POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO ENEMY ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-510-1-8-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 4, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/05 : LOC-HAK-510-1-8-5
March 4, 1969
DOS, NSC, JCS
reviews completed.
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT* Possible Responses to Enemy Activity
in South Vietnam
Attached is a memorandum from Mel Laird
summarizing his views on the nature of the North
Vietnamese off*xsiv?e and his appraisal on counter-
action, which might be undertaken.
Mel is anxious that you have this
memorandum prior to his departure for Europe.
OSD review complete. RIF w/secondary referral to
NSC
MORI C03356477
pages 1-5 and
C05082815 pages 2-5
Army review completed
pages 2-5
TOP SECRET
V
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/12/05: LOC-HAK-510-1-8-5
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20301
4 MAR 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Possible Responses to Enemy Activity in South Vietnam
The General Situation
Our military commanders believe that the enemy has the capability,
and is likely, to sustain for some time acampaign of attacks by fire
and by ground assaults against allied military installations and
selected civilian targets. The enemy has,not yet committed many main
force units to ground actions. It is possible, therefore, that intense
fighting could develop during the next few weeks, particularly in
I Corps near the DMZ and Danang, and in III Corps around Saigon.
Our commanders are confident that they can deal effectively with
the military aspect of this campaign. At the same time, all concerned
recognize that the enemy's principal aim in this campaign is almost
certainly psychological -- to raise the level of US casualties, to
increase the level of dissent against the war here, to demonstrate
their continued military capability, and to dramatize the inability of
allied forces to prevent them from striking targets of their choice.
While they have succeeded in their objective of increasing US casualties,
the degree of success in attaining other objectives is as yet unclear.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the field commanders are
doing everything possible in South Vietnam within the limits of their
resources to spoil and to counter the enemy's military activity. I
concur generally in this judgment, though it is a point I shall want to
discuss with General Wheeler and General Abrams during my forthcoming
trip to South Vietnam.
In assessing our military activities in South Vietnam (and,
pe aps, in evaluating some of the reasons for the enemy's current
campaign) it is pertinent to remember that. General Abrams has been
operating under instructions to apply maximum possible pressure against
enemy forces. The following table illustrates the high level of effort
being directed against the enemy in South Vietnam.
IL 05
sea Der Cont 'fi'r. X-- --------
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Jan 66
Jan 67
Jan 68
Jan 69
Strength (000)
Allied Forces
909.0
1216.3
1359.8
1641.4
(US Forces)
196.4
403.4
492.9
542.1
(VC/NVA Forces)
235.7
284.7
249.3
231.6
Weekly Average
Bn Days of Opn
445
1119
1270
2136
Combat Deaths
us
64
117
271
179
RVNAF
204
206
327
230
VC/NVA
598
1369
3436
2485
Sorties in.SVN
Attack
2743
3459
4035
3964
B-52
NA
134
152
178
Consumption of
Munitions (000 Tons)
Air
9.2
16.0
20.7
29.3
Ground
5.6
14.3
28.4
23.9
do not know at this time whether there are new military initiatives
which we might take in South Vietnam to cause the enemy to reduce the
intensity of his attacks. That, too, is an issue I shall discuss in South
Vietnam. (We shall, in this regard, continue to analyze the more recent
patterns of military activity vis a vis those of 1968. We have furnished
some comparative data to Dr. Kissinger's staff and will provide more as
it becomes available.)
As I see the matter now, I do not believe we can prevent the enemy
from initiating attacks If he believes it furthers his objectives to do
so. We can make, and have made, difficult and expensive his preparing
for and executing the attacks. It seems possible that a near-term reduc-
tion in the level of hostilities and casualties in Vietnam may result
only from a mutual de-escalation, arrived at either in Paris or de facto
on the ground. The latter is an alternative I will explore during my
visit to Vietnam.
Alternatives
There are several actions which we could take in response to the
increasing enemy initiated attacks in the South which, while having
nominal military importance, would have a psychological impact..
We could take actions that would signal to the North Vietnamese
potential preparations for military action against North Vietnam.
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Such "indicator" actions could range from unmistakable signals such as
moving naval gun ships or a carrier task force into the Gulf of Tonkin
to ambiguous actions such as increasing the level of-our manned recon-
naissance effort or changing the pattern of our tanker orbits. On
February 27th I asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide me their
views on a broad range of such actions. The objective would be to elicit
from the North Vietnamese a diminution of combat activity in South
Vietnam, while still keeping our actual operational activity below a
resumption of attacks against North Vietnamese territory.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned with the increased threat
against allied forces near the DMZ. The Joint Chiefs have requested,
therefore, that COMUSMACV be given authority to take such action in the
southern portion of the DMZ as he deems necessary to protect our forces
south of the DMZ. (MACV now has the authority to strike.with air or
artillery any observed enemy targets in the southern part of the DMZ,
to respond to enemy fire directed against ground forces from any point
in the DMZ or North Vietnam, to conduct squad size ground patrols in the
DMZ with authority to reinforce to platoon size, and to conduct operations
in the southern portion of the DMZ if necessary for the preservation of
allied forces.) I have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for additional
Information on the imminence and magnitude of the military threat and
for their suggestions as to the various ways in which the threat might
.be met.
The intensity of fighting in northern I Corps has diminished greatly
since the bombing halt and the related "understandings." I believe that
is to our benefit. We do not keep separate statistics in Washington for
casualties associated with operations in northern I Corps, but since
November 1st, casualties in all of I Corps, which used to account for
about 600 of all US combat deaths, now account for only about 38%. This
differential would almost certainly be greater if we could delineate
casualties along the DMZ only. I am most reluctant to re-Initiate large-
scale activities in and around the DMZ because I fear that doing so not
only will increase the level of fighting and resulting casualties there
but also will produce intense pressure to resume bombing in North Vietnam,
at least in those areas immediately north of the demarcation line. Resump-
tion of ground activity on our part up to the demarcation line might also
be just the excuse the enemy is looking for to move in force across the
DMZ. That could put our troops in greater jeopardy and/or force redeploy-
ment of our units.
Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, and Admiral McCain (CINCPAC)
concurred in recommending a 96-hour air and naval campaign against North
Vietnam south of 190 in response to the early days of the enemy offensive.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had previously taken a position in support of
a military response to enemy attacks on civilian population centers. I am
impressed with a CIA judgment that Hanoi may well be attempting to provoke
a US retaliation "disproportionate to the provocation," resulting in
"domestic and international criticism of-the US Government and pressures
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for an early settlement." Additionally, CIA suggests that "North Vietnam
would be likely to suspend the Paris talks. Its objective would not be
to break them off permanently, but to use the suspension as an instrument
of pressure for a renewal of negotiations in conditions more favorable
to them." I believe we should continue to take an extremely cautious
attitude toward any resumption of hostilities against the territory of
North Vietnam and that any such action should be thoroughly discussed
with Paris and Saigon, as well as here in Washington before it is under-
taken.
Recommendations
I am leaving for Vietnam on Wednesday morning, March 5. 1 am hopeful
that after my discussions with Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams
I will be in a better position to make specific recommendations to you
regarding actions to be taken in Vietnam. I will be especially interested
in pursuing whether any of the suggested alternatives - or any new
alternatives - might accomplish the purpose of deterring the enemy's
present campaign, and more importantly, what impact they might have in
terms of the Paris negotiations.
Based on some preliminary doubts of the efficacy of the various
military alternatives considered to date, I believe that our efforts and
our thinking should focus once again on Paris negotiations. This should
take place at the highest levels. I note that neither the NSC Review
Group nor the NSC, itself, has Vietnam on its agenda for the next nine
weeks. I believe that staff work on the key aspects of our negotiating
posture in Paris should be begun on a priority basis, and that the
Review Group and the NSC should meet as soon as possible to review the
appropriate papers.
Until we can instruct our negotiators in Paris of our positions on
the most critical elements, specifically our position on withdrawals,
it seems to me that we are not in a position to press ahead with the
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