SITUATION IN PERU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-510-1-7-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 17, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/05: LOC-HAK-510-1-7-6
THE WHITE HOUSE IP
State Dept. review
completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Situation in Peru
February 17, .1969
Another event which has helped to crystallize opposition against
Velasco is the reportedly disappointing outcome of the recent Soviet
Trade Mission to Lima which departed Peru without providing any
real assurances of Soviet trade or aid support.
Montagne has remained extremely cautious, however. Moreover,
at their last confrontation in January, Montagne lacked either the
will or the muscle .to oust Velasco. At that time, the armored unit
.of the Army garrison in Lima
stuck with Velasco.
Peruvian Government the inevitable consequences of the mandatory
application of the Hickenlooper Amendment and the Sugar Act of
1948 unless some. form of meaningful dialogue can begin promptly
between our two governments.
consider over measures designed to impress upon a asco and the
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/05: LOC-HAK-510-1-7-6
WASHINGTON
25X1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/05: LOC-HAK-510-1-7-6
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -27
Perhaps our best hope for impressing Velasco and the Peruvian
Government rests with the dispatch of a special emissary thereby
affording Velasco a face-saving formula for the beginning of a
dialogue. This course of action also involves high risks, including
a misreading of our motives as weakness by Velasco or other Latin
American republics or a distortion of the visit by Velasco to support
complaints that he is being bullied by the U. S. Either turn could
impinge unfavorably on the prospects of a coup. Thus, the dispatch
of a special emissary should only be undertaken after Ambassador
Jones has had an opportunity to lay the necessary foundation.
I will discuss these risks and the timing of such a mission with
Secretary Rogers today with the view towards. having firm recom-
mendations for your approval by Wednesday.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/05: LOC-HAK-510-1-7-6