINUTES OF WSAG MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-479-1-1-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 4, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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MORANDUM /~,_.....~'
MINUTES OF WSAG MEETING
PARTICIPANTS:
MORI PER
C00578050
Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger
Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas
Moorer
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, Joseph Sisco
Ambassador Robert McCloskey, The Secretary's
Staff
Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Major General Brent Scowcroft
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Sunday, November 4, 1973
11:10 a. m. -- 1:00 p.m.
The Situation Room
The White House
Secretary Kis8 nger: I. apologize for calling you in on a Sunday, but I wanted
to bring you up to date on the state of negotiations with the Egyptians and the
Israelis before I head off on my trip. If the people here don't hold together,
we haven't got a prayer. And I want to get your judgments on these issues.
As you know, our long-range strategy has been to get the Arabs to turn to
us. We've been trying to convince them that we're the ones who can deliver
for them. We promise less than the Soviets, but we can deliver. In a sense,
this situation has been achieved by the evolution of the Arab-Israeli war.
Politically it is more or less proven by the fact that practically all of the
Arabs, of whatever persuasion, have come to us and want to deal with us.
I have told the Egyptian Foreign Minister..that..anything demanded by the
Soviets on his behalf would automatically be rejected by us. The Egyptians
will have to -deal with us directly.
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supervise the ceasefire and act- as contacts-for getting negotiations started.
I got the Egyptians to turn that off. The second suggestion was that white
painted helicopters be sent in to supply the Third Army. I turned this off by
saying to the Soviets that I was doing this already with the Egyptians. We
got the Egyptians to send back 35 of the 70 Soviets who had been sent in as
"observers. " I based that number on the fact that the largest observer
delegation was 35 from Sweden. The Soviets claimed they were working
The Soviets have tried two things during the past week. First, they sug-
gested that a joint U. S. -Soviet team of ambassadors be sent to the area to
against us.
Secretary Schlesjnger: How true.
Secretary Kigsin er: So this is the strategy, one which we hope will-get the
oil embargo 'off. If the Israelis were rational they would recognize that this
is in their interests. But they think they can stay on every square inch of
territory they have taken. They should work with us. If they were a little
more subtle there is a lot we could do and perhaps work out a fallback. They
could even claim we forced them. But they are not willing to do this.
The October 22 line is only part of the problem. But the Arabs have.made
a test case of what we can or cannot deliver. This .is probably a mistake on
their part. There is, by the way, a :very perceptive Heykal article which
has. just been published. Have you seen it?
Secretary Kissinger: It talks about the weaknesses of the President, long-
term U. S. strategy, and makes the point that October 22 is the test case.
But it has a phrase about wrapping this into a general disengagement. In
other words, there is the idea of October 22 and then a long-range move.
With respect to what we proposed to Fahmi, it was basically this: Israel
and Egypt would negotiate about where the line was, and while this was going
on the Israelis would let non-military supplies through-on the, roads under
UN auspices. If pulling 'back to the October 22 lines means opening roads
to the Third Army, only non-military supplies would be sent in under UN
auspices. There would be an exchange of prisoners and the blockade at the
Ambassador McCloskey: [Most of the groups says "no. "] I have seen excerpts.
mouth. of the Red Sea would be lifted.
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Secretary Schlesinger; There is no blockade.
Director ColA Japanese ship got in.
Secretary Kissinger Yes, the Egyptians told me they were going to let one
through. But I believe it was Liberian. The Egyptians have been vague
about when the POWs would be released. The Israelis, of course, want it
when the road is opened. The Egyptians want it only when the Israelis with-
draw to the October 22 ceasef ire line. But the Egyptians have essentially
accepted the proposition, except for their vagueness on the question of when
the POWs would be-released. The Israelis, have rejected it. Each of these
points, ' by the way, represents several hours of effort talking to them.
On Friday. night, it was a tea party. Israel accepted in principle the idea that
the roads would be under UN supervision. Joe Sisco was there. No one said
that it was a contingent agreement on their part. Yet yesterday they with-
drew it totally. Now all they are willing to accept is a POW swap and are
willing to assure that non-military supplies can flow on their roads.
Secretary Schlesinger Is that contingency consistent with their turnaround'
on equipment? They have even blown their relationship with Keating on that
one and that is hard to do.
Secretary Kissinger Undoubtedly it is related. [To Sisco] Do you have the
text of their formulation on October 22? They talked about disengagement
of forces.
Secretary. Sisco: [Reading from notes]: The question of the October 22 line
can be discussed with the question of separation and disengagement of forces.
Secretary Kissinger: I don't think Sadat can accept that. I can say that that
is all they delivered.
Secretary Sisco: You can say there has been a tremendous bloodletting.
Secretary Kissinger: What needs to be done is -substantial disengagement.
Israel can't stay on the West Eank forever, but for us to take on the domestic
problem at this time is suicide. I can say that the pressures for October 22
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a
N-M re not much less than they would be for getting the Israelis off the Nest
ank. They should live with this, and we will try to shift October 22 to
general disengagement. By linking it to the general disengagement scheme,
it gets the Israelis off theest 'nk and into the Sinai. We would work hard
for this in January and :get it? done by April.
What I think we need to do now .is get organized and then we can slug the
Israelis. But it will kill us if we try to do this while we are travelling.
Golda feels that she won the war. And when you put this in the equation,
she goes back to biblical times. [Sisco nods in agreement. ] Can Sadat
afford to say he gave up POWs just to get the Third Army supplied? Can
we get the oil embargo lifted this way?
Director Colb He has to get more than that out of this.
Secretary Schlesinger: We could stop the airlift. [To the Israelis]
Secretary Kissinger:.- Yes. That can be a sweetner. It's still going on I
trust.
Sec retar y Schlesin er: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Excellent. When you like my ideas, it is amazing
what DOD is able to do
.
Admiral, Moorer:. That hurts.
Secretary Kiss-n er: Seriously, it has proven invaluable in carrying out our
strategy. I have tried.to get across to.the Israelis.that they are .screwing
themselves if Sadat goes back to the Soviets. What the Israelis have done
apparently is to decide that October 22 is important because the West Bank
is important and they are going to stay in the Sinai. They could have been
generous and gotten ready for disengagement. If we could have delivered
something substantial to Sadat, it would have meant a significant shift in
Egyptian policy. Now the Soviets will tell Sadat that he has been made a
sucker by the United States.
Director Colb : And d"on't underestimate' the Arab feeling about what a great
guy you are. They will feel they have been suckered by you.
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Admiral Moorer: Sadat even said the U. S. was being constructive about
the situation.
Secretary Kissinger: Shutting off the airlift will be-a big step.
Secretary Sc: esin er: We could just leave our aircraft at Lajes. Then
they would not be taking off from Israel.
Secretary Kissinger: What the Israelis will give is not stable. They are
prepared to have themselves frozen into a ridiculous position. I would
rather have them in that -position unless they are willing to withdraw to
October 22. There just does not seem to be enough blood in the stone. I
will tell Sadat that the airlift has ended as of Tuesday evening, and as a
result the Israelis can't move.
Admiral Moorer: That's fine. That's what we were planning to do, to run
it through the 6th.
Secretary Kissinger: Do the Israelis know that?
Secretary Schlesinger: Hell no.
Secretary Kissinger: Well then let's end it on the night of the 6th. We will
j st tell them to go to hell.. You've got a big problem domestically, we've
got a big problem domestically.
Ambas sador McCloskey: The. Arabs have a lot riding on you.
Secretary Kissinger: Sadat will not take the Israeli package. He can't afford
it. He can't release the POWs just to get the road open. If he refused, then
the Israelis will close the road. We will be in one hell of a position. We
should be prepared to go to. the UN with a package like the one we presented
to the Israelis on Friday night. We would agree to a return to the October 22
line and a beginning of negotiations on that. There would also be a release
of prisoners. Otherwise, the Third Army will be starving.
Secretary. Schlesinger: We can resupply them ourselves. We were prepared
to do that a week ago.
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Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but it was premature then. It was not necessary
then. We could have all come in ahead. If we have a military airlift, then
the Soviets. will have their airlift. There is the concept of a UN helolift.
Secretary Schlesinger. We have the forces to airlift into Egypt, and we
could get the plaudits.
Secretary-K, issinger Yes. But this would be matched by a unilateral Soviet
arms lift.. We had hoped that the flood gates of arms supplies would be
closing.., This would also mean,.anovert shifting of our policy to the Arabs.
Director Colby: We could drop supplies by air.
Secretary Schl.esinger? And the Israelis would get half of them.
Secretary .Kiss inger: But the Soviets would come out ahead. I think we
should keep it non-military with no great powers involved. I am not against
using C-130s with UN inspectors checking the cargoes. In other words, we
ld
wou
do it under UN auspices, under UN supervision.
Director Colby:, If the UN was running it, then it could be Russian.
Secretary Kissinger: It would be ideal to have no great powers. The next
Director Colby: We would have a UN resolution.
Secretary Schlesinger: What are we going to say to the Israelis?
Secretary Kis in er: I have told the Israelis. Youshould just stop all talks
with the Israelis on resupply. Don't do it sharply, just terminate it by
screwing it up. Just don't be available to talk to them.
25X1
Secretary Ri- singer: Yes. But I don't want a public confrontation while I
am travelling. We .should keep loading up the ships. and do any turning off
of that later on. If the Israelis turn it into an October 22nd issue, they will
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say our blood is on your head, we've lost because of you. We will have
unleashed all of this for crap. What we need to do is get the Israelis to the
Mitla Pass by April. We.actually want to avoid October 22nd. The dumb
thing the Israelis have done, from their point of view, is to link October 22
to general disengagement. If Sadat will play our game we could use general
disengagement to get the big scheme accomplished.
Director Colby: If we could get something real for him, Sadat might be
able to put his trust in U. S. support. .
Secretary Kissing er:.,'Sadat has a massive problem, not only domestically,
but with people like the Syrians. They will be asking, was he snookered by
Kissinger?
Director Colby: He could go public and say I have a commitment from the
U.S.
secretary Kissinger: We have to be very careful. We don't want the Israelis
to run amuck before I leave Cairo. If they do, we will have a fierce problem.
Secretary Schlesinger: Until you return he could simply say we have certain
arrangements
have had a chance to work on the Congress. I don't think they have as much
Secretary Kissinger: No, that wouldn't be good. The Israelis will think
we have struck a deal. We will face the Israelis after I get back, and we
strength in the Congress as some believe.
Secretary Kissinger: But it is stupid to fight before we get organized.
Stennis came over after the breakfast with the Israelis the other morning
and told me he would be with us. He didn't even know there had been a
confrontation.
Admiral Moorer: I agree. The House will be opposed to them.
Secretary Schlesinger: _ And I think Symington would side with us too, sur-
prisingly as that sounds.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, what we will have to do is get together and
get organized, get the media lined up, talk to some people in the Jewish
community and then slug the Israelis. But it still makes Sadat's problem
unmanageable.
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Director CQjby: You could use the end of the airlift.
Admiral Moorer: It's not going to hurt the-Israelis.
Director Colby: I assume the averages are not going to be beyond pre-
October 6 levels.
Secretary Kissinger: If it doesn't work, we will have to go to the UN while
I am travelling. I want this group to backstop everything. Given the state
of our government, you must have all the information and we will have to
coordinate everything='closely. Scowcroft will keep you all informed. If
it goes to the UN, do we all agree that something must be done along the
lines of the principle of return to October 22 and exchange of prisoners?
Secretary Schlesinger: They've already done that.
Secretary Sisco: We will spell it out a little more.
Secretary Kissinger: That's correct. We will spell it out in more detail
and add to it. What is new is that pending final determination of the
October 22nd line, the UN takes over the airlift of non-military supplies
into the Third Army area. Do you all agree that this is the right course?
It will be significant.
Director Colby: Do we have to have an airlift? Why not have it down the
Secretary Kissinger : But the Israelis have closed the road.
Secretary Schlesinger: It is possible that they would shoot down a UN air-
craft.
Secretary Kiesin er: In that case we would have to provide UN military
protection for the aircraft. I told the Prime Minister that if Egypt takes
it to the UN, the UN will organize a resupply. The UN-will order UN re-
supply by air or along the roads. We car see if the Israelis try to stop
convoys along the road, and then we could go to a UN airlift. It depends
on our assessment of how long the Third Army can hold out.
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Secretary,Si1 I suspect that they would let a few supplies dribble
through so they could starve it out, but not cut it off altogether.
Admiral Moorer: If the Israelis shoot down a UN plane, they would have grave
problems with their world image. The Africans have already been after them.
Secretary Kissinger: If they do that, they will have to be. sanctioned.
Director Colby: I am not sure they would interfere with a column either.
Secretary Kissinger:; But it brings back memories of the Berlin syndrome.
Admiral Mgorer? There will be all sorts of pressures when we start getting
the horror stories about the Third Army being starved and not.having water
for their wounded.
Secretary Kissinger:- We will have to have very strict discipline on public
affairs. We can't shift prematurely in our strategy. What we give, we should
do as acts of policy. The theme for Sadat will be to accept this and an end-.
to the airlift.
Secretary Sc esinger: What about the sealift?
Secretary Kissinger: . They don't know what that is. If it looks big, then we
can cut it down, but I prefer not to touch that until we get to the Mitla Pass
scenario.
Secretary Sch esin?ger By April there will be lots of supplies in.
Secretary Kissinger I am thinking more in terms of January. But I don't
want to offer it now.
Secretary Schlesinger: We are shipping about twenty thousand tons a month.
In a couple of months that will be quite a lot.
Admiral Moorer: We Will front load it.
Secretary Kis:sineer I want to offer it as a concession, like ending the air-
lift. When we end it we should get something for it. If Sadat accepts our
plan, we're going to have a massive brawl in January. We'll have to use
our allies and get the whole world demanding it. There should be quite a
lot of support once we get going.
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Director Colby: And the airlift will be without the great powers.
Secretary Kissinger: Can we do that? I certainly would prefer it. The
great powers could contribute to the supplies.
Secretary Schlesinger: The Turks might be good.
Secretar Kissinger: I prefer not to have the great powers. It would be a
mugs game.
SecretarySLS'sco We've abused the Turks over the last few years.
Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to let EUR.? do that from now on.
Secretary Sisco: That's fine. with me. But we have done a poor job for the
last few years-
Secretary Kissinger: How did we miss getting you on the NSC staff when
ew
??r.ww......-..~ t
mil
_n
a
o g
Corms fell
Schlesinger: Is the Turkish Ambassador a good man?
Secretaryy_ Sisco: Very good.
".Secretary ,,? Kissinger: Another thing-we have to consider is how we're going
to manage this, particularly how we are going to keep Scali under control.
Secretar Sisco: Scowcroft.
Secretary Kissinger: We have to insure that the problem is not driven by
Scali's concerns. . Joe [to Sisco],. I want you to leave the text here for
Scowcroft. Brent will have to insure that no one goes off it or deviates
from it. Everyone will want to manipulate it.
Should we try the ground lift approach first or go right away to an
airlift?
Secretary Sisco: I don't know what would be best.
Secretary Schlesin er and Admiral Moorer: Ground would seem preferable
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Secretary Kissin er? My only concern is that i.f the convo
ets sto
d
y g
ppe
.
then we'll have a Security Council resolution ordering the UN emergency
force to escort it. The Israeli blockade will be broken on the ground.
That may be harder on them than an airlift.
GeneralScowcroft_ We could end up with a resolution of sanctions against
Israel.
Director Colby. Not unless they shot at the-UN convey.
Secretary Kissinger:? . The Egyptians might want to run in tanks, etc.
Director Colby: Not if the UN supervises.
Secretary Sisca: I am not convinced that the Israelis will prevent it.
Admiral Moorer: The first time the Egyptians tried to ship a convoy through,
the Israelis claimed there were arms in it. In my view the best thing would
be to on on the
ro nd fi
g
rs
Director Colby:- It gives the task of providing to the UN. The Israelis.will inspec
it.
Secretary Sisco? They wouldn't be able to argue that military arms wer=e
beynn fl n
Adm.iral_ Moorer: They could set it up as a humanitarian thing..
Secretary K"ssin er: But the Israelis will screw up the roads.
General_Scowcroft? They will open all the boxes.
Secretary Kissinger: Of the hundred vehicles in the initial convoy, one
week later only 90 have gotten through. Even if Clements were running it, they
wouldn't have done better. [Laughter]
Secretary Schlesinger He will go along .with policy.
Secretary Kissinger: What you're saying is that when the Deputy Secretary
it b
.7 .: - rT Y . I
screws up he I s doin
y
g
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Secretary Schlesinger: Of course, We could also do it with an.LST.
Secretary issi er: I prefer to keep the choice either ground or the air.
It breaks it once and for all.
Secretary Schlesinger: It is cleaner.
Secretary, Kissinger: I am concerned about flat tires etc. Once the Israelis
decide to be ornery, it will be a mess. I believe the airlift would be cleaner.
[To Sisco], Let's have. two draft resolutions: one with airlift, the other with
ground.,.,.`
Director Colb. Sea is a possibility.
Secretary Kissinger: But the name of the game is to keep the Egyptians still
wanting more.
Director Colb : But do we really want them resupplied?
Secretary Kissinger:- Just enough to keep body. and soul together. The air-
lift has enough capacity but it isn't large. We want them to keep needing us.
The Egyptians have the POWs and they will use the prisoner issue.
Secretary Sc esinger: We should also note that the Israelis have a big cost,
staying mobilized. By January, when we push for withdrawal, they will be
Secretary Kissinger: It certainly, seems to me that if we fight the big battle
with Israel on the October 22 line, it really gets us nowhere.
Admiral Moor2r They will never know where the line was, just somewhere
north of the road. Everything was in motion at the time.
Secretary Schole 'n er: On the bigger issue,' each week, each month, the
economic situation will be worse.
Secretary Kissinger: That's one of the reasons why I do not want to move until
.January. If Sadat trusts us., our program is best for him, if he can stand
the heat. When I gave" this program to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, his
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eyes lit up. Who will tell Rush? I guess you should, Brent. You
should also hold regular meetings, at least fifteen minutes a day, and go
over things like public affairs guidance.
Secretary Schlesinger: We will stop the airlift on November 6.
Admiral Moorer: I will write up a message stopping it when I get back from
this meeting.
Secretary Kissinger:, No. We don't want it to get out. You shouldn't do
anything yet. End it-dn the night of the 6th.
Secretary Schlesinger: Why don't we run it through the 7th? Then you
could sell it to Sadat.
Secretary Kis n er: Right. I could say, if you agree I will have it ended
tonight. That's better.
Secretary Schlesinger: We will do so.
Secretary Kis in er: But for now we should act as if we were going to go
on forever. Then we will cut if off on Wednesday.
Secretary Sisco:. With regard to the UN, we should have a ,two-part plan.
We could come in with a second resolution on airlift., It would be a two-
stage
Secretary Ki.spinger: Who introduces the resolution?
Secretary Sisco, The U.S.
Secretary Kissing: We could have the U. S.
Soviets what we are going to do,
introduce it, and tell the
General Scowcr.oft: That would keep it clean.
Secretar Sisco: In this way the first stage.. resolution would give the Israelis
time to react. In the second stage we would hit the airlift angle.
Secretary Kissinger: What if .the Soviets come in with helos?
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14
Director Colby: The UN has already passed a resolution about no great
powers.
Secretary Kissinger: What if the Soviets tag it on to the first resolution?
I guess we can say we don't reject it in principle. We would give the Israelis
twenty-four hours and then implement. Brent [to Scowcroft], this will be your
problem: Scali will be under pressure for variations. He will have to hang
tough, just as he has on the composition of forces issue. Scali will play
the game,. but he will be in the cockpit.
There should be no' indication of displeasure with the Israelis in the next
few days. We should not mention a deadlock or -anything. We should let
them take us on. We should let them worry about what we will do. On
supply talks we should just screw it up by not being available. There should
be no statement that we have stopped supplies. Maybe we will need it in
January. It should be a non-cutoff..
Admiral Moorer: We have laid the ground work for that.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They got the point. You said there were three
criteria, one of them being national policy. You got their attention on that.
You also mentioned time and the fact that inventories were low.
Admiral Moores: We did mention time pressure. We will be able to filibuster
them and not make additional commitments.
Secretary_ Kissing er: We want this to fit into the disengagement scheme.
Secretary Schlesinger: From Sadat's point of view this will be, OK, if he
can take the heat.
Secretary Kisssin er: Sadat's proposal is that Egypt stay in its current enclaves
on the East Bank, and that there be a DMZ some thirty miles east of that.
The UN would be put in the DMZ with the Israelis on the other side.
Secretar Schl s er: Beyond the passes?
Secretary Kissinger: It goes east of the passes, but the Israelis don't have
to accept it. It has the advantage that the Egyptians don't follow when the
Israelis withdraw;the UN does. The Egyptians are not ten kilometers beyond
the Canal, but the UN force is.
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Director Colby It would be something like the 67 two-part formula.
Secretary Kis?in,ger: In the second phase, but we do not need to think
about that now. The old Israeli argument that there could beano Arab forces
across the Canal is a non-argument now. The Israelis know whenever the
Egyptians wanted to move they could move. If they could move against the
Bar Lev line they could certainly move against their present position. We
are at the stage where the Israelis might be better off back at the passes.
The UN would be between them and the Egyptians and the Egyptian zone
would have limits on it.. For one thing there would be no SAM belt. If the
Egyptians decided to.. move into the UN area, it would take several weeks to get
the UN out. In that time the Israelis could get mobilized. From a security
point of view it seems better to me than the direct confrontation that they had
before, with the Egyptians protected by the SA.M belt. That, in any case, is
what we would. head for after January 1. They understand what I am trying to
do in Cairo, and Jidda.
Ambassador McCloskey: You are going to Riyadh?
Secretary Kissinger: Which one is on the coast?
Ambassador McCloskey: Jidda., YcuwiU love Riyadh [said sarcastically]. Do
you realize that Helen Thomas will be the only woman in the party.
Secretary Kissinger: Only McCloskey could have gotten togeffier Helen Thomas,
Marvin Kalb, and Murray. Marder. I am really looking forward to those sour
faces. We will be able to hold Jewish services in the rear of the plane. You
only need ten.
Admiral Moorer: I think in January we will be able to get Congressional
support.
Secretary Kiss n ger: The other day Javits told me he had seen the head lady
and he did not-understand why I was not in favor of release of POWs since I
fought so hard for them in connection with Vietnam. Iexplaiined the situation
to him and he said, we have got to get her out of this country and get a pro-
fessional in here. I think we would be nuts to spill blood on the October 22
issue. There would be no new commitment.
Secretary Schlesinger: We don't want to win the Egyptians and lose the Saudies.
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Secretary Kissing: I had things set with the Egyptians, even for reopening
diplomatic relations. The Saudis then would not have to be in front and this
would be good for them. I will give you a .full report after I have talked to
them. By the way, I was imipressed with Herman Eilts. He thinks the
King will understand. If the Israelis had played ball with us, we would have
upgraded our interests section in Cairo to Ambassadorial level.
Secretar i co And we should do the same here. They need a higher level
representative in Washington.
Secrets Kissin er:,, It was all set, If Sadat can stand the heat, this week
will have been useful?. We started out with tactics for handling the present
situation and came out with a strategy for the period through April. If the
Israelis are. at all pliable now, we could perhaps do something. But I want
no confrontation with the Israelis now.. We should let them start the fight.
By the way, the British are complaining about our fleet. They say if they
have to give us help, they want to know what we want it for. They are
complaining about our request for RAF cover.
Admiral Moorer: All we talked about was Diego Garcia and some tanker
services.
5-ecretary Kissinger: But what have you asked of the RAF?
Admiral Moorer: Nothing.
Secretary Kissinger Heath is treating it as a major diplomatic event'. claim-
ing that he didn't know anything about it. The British want a formal briefing.
Admiral Moarr; We can do that. All we have told them is that we are
moving to the.A.rabian Sea to establish a presence. We may need some flights
for mail and critical spare parts. We can do that just as well from Iran. If
the Soviets send a cruiser and other fleet elements from Vladivostok, we
might want to put two or three P-3s into Diego Garcia to keep an eye on them.
Secretary Schlesinger: Will that cause Congressional troubles? Don't they
think that base is mainly for communications?
Admiral Moorer. When I testified in 1969 as CNO, I told them that we would
want to operate more fully out of there from time to time.
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Secretary Kissinger: The U. S. may stop being a world power but the U. S.
Navy will never. You are the only ones with long-range plans.
Admiral Moorer I will go over this with the British in the morning.
Secretary Schlesinger: Why are the British complaining?
Secretary Kissinger: They are just showing they can be ornery. They say
they meet every request we make. Without full consultation U. S. unilateral-
ism can get them in trouble.
AdmiralMoorer: All we asked for were those minor things.
Secretary Kissinger: Rush will tell them.
Secretary Schlesinger: We could hold up.
Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is worth it.
Admiral Moorer: All we would use it for would be for mail and-maritime
patrols.
Secretary Schlesinger: Why not use ;Iran?
Admiral Moorer; I am not sure we can make it from there.
Secretary Schlesinger: Sure, we could fly aircraft from Thailand to Iran.
Secretary Kissinger: I will tell Rush then that this is not for strategic help.
It is just for technical help and mail. Admiral Moorer will explain it to
them. When we talk to them we can do it in an aloof way, and say we will
do whatever they want us to. We initiated the requests at a lower level.
Secretary Schlesinger. If we are only talking'about a mail plane, why did
Heath want to know?
Admiral Moorer: They have never acted like. this before.
25X1
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Secretary Kissinger: This is the only thing we asked?
Secretary Schlesinger: They are only being ,ornery.
Secretary Kissier: Usually when their Prime Minister instructs them
to protest, it has to do with major events not just something done on
technical levels.
Secretary Sc iesin er: We should say to heck with you.
Secret r K' in er:, ; Lets -let Cromer talk to Rush.
Secretary Kissinger: No.
LNote: The time was 12:30 P.M. and Dr. Kissinger left the meeting briefly
to make a telephone call. ]
Secretary KKi r: Can I extend the invitations to them while I am there?
Will the shi be in 4-1%
i
Secret r Schlsain er: Is it your intention to invite. the Shah to visit the
.Hancock. It seems like. a good idea. And King Faisal as well.
Secretary Kill in er: We sent a message last night on the Hancock.
Ambassador. . That is the one that I 'checked on.
S;ecretarySchle i er: We will have them there.
p
e vicnity.
e n c What about putting. it into the Persian Gulf?
Secretary Kissinger: I will ask the Shah. Who else really.. matters?
Secretary Sc n er? I assume we should be low keyed on the press line.
about th
secretary S?chjes
to ask hire or not.
c e ax K 'n er: My instinct is that the King would say no.
Secretary Schlesin Berl Then don't ask.
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TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE 19
SecretaryK,iss?neer: I can ask whether he wants to go. That is easy.
Admiral Moorer: You can make your dec.ision after you see Faisal. If all
goes well, you can ask him.
Secretar Kissing-: But I will not ask him about the ship going into the
Persian Gulf. I don't want to establish the principle that he can control our
movements. The Shah we can ask. We could ask the Shah before it gets
there. I will ask the Shah while there if it would help our overall strategy
if the carrier steams into the Persian Gulf. We will tell him we would be
delighted to have him go aboard. He will have to fly out. I assume that is
the only way to get him there.
Admiral Moorer: Right. We could send a boat out with him but it would take
two weeks.
Director Co by: You could come into a port.
Admiral Moorer: We could anchor it.
Secretary Kissinger:
visit it.
stopped the previous night. On the airlift we should just say the emergency
is no longer there. Don't say it is being replaced by other things.
Secretar?y, S-si4n er: With the Saudis you will have to make the point that
they are making a mistake. by driving the U. S. to the wall.-
Secretar Kisssin er: I will just say that directly to them. I am not smart
enough to be subtle.
While I am there I will ask the King if he wants to
Note: There was then a slight digression in the conversation to discuss
such delicacies as sheeps' eyes and the head of the Peking Duck which is
reserved for the guest of honor.
Admiral Moorer: If things go well, you may not want to ask the Shah.
Secretary Kissinger: He may be pleased by the airlift T4-
Sec Letary Schlesng.er? What do we say to the British at The Hague. We don't
know what we are. getting out of the alliance?
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 20
Secretary Kissinger: You can give that as a Schlesinger opinion but not the
official position of the United States. They are milking us in the service of a
policy which is no longer cooperative.
Joe, [to Sisco] are you comfortable with where we stand?
Secretary Sisco: There are still two things that bother me. With regard to
the disengagement phase, Sadat is not going to want to disagree per se without
the link of where we go at the end of the line. He can't accept disengagement
as an end in itself.
Secretary Kissinger: The trick will be to keep that fuzzed up.
Secretary Sisco: With regard to the sweetened version, minimal program,
if Sadat comes back with anything it may provide a basis for going back to the
Israelis. 1 don't disagree with October 22 but January is a long time away
from Sadat's point of view. He may need something.
Secretary Kissinger: Then we will be in the UN.
Secretary Sisco: Well that is sensible and a position which is consistent with
Resolutions 338 and 339.
Secretary Icj singer: If Sadat holds out until January, that will be a trap for
the Israelis in.the UN context and that will lead to disengagement.
Director Colby But Sadat needs the appearance of motion.
Secretary Kissinger: If the Israeli package won't fly, my trip may fail.
Then the Israelis will tackle us and force us to support them. That is what
I am trying to prevent.
Secretary Sisco: They want the status quo ante situation. They haven't
learned anything from this recent experience.
Secretary Ki sin er: . I told them they lost the war. She ?said-they won. I
said you won the battle but lost the diplomatic var.
Secretary Schlesinger: Why did she stay over?
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Secretary Ki sin er: What we had talked about on Friday was disapproved
by the Cabinet. They wanted a new package. I told her the Friday package
bearly had a chance and there was no sense going on. There was absolutely
no flexibility last night.. She argued that the blockade was a violation of the
ceasefire but violating the October 22 lines was OK. She said, you say
go back to October 22 but why should we. She claims it is an attack on her
sovereignty.
Secretar Sisco: She was at her worst.
Secretary Kissinger: Right. She had been great the night before, but last
night was like the mid hatter's tea party. It was worse than with the Viet-
namese and we have a much more severe domestic problem here.
Secretar Schlesinger: They have no support from the House. Once the
silent majority gets cold, the Israelis will find they,have little support.
Secretary_K singer: If they were smart they would have played our game
rather than putting themselves in hock to Egypt. It is hard to image the
scenario in which there would be enough of a crisis to move them back from
the October 22 line to the Canal. They are in the syndrome of why distrub
the situation when everyone is happy. It is going to be tougher for us now.
It could blow up my trip. One thing it has done is clarify my thinking. But
that won't necessarily help.
Secretary Schlesinger: They must recognize the strategic defeat which they
have suffered.
Secretary Kis in ex: I told my thinking to the Egyptian Foreign Minister.
He didn't say, you SOB. He understood. Whether Sadat will be willing or
not is another thing. [To Schlesinger] I will send you something back Wed-
nesday night or Thursday, but only you are to see it.
Secretar. Schlesinder: We will work out a fail safe system.
What about the approach to the Germans? I told our visitor we must have
access to things if they are prepositioned. He agrees.
I want to see the Turk. Ambassador and see if we can get this early warning
situation straightened out.
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 22
Secretary Kissin er what is it?
Secretary Schiesin er: DOD screwed it up I am afraid.
Secretary Kissinger: As the academic level of this group has risen, I have
noticed that the choice of words has declined.
Secretary Schlesinger: We have abused the Turks. It is good to get the
problem solved.
Secretary Kissinger:'.- Take it easy on the French. Who all will be there?
Admiral Mo r ? The Italians, 'the Netherlands, and the Germans.
Secretary Schlesinger: All the good guys except for the British..
Admiral Moorer: Some of our ships have been at sea for a long time due
to this exercise before the crisis. Also, we need to save some fuel. I
would like to propose that we put some of them into Greek ports. They
will be available on six to eight hours notice. While you are in China, we
would have them all out to sea again.
SecretaryKissinger: I think that is;a good idea.
Secretary Scka;Iesinser: And we will phase them down as the Soviet fleet levels
go down.
Admiral Moorer: We have to take some long-term conservation steps if
we are going to keep our fleet levels up through January.
Secretary Kissinger: We won't need them that long for the Israelis.
,Admiral Moorer: What I would propose would be to let about one-third of
them anchor.
Secretary Sc yea; : - What about the .Marines?
Secretary KissirggXThere shouldn't be any..redeployment until after my
trip.
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Admiral M orer? But we could let half of them anchor.
Secretary Schlesinger: The whole Department of Defense is down on fuel levels
Admiral Moorer. It will take us a little time to redirect the flow of oil. We
would like to gain some time before we get down to the war reserve position.
Secretary Kissin er. Is it their first cut-off or the more recent actions
which are cuttin 'nt
1
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rou a getting fuel for Vietnam and Cambodia.
g
your situation?
Director Colb : It is not the reductions, it is the embargo that is hurting.
Admiral Moorer? Now Faisal is going to do an audit trail on oil to the refiner-
ies. We are going to have t 111
Director Colby- The reduction the Arabs might have done anyway without
the war in the Middle East.
Secretary Kissinger: Then it is the embargo which hurts?
Secretar Schlesin er: It is the audit trail which will really give us troubles.
Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis have made it easy for us.
Director G lb : I have tried to scare them with the Soviet angle.
Secretary y Kissinger: Keep me informed.
Secretary Schlesin Pr: Do you have any reaction to the Israelis bad manners
with regard to providing us with captured equipment?
Admiral Moo a r- They have the immediate requirement, not us. They are
really cutting off their nose spite their face.
Secretary Kissin er? . I would be cool and not show that they are getting to
us. Don't cut them off completely. We have to have something to come back
f rpm.
Admiral Maorer. If they bring up the point in Cairo that our reconnaissance
photos permitted the Israelis to break through, you might answer that the
timing was after the Isran1;
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Secretar Kissin er: I don't rnind them thinking that we are a tough enemy.
Secretar Sisco: Right. I think our actions impressed them.
[The meeting then broke up. j
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