MEETING OF WSAG PRINCIPALS, FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1970

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
December 15, 2010
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 30, 1970
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1.pdf155.95 KB
Body: 
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE April 30, 1970. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER FROM: Richard T. Kennedy SUBJECT: Meeting, of WSAG' Principals, Friday, May 1, 1970 The talking points which follow cover (1) the Base Area 352/353 Operation (Shoemaker - Toan Thang), (2) the Parrot's Beak Operation, and (3).Military Assistance to Cambodia. The Attack On Base Areas 352/353 (Operation Shoemaker Toan Thang) The Attack --- The attack was scheduled to begin at 7:30 PM Washington time U last night. You might ask General Wheeler to brief on the situation. -- Has the attack gone as planned? Have we reached initial objectives? V What has been enemy reaction? Press Reaction State Department, OSD, NSC, Army review(s) completed. -- What pressure are the Departments getting for additional informa- tion? (The pressure probably will build during the day looking for U. S. units involved, casualties and indications of additional operations. ) -- How is the press playing the President's rationale? --.What has MACV said in Saigon? (General Wheeler thould be able to summarize MACV's statements for the press. ) Is our scenario for further briefings and statements complete? (Ziegler, Henken and McCloskey were preparing a scenario. You had asked that statements and briefings be held to a rni.n.imum for 4.4 hours following the President's speech. ) TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE _ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1 TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE What was Lon Nol's'reaction when informed by Rives? (Ambassador Johnson should be able to report. ) -- Has Indonesia reacted favorably? (Before the speech Suharto and Malik had indicated that they understood our position, recognized the need to give military assistance to Cambodia, 11 and were going ahead with their plans for the Asian conference. -- Has the speech and the new attack changed their position? (Ambassador Johnson should be able to report. ) countries? -- Has there been any reaction from the troop contributing -- Have we had any reaction from others including the UN? (Ambassador Johnson should be able to speak to the above questions. ) What is the reaction from Moscow and Peking? 2. Parrot's Beak Operation. (Rock Crusher) The Attack -- The operation is now in its third day. You might ask General Wheeler to brief on the situation, Is the operation still going according to plan? What results are they having? (enemy killed or captured, caches uncovered?) Has U. S. Tactical Air been employed in this operation? Enemy Reaction -- Has there been any North Vietnamese reaction to this attack and to the attack against Base Areas 352/353? -- Is there any evidence that the enemy is moving forces into these areas or are they 'withdrawing from them? Has Hanoi made any statement on the. new situation? TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE _,_; No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1 3. Military Assistance to Cambodia TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE At yesterday's meeting all agreed that we were shipping weapons and ammunition to Phnom. Penh about as fast as the Cambodians could receive and effectively use them. An additional 100, 000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition has been located in Okinawa and is being shipped to Saigon for delivery to Phnom Penh. Delivery of 3, 000 carbines and ammunition is underway -- the remainder of the 15, 000 will be shipped in increments over the next week or two. President Thieu, when he approved the use of GVN aircraft for delivery of the last shipment of AK-47's, asked that there be no publicity. This is very hard to control. Is there anything more we should do with Thieu to avoid a possible interruption of deliveries? - Should we consider delivery using U. S. aircraft if the GVN air assets are not adequate or if Thieu holds up shipments? (We believe it would be preferable to use U. S. air assets to provide airlift for the GVN in South Vietnam, thus freeing GVN aircraft for the Phnom Penh mission. If Thieu were to hold up shipments, however, we could use unmarked U. S. aircraft.) Khmer Krom -- MACV has completed planning for the movement of the Khmer Krom to Phnom. Penh. The first increment was to rfiove today. -- Has the movement begun? TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-522-6-4-1