VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 26, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

AlY.+A hT 71t ~~.ISiH~^ 1 3 ~41~
THE WHITE HOUSE /4'~ -for
WAS IINGTON 1 \y N
- P CECr. T-.m lrr.+t.rrrm rtrr-./EYES ONLY -0~
May 26, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger I-W
SUBJECT: Vietnam t 1t-'
State Dept, OSD,
NSA, ARMY, and
USAF reviews
completed
Attached is a report from General Haig based on recent conversations
in Saigon. The following points are of particular significance:
General Abrams believes that the major threat in South
Vietnam in the foreseeable future is concentrated in
I Corps. Some modifications from present withdrawal
priorities may be required.
General Haig cautions that even with.the benefits of the
Cambodian operation, the present deadline for with-
drawal of 150, 000 should be extended from May 1 to
July 1, 1971. However, withdrawal of 50., 000 by
October 15, 1970 is satisfactory.
General Haig also warns that existing plans for reduction
of tactical air and B-52 sorties after July 1 are dangerous
in light of military requirements. He recommends continu-
ance of current levels through September 30, 1970, and
believes General Abrams also shares this view.
Ambassadors Bunker and Berger and General Abrams
agree that President Thieu's post June 30 plans are
completely compatible with US guidelines, with the
exception of Thieu's plan to keep the water route to
Phnom Penh open, and possibly a road route as well,
In light of overall objectives, Thieu's plan is considered
to be desirable.
-- Two recent strikes against COSVN apparently were
successful and may have hit COSVN solidly.
General Haig has also suggested a number of topics for the Sunday
meeting, and these will be incorporated into your Talking Points.
TOP SECriET Ic+r..TT IT 7ST T'1/EYES ONLY '
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
MORI/CDF,
C03322882
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
EYES ONLY .
T'-UP SEtRE'T/SENSITIVE 261025Z May 70 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FROM: GENERAL HAIG, SAIGON 661
TO:. THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY DR. KISSINGER
Following meeting with Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu this a. m.,
met with General Abrams, Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador Berger
at 2:30 p.m. local this afternoon. Gen. Abrams showed mmne message on
May 31 meeting. I believe meeting will be most constructive if it is used
to clearly enunciate President's views on several key questions facing us.
I will list these later in this message.
Meeting was designed to discuss mutual problems and to coordinate subjects
to be discussed by Abrams and Bunker preliminary to 6;00 p.m. meeting by
both with Thieu this p. m.
As mentioned. in earlier message, Ambassador had requested this meeting.
with Thieu to convey guidance, received in from Washington on GVN operations
in Cambodia after June 30. We reviewed results of our meeting with Thieu
this a. m. and all agreed Thieu's own plans were completely compatible with
U. S. guidelines except for continuing plan to keep water route and perhaps
road route to Phnom Penh thru Parrot's Beak open. All assumed this post-
-June -30 objective-compatible with guidelines. I believe this is desirable and
General Abrams stated U. S. and GVN are training'900 - 1, 000 additional
.Kbjners to assist Cambodians to keep road open.
.General Abrams also confirmed he had just received authority for air operation
in Eastern Cambodia with appropriate safeguards. He was obviously pleased.
General Abrams reviewed situation on ground in SVN and noted that major _
threat in foreseeable future was concentrated in I Corps where some 14 enemy
regiments could be employed. He now believes some modification in his
withdrawal priorities may be required and intends to discuss this problem with
Thieu so he will be armed with Thi:eu's thinking prior to Sunday's meeting.
Abrams' current planning is based on his latest instructions from White House
on that subject. Guidance provides for:
1. Redeployment of 150, 000 by May 1, 1971.
2. Reduction of levels from 434, 000 to 384, 000 by Oct. 15, 1970.
3. In meeting 1 and 2 above Abrams now plans to withdraw 2 Army
brigades from II Corps and one Marine RLT from I Corps by 15 Oct. with
their standdown from operations about 1 Sept. By Jan. 1, 1971, one additional
RLT from Marines in I Corps and by May 1 additional 90, 000 including 4th
Division Americal and lst Cav. Airmobile plus remainder of Marines in.
I Corps.
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY
Emphasize above thinking is tentative but in my view is too fast even after
benefits of Cambodian operations are fully felt. I believe we can live with
50, 000 drawdown by Oct. 15 but still consider balance of 100, 000 should be
stretched out until July 1. I?recognize desirability of early impact with-
drawal in wake of Cambodian operation and agree it is both politically and
militarily desirable not only to confirm wisdom of decision but also to rein
in any residual GVN ambitions for greater commitment on their part in
Cambodia. This will tend to focus their attention on need to progress in
South Vietnam.
General Abrams also reports his planning reduction for air operations will
be:
1. Reduction from 20, 000 tac air sorties to 13, 000 by July 1.
2. Reduction from 1, 4000 B-52 sorties to 1, 000 over same period. .
Both of these cutbacks strike me as foolish and dangerous in view of increased.
need to interdict trail conduct'operations in Cambodia and postured to react
to real danger of major enemy attack in I Corps or against Phnom Penh. I
can see no political gain in this action, only fiscal savings. As I mentioned
earlier, President should direct maintenance of current tac air and B.-52
levels thru1st quarter of FY71. I am sure General Abrams shares this view.
General Abrams also inforxn.ed me that his system tried twice now on targetting
B-52's against COSVN have apparently been successful. After these two
strikes, knowledge of which was given to only 5 officers, COSVN went off
air for 13 hours. Since that time, they have displaced erratically with a
totally inconsistent pattern. Abrams believed he probably hit COSVN
solidly or as a minimum has deprived them of early warning, reported
by prisoner taken this month.
Recommend you prepare positions on following topics prior to Sunday meeting.
1. US/GVN reaction to major NVA attack on Cambodia with or without
request for help and with fall of Phnom Penh imminent.
2. Diplomatic initiatives needed to obtain support of Asian states
for Lon Nol government.
3. Character of U. S. presence in Phnom Penh. (I will discuss this
problem with you personally, but believe drastic changes are needed as soon
as possible to include Ambassador of special qualifications -- senior military
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
No Objection to
Declassification in Part 2011/12/20 : LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/ EYES ONLY 3
advisor with small and highly qualified staff -- expanded communications,
and balanced CAS role. )
4. Character of direct U. S. military assistance to include immediate
survey to determine needs within established guidelines scope will involve:
up to 30, 000 small arms automatic weapons and individual equipment,
communications, transportation.
6. Possible GVN operations in tri-border area after June 30 designed
to inhibit enemy use of trail and alternative, routes which may be c el aped.
7. Level of sorties for U. S. air in conjunction with above.
8. Withdrawal schedules for U. S. forces and deployment and sta-
tioning planes in light of Cambodian situation and threat in I Corps.
9.. -Objectives for size and character of Cambodian armed forces.
10. Availability of U. S. equipment as between SVN and' Cambodia
resulting from U. S. troop withdrawals.
11. Possible negotiating initiatives in Paris or in. other forums.
12. Economic situation in SVN. Augmentation of Embassy staff.
13. Long term status of Cambodia among Asian states.
tC'OP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-503-2-10-9