CABLE TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM ALEXANDER HAIG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-503-4-5-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: CABLE

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/11/22: LOC-HAK-503-4-5-3 61" J- 3-0
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TO: DR. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE
FROM: GENERA L. HAIG
ARMY review(s)
completed.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
I met with General Abrams for three and a half hours this afternoon
and covered topics we programmed prior to my departure. We also covered
in depth the plan MACV team is briefing to JCS and SecDef this week. As
you know force level target of 60, 000 as of 1 September 1972 contained in
plan was dictated by SecDef, The plan was prepared by a select group of
MACV staff on a most close hold basis. It has not had the benefit of the
kind of scrubbing and refinement that more' detailed staffing would have
permitted. For this reason it should not be accepted as sufficiently tested
to allow rigid application. For example, careful questioning of General
Abrams and his J-3 confirmed that both would feel far more comfortable
with target figure of 90, 000 to 60, 000 by September 1, 1972. For this
reason I believe it is essential that you not allow President to become
wedded to 60, 000 figure. On the other hand, my discussions with General
Abrams have convinced me that we have gone far enough now to make
reductions to less than 100, 000 by September 1972 an acceptable risk. I
am also convinced that if ce- tain minimum requirements are met this plan
is workable and will not result in any serious unravelling here through
period of our Presidential elections and well beyond. I will need more
time here to consider throughly all minimum requirements which will have
to be met; however, two are quite evident:
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PAGE TWO
1) TacAir sortie levels must be kept at 10,000 per mos for FY 72 and
8000 per mos for FY 73, B52 sortie levels must be kept at 1000 per mos
thru FY 73. These levels will reduce risks acceptably only if sortie
levels for Laos remain at rates consistent-with those required by
Ambassador Godley prior to LAMSON 719.
2) 1 he US must be prepared to compensate with additional financial
assistance for the drastic impact that US base closures and reduced US
activity will have on SVN economy. Ambassador Bunker has described
this as trading millions for billions.
General Abrams believes his plan will work and correctly makes the point
that regardless of our rate of withdrawal, once our forces reach a certain
level sometime after January 1, 1972, there is little point in quibbling
about. whether our level is 150, 000 or 60, 000. US ground forces will no
longer have an impact on the conduct of the ground war. Therefore, from
that point on, our force levels should be dictated by what is needed to
continue to advise, to fill those areas of modernization shortfall needed
by GVN forces such as intelligence, communications, some air cavalry
capability and to accomplish the orderly out-loading of the tons of
equipment and supplies which must be processed. Some local security is
also called for but the large, measure of security for US personnel will
have to be provided by GVN forces because of dispersed geographic
locations involved.
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PAGE THREE
The drastic nature of this plan will ,require the most sensitive handling
with Thieu and the South Vietnamese. Its premature surfacing here
could have a disasterous effect on Thieu's election chances and whole
stability of GVN -- also, I believe its early surfacing at home could deprive
president of major campaign coup. It should therefore be handled with
utmost secrecy in Washington. The chances of leakage are high given
past experience. Therefore I would urge you to caution Secretary Laird
and the President of the absolute necessity of preventing its leaking until
GVN can be appropriately brought aboard and until a game plan is devised
to achieve maximum impact for President. Unfortunately handling will be
complicated by need to give General Abrams approval to proceed with it
not later than May 1. He must have this time to permit ports to handle
out-loading in an orderly and responsible fashion. Reduced US strength
will not permit any slippage beyond this date.
This plan and its drastic nature may lend itself to inclusion as key agenda
item during July meeting of President' s.Ch,I now believe should be held
for a host of reasons.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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Army forces in this plan will total between 50 and 60, 000 by September 1,
1972, I believe Army should be asked now to study if a figure of this kind
could be sustained on a volunteer basis. Chances appear good from here
but General Abrams has declined to commit himself on this item.
I will have comments for you on situation in Laos and Cambodia tomorrow.
In the interim I urge you to discuss Abrams plan with President, highlighting
need for absolute security and need to stay flexible on 60, 000 figure which
is best thought of as a range of 90, 000 to 60, 000. Best regards.
GP-l
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