DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-511-1-7-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 30, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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8717
MEMORANDUM - .
THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Defense Program Review Committee
OSD, NSS,
Review
Completed
In order to areventarepetitaon of f1.e robl;ern hice?h ,e
had .w ka the ,X,71 A get Fas. at_ gqX De efense Depart-
ment expenditures, a basic charter is needed for the Defense
Program. Review Committee. It is requested that you
sign the attached xnexnorax duxn,, which xs, aes gx ed -,parov3. e
&I g4o
TO
ACTION
March 30, 1970
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Ap
THE WHITE HOUSE
APR 21
CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE
This year, I would like to review major defense policy and program
issues when the Defense program is still in its formative stages,
well in advance of the final review of the Defense Department's
budget in December.
I would like the Defense Program Review Committee to assist me
in this review by undertaking immediately a series of studies on
our military posture and forwarding the results to me over the next
six months.
I would like this review to cover the following subjects:
-- a definition and analysis of our overall strategy for general
purpose and theater nuclear forces in relation to the threats we face
and to our interests and commitments;
-- the availability of funds for defense and non-defense programs
over the next five years and potential trade-offs between defense and
non-defense expenditures;
-- an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs
of our general purpose forces in relation to specific military threats,
in particular Army and Marine Corps land forces, carrier-based and
land-based tactical air forces, and anti-submarine warfare forces;
-- an analysis of the actual and projected capabilities and costs
of our strategic nuclear forces in relation to the Soviet and Chinese
threats and to our criteria for strategic sufficiency, including analysis
of U. S. requirements for a manned bomber and for continental air
defense forces;
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-- an analysis of our overall concept and programs for military
research and development in relation to projected requirements for
new weapon systems.
Would you please have the Defense Program Review Committee
prepare terms of reference and a schedule of completion for these
studies and forward them to me for my review by April 10, 1970.
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? MEMORANDUM C `a - r ? ' ?- ? -
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR.. KISSINGER
FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr
SUBJECT: DPRC
March 26, 1970
As you requested, I have prepared a Memorandum for the President:
-- explaining your disagreements with Secretary Laird
concerning the role of the DPRC, and
-- recommending that the President sign a memorandum to
you as Chairman of the DPRC directing that a series of studies
be done.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Defense Program Review Committee (DP
B ackg round
On October 11, 1969 you signed a Nationa ecurity Decision Memo-
randum which directed the formation of t ye Defense Program Review
Committee. (Tab B)
The NSDM states that:
"The Committee will revi r the diplomatic, military, political
and economic consequences issues requiring Presidential determi-
nation that result from;
proposals to chnge defense strategy, programs and budgets,
-- proposals to change U. S. overseas force deployments and
committed forces sed in the U.S., .
-- major 14fense policy and program issues raised by studies
prepared in r sponse to National Security Study Memorandum.
The NSDM urther states that- "Issues will be brought to the attention
of this gr up at the initiation of the addressee agencies or of the
Chairm [the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs].
The central purpose of the DPRC, as I understood your thinking then,
was to insure that major defense policy and program issues were being
examined in a broad foreign policy context throughout the year and, if
necessary, brought to your attention.
If this were done, you would not be confronted with the necessity to
make major defense policy and program decisions. under intense pressure
and without adequate analysis at the end of the annual budget review.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
In the months since the DPRC was formed, there has been an extended
discussion among the agencies concerning how your guidance should be
translated into a specific work program for the DPRC and how the
DPRC itself should function.
Because some important differences of view have emerged, I believe
it would be desirable for you to review them and provide us with a
further indication of the role you want the DPRC to fulfill.
Secretary Laird's Views
Secretary Laird's views on the scope of the DPRC's work are summarized
in his two March 14, 1970 memorandums for me at Tabs C and D. Two
memorandums of mine which he objects are at Tabs E and F.
Secretary Laird notes that there are seven levels of analysis required
for well informed decisions:
I. Overall U. S. Economy - - government vs. private spending
2. Within Government Sector -- federal vs. state vs. local
spending..
3. Among Federal Government Uses -- DOD vs. HEW, etc.
4. Within Defense -- strategic forces vs. general purpose forces
vs. research and development
5. Within a.Given Defense Use -- ICBMs vs. Bombers vs. SLBMs
6. Within a Given System - - Minuteman vs. Titan, etc.
7. Within a Particular Weapon -- warhead vs. guidance vs.
penetration aids, etc.
Secretary Laird's judgment is that 1'The DPRC should . . . address
the optimizations at the first three levels . . . . We have existing
and appropriate arrangements for considering the lower level optimi-
zations. Kr
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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MW
IV
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
The lower level question which Secretary Laird feels are inappro-
priate for the DPRC include, for example, how we should balance
expenditures on-strategic and general purpose forces in light of
the threats and risks we face, requirements for continential air
defense, the future strategic role of a manned bomber, and our
requirements for aircraft carriers and the military and foreign
policy implications of alternative carrier force levels.
My understanding of his rationale is that he wants to be in full control
of his internal force planning process. In the next few months, he
must review each Service's proposals, together with the force plans
of the JCS, and find ways to fit them within the overall budget guidance.
When he has completed his internal review and decided on a five year
plan which is consistent with the budgetary guidance, he will submit
it to the DPRC in September.
In the meantime, he doesn't want an outside Group like the DPRC to
intervene and further complicate an already complicated planning
process.
The Issues
Secretary Laird and I are in complete agreement on four issues:
-- We both believe that systematic analysis of the proper size
and allocation of the Federal budget is badly needed and would be of
great assistance to you in your budget planning.
-- We (and Budget Bureau officials as well) agree that the process
whereby major domestic program decisions are made throughout the
year, whereas the DOD budget is reviewed only near the end of the
budget cycle, may put DOD at a distinct disadvantage: if new domestic
program initiatives taken during the year cause your spending commit-
ments to exceed projected revenue by the time DOD's budget comes
to your attention, DOD may be forced to take disproportinate cuts in
its budget to bring total spending and revenues into balance.
-- We agree that the DPRC should analyze alternative DOD budget
levels in the light of their impact on spending for domestic programs,
on our ability to fulfill our obligations and commitments, and on the
overall capabilities of our military posture. Studies to accomplish these
objectives are already underway.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE W 4
-- We agree that the DPRC should not become involved in
detailed program management or weapons design issues.
Our disagreemen.isare as follows:
-- I do not believe that the DPRC -- the primary function of
which, as I understand it, is to insure balanced and comprehensive
analysis of major Defense policy and program issues -- should
concern itself with analyzing the size and scope of government
activities, the proper level of Federal spending and the allocation of
the Federal budget among DOD and other agencies. The DPRC is
not constituted for these tasks, as it lacks non-defense agency re-
presentation, and I question whether it would be appropriate for me
to oversee this work.
However, at such time as your Domestic Policy Council is in a
position to undertake an analytical presentation of domestic program
"strategies" and their costs, we could join forces with them and
discuss the larger questions Secretary Laird raises with the entire
Cabinet. I see no intellectual obstacles to achieving this within six
months.
-- I believe that, in addition to analyzing our national security
objectives, strategies and overall budgets the DPRC must analyze
major DOD policy and program issues well in advance of the final
budget review.
We cannot analyze the size of the DOD budget in the abstract. It
must be done in the context of specific threats to our security and
our interests, capabilities required to meet these threats at various
levels of risk, and the implications for defense and non-defense
spending of implementing any particular alternative.
For example, in my January 19, 1969, memorandum to which
Secretary Laird is responding, I suggested a work program as
follows
-- Analysis of forces, threats and strategies in relation to
U. S. overseas commitments and policies,
-- Analysis of resources required for defense and relation of
defense budgets to civilian programs and the economy.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
(Secretary Laird and I are in agreement on the need for these
first two studies, and they are underway.)
-- review of U. S. general purpose forces posture;
- review of U. S. strategic posture;
-- future strategic role of manned bombers;
- requirements for aircraft carriers;
In addition, the State Department has proposed a study of our overall
base structure in East Asia.
In my judgment, if s ph analyses could be completed and reviewed by
you during the next tree or four months, you could indicate your
decisions and priorit `es to both DOD and the Budget Bureau well in
advance of the final budget review and foreclose the necessity of
making most major decisions at the last minute without knowledge of
their implications.
Moreover, Secretary Laird would no longer be at the ""end of the line"
.when the final budget review took place..
Equally important, you would have a much better opportunity to shape
our defense posture in accordance with your thinking rather than having
the posture reflect compromises struck among three competing Military
Services. (Many thoughtful military leaders, recognizing that three
Military Departments competing with each other for prestige and scarce
resources can never harmonize their interests, would welcome more
Presidential direction.)
(For example, DOD is now planning the U. S. Army to be about the same
size as it was when the "massive retaliation" doctrine governed our
posture in the 1950s. Furthermore, the greatest part of the sustain-
ing support for the Army will be in the reserves rather than in the
active-forces. Thus, in the future, sustained combat by sizeable
Army forces will require a reserve call-up.
TOP SECRET/SENSTIVE
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SE
SITI
TOP SZCRE'T/
These may well be wise policies in the light of the situation we
expect in the 1970s. However, in view of their implications, I
believe you should have the opportunity to review them and con-
sider the costs, advantages and risks of alternatives.)
RECOMMENDATION
Unfortunately, prolonged discussion has not resolved the disagree
ments.
. -- If you endorse Secretary Laird's view that the DPRC should
concentrate on high level resource allocation decisions, you need do
nothiAg further. I will see to it that the DPRC moves in the proper
directions.
_.. If you endorse my view that the DPRC must analyze major
DOD policy and program issues throughout the year, I recommend
that. you sign the memorandum at Tab A, which states your view of
the DPRC's role and directs that a series of studies be done.
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SECRET
October 11, 1969
National Security Decision Memorandum 26
TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State ?
The Secretary of Defense-
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Office of Emergency
Preparedness
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
The Director. of the Bureau of the Budget
SUBJECT: Defense Program Review Committee
To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct
of national security affairs, I hereby direct the formation, of the
Defense Program Review Committee.
This Committee will review the diplomatic, military, political
and economic consequences of issues requiring Presidential
determination that result from
-.- proposals to change defense strategy, programs and budgets,
-- proposals to change U. S. overseas force deployments and
Committed forces based in the U.S.,
?
-- major defense policy and program issues raised by studies
prepared in response to National Security Study Memorandums.
The Committee will meet as necessary and supervise the preparation
-of issues papers for consideration by the National Security Council.
Issues will be brought to the attention of this group at the initiation
of the addressee agencies or of the Chairman. Studies of defense
SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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policy and program issues undertaken in response to National
Security Study Memorandums will be submitted to the Defense
Program Review Committee prior to NSC consideration rather
.than to the NSC Review Group.
The membership of the Defense Program Review Committee shall
include:
?
The Assistant to the President for National
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
V V V Ki 14S iYliQA i .. % JL'LM11 J.Alq.IAJ
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
-The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall
be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.
SECRET
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C'??SpCi
W
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
14 MAR 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) Working Group
Procedures
As I am indicating in a separate memorandum to you, I am con-
cerned about the role and utilization of the DPRC. It appears the
DPRC may not be addressing the major and critical task for which it
was established. Rather, the DPRC appears to be addressing other
Issues -- of importance, to be sure -- but for which other institu-
tional arrangements for resolution already exist.
We agree, presumably, there is inadequate analysis of the
distribution of resources within the public sector. The following
outline illustrates, using Defense as an example, the chain of allo-
cation decisions which must be made:
Sector and Optimization Level
1. Overall US Economy
2. Within Government Sector
3. Among Federal Govt Uses
4. Within Defense
5. Within a Given Def Use
6. Within a Given System
7. Within a Particular Weapon
00-
Consumer vs. Business vs. Gvt Uses
Federal vs. State vs. Local
Defense vs. HEW vs. Trnsp, etc.
Strategic vs. GenPurp vs. R&D, etc.
ICBMs vs. SLBMs vs. Bombers
MinMan vs. Titan, vs. Other
Warhead vs. Guidance vs. Pen Aids, etc.
The DPRC should, in my judgment, address the optimizations at the
first three levels, as outlined above. We have existing and approp-
riate arrangements for considering the lower-level optimizations. (I
will soon forward to you a proposed DPRC agenda for the next six months.)
Given those fundamentals, I believe it is desirable to reassess the
role and mechanics of a DPRC Working Group. It is not clear a Working
Group, in a formal sense, would be needed.
0 1!PCrge.*ace ;
See tDef ao it Hr. X-., .. ~. ~
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i As you note in your memoranda, DOD will normally be the agency
most concerned with the issues before the DPRC. Under your proposed
procedure, the Working Group would thus usually be. referring its
work to DOD. Given this situation, I believe it is essential that a
DPRC Working Group be chaired by someone within DOD, that is, if
the Working Group is to be maintained. I would designate my Assistant
Secretary for Systems Analysis, Dr. Gardiner Tucker, to direct such
DPRC Staff work.
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w W
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
14 MAR 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC)
I believe that we should carefully reconsider the role of the
DPRC. Your memoranda of January 19 and February 26, 1970 indicate
that we do not share the same views on this subject. I hope we can
fully agree on this issue, because I believe that the DPRC should,
and can, fulfill a critical function which is not being, and which
has never been, performed.
The primary concern of the DPRC should be the allocation of
resources within our economy. The studies would include the allo-
cations between the public and private sectors, within the public
sector, and between defense and other Federal programs.
In considering this problem of overall resource allocation, the
DPRC should examine the following types of questions:
1. The resources available for defense. This would include
studying the total level of overall resources, the availability of
resources to the public sector, and allocations within the public
sector between defense and other needs.
2. Our national security objectives and strategy. We need
a better understanding of the implications of our current strategy
in terms of the broad tasks to be accomplished.
3. The relationships among goals, resource availability and
policy. To meet national security goals, while striving for other
public sector objectives, may require fiscal, monetary, and debt
policies -- even to include controls -- that constitute diminution of
other national goals. We should consider the trade-offs, for example,
among national security, price stability, balance of payments equi-
librium, and the absence of controls.
4. The foreign policy implications of defense actions. If
we cannot meet all obligations within reasonable terms, a variable in
our studies should be reformulation of US interests and commitments.
135
See l of Cont Nr. -_..-......~.~.... .~.
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``11 3
?. i..] a y'
It is unlikely that the DPRC's first iteration of our national
goals and the resources available to meet them will be perfectly
balanced. The DPRC should be prepared to examine alternative levels
of funding for defense, including possible reallocations from other
public programs or from the private sector of the economy. Several
iterations may be necessary to provide the NSC, and the President,
with a satisfactory array of options.
The job outlined above is, in my judgment, critical to national
planning elsewhere in Government and especially to logical Defense
planning. But the job is not being done. It was my understanding
the DPRC was established specifically for this purpose. It is the
task outlined for the DPRC in the President's Foreign Policy Report
to Congress. To do the job responsibly will be a major task, occupy-
ing the full time and talent now available to the DPRC.
After the President has decided upon strategies and resources
for defense, I believe it is my responsibility to provide the forces
which implement these decisions. The DPRC should not be distracted
from this role by lesser issues such as the future role of strategic
bombers, requirements for aircraft carriers, and continental air
defense.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
January 19, 1970
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Establishment of Defense Program Review Committee
Working Group
Based on our prior discussions and the presentation to us at our last
meeting of the draft Fiscal Guidance for the Defense Department, the
agenda for the Defense Program Review Committee for the coming
months should include:
General issues;
-- Analysi;; of FI rces,Threats, and Strategies in Relation to
.
U. S. Overseas Commitments and Policies;
-- Analysis of Resources Required for Defense and Relation of
Defense Budget: to Civilian Programs and thc: Economy;
Review of U. S. General Purposes Forces Postures;
Review of U. S. Strategic Posture.
Specific issues.:
-- Future ;strategic Role of Manned Bombers;
Requirements for Aircraft Carriers;
Contine::ital Air Defense.
These issues, together with any other issues suggested by naembersof the
Committee, will be considered by the DPRC during the period prior to
the submission by the Defense Department in September of their Five
Year Force and Program Plan for FY 72-76.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
It is essential that the Committee have a regular procedure for
organizing and preparing for its consideration of these issues.
To that end, the President. has directed that the Defense Program
Review Committee establish a Working Group to assist it in its work.
This Working Group will be chaired by a representative of the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and will
include a representative of each regular member of the Committee.
The responsibility of the Working Group will be the preparation,
prior to DPRC consideration of an issue, of a paper which will :
set forth and analyze the issue or problem;
.._ state w'.th precision any differences of views within the
Government anc' the reasons therefore;
-- present the options available to the President, indicating
in summary form their advantages and disadvantages.
The Working Group will be responsible for organizing and supervising
whatever studies and analyses are required for the preparation of the
DPRC papers, drawing on the participating agencies for staff support.
Please let me have the name of your representative on the Working
Group by January 23, 1970.
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
. ? February 26, 1970
MEMORANDUM FC'R
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
SUBJECT: Defease Program Review Committee Working Group
Procedures
I have designated D:r. Laurence E. Lynn as my representative to, and
chairman of, the Working Group.
These procedures will govern the functions of th,: Working Group:
-- The DPRC, normally after receiving a proposal or presenta-
tion from the Defense Department will identify IE sues requiring further
consideration and will refer them to the Working Group.
-- The Working Group will assign the agency most concerned,
usually the Departrr..ent of Defense, or, if approl riate, an interagency
team, the task of pi eparing an initial paper. For example, the Defense
Department Repres,:ntative would normally prepare papers on issues
_.involving force levels or weapons systems, anal'-zing the issue and
setting forth the DOD position, or the alternative s among which it
recommends that choice be made.
-- The Work:.ng Group will then review tho paper for completeness,
adequate presentation of differing views, and inclusion of an adequate
range of alternatives.
-- After necc.ssary revisions, the paper will be forwarded to the
DPRC for discussio.i. ?
f1
Henry.A. Kissinger l 4
SECRET ;
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