SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-502-4-18-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 26, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

N_ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-502-4-18-0
ARMY review completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Ti PRESIDENT HAS SZEN._.
April 26, 1972
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Situation in South Vietnam
Attached at Tab A is an assessment from Ambassador Bunker on the
situation in South Vietnam which will be of interest to you in preparing
for this evening's statement. Among the more positive statements in
Ambassador Bunker's assessment, the following are significant:
-- The enemy is totally committed to the defeat of South Vietnam's
military forces and to the destruction of its government.
-- The resistance put up by GVN in most areas is heartening.
-- The senior Vietnamese leadership has faced the continued
enemy pressure with skill and determination, preventing the enemy from
achieving its major objectives.
-- After nearly a month of intense warfare, the confidence of the
GVN and of the population in eventual success is unimpaired.
-- The enemy's ~pR ea a= - n Tonal uprising has resulted in no
increase in Vit on _actiyity in and around population uni s. en -he-
offensive began, many people feared a repetition of th'e Fe-bruary 1968
TET in which enemy units appeared suddenly in populated areas. This
failed to materialize owing to the apparent weakness of the Viet Cong
movement while concurrently the steadiness of the GVN and the effective-
ness of its armed forces became obvious to the people.
-- The bombing of the North has been widely applauded here both
as a means of inflicting danger on the enemy and as a demonstration of
U. S. and GVN determination to pursue the war aggressively.
-- The weakness of the Viet Cong effort until now and the absence
of terrorist activity in Saigon and other cities has convinced the population
that the local threat is minimal and they are confident that with U. S. air
support the North Vietnamese invasion will ultimately be defeated.
- Economic conditions in areas not directly affected by the war remain
stable.
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VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 26 April 1978
TITS 'RE"Iii :1'i' 11.A$ SEEN..
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
1. During his visit, Al Haig suggested that General Abrams and I
continue to send you our personal assessment of the situation here about
once a week. General Abrams, of course, will be sending his personal
assessment to the President as requested reftel. I believe the following
may be timely.
2. Summary. In the period since my last assessment we have seen
no reason to change our estimate of the enemy's objectives in this
offensive nor of the lengths to which he is prepared to go in order to achieve
them. NVA forces have fought bravely and tenaciously in every area, but
the resistance put up by the GVN in most areas has been heartening. The
GVN is continuing to react positively and energetically to the problems it
confronts, but now that the first shock of the invasion is passed, the tradi-
tional carping of opposition leaders at the Thieu Government is beginning
to appear.
3. It has become increasingly clear that the enemy is totally committed
to the defeat of South Vietnam's military forces and to the destruction of
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
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of its government. He has already employed all but his remaining reserve
division - the 325th - and it has moved south to a position from which it
could join the battle in MR 1 in less than a week. He has repeatedly
committed his units in coordinated attacks of battalion size and larger in
MR RIs 1, 2, and 3, supporting them with tanks and heavy artillery. In
spite of sizeable losses in men and equipment, he appears ready to pay
any price for a conventional victory on the ground.
4. The senior Vietnamese leadership has faced this continued pressure
with skill and determination, preventing the enemy from achieving his
major objectives. US and VNAF air power have been decisive elements
in the battles to date, ably supporting the ground forces which have stubbornly
fought it out with the best the enemy can offer. There have been isolated
cases where leadership was weak, but the ARVN forces have generally
distinguished themselves.
5. In MR 1 the enemy has been unable to open Route 547 to reach
Hue or to take vital areas in Quang Tri Province. General Lam remains
confident and offense-minded, pushing the enemy to the west - farther
from the positions needed to mount an attack on Hue.
6. In MR 2, the expected all-out offensive appears to have begun. Key
positions on Rocket Ridge have been evacuated and the intensity of assaults
by fire is increasing each day. General Dzu is realigning his defensive
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posture to defend Kontum and Pleiku. Command arrangements have not
been effective in the coastal provinces and small unit leadership has
been poor.
7. The fighting in MR 3 has centered around An Loc with the
enemy's 5th, 7th, and 9th divisions committed in the area. The
ARVN forces in An Loc have done an outstanding job, morale is high,
and they are determined to hold the city. The battle has been costly
for the enemy, but he continues to launch daily attacks - though diminishing
in intensity since the 16th of April. The leadership in MR 3 is steady
and dependable.
8. The situation in MR 4 is difficult to assess because thus far there
have been only widespread, low level attacks against outposts, national
police, small ARVN units, and communication routes. The main force
units appear to be planning to make major attacks against Chuong Thien
from which they can exert pressure on the five bordering provinces; however,
no clear pattern of enemy intentions has been discerned. General Truong
is the most capable of all the regional commanders and continues to employ
his limited forces skillfully throughout his large area of operations.
9. I am concerned by the degree to which the GVN has lost control
of areas in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai as well as the deterioration in An
Xuyen and Chuong Thien. On the other hand, the overall picture in the
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delta and MR 3 is most satisfactory, and except for localized setbacks,
the pacification program has held up well. Intelligence reports indicate
an upsurge of political and propaganda activity in many areas, but this
will not be meaningful if the enemy fails to achieve military success.
10. After nearly a month of intense warfare the confidence of the GVN
and of the population in eventual success is unimpaired. This confidence
appears to me to stem partially from the fact that the enemy's appeal
for a national uprising has resulted in no repeat no increase in VC activity
in and around population centers. I believe that when the offensive began
many people in the cities and in the countryside feared a repetition of
TET 1968 in which enemy units appeared suddenly in the populated areas.
This failed to materialize owing to the apparent weakness of the VC
movement while concurrently the steadiness of the GVN and the effectiveness
of its armed forces became obvious to the people.
11. The bombing of the North has been widely applauded here both
as a means of inflicting damage on NVA installations and as a demonstration
of US and GVN determination to pursue the war aggressively. Thoughtful
observers are mindful of the relationship between these operations and
domestic support for the administration and are watching the increase of
peace demonstrations in the US with some concern. The weakness of the VC
effort until now and the absence of terrorist activity in Saigon and other
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cities has convinced the population that the local threat is minimal and
they are confident that with US air support the NVA invasion will
ultimately be defeated.
12. Thieu's speech on Hung Vuong Day was fine, but I believe he
must do more to rally the population. I have suggested to him that he
regularly make fireside chats and give the people of Vietnam his views
on the situation as it develops. This is unfortunately not his style, however,
and I doubt that he will do it.
13. Since my last assessment I am encouraged by the degree to
which the situation in Northern MR 1 has stabilized. Enemy marauding
in Quang Ngai is of concern, however, as is the current impact of the
offensive in MR 2 both in the highlands and on the coast.
14. The information output of the GVN continues to be satisfactory.
As in any country at war, rumors abound and`the population is following
developments closely, particularly through the national radio. The
improving situation in An Lac has cont ributed to popular confidence although
I am sure that reports and photographs showing the destruction there will
come as a shock. It is too early to tell what effect bad news from Kontum
will have, but I am inclined to believe that reverses there will seem very
remote to people in MR 3 and the delta.
15. Economic conditions in areas not directly affected by the war remain
stable. Prices in Saigon have fallen a notable four percent in the last two
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weeks and the black market currency rates are down significantly.
Hoarding is minimal, supply routes are open, and food deliveries have
been maintained. Business activity generally has fallen off, however,
and there are localized supply problems in towns and areas directly
affected by military activity.
16. Warm regards.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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