CABLE TO HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM ELLSWORTH BUNKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-490-8-48-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: October 31, 1972
• Content Type: CABLE

T 0 P S E C R E T. NSITIVE, 3110402 OCT 72 V CAS CtiAwre.L.5 (BUNK
SECT ION 1 OF 12 DOS Review Completed.
FROM! AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON' 0640 IMMEDIATE
ER)
TO! THE WHITE .HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES..`ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
REFS: A) WH ' 2304; B)' WHS 2306
1. I DELIVERED THIS MORNING THE PRESIDENT.'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
THIEU WITH THE CHANGE IN TEXT AS INSTRUCTED IN REF Be THIEU READ
THE LETTER CAREFULLY AND THEN.PROCEEDED TO RECOUNT THE APPREHENSIONS
WLLCASCISE;IH HE. CLAIMED TROUBLED THE VIETNAMESE.YPEOPLE AS
EN HANOI PUBLISHED THE ' TEXT' OF TNE' AGREE THIEU SAID,
~IEA~JHRINESS DEVELOPED HERE. PEOPLE DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW THE.
AGREEMENT HADBEEN DEVELOPED AND AT DR' KISSINGER'S PRESS CON
FERENCE WHEN "SMALL DETAILS" WERE REFERRED TO WITH NO EMPHASIS ON
THE 'MAIN PRINCIPLES '..' THE DMZ, NORTH VIETNAMESE.. TROOPS REMAINING
IN THE SOUTH,".AND "COALITION GOVERNMENT." AS HANOI HAD CALLED THE
NCRC -- PEOPLE'S APPREHENSIONS WERE INCREASED. THERE WAS A
FEELING THAT WE HAD GONE -TOO FAR, TOO FAST; THAT- IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
MORE LOGICAL TO HAVE WORKED OUT ADRAFT AGREEMENT OF PRINCIPLES '
WHICH COULD .HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. HERE AND THEN TAKEN UP AGAIN WITH.
,THE OTHER SIDE THE IMPRESSION_GAINED,HERE FROM THE HANOI BROAD-
CAST THAT,DEADLINES ? HAD BEEN SET AND- THEN POSTPONED HAD ALSO CAUSED
MUCH CONFUSION.. IT WAS .NOT. UNDERSTOOD WHY:.HANOI HAD BEEN GIVEN'
A PRETEXT TO CRITICIZE-US.
3. I INTERVENED-TO SAY THAT WHAT THIEU WAS SAYING IN EFFECT WAS
THAT -HANOI'S WORD WAS BEING TAKEN"AT FACE VALUE AND NOTOURS.' DR.
KISSINGER HAD MADE-CLEAR MANY TIMES THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS. AD
REFERENDUM.`,'IF EVIDENCE WERE NEEDED IT WAS THE FACT THAT THE
.AGREEMENT HAD ' NOT BEEN. SIGNED AT, HANOI.' S BEHEST, AND THAT. WE WERE"_`
COMMITTED TO'DOING.OUR UTMOST TO-SECURE THE CHANGES THE GVN
,WANTED. AFTER ALL THESE YEARS AND ALL THAT.. WE HAD DONE IF THERE WAS
NOT TRUST BETWEEN US9 THEN THE SITUATION WAS-TRULY HOPELESS.. INSTEAD
OF INFORMING.'THE PEOPLE OF THE TERMS OF :THE' AGREEMENT AND EXPLAIN
I M2 ITS PROVISIONS., HOW .THESE WOULD ' WORK . AND WHAT THEY WOULD
ACCOMPLISH? THE GVN HAD JOINED IN CRITICISM QF IT? AND OF US.
4. THIEU THEN TURNED TO-THE QUESTION OF THE: NCRC WHICH HE SAID
WAS A MATTER OF CONCERN HERE AND WE NEEDED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT IT;
HANOI KEEPS REFERRING TO IT AS A GOVERNMENT. WITH A COALITION`:
GOVERNMENT, PEOPLE HERE THINK THE GVN WILL SURVIVE ONLY SIX
MONTHS, PROVIDED THE AGREEMENT IS OBSERVED; IF IT IS NOT 'OBSERVED,
SOUTH VIETNAM WILL-BE PUT IN THE WRONG.
5. I'REPLIED THAT THIS WAS JUST A CASE IN POINT. ANY OBJECTIVE
EXAMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT WILL INDICATE THAT THE NCRC IS NOT
,IN ANY_SENSE A GOVERNMENT, THAT IT HAS NO GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS.
ON THE- OTHER HAND, THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF THE SVN GOVERNMENT.
IS MAINTAINED.," THE PRESIDENCY, THE LEGISLATURE, THE JUDICIARY,,
PROVINCE,. DISTRICT AND HAMLET CHIEFS, THE WHOLE APPARATUS OF
GOVERNMENT.' THE GVN CONTROLS 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION.,
THE NATIONALISTS OUTNUMBER THE. NLF TEN TO ONE. HOW CAN THE
GOVERNMENT BE. WOED OUT BY, ELECTIONS?
6. THIEU THEN SAID. THAT ANOTHER MAJOR CONCERN. IS THE. .FACT THAT.
THE .NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN SOUTH-VIET-'NAM.
PEOPLE a ASK . WHY NORTH,. VIET -NAM SHOULD HAVE THIS RIGHT `WHEN THEY
WITHDRAW. FROM CAMBODIA AND LAOS. IN THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS, THE
NORTH HAS SENT, A MILLION MEN SOUTH AND HAS NOT, YET BEEN ABLE TO
WIN!. THE WAR.'-WHY THEN SHOULD THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TOSTA ON-FILENSCRELEASE
. . . INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SOUTH?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-490-8-48-7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-490-8-48-7 cA\~
 P c No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-490-8-48-7 3 (BUNKER)
FINAL SECTION OF , ? ,
FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0640 I EDIATE
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
7. I REPLIED.THAT, AS HE KNEW, THIS WAS A MATTER WHICH DR.
KISSINGER WOULD TAKE UP WITH THE OTHER SIDE. WHETHER OR NOT
THIS COULD BE. RESOLVED TO HIS ENTIRE SATISFACTION WAS DIFFICULT TO
SAY. IT WAS'VERY' HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT WITH A FORCE OF
1,100,000 IN BEING, A RATIO IN FAVOR OF THE GVN OF ABOUT 7.5;1,
PLUS 120,000' POLICE,' AND A MILLION COMBAT PSOF THAT' THE GVN "
COULD NOT HANDLE 143-000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WHICH INCLUDED
REAR SERVICE,.ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT AS WELL AS COMBAT TROOPS.
THIEU ADMITTED` THAT THEY COULD HANDLE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS
BUT FEARED THEY MIGHT ATTEMPT ANOTHER OFFENSIVE. I POINTED OUT
THAT THIS WOULD BE A CLEAR'VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND IN THAT
CASE WE.WOULD REACT STRONGLY-AS HE HAD BEEN. ASSURED BY BOTH THE
PRESIDENT AND DR. KISSINGER.
9. THIEU THEN ENUMERATED HIS OTHER CONCERNS - A THREE 'SEGMENT
NCRC, LACK OF MENTION OF THE FOUR STATES OF INDOCHINA, ACCEPTANCE
OF A GENERAL `ELECTION. "PEOPLE WILL SAY THAT HANOI HAS GOTTEN
EVERYTHING THEY HAVE ASKED FOR -- A COALITION, ELIMINATION OF THIEU,
THAT VIET-.NAM IS ONE, AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS REMAIN IN THE'
SOUTH."
9. I SAID THAT', AS HE KNEW, THE MENTION OF THREE STATES. OF INDO-
CHINA WAS AN OVERSIGHT WHICH WOULD BE CORRECTED;.THAT THE NCRC
HAD TO ACT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY - AND, .THEREFORE, THE GVN
HAD A VETO ON ANY OF ITS ACTIONS. THE NATURE OF THE ELECTIONS WHICH.
ARE TO BE HELD WOULD BE DECIDED BY DISCUSSIONS.BETWEEN THE TWO
SIDES, BUT WE AND THE GVN HAD ALWAYS. PROPOSED ELECTIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, 'IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE SOUTH VIET-
NAMESE PEOPLE WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE ALL THESE-FACTS PRESENTED TO
THEM AND GIVEN AN ACCURATE PICTURE, OF WHAT, THE AGREEMENT INVOLVES
AND WHAT IT-REALLY'DOES.' WE ARE QUITE.CLEAR IN OUR MINDS.THAT THE
GVN HAS WON OUT.. HANOI,HAS GIVEN UP DEMANDS WHICH' THEY HAVE
HELD TO STUBBORNLY FOR FOUR YEARS, DEMANDS FOR HIS ELIMINATION
AND A COALITION:~GOVERNMENT. AND THIS ;IS WHAT,THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT.TO KNOW.
10. I THEN SAID J WANTED TO SPEAK AS FRIEND AND ADMIRER, AS ONE
WHO HAD SUPPORTED HIM ALL THROUGH THE FIVE AND ONE-HALF YEARS.
i HAVE SERVED AS AMBASSADOR, THAT I, TOO, WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED
THAT THE OMINOUS DRIFTING APART OF THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERN-
MENTS MAY BE IRRECONCILABLE. AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAS POINTED
OUT, SUCH A SITUATION COULD LEAD ONLY TO DISASTER AND TO COMPLETE
FAILURE IN OUR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS WE HAVE STRIVEN SO LONG
AND SO PAINFULLY TO ACHIEVE. THE ONLY WISE COURSE FOR BOTH OF US
TO FOLLOW NOW IS TO AWAIT THE RESULTS OF DR. KISSINGER'S DISCUS-
-SIONS WITH THE OTHER.SIDE BEFORE ENGAGING IN FURTHER ACTIVITIES
WHICH CAN ONLY SERVE TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION IN VIET-NAM, IN THE
UNITED STATES, AND, ABROAD THAT WE ARE EMBARKED ON A CONFRONTATION
COURSE.' AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAS SO CLEARLY STATED, THIS CAN ONLY
BE DISASTROUS FOR BOTH OF US.
11. OUR CONVERSATION WAS CARRIED OUT CALMLY AND WITH NONE OF THE
TENSENESS WHICH~HAD CHARACTERIZED PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS. THIS WAS
NO DOUBT DUE IN LARGE PART TO THE SOBERING EFFECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER WHICH, AS.I MENTIONED EARLIER, I THINK WAS EXACTLY WHAT WAS
NEEDED AT THIS MOMENT. I LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THIEU HAD
ABSORBED THE'POINT :THAT THIS DRIFT APART MUST BE HALTED. WE SHOULD
HAVE A BETTER;~READINGBEFORE LONG WHETHER THIS IS SO, FOR NHA HAS CALLED
TO SAY THAT THTF_I1. WILL HAVE REPLY FOR THE PRESIDENT.
19. . W No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-490-8-48-7